BEF Campaign on the Aisne 1914

by Jerry Murland

  Onslow remembered ‘a journey in a motor lorry of about fifteen miles’ before he was put onto an ambulance train at Ouchly-le-Château, arriving at St Nazaire on 19 September. Onslow was in all probability at the farm on the day Jim Pennyman arrived in a 13/Field Ambulance wagon:

  ‘We crossed the Aisne somewhere by a pontoon bridge and fetched up at a large farm called Pont-de-Soissons (sic) in the early morning. I recognized it as a place we had been to on the previous Saturday (12th). I lay there all the morning and was given a glass of egg and milk to comfort me. Our heavies were shooting from a place close to the farm – very inconsiderate of them, as shells aimed back might easily have hit us.’99

  Pennyman was also taken by what he described as a ‘springless motor lorry’ to the railhead at Oulchy and arrived at Number 8 Clearing hospital at Rouen late on 19 September.

  As far as the Chivres spur was concerned it had become very apparent that its capture was beyond the current strength of the BEF. To the left and right of the British front the French were also in the same position and as the 5th Division commenced its consolidation of the line it clung to from Missy to Ste Marguerite, the battle entered a new phase.

  Chapter 7

  The Centre Right – 3rd Division

  I slowly raised my head to see that the shell had exploded precisely over the hollow and killed every one of the wounded.

  Corporal John Lucy – There’s a Devil in the Drum

  Between Missy and the 3rd Division bridgehead at Vailly the Condé salient drove a dangerous wedge through the British front. Originally allocated to the 5th Division as one of two crossing points over the river, the reader will recall that the bridge at Condé was discovered to be intact on 12 September by a patrol of 4/Hussars led by Captain John Gatacre. A hail of fire from the northern end of the bridge greeted his patrol as they had crossed over the River Vesle and headed towards the road bridge over the Aisne. At the time the approaches to the Condé bridge were said to be too exposed and the bridge too heavily defended to allow a direct infantry assault. From all accounts it would seem that this was never actually put to the test and the bridge remained in German hands for the whole of the British campaign, something which Douglas Haig – on hearing the bridge had not been taken – felt required an explanation. The terse note in his diary regarding ‘the action of the 2nd Corps and particularly the 3rd Division (H Hamilton) on 13th September, will want a lot of explaining’, was probably aimed at Simth–Dorrien’s failure to secure the Condé Bridge. Bearing in mind the location of the bridge in relation to the Condé spur he did have a point!

  At Vailly, Second Lieutenant Cyril Martin’s reconnaissance had established that the bridge spanning the Canal Latéral was intact but the river bridge was badly damaged and the light railway bridge a mile upstream destroyed. Nevertheless the 3rd Division began to negotiate the river crossing on 13 September using a single plank to span the gap which the Germans – according to the Official History – had apparently left behind. The high ground north of Vailly is divided by the Jouy Valley up which the D14 now runs to join the N2. On the left of the D14 is the Jouy spur and on the right, the larger Ostel spur with the St Précord spur running south from La Rouge Maison Farm. Hamilton’s plan of attack for the 3rd Division was to keep McCracken’s 7 Infantry Brigade in reserve and deploy Doran’s 8 Brigade to advance up the Jouy spur and Shaw’s 9 Brigade to the Ostel spur, where it was hoped to join up with the left of the 2nd Division advancing north from La Cour Soupir Farm.

  Yet even before 8 Infantry Brigade had reached the river they came under fire from German batteries. Arriving at Chassemy, which overlooked the river below, German gunners were quick to greet them with a heavy barrage. Despite the grey and wet start to the day, the single road – the D14 – which led down to the bridge at Vailly was clearly visible to the Germans on the Chivres spur and as the 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Regiment (2/Royal Irish) left the security of the wooded slopes they came under shell fire sometime after 8.15am. 26-year-old Lieutenant Frederick Rushton immediately ordered his men to take cover on either side of the road, noting that, ‘a battery of our guns took up a position in [the] wood in rear of open space. Enemy shelling the edge of wood steadily. Range absolutely correct. Each shell overhead, bursting in rear’. The British battery seen by Rushton and his men was 49/Battery from XL Brigade which had unlimbered, not in the wood, but in the open and commenced firing across the valley. All too soon it was silenced by the greater fire power of the German howitzer batteries, putting two guns out of action and forcing the gunners to abandon the guns, or as Frederick Rushton rather benevolently put it, ‘our gunners have moved back, leaving [the] guns ready to fire when required’.100

  At 10.00am, under the cover of the guns of 48/Heavy Battery which had come into action north of Brenelle, the 2nd Battalion Royal Scots (2/Royal Scots) began working its way downhill through the woods to the right of the road to reach the canal a little to the east of the bridge. It was followed by the Royal Irish and the 4th Battalion Middlesex Regiment (4/Middlesex), all of which were successfully over the river and established on the other side by 4.00pm on 13 September. It is worth noting here that 8 Brigade was without the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders, which had suffered badly at Le Cateau on 26 August, losing over 700 officers and men killed or taken prisoner and in the process practically ceasing to exist as a battalion. It was only at the end of September that the battalion attained its full strength again and rejoined the brigade.101

  After dark, Shaw’s 9 Infantry Brigade crossed the river. The 1st Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment (1/Lincolns) historian described the passage which took place in the pouring rain:

  ‘It was near midnight before the Lincolnshire began their hazardous crossing. The advance was by sections, each section first crossing the bridge over the canal and then over the single plank spanning the gap in the broken bridge over the river in single file. A false step left or right would have meant certain death from drowning. Every now and then a bursting shell would throw the weird scene into prominence but not a single man was hit, neither did anyone fall into the river. Progress was very slow, but once across the men had to double several hundred yards to where the battalion was forming. When the last man had joined, the battalion marched off through the town of Vailly at a rapid pace and wheeled right up a narrow lane and then across a large tract of cultivated land on to a high ridge to the southwest of Rouge Maison Farm.’102

  The crossing, ‘took the best part of two hours and we had a weary wait in the pitch darkness’, wrote Captain Gerard Kempthorne, the medical officer attached to the battalion. As the battalion moved up above Vailly onto the southern slopes of the Ostel spur they found themselves in what Kempthorne described as a, ‘vast turnip field’ where they found the men of the 4th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, (4/Royal Fusiliers) already in place having completed their crossing by 11.30pm. The Lincolns extended the line to the left of La Rouge Maison Farm and the medical officer and his team dug in behind the firing line alongside one of the A Company platoons:

  ‘We were in a trench with about 30 men, all cold, hungry, and shivering and caked with mud from head to foot. The ground rose a little, 100 yards in front of us, and all that was to be seen was wet turnips, on either side, and to the rear.’103

  At dawn on 14 September two companies of the Royal Scots advanced up the Jouy spur through the mist and rain with the Royal Irish on their left and the Middlesex on the right. Artillery support, such as it was, provided little to assist the advance and as the Royal Scots historian remarked, ‘the German fire by this time was positively murderous’.104 The German trenches were on the reverse slope of the crest and as soon as the British troops came into range they were effectively stopped in their tracks by machine-gun and artillery fire. Major Hamilton Finch, advancing with the Middlesex, was alarmed to find they were, ‘for a short period under fire from several directions’, as German machine-gun teams managed to establish a firing line on the British flanks. ‘An effort was made
by some to take their machine guns’, wrote Finch, ‘but it was a hopeless attempt and our men got back with wonderfully few casualties’. B Company of the Royal Irish found themselves involved in heavy fighting in the wooded slopes and shortly after being reinforced by half of A Company, Lieutenant Frederick Rushton was killed at the head of his platoon. Pushed back, the Royal Irish took up a new position on the minor road running east of Vauxelles towards Vailly, with the Royal Scots and the Middlesex on their left.

  The lack of fire power offered by the attacking 8 Brigade would certainly have given encouragement to the German counter-attack which was launched just before 9.00am. It was well timed and the British were in no position to respond effectively, although they did manage to hold on for close to an hour; long enough for the enemy attack to peter out. At around 10.00am the brigade began to fall back. Major Finch’s account:

  ‘Now came the moment for us to retire, and this might have been a very unpleasant experience as the enemy’s guns were very busily at work on the bend of the road we had to follow before we could get on the high ground. However, we reached another ridge with, I believe, no casualties, by doubling round the bend at about 20 paces interval. The order then came that we were to hold on there (on the north side of the river) at all costs; this was about 4.00pm.’105

  In many ways the attack had had little chance of success from the outset. On 14 September 8 Brigade had to rely very much on the fire power from its rifle companies as the three battalions had not a single machine gun available between them.106 Moreover, the combined manpower of the three battalions only numbered some 1,500 officers and men, a state of affairs which can be traced directly to the brigade’s action in the Nimy salient at Mons on 23 August and the subsequent encounters at Le Cateau and on the Marne. At Nimy the Middlesex and the Royal Irish had fought a desperate rearguard action as they had retired towards Cuesmes – which incidentally was held by 1/Lincolns – both regiments losing heavily in the process. Le Cateau further depleted the ranks with the loss of the Gordon Highlanders, as did the rigours of the retreat. It was only after the arrival of the 1st Battalion of the Devonshire Regiment (1/Devons) on 15 September that the brigade could put two machine guns in the firing line! Little wonder then that the attack on the Jouy spur failed.

  On the Ostel spur at La Rouge Maison Farm the morning mist had concealed the presence of the German positions which were only 600 yards away just below the crest of the ridge. It was from these trenches that the German attack was launched at 7.30am. Somewhat taken aback by the ferocity of the supporting shell and machine-gun fire, the appearance of waves of enemy infantry initially put the British on the back foot, prompting Brigadier General Shaw to reinforce the line with the Northumberland Fusiliers and the three battalions – although ordered to counter attack – were eventually pushed back almost to the edge of the spur. Throughout the morning the Germans continued the attack; wave after wave advancing against the British line. According to the Royal Fusiliers’ war diary, they managed to hold their sector of the line for ‘some time’ until the regiment on the right gave way, forcing them to retire to a sunken road about 200 yards south of La Rouge Maison Farm. The regiment in question was 1/Lincolns which had come under attack from German machine gunners who had managed to get into La Rouge Maison Farm and were pouring heavy fire into A and C Companies. At the same time German infantry were attacking their right flank from the woods near Folemprise Farm. It was an unenviable position.

  Calling for support, four companies of Royal Scots Fusiliers – two companies to the right flank and two to the left – were ordered up to the firing line. Advancing through turnip fields on the right of the besieged Lincolns, the Scots came under heavy machine-gun fire from the woods on their right flank, which, in the absence of supporting fire from the British artillery, eventually forced Captain George Briggs to order a gradual withdrawal. Tragically Briggs was killed during the retirement along with seven other ranks, the battalion recording sixty-seven wounded and ninety missing. It had been a costly morning for the Scotsmen.107

  Exactly when the Lincolns retired is unclear, the battalion war diary covers the whole action in eight lines but notes that 7 officers and 184 other ranks were reported as killed, wounded or missing. Kempthorne’s diary sheds some light on the story at the point the Lincolns began to pull back:

  ‘After a time it became obvious our flank was threatened as the bullets began to hit the traverses instead of the parapet and we had to pull our wounded under their protection. Then I saw a section of our men retiring … but we hung on, and continued our work, till to my disgust I sighted the whole German line advancing over the skyline 200 yards away. It was obviously hopeless to make a bolt in the open over slippery turnips and still clay so we carried on. When they were about 50 yards off I climbed out of the trench brandishing a very dirty handkerchief and they made no attempt to fire on me. By this time the brigade must have made good their retreat down the line to the river for all was quiet.’108

  Simpson, in his history of the Lincolnshire Regiment, confirms that the battalion not only retired to Vailly but continued over the river crossing by the light railway bridge! No mention of this retirement is made in the war diary or in the Official History although there is a short reference to British soldiers from 9 Brigade, ‘filing back over the narrow passage towards the southern bank’.109

  The situation had now become critical. With the retirement of the Lincolns, the right flank of 9 Infantry Brigade was wide open, increasing the gap between them and the left of the 2nd Division on the spur above Soupir to a distance of one and a half miles. To add to British woes the Guards Brigade along with the Connaught Rangers at Cour de Soupir Farm came under a furious attack which began at 10.30am and threatened to push the division back to the river. As far as the 3rd Division was concerned the mist and fog which clung to the hillsides had rendered the artillery batteries on the southern heights of the river practically useless for a large part of the day and at this point in the battle there was a real possibility of a strong German counter attack splitting I Corps on the right flank from the remainder of the BEF. Hamilton was now in need of his reserves but the only troops that were on the northern side of the river and available to plug the gap were those of 5 Cavalry Brigade who had crossed early that morning and were now at Vailly. Infantry reserves in the form of McCracken’s 7 Brigade were still in the process of crossing the river.

  On 13 September the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades had been formed into 2nd Cavalry Division under the command of Major General Hubert de la Poer Gough.110 ‘Goughie’, as he was universally known, had demonstrated his maverick streak during the retreat from Mons when he had all but detached himself from Major General Edmund Allenby’s command and acted independently. Many commanders exhibiting similar behaviour would have been sent home but Gough, basking under the aegis of Sir Douglas Haig, was rewarded with promotion and divisional command. That said, as far as 5 Cavalry Brigade was concerned, on the particular misty morning in question, it was still answerable to Brigadier General Chetwode.

  When Captain John Darling, the signalling officer with 20/Hussars, crossed over the pontoon bridge with his regiment, the Scots Greys and 12/Lancers had already arrived and had dismounted at Vailly:

  ‘The whole valley, including the bridge, was under hostile observation and artillery fire. It was a misty morning, and to this alone could be attributed the fact we had got so far without drawing the enemy’s fire. As the regiment reached the bridge the fog lifted, the German gunners spotted us and started firing. Pontoons are not intended to carry cavalry at a trot, at least this one was not, so the Colonel dismounted the regiment and gave the order to lead over in single file. This we did.’111

  Gunner Myatt from 109/Battery was close enough to observe the cavalry crossing the bridge:

  ‘The Scots Greys came along in fours and the Germans’ first shell knocked their machine gun, horse and men all in the river, so they had to gallop for it. The 12 Lancers came across in s
ingle file and did not lose a single man, and my word did the RHA gallop across like mad and came through safely.’112

  Myatt may have been mistaken about the RHA galloping across the bridge, the J Battery war diary records the battery being stopped by Brigadier Chetwode about 400 yards short of the bridge, ‘as the village of Vailly was full of cavalry who could not get on as the infantry attack was held up’. The battery retired and came into action east of the Chassemy road about a mile from Vailly where it opened fire on a German battery.

  The individual responsible for controlling the movement across the bridge on the morning of 14 September was Captain Theodore Wright, the 57/Field Company officer who had been awarded the Victoria Cross for his bravery at the Mariette Bridge during the Battle of Mons on 23 August. Wright and Lance Corporal Alfred Jarvis – also 57/Field Company – had both won the coveted cross for their work in blowing the canal bridges at Mons. Tragically, controlling the movement of the cavalry across the pontoon bridge at Vailly was to be Theodore Wright’s last act, he was killed by shell fire whilst assisting wounded troopers to shelter. The three batteries from XL Brigade which had crossed with the cavalry decided on a safer passage over the river and eventually recrossed at Pont Arcy.

  Meanwhile, 7 Infantry Brigade was attempting to cross the river. Lieutenant Alexander Johnston’s anxiety over the accuracy of the German artillery batteries which, ‘seemed to be in some strength’, was relieved somewhat by orders to cross further up the river, using the repaired light railway bridge which took him away from the shrapnel torn crossing at Vailly. This delay, however, almost certainly contributed to the difficulties 9 Brigade was experiencing on the spur. Even before McCracken’s brigade had crossed over, elements of 9 Brigade were already seen to be withdrawing.