BEF Campaign on the Aisne 1914

by Jerry Murland

  The Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, held a simple view of defence: ‘A battle is defensive’, he opined, ‘if we await the attack – await, that is, the appearance of the enemy in front of our lines and within range’.33 But while he makes the point that defensive warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive, he goes on to say that, ‘it would contradict the idea of war to regard defence as its final purpose’. His treatise on defence, which he put together in the early nineteenth century, may almost have been written with the Aisne in mind:

  ‘It is self evident that it is the defender who primarily benefits from the terrain. His superior ability to produce surprise by virtue of the strength and direction of his own attack stems from the fact that the attack has to approach on roads and paths on which it can easily be observed; the defender’s position, on the other hand, is concealed and virtually invisible to his opponent.’34

  Of course students of Clausewitz were not confined to the German Army, despite the optimism of British GHQ with regard to the retiring Germans. There were several individuals marching towards the Aisne who had already come to the same conclusions as the German strategists: if the German Army could hold its position along the heights of the Aisne Valley it would be in a very strong position to parry the blow which was approaching and perhaps build on their defensive positions by transforming defence into a new offensive action.

  By nightfall on 12 September the pursuit of the German Army had effectively been concluded; its units were across the Aisne and consolidating their positions north of the river. Hauptmann Walter Bloem’s account confirms that the German 10 Infantry Brigade crossed the Aisne on 12 September near Soissons and marched via Bucy-le-Long up the valley to Chivres, where it was informed of the intention to reform on the northern heights of the Aisne valley.35 The brigade had marched with von Kluck’s First Army since it had left Frankfurt on 7 August 1914. Between 17 August and 12 September it had marched over 400 miles through Belgium and France with very little, if any, respite. Bloem, a reserve officer with the 12th Brandenburg Grenadiers, had already encountered the BEF at Mons on 23 August where his battalion had been severely mauled by 1/Royal West Kents and 2/KOSB at St Gillian. After Mons the battalion had marched continuously, almost to within sight of Paris. ‘For three whole weeks’, wrote Bloem, ‘we had not a single rest day, nor the suggestion of one’. At the conclusion of the battles on the Marne in early September, Bloem’s battalion had been reduced to two composite companies, yet regardless of the casualties and the fatigue it was still with a sense of disbelief that they received their orders to retreat:

  ‘At breakfast the next morning came a curious order which further depressed our sorely tried spirits: The regiment will assemble at 7am in the hollow north of Sancy, facing north. North! Backwards in fact! … The men are to be told that the future movements of the corps are in no way to be regarded as a retreat.’36

  It is unlikely that Bloem and his men had any inkling of the potentially serious nature of the yawning gap which still existed between von Kluck and von Bülow, a gap which on 13 September ran from the eastern village of Berry au Bac to Ostel in the west. Although it was a gap in the defences it was one which was hardly wide open; thrust into the break were three weakened divisions from the 2nd Cavalry Corps under the command of General Georg von der Marwitz.

  Although these thinly-spread German units were all that stood between the advancing Allied armies and disaster, they did have the advantage of terrain and a strong defensive position behind them. However, if the gap could not be held – and the line were to be successfully pierced and exploited by the enemy – then the retreat would in all probability have to continue, the effects of which could easily spell the end of German ambitions in France. In spite of the seriousness of the situation von der Marwitz could spare very few troops to defend this vital piece of ground. The 5th Cavalry Division had already been detached to the Third Army and the 4th Cavalry Division was on the right flank of the First Army northeast of Rethondes at Tracey le Mont. However, by nightfall on 12 September both the 2nd and the 9th Cavalry Divisions were in place north of the Chemin des Dames – the 2nd at Filain and the 9th at Chavignon – while the Jäger battalions of von Richthofen’s 1st Cavalry Corps were under the command of III Corps to the north of Condé and at Vailly.

  Nonetheless, to fully appreciate the extent of the troop movements required to reinforce the defences on the Aisne we must return briefly to 7 September when von Bülow pulled back his right flank behind the Petit Morin River and in effect increased the gap between himself and von Kluck. The response from OHL was to order the German XV Corps and the 7th Cavalry Division from the German left in Alsace to move post-haste to the extreme right of the German advance to outflank the French Sixth Army which was threatening von Kluck. Ordered to join them, and form the nucleus of a new German Seventh Army was the VII Reserve Corps, consisting of the 13th and 14th Reserve Infantry Divisions, which had been laying siege to Maubeuge.

  The retreat of the BEF and the French Fifth Army after the Battle of Mons in August had left the fortress at Maubeuge and its important railway junction isolated. The town sat close to the border between Belgium and France on the River Sambre and was defended by fifteen forts and gun batteries totalling some 435 guns. The permanent garrison of 35,000 troops was initially strengthened by its selection as the advance base of the BEF but with the subsequent retreat of the BEF and the French Fifth Army on 23 August 1914, the town came under siege by the Germans on 25 August. Initially it was thought the garrison might delay the German advance but instead, in keeping with the timetable demands of the Schlieffen Plan, von Bülow detached General Hans von Zwehl and VII Reserve Corps to besiege Maubeuge, leaving the remainder of the army to continue the advance into France. The bombardment of the forts surrounding Maubeuge began a few days later on 29 August and by 5 September the heavy artillery of VII Reserve Corps had reduced four of the key forts to rubble and broken the outer ring of defence. Two days later the garrison surrendered.

  The 63-year-old Hans von Zwehl had been recalled from retirement to command the VII Reserve Corps in 1914. During his career, which began in December 1870, he had commanded both 30 Infantry Brigade and the 13th Infantry Division and despite his age was still a formidable commander. Initially von Zwehl had been under orders to move towards Antwerp when three battalions of British marines had been landed at Ostend on 27 and 28 August as part of the ill-fated operation to relieve the beleaguered port. But with the crisis developing on the Marne these orders had been rescinded and, leaving five battalions to garrison Maubeuge, the remainder of VII Corps departed on 10 September to march to La Fère where it was to join the Seventh Army.37 Events on the Aisne conspired to alter these orders yet again. At 9.40am on 12 September, VII Reserve Corps was redirected to Laon which von Zwehl’s Corps reached at 6.00am on the morning of 13 September, rested for three hours – during which time its commander was appraised of the situation on the Aisne – and completed the final 12 miles to the Chemin des Dames. During the course of 13 September von Zwehl’s men had marched over 40 miles and lost some twenty-five percent of its strength to fatigue.

  Captured documents give us some idea of the relentless nature and urgency of the march south; the war diary of the adjutant of the 3rd Battalion of the German Reserve Infantry Regiment 53 (3/RIR 53) places the 14th Reserve Division 1 kilometre south of Crecy-sur-Serre at midnight on 12 September. Having had very little sleep during the previous twenty-four hours the battalion was once more on the road at 12.50am on the morning of 13 September en route for Laon:

  ‘The 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment followed by Machine Gun Company advance to within 1 kilometre south of Montigny where it joins up with the 16th Infantry Regiment. Order of dress – sturm anzug (storming order). Iron rations and all cartridges. March via Chery-les-Pouilly-Laon-Festieux. Halt 10.11 at Bievry-Montberault-Chamouille. Division to be placed in a position of readiness on the heights of Chamomile.’38

  OHL had
placed von Bülow in overall command of the First and Second Armies as well as the Seventh; his orders were for the VII Reserve Corps to move with all speed into the gap on the left of the First Army. Leaving Laon, von Zwehl’s Corps moved southwest towards Chavonne, the 13th Reserve Division deployed towards Braye-en-Laonnois and the 14th Reserve Division to Cerny. Yet another change of orders issued at 11.00 am on 13 September ordering the VII Reserve Corps to Berry-au-Bac where the right of von Bülow’s Second Army was being threatened by the French, provides a further snapshot of the anxiety which was still prevalent at von Bülow’s HQ. It was – unfortunately for the British – an order which von Zwehl chose to ignore. As far as he was concerned his troops were far too committed to change direction.

  By 2.00pm the majority of the German 13th Reserve Division was in position along the Chemin des Dames northeast of Braye, the adjutant of 3/RIR 53, whose battalion formed part of 27 Reserve Brigade, found himself approaching Cerny with, ‘11th Company as advanced guard and Machine Gun Company, main body of 10th Company, 2 batteries of Field Artillery Regiment, 9th and 12th Companies’. That afternoon 25 Landwehr Brigade – which according to General Maximilian von Poseck,39 the 2nd Cavalry Division had ‘picked up retiring from the direction of Bourg’ – joined them along with 1,200 reinforcements which had been intended for the Second Army’s X Corps in addition to a horse artillery Abteilung from the 9th Cavalry Division.40 Thus by the afternoon of 13 September the crisis on the Aisne was practically over for the German Army. Moreover, on the same day Belgian operations emanating from Antwerp had come to an end with the Belgian Field Army retiring into and taking cover behind the city’s defences which in effect released Berthold von Deimling’s XV and Max von Boehm’s IX Reserve Corps for immediate duty on the Aisne.

  RFC reconnaissance flights on 13 September were again hampered by poor weather but Captain Shephard and Lieutenant Kenlis Atkinson from 4 Squadron based at Saponay, northwest of Fère-en-Tardenois, managed to get airborne despite the, ‘tremendous gale and low cloud’, with the intention of observing the fighting east of Soissons, but it was to be a short flight as the wind proved to be to strong for the flimsy BE2, forcing them down near Orme. There was more success later when Atkinson was again observing with George Raleigh and this time they were airborne for ‘a little over an hour and saw the whole German position, no emplacements yet dug, so they are just getting into it’. Unfortunately whilst over Cerny, Raleigh accidentally switched the engine off, forcing them to glide down and land at Revillon where they found a brigade of French infantry which, much to their relief, ‘did not fire … but were very nice to us’. What Raleigh and Atkinson had probably seen was the vanguard units of the German VII Reserve Corps arriving and preparing positions on the Chemin des Dames; not only had the gap been closed but it had also been strengthened by relatively fresh troops which had not taken part in the retreat from the Marne.

  The question inevitably arises; how close did the British and French come to exploiting the gap and establishing themselves firmly on the Chemin des Dames? The Official History tells us that there was a difference of some two hours between the first units of VII Reserve Corps arriving and the initial contact with British cavalry patrols. This may very well be the case but as I Corps was in no position to advance at the time it is of little consequence. Despite the reconnaissance report from 4 Squadron, which presumably reached GHQ at Fère-en-Tardenois sometime on 13 September, it was obviously still not clear to Sir John French that German troop movements from the north had in fact reinforced von der Marwitz. A further indication of substantial German troop movements had been observed on 12 September by two pilots from 2 Squadron who were forced to land behind enemy lines in a small field near Anizy-le-Château after their machine developed a fault. Incredibly Lieutenants Leonard Dawes and Wilfred Freeman landed their damaged aircraft between two large German columns which were on the roads either side of them and hid until nightfall in a nearby wood. Evading capture they navigated across country and swam the river eventually returning to their unit on 14 September, by which time the intelligence they had to report was of little use. If – as was probable – they had observed fresh units moving towards the Aisne and successfully reported their information it may well have encouraged I Corps to press forward with more haste on 13 September.

  However, British intelligence on 13 September, devoid of the 2 Squadron report, suggested that the gap had not been substantially reinforced and there was little in front of I Corps but a strong force of cavalry and five batteries entrenched on the Chemin des Dames. Up until lunchtime this estimate was essentially correct, which together with the news that the French 35th Division had crossed the Aisne at Pontavert and that Conneau’s cavalry were already pressing the enemy at the eastern end of the Chemin des Dames, made the possibility of a break-through a realistic prospect to Douglas Haig at I Corps HQ.

  It was not to be. By 1.00pm on 13 September the advance guard of Haig’s I Corps – 2 Infantry Brigade – had reached the top of the spur north of Bourg enabling patrols from C Squadron, 15/Hussars, to press on beyond Moulins and Vendresse and to reconnoitre towards the Chemin des Dames. Major Frederick Pilkington soon reported contact with the enemy in the form of, ‘large numbers north of Vendresse with artillery in position’. Later that afternoon another RFC reconnaissance flight sighted German columns moving towards Bourg from the direction of Chivy and, potentially more worrying for GHQ, the concentration of yet more enemy forces north of Courtecon. This time there could be no doubt that a fresh army corps was moving towards the Aisne and that substantial troop movements were taking place along the Chemin des Dames. Major Archibald ‘Sally’ Home was at Troyon on 13 September with 2 Cavalry Brigade and recalled seeing ‘masses of German cavalry moving all along the skyline on the main Rheims-Soissons road, we watched them for about two or three hours and estimated them to be a strong division’. He does not put a time on these observations but they may very well have been units of the 2nd and 9th German Cavalry Divisions.

  The war diary of I Corps on 14 September indicates that the I Corps divisional commanders were aware that RIR 56 and RIR 53 were in position in the ‘Cerny-Troyon neighbourhood’ together with two Landwehr regiments, but it would not be for some days before the complete picture of German forces opposing them on the Chemin des Dames became apparent.41 What was not clear to the British at the time was the extent to which German units were being trawled from elsewhere and diverted towards the Aisne in order to bolster the forces already engaged along the Chemin des Dames. Consequently it was the arrival of fresh German units such as the mixed detachment from von Kirchbach’s XII Saxon Reserve Corps, 50 Brigade from the Fourth Army’s XVIII Corps and the five battalions from von Deimling’s XV Corps which would finally put an end to any hopes of a breakthrough.

  The strength of German forces facing Smith-Dorrien’s II Corps was never in doubt. Von Lochow’s III Corps consisting of the 5th and 6th Infantry Divisions and 34 Brigade from IX Corps with two field artillery brigades were firmly in position by last light on 13 September; whilst in front of the British 4th Division the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions of von Linsingen’s II Corps, supported by 3 and 4 Artillery Brigades, were digging in above Bucy-le-Long. Overall this was still a formidable fighting force and despite the attrition of the previous weeks there were at least 100 – albeit under strength – German infantry battalions opposing the seventy-two tired and weakened infantry battalions of the BEF, a figure which would only be increased to eighty-four with the arrival of the 6th Division on 19 September.

  Von Bülow was now nominally back in charge on the German side and this time he was clearly on the offensive. His orders for 14 September were for a general attack to consolidate the line of his three armies with the end result of pushing the Allied armies back over the Aisne. Even so, there was still doubt at OHL as to the successful outcome of the decision to stand and fight on the Aisne heights. Von Bülow entered the fray on 14 September with the OHL directive still on hi
s desk: ‘If the First Army cannot hold the Aisne valley, it should retire in good time in the general direction of La Fère, behind the river valley’.

  Chapter 4

  Bridges over Troubled Waters

  The temporary pontoon bridge the Engineers had put up, further down the river, had just been blown up by a shell, and the only way for me was the canvas raft which, by chance, might still be intact.

  Captain Robert Dolbey – describing his passage across the Aisne.

  At 4.30am on 11 September, after completing their mammoth task of bridging the Marne at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, the officers and men of 9/Field Company together with their weary contemporaries in 7/Field Company were told to lift their bridging equipment and move to the head of the 4th Division column in order to be available to bridge the Aisne should it be necessary. It was another case of divisional staff officers writing out orders and expecting them to take effect immediately. The sappers were quite used to this by now, during the retreat orders and counter-orders had, on more than one occasion, placed them in some considerable danger. More to the point perhaps, was that often many of these orders were very confusing and despite the high level of complaints from senior RE officers, the staff at divisional level still failed to align the vital work of bridging with the movement of troops.

  As Lieutenant Bernard Young and his colleagues well knew, marching with all their equipment to catch up with and then attempt to pass the divisional column was ‘no light undertaking’. Not only did they have to share the road with numerous motorised supply columns, which inevitably overtook them and then met them again on their return journey, but also there were also ambulance convoys to pass before they came into contact with the main body of marching troops which made up the 4th Division. A division on the march in 1914 occupied some 15 miles of road and included over 5,000 horses and seventy or more artillery pieces – and that was without including the slow-moving divisional ammunition column which took up another one and a half miles of road. Add to this sundry other forms of transport which seemed to attach itself to divisional columns and which contributed to, ‘making life extremely difficult for everyone’ and some perception of the task facing the engineers begins to emerge. Is it any wonder that Young later suggested – rather politely in the circumstances – that the bright spark who had opined that, ‘bridging equipment should be kept well to the rear and rushed up in lorries when wanted,’ should have tried the exercise for himself, particularly as lorries never seemed to be available!