BEF Campaign on the Aisne 1914

by Jerry Murland

  ‘I am convinced that had we been more careful with our reserves until we had some idea of the situation, and then given a unit a definite task such as to clear the wood just N of Brigade HQ, we should have done much better. As it was we were at one time in rather a tight corner with only a platoon in reserve and the Germans within a few yards of Brigade HQ.’228

  The day’s fighting had cost 7 Brigade some 400 casualties, most of which were from 2/South Lancs. The Wiltshires’ casualties, although comparatively light, did include the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur W. Hasted. Hasted was the second commanding officer in 7 Brigade to be wounded in the space of two days, joining Colonel Wilkinson Bird of the Irish Rifles who was badly wounded on 19 September.

  The attacks on the 2nd Division on the morning of 20 September began at dawn and fell on the King’s Liverpool Regiment’s front, east of the canal and on the Connaught Rangers, positioned on the ridge further to the east on the Beaulne spur. Lieutenant William Synge of the King’s found dawn of 20 September to be wet and misty when he was, ‘rudely disturbed by the rattle of machine gun’. Hurriedly moving his men under cover, he spotted the tell-tale cloud of steam which issues from the water jacket of the Maxim machine gun betraying its position in the strip of wood which ran down to the lock keeper’s house. ‘We knew the range, and that machine gun was finished off in half a minute’. Watching from his company trenches – which were a little above those of C and D Companies – Synge and his men were able to catch the German attack in a deadly crossfire, ‘it was exactly like ferreting for rabbits, and I do not think many of those who came out of the wood got back into it again’.

  At about 9.00am the German infantry made a second, more determined attack:

  ‘The attack had now veered round to our right, and we could catch glimpses of the enemy running about on the high ground above. As they were also firing down onto us through the wood, things were by no means pleasant. At this time I was sent back by the Colonel with a message to the second-in-command, who was back on the hill top above Moussy, finding a position onto which we might fall back if the worst came to the worst …on getting back to the Colonel, who was in the same place. Namely where the pathway entered the wood, I found that matters were going very badly indeed’.229

  The Connaughts by this time had been shelled out of their trenches, the German artillery getting the exact range of the forward trenches which, in the words of the war diary, ‘made them untenable’. The King’s right flank was now dangerously exposed and enemy infantry began firing down on the King’s from above, ‘for a moment or two we all thought that they were through and that very soon we should be surrounded’. But Synge’s qualms were soon dispelled by the arrival of reinforcements in the form of two platoons from B Company of the Highland Light Infantry and six from 2/Worcesters. The consequent counter attack captured the first line German trench beyond the Connaughts’ positions but elation turned to anguish when the relieving force was ambushed in the woods. There was momentary chaos as the British fell back on A Company of the King’s:

  ‘The Colonel, however, refused to retire, and sent me up with a message to the commander of A Company, which was holding the trenches in the wood, to the effect that he must hold out, and there were no more reinforcements. This captain, owing to the thickness of the wood was very much in the dark as to what was going on, swung his line round slightly so it was facing the crest, and ordered his men to fire rapid fire until further orders into the trees towards the hill-top … this move, I think, saved the situation, for the Germans began to withdraw.’230

  It had been another close call. Synge was of the opinion that, ‘had the country been more open, and had they been able to see what they were doing’, the Germans would have got right through the British lines and into Moussy where they would have captured the guns and, ‘also probably the Brigadier and his staff’. The Official History felt the day belonged to the King’s as their casualties did not exceed fifty, but far in excess of that figure was the casualty return from the Highland Light Infantry. After leaving Verneuil to support the Worcesters – under attack on the Beaulne spur – every man from B Company who took part in the counter attack was either killed or wounded. Lieutenant William Lilburn, who led the two platoons of Highlanders, only managed to get back himself after dark with a few of the survivors. The day’s fighting cost the Highland Light Infantry three officers killed and two others wounded, they also lost Lieutenant John O’Connell, the battalion’s medical officer who was killed tending the wounded. In the ranks twenty men were killed, seventy wounded and twenty-five missing.231

  Other casualties of the day included Major William Sarsfield, the commanding officer of the Connaughts who had led the battalion since late August. The shell fire which drove the battalion out of its trenches killed Sarsfield and 22-year-old Second Lieutenant Robert de Stacpoole, the fourth son of the Duke of Stacpoole. Three other officers were also killed along with thirty-five other ranks killed and wounded.232

  John McIlwain was less than complimentary in his diary about Robert de Stacpoole’s brother, George, who was serving in the battalion. Commenting on the day’s events, MacIlwain was not pleased at the prospect of having Lieutenant de Stacpoole as his company officer, ‘who is hardly in a fit state to take charge of anyone. His nerves are all to rags’. Although not corroborated by the war diary, MacIlwain does give us an indication of the strength of the battalion – despite being reinforced by about 200 officers and men from the special reserve a week earlier – he estimated the battalion was less than 400 strong at roll call on 21 September.

  Up at Cour de Soupir Farm the Grenadiers were under shell fire for most of the day on 20 September but were not under any direct infantry attack on the scale of the attacks launched against the two brigades on their left. Major Bernard Gordon Lennox and his company relieved Number 3 Company at dawn and were busy improving the trench when a Jack Johnson exploded just above him:

  ‘The man in the pit next door was badly hit by a shell, and has since had his arm off. My coat had the right arm nearly taken off at the shoulder and the left sleeve cut to bits, and it was only a yard off me, but I am thankful to say I was not inside the coat at the time. After that they left us pretty well alone till the afternoon. The battery that is plastering us like this is so close that one has no warning of the shell coming along: the only thing one hears is the burst and woe betide you if you aren’t down in the bottom [of the trench].’233

  After dark there was a half-hearted attack which failed to materialize on the Guards’ frontage but did have the effect of ensuring every other man was standing at arms in expectation. Gordon Lennox was of the opinion that the German infantry were reluctant to face the Guards in their entrenched positions, adding, ‘I think they are very wise’.

  Chapter 11

  The 6th Division

  It seems a favourite trick to shoot one’s finger off when one is cleansing one’s rifle, two men were admitted to hospital today having blown off their fingers cleansing their rifles today.

  Lieutenant Neville Woodroffe – 1/Irish Guards

  Although the 6th Infantry Division was mobilized on 4 August 1914, it remained in the Cambridge area until 7 September. Concerns at home that England might possibly be invaded by the Germans prevented the full six divisions from being transported to France in early August. Amongst the officers and men of the division there was a real fear that they would arrive too late to join the fight. They had been following the fortunes of the BEF over the retreat from Mons and the advance from the Marne to the Aisne and it was with some relief that orders were received to proceed to Southampton. The West and East Yorkshire Regiments were packed aboard the SS Caudor Castle which docked at St Nazaire at 9.00pm on 9 September. The 1st Battalion the Leicestershire Regiment (1/Leicesters) arrived aboard the SS Braemar Castle at 8.00am the next morning. On board was Captain Robert Hawes who was still technically a newly-wed, having married Eleanorah Rydon a matter of months before mobilization.
Hawes had been a gentleman cadet at Sandhurst in 1902 with the author’s grandfather, Howard Murland. The two young men formed a firm friendship whilst in E Company and even though they went their separate ways on being commissioned, their friendship was rekindled when they met up again in India. In 1911 Robert Hawes returned to England to take up his appointment as adjutant of the 3rd Battalion, he was not to see his old friend again.

  The division was initially delayed by the decision on 29 August to move the British seaboard base at Le Havre to St Nazaire, some 250 miles further south. This huge transfer of stores was completed in a week – a testament to the Royal Navy’s dominance of the channel and its surrounding waters – and placed the 6th Division southwest of Paris and even further from the Aisne valley. Strangely there was little urgency noticeable in getting the three brigades of Major General John Kier’s division into line with the BEF, which at the time was crossing the Marne on its way north. If the experience of the 1st Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment (1/East Yorks) is anything to go by, it was a fairly leisurely introduction to war. After disembarking at 9.20pm on 9 September, the East Yorks took some ten days to make the journey to the Aisne crossing at Bourg. The first twenty-eight hours were spent courtesy of the French railways which took them to Coulommiers. From there the battalion marched to Doue where it arrived at 3.00pm on 12 September, remaining stationary – apart from a route march – for the next two days, drawing supplies and waiting for 18 Brigade HQ to catch up. When the battalion did resume its move north on 15 September, the war diary reports that it was held up by brigade supply trains and ammunition columns. The battalion finally crossed the Aisne at 6.00am on Sunday 19 September.

  Exactly what news had filtered through to Kier’s brigades as they marched north is imprecise but on 16 September Lieutenant Billy Congreve with the 3rd Rifle Brigade was still under the impression that the Germans were retiring.234 It must have come as some surprise then, to hear that the advance had stalled and instead of joining III Corps as originally planned, the newcomers were now to be put into general reserve. For once Sir John French had made a strategically sensible decision; there was little point in deploying the division on the left flank with the 4th Division which is presumably where they were destined. Nevertheless, there had been some discussion at GHQ as to the deployment of Kier’s division before it was decided to use the fresh troops as reinforcements for what was now a very tired and depleted BEF; only the divisional artillery brigades would take up their allotted place in III Corps. Consequently 16 Brigade was sent to relieve 7 and 9 Brigades above Vailly, 17 Brigade was placed in corps reserve and 18 Brigade went to relieve the hard-pressed 1 and 2 Brigades on the furthest extremity of the BEF’s right flank.

  18 Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General Walter Congreve VC – the father of Billy Congreve – began the relief of the 1st Division units after dark. The 1/West Yorkshires would have been a welcome sight to the Coldstream Guards in the trenches at Troyon, their casualties over the previous few days had been comparatively light but had included two officers from No.1 Company killed and Captain Alfred Egerton who was wounded after serving only one day with the battalion. After completing the handover with Major Leslie Hamilton, the Coldstream Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Towsey deployed his A and B Companies under Major Alexander Ingles into the firing line and his remaining two companies into the support trenches along with the HQ staff. The troop movements during the relief must have alerted the Germans as they were fired on shortly after 9.00pm which did little more than hone the vigilance of the men in the firing line. But much more was to follow at daybreak.

  On the right of the West Yorkshires the Moroccan troops of the French XVIII Corps were in position on the extreme left flank of the French Fifth Army. Arthur Osburn was quite distressed by the wretched sight of these North African troops who were not equipped for the cold and rain of a European autumn on the battle-strewn slopes above the Aisne:

  ‘Drenched with rain, without food or medical aid, they squatted in the mud on the hillside around Paissy. Huddled up together like wounded animals supporting shattered limbs or badly mutilated faces, they were as pathetic a sight as the German wounded had been outside Braine. Those sodden hillsides, strewn with dead horses and dead men, must have been in gruesome contrast to …the whispering palm groves of Ghardais and Side Okba.’235

  Osburn could see no sign of any French medical services or any ambulance transport to move them from the firing line. Taking it upon himself to tend to their wounded he and his small medical team established a dressing station in the caves at Paissy. ‘Like the prophets of old, we hid them by tens and fifties in the caves of Paissy where, in their saturated cotton clothing, they huddled close together for warmth’.

  20 September was another cold day with heavy showers of hail and rain and it was on the poorly-equipped French colonial troops that the first onslaught of the morning fell. Commanding the German Seventh Army on the Aisne, Josias von Heeringen must have been only too aware of the fragile nature of the French line at this point and began softening up the French lines early that morning. The West Yorkshires on their left reporting heavy shell fire from about 4.00am onwards and at 4.14am some Moroccan troops began leaving their positions. Although they were encouraged to return, the West Yorkshires’ right flank was immediately put under pressure and became increasingly vulnerable in the face of the wavering Moroccan troops. With this in mind, Colonel Towsey sent an officer’s patrol under Lieutenant Thomas Meautys out to his right in order to get a fuller picture of what exactly was taking place.236 Meautys and his men confirmed Towsey’s worst fears; the Moroccan troops on his right flank were in no position to contain a resolute German attack and appeared still to be in some disorder. Towsey had no choice but to deploy one company to protect the right of his battalion’s position. Private Charles Rainbird was with D Company:

  ‘As dawn was breaking this morning, there occurred one of those hellish mistakes which occur in every war. We saw through the half light a large body of men evidently retiring on our right. Our Colonel ordered my Company ‘D’ to swing round so as to cover their retirement if they should prove to be allies. After advancing about 200 yards we saw that they were allies (Zouaves) when, to our horror they suddenly turned and opened fire on us. Oh God, it was awful, every one of us exposed to a raking fire and no cover; they had evidently mistaken us for the enemy. My mates were falling all over the place and there was 37 killed in less than two minutes. Naturally our boys opened fire on them, in spite of the CO’s shout of “Don’t fire!” I dropped one fellow as he was in the act of firing, then we received the order to retire.’237

  In the confusion of the early morning a party of Moroccan troops had opened fire on the West Yorkshires as they moved into position, an incident which underlined the delicate nature of the French positions and the nervousness of the men holding them. After this the line appeared to settle down and there was a pause before the second German attack was made sometime after 10.00am. This time the West Yorkshires were ready for anything and easily checked the attacking enemy infantry and for a while it appeared as if the Moroccan infantry had regained their composure. But this attack was only a precursor to another more determined assault.

  Meanwhile Jock Marden had been turned out of his billet at 4.30am with the 9/Lancers to provide support for the infantry. Detailed with eight men to act as, ‘intercommunication between English right and French left’, he established himself on the ridge to await developments:

  ‘Dig ourselves a little trench for protection from splinters. Leave 2 men with the OC West Yorkshire Regiment on the ridge and remain below with the rest. Note the OC West Yorkshires is sitting eating in the support trenches … Am shown remains of last intercommunication patrol – officer killed238 – 3 horses – 4 men! This, I suppose, is to cheer me up!’239

  Marden’s light-hearted rendering cloaked the seriousness of the situation the BEF faced that morning. Colonel Towsey may well have been snatching
a bite to eat but it was probably the last chance he had before the next German attack began at about 12.30pm under the cover of a violent rainstorm. The Moroccans were thrown back yet again and Towsey and Lieutenant Meautys both went forward to the firing line to see what was happening – returning a few minutes later with Meautys mortally wounded. According to Captain P H Lowe who was with D Company, the advanced line of the West Yorkshires was on the forward slope of the hill and composed of a succession of rifle pits without any form of communication trenches:

  ‘The trench here was very badly sited, there being dead ground to the front, though the field of fire to the flanks was good. There was no room in the trench for a number of my men, but there were in many places craters made from shell fire …we beat off comparatively easily two attacks. Then the Germans massed in the dead ground in front. From here they tried to advance by rushes in small bodies. This was more difficult to stop. In the meantime our casualties had been heavy and particularly from machine guns and shrapnel, which was continually traversing our trenches. Near midday two catastrophes took place. The French went, leaving our flank exposed and a short heavy storm of rain turned the ground into a quagmire. Ammunition was being collected from the wounded with the result that all the rifles began to jam.’240

  Lowe describes how there were only four serviceable rifles in his particular pit and the bayonets on each had been smashed by enemy fire whilst the bolts on two of the weapons were only able to be operated with the aid of an entrenching tool: