BEF Campaign on the Aisne 1914

by Jerry Murland

  The BEF had entered the Great War scarcely prepared for a major European conflict and unable to act as more than a subordinate partner to its French Allies. After the retreat from Mons and the reversal of fortune which was epitomized by the Battle of the Marne, the British arrival on the Aisne marked a distinct change in the nature of the fighting experienced in the western theatre up to that point. The sluggish advance of the BEF towards the Aisne impacted on the advance of the French armies to either side and thus allowed the German Army precious time to reinforce and dig in on the Chemin des Dames. Thus the high ground to the north of the Aisne valley witnessed the beginnings of a trench-based encounter which was largely dictated by the tactical nature of the fighting. On the Chemin des Dames the Germans found a position that they could defend effectively and in order to hold that vital ground they resorted to the spade. In response the Anglo-French armies which were attempting unsuccessfully to evict them with frontal assaults and outflanking movements found themselves digging positions which ran parallel to those of their adversaries. As that process replicated itself time and again in many localised actions, so the still embryonic lines of ‘trenches’ gradually snaked their way north and west as both sides attempted to get round the open western flank in the hope of ending the war with a final battle. The trench system which came to characterize and then symbolize the Western Front for generations to come was created by the weeks of flanking attacks which were forced upon both sides by the stultifying stalemate on the Aisne. The picturesque rolling hills and valleys of the Aisne had unwittingly given birth to positional warfare that would eventually create a 400 mile livid scar across a good deal of Western Europe.

  Although neither side envisaged a war conducted from fixed positions, it was the Germans who had the advantage of a ready supply of equipment suitable for this troglodyte ‘trench warfare’. Barbed wire, spades, duckboards and trench mortars were readily available, resources which the British and French armies sadly lacked in sufficient quantities. The German artillery was distinctly more powerful and used to much greater effect than the inadequate artillery support offered by the Allied armies to their infantry units. The intensity and accuracy of the German guns, qualities which had taken the BEF’s GHQ by surprise, was undoubtedly another reason behind the issue of Operational Order No. 27 from Sir John French on 16 September, instructing his divisions to dig in and hold their positions against German attacks. Sir John was correct in thinking that trenches enabled both sides to hold ground and protect themselves against shell fire but with no subsequent orders being issued until 1 October – marking the beginning of the BEF’s withdrawal from the Aisne – the British were left without direction from their commander-in-chief. It was in those two vital weeks, when the humble spade became the most sought after weapon in the valley, that trench warfare can be said to have become a reality.

  If the Aisne gave birth to the Western Front it also marked the ascendancy of heavy artillery as a major weapon of modern warfare. Faced with the demoralizing and destructive capability of the German heavy batteries, the BEF was forced to re-examine its strategic use of artillery. For the first time in the Great War, fire plans which focussed the fire of British batteries on to a single target or area were used on the Aisne, alongside the all important wireless liaison between aircraft and artillery batteries which would become an essential feature of air/artillery co-operation in the years to come.

  The reader will recall General Joffre’s intention of enveloping the German right flank which was bent back near Noyon south of the Oise River in order to break the deadlock on the Aisne and resume the offensive. These plans were hardly a secret and had certainly not gone unnoticed by the German High Command whose purpose was to carry out the same manoeuvre on the French left flank. This was the so called ‘race to the sea’, a race which neither side wished to win as victory would constitute a failure to turn the other’s flank. On 17 September – with orders to outflank the German right – Maunoury’s Sixth Army, which had been reinforced by the French XIII Corps, clashed with the Germans at Carlepont. The attack failed leaving Joffre to try again on the Second Army front north of the River Avre nine days later. This time there was a partial gain as the French left wing reached Péronne but a reinforced German II Corps managed to hold the right of de Castelnau’s forces. The hold on Péronne was short-lived as on the 26th de Castelnau was pushed back across the River Somme.

  By 25 September the German High Command was becoming impatient and ordered their First, Second and Third Armies to take the offensive to hold the British and French on the Aisne in order to prevent the movement of reinforcements to the Somme, thus enabling the German offensive in the north to reach Amiens and the channel coast – hence the German attacks of 25 September. The ‘race’ was well and truly on but it is not within the scope of this book to describe the sidestepping scramble of the French and German armies which culminated in the First Battle of Ypres in October and November 1914. Suffice to say that by 9 October the battle lines had been extended from the Aisne to within 30 miles of Dunkirk, by which time the first units of the BEF had already left their positions on the Aisne and were moving towards Flanders where the final battles of 1914 would be fought.

  The first units of the BEF to move were from Allenby’s cavalry and Smith-Dorrien’s II Corps. Joffre had agreed to the transfer of the BEF to Flanders – particularly as the 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division were about to be landed at Ostend. It must be said that the move was carried out extremely well with all movements carefully concealed. Battalions were moved under the cover of darkness and their places taken by French troops, by 9 October II Corps was advancing towards Béthune and III Corps was moving on Armentières and Bailleul. The evacuation was completed by 15 October and four days later Douglas Haig and I Corps arrived at Hazebrouck.

  The British battle casualties sustained during the Aisne fighting has been put at approximately 560 officers and 12,000 other ranks, an attrition rate of experienced officers and NCOs the BEF could ill afford to lose.301 The high proportion of officer casualties had much to do with the great emphasis that was placed on personal bravery. Officers were expected to lead from the front thus setting an example to the men and the alarming numbers of officers who were killed or wounded bears testament to this mindset. However, the lessons learnt in the South African War – where officers were particularly targeted by the Boer snipers – appear to have been either forgotten or ignored. The practice during the South African war of officers and men being indistinguishable through their battlefield dress and armament was not evident on the Aisne. The Northamptonshire subaltern, Lieutenant Jack Needham’s attire was typical of officers going into battle; he writes of carrying his sword when leading his men, which – together with his distinctive officer’s uniform – would have made him a highly visible target to enemy riflemen. Such practices, combined with undoubted bravery, ultimately led to great swathes being cut through the officer corps and it was a trend which would be maintained after the move north.

  As the men who fought on the Aisne moved north with their respective units, very few would have contemplated a future featuring a war that would drag on for another four years. For many of those who were now heading north to Flanders – in the vain hope of finding the open flank – their life expectancy would be measured in days or weeks.

  If Sir John French had been concerned by the casualties inflicted on the BEF on the Aisne, what followed at Ypres provided a shocking induction of what was to come as trench warfare became established. Amongst those whose accounts appear in this book and who lost their lives during the savage fighting which has gone down in history as ‘First Ypres’ was Major Lord Bernard Gordon Lennox of 2/Grenadier Guards, along with his regimental colleague Captain Cholmeley Symes Thompson who were both killed within a week of each other near Zillebeke in November and are buried with their comrades in the tiny Zillebeke Churchyard Cemetery. Charles Paterson, the adjutant of 1/ who was mentioned in despatches in September only surv
ived another month. Promoted to captain in October, he was badly wounded at Geluvnelt and died of his wounds on 1 November 1914 and now rests at Ypres Town Cemetery. Two commanding officers who led their battalions on the Aisne are commemorated on the Menin Gate Memorial: Malcolm Green of the South Lancashire Regiment was killed on 17 November and Hugh Crispin’s name is also there inscribed. Crispin – killed on 30 October during the heavy fighting south of the Menin Road near Ypres – had taken command of 2/Royal Sussex after Ernest Montresor was killed on the Chemin des Dames. (Six days after Ernest Montresor’s death, his son-in-law, 24-year-old Lieutenant Geoffrey Russell Fenton, was killed in action whilst serving with 2/Connaught Rangers.)

  The rate of attrition amongst battalion commanding officers in the first weeks of the Great War was staggeringly high. By the time the BEF arrived on the southern heights above the Aisne Valley in September 1914, six commanding officers had been killed in action or had died of wounds, five had been taken prisoner and one had been wounded. The Aisne campaign saw a further five commanding officers killed in action and six wounded and of the commanding officers who led their battalions to Flanders in October, a further seven would not survive beyond 1914. Lieutenant William Synge’s commanding officer, 45-year-old Lieutenant Colonel William Bannatyne was killed near Polygon Wood at Ypres on 24 October. Also killed at Ypres was Lieutenant Colonel Norman McMahon DSO who commanded 4/Royal Fusiliers. He was killed on 11 November the day before he was due to take command of a brigade. He is commemorated on the Ploegsteert Memorial. Lieutenant Colonel Reginald Alexander, 3/Rifle Brigade, died of wounds on 20 December and is buried at Bailleul Communal Cemetery and Major Edward Daniel, who commanded 2/Royal Irish, was killed in action at Le Pilly on 20 October and has his name on the Le Touret Memorial.

  1915 saw the death of 23-year-old Lieutenant Robert Flint DSO, the RE officer who worked with Johnston ferrying men across the river at Missy. Mentioned in despatches he was killed near Kemmel on 12 January and is buried at Dranouter Churchyard Cemetery. Major John Leslie Mowbray DSO the Brigade Major to the 2nd Division CRA was killed on 21 July 1916 whilst in command of a battery of XLI Brigade guns. His headstone can be found at Péronne Road Cemetery, Maricourt. Almost a year later Mowbray’s nephew, 21-year-old Lieutenant Maurice Mowbray MC was killed on 23 August 1917, serving with 89/Field Company. Major Wilfred Ellershaw, the battery commander of 113/Battery attained the rank of brigadier general before his death on 5 June 1916 aboard HMS Hampshire, an occasion which also marked the death of Lord Kitchener. Ellershaw’s name is on the Hollybrook Memorial at Southampton as is that of Horatio Herbert Kitchener.

  A particularly tragic story is that of the three boys of the Meautys family. Lieutenant Thomas Meautys was killed with the West Yorkshires on 20 September which must have been heartbreaking for his wife Nora and parents Thomas and Ellen Meautys. His younger brother, 19-year-old Lieutenant Denzil Hatfield Meautys, died of wounds on 7 May 1917 and a month later tragedy struck again in June 1917 when the eldest brother, Captain Paul Dashwood Meautys was killed. Denzil is buries at Etaples Military Cemetery and Paul at London Cemetery, Neuville-Vitasse, near Arras.

  Major Charles ‘Bertie’ Prowse DSO who commanded the Somerset Light Infantry rose to command 11 Brigade in 1916 but was killed on 1 July of that year on the Somme. He was mentioned in despatches four times and is buried at Louvencourt Military Cemetery near Doullens. Lieutenant Geoffrey Prideaux who served with Prowse was promoted to captain soon after leaving the Aisne and was killed on 19 January 1917 having been promoted brigade major to 11 Brigade. He was awarded the Military Cross in 1916 and now rests at Hem Farm Military Cemetery, near Albert on the Somme.

  Amongst those who survived the war was George Jeffreys who fought with the 2/Grenadier Guards at Soupir Farm. After realizing his ambition of commanding the battalion he was appointed brigadier general in command of the Guards Brigade in 1917 and by the end of the war he was commanding the 19th Division. After the Armistice he became member of parliament for Petersfield and was created a Baron in 1952. He died, aged 82, in 1960. Captain Guy Ward who fought with the South Wales Borderers ended his war as a lieutenant colonel with a DSO and died in March 1933 aged 58. He is buried at Brookwood Cemetery.

  There was an understandable tendency amongst senior officers to promote the careers of those infantry commanders who had demonstrated personal bravery and an offensive spirit. One such commander was Edward Bulfin, the commander of 2 Brigade. Bulfin’s attack on 14 September 1914 was pressed home in his usual determined manner and his performance during the First Battle of Ypres followed a similar pattern. His dogged determination and clear qualities of command resulted in his promotion in October. In 1916 he was commanding the 60th Division on the Vimy sector and in 1917 he was promoted to lieutenant general in command of XXI Corps in Palestine. Bulfin retired in 1926 and died at home in Bournemouth in 1939.

  John Ponsonby DSO, who was wounded at Cerny, was initially promoted to command 2 Guards Brigade and then the 5th Division which he led until the end of the war. He retired as Major General Sir John Ponsonby in 1928 and died in 1952. Brigadier Aylmer Haldane went on to command the 3rd Division and in 1916 was appointed to command VI Army Corps. After the war he became General Officer Commanding Mesopotamia and retired in 1925. He died aged 88 in 1950 and is buried at Brookwood Cemetery. Haldane wrote several books, one of which was an account of his escape from captivity during the Boer War in How We Escaped from Pretoria. Brigadier General Gleichen continued to command his brigade until March 1915. Subsequently, as a major general, he commanded the 37th Division until October 1916. He was then appointed Director of the Political Intelligence Bureau of the recently established Department of Information, of which his close friend, the author John Buchan, was a deputy director. Gleichen held this post for the rest of the war. He retired from the army in 1919 and died in December 1937.

  Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Wolfe-Murray who commanded 2/Highland Light Infantry became a brigadier general and died at home on 7 December 1918. He is buried at Eddlestone parish churchyard in Scotland. John Longley who commanded 1/East Surrey Regiment so ably on the Chivres Spur was appointed a brigadier general in 1915 and shortly afterwards command of the 10th Irish Division followed. Mentioned in despatches on ten occasions, he retired as Sir John Longley in 1923. During the Second World War he served in the Dover garrison and died in 1953. He is remembered with a stained glass window in the chapel of the Church of All Saints at Kingston-on-Thames. Brigadier General Aylmer Hunter-Weston also went on to greater glory but of all the brigade commanders who fought on the Aisne his subsequent career has probably suffered the most from a bad press. His command of 29th Division at Gallipoli has been rather unfairly described by John Laffin as verging on the wilfully negligent which is slightly less offensive than another remark which accused him of being one of the most brutal and incompetent commanders of the First World War. Hunter-Weston returned from Gallipoli to an October 1916 parliamentary by-election in which he was elected to the House of Commons as the Unionist Member for North Ayshire. He was appointed GOC VIII Corps when it was re-established in France in 1916 and commanded the corps during the Somme offensive. On 1 July 1916 his divisions attacked in the northern sector of the battlefield and failed to capture any of their objectives. Again his leadership and artillery fire plan was called into question. Hunter-Weston continued in politics after the war being elected again for Bute and North Ayrshire in 1918. He resigned from the army in 1919 with a knighthood, and from parliament in 1935. This complex and single-minded individual of whom history has been generous in its criticism, died in 1940 following a fall at his ancestral home in Hunterston.

  Edward Northey, the commanding officer of 2/KRRC, had a far less chequered career. He was in command of 15 Brigade by 1915 but was wounded during the Second Battle of Ypres. On his return he was sent to East Africa to command the Nyasa-Rhodesian Field force. He was knighted and promoted to major general in 1918 and two years later became governor of British Eas
t Africa – the modern day Kenya. He also died in 1953. Francis Towsey the commanding officer of 1/West Yorkshires who was wounded on 20 September, regained the confidence of Sir Douglas Haig and after two successful temporary appointments to brigade command was appointed to command 122 Brigade which he led during the Battle of the Somme in 1916. He died aged 83 in May 1948. Major Christopher Griffin who led the Lancashire Fusiliers was wounded four times during the Great War and died in 1957 having retired as a brigadier general with the DSO and bar.

  For many others surviving the war intact was reward enough. Lieutenant Arthur Griffith, the gunner subaltern who won a DSO with his 71/Battery guns at Cour de Soupir Farm, retired as a major. He was wounded at Cour de Soupir Farm and again on two other occasions. In addition to his DSO he was mentioned in despatches four times. He died aged 46 in hospital after an operation. Lieutenant William Synge who fought with the King’s Liverpool regiment retired as a captain and apart from writing up his experiences of the Great War, he put pen to paper again in 1926 with the publication of The Story of the World at War and in 1952 wrote The Story of the Green Howards 1939–45. He died in 1968 aged 72. Another officer who turned to writing was Lieutenant Arthur Mills. Mills came from a family of authors, his brother George was the author of Meredith and Co and King Willow whilst his father, Arthur, wrote India in 1858 which is still in print! Promoted to captain, Mills was wounded at La Bassée and during his convalescence in 1916 wrote With My Regiment: From the Aisne to La Bassée and Hospital Days. At his wedding to Lady Dorothy Walpole in 1916, her wedding ring was reputed to have been made from a bullet which had been removed from his ankle. Mills eventually became known as an author of cheap crime and adventure novels.