Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta

by Carpenter, Stephen

  Major Beckwith was critical of the lack of support he had received from the 1st Cavalry Division.1 He could not have been overjoyed at being assigned another mission in support of that unit in Pleiku in early November. This time, in a departure from established protocol, Delta would operate from the 1st Cavalry’s Huey UH1D aircraft with any necessary reaction forces to be supplied by the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) instead of the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, still combat weary from the Plei Me operation.1,20 Use of these smaller aircraft mandated insertion of smaller teams. In his After Action Report (AAR) for this operation, Major Beckwith specifically identifies the team composition as being three U.S. advisors and two Nungs.20 This is also a significant departure from the ten man teams comprised of two U.S. advisors and eight ethnic Vietnamese LLDB. In another bold move, Delta committed five teams into the Area of Operations (AO) at one time. To date the Project had cautiously kept the maximum number of teams on the ground at one time to three, reflecting the limited rescue capabilities of the attached Vietnamese air element. The five teams were inserted on November 1st, 1965 and extracted on November 4th, 1965. Evidence of recent activity by a large force was discovered without incident. In his AAR Major Beckwith was critical of the pilots in that all five teams were inserted on the wrong LZs, but was encouraged that the UH1D helicopters handled the five man teams with no problems.20 Beckwith also pointed out that the 1st Cavalry did not have an understanding of Delta’s capabilities and limitations and recommended that future operations be coordinated at a higher level than the conventional unit Brigade level.20 Major Beckwith had come to the realization that he commanded a unit with unique capabilities that required the attention of the upper echelons of the military command in order to be properly deployed with continued success. The operations at Plei Me and Pleiku were a prelude to the battle for the Ia Drang Valley that commenced on November 14th.

  1965 ended with consecutive operations conducted in III Corps in support if the U.S. Army’s 1st Infantry Division.21,22,23 The first of these operations was conducted from Bien Hoa with helicopter support and an immediate reaction force provided by the 1st Division. While enemy presence was observed and documented, and there were contacts made with the enemy, Major Beckwith was frustrated by the use of the Project for such routine work. One source of his frustration was that the teams had identified targets for artillery and air strikes but could not get the necessary Forward Air Control (FAC) support to effect the attacks. He strongly recommended that all infantry units of Brigade strength or greater be required to develop their own long range patrol capability. He was again critical of the lack of training of pilots in conventional units for flying covert missions and demanded that Delta be assigned its own air assets. In an interesting turn, the final operation of 1965, again in support of the 1st Infantry Division, involved only two recon teams, neither of which ran a mission. The UH1D on the first insertion crashed on the LZ for unknown reasons, injuring four people, including one 1st Division infantryman assigned as part of the recon team. The second team’s helicopter ran low on fuel circling the crash site and aborted the mission. From this operation came a pledge that Project Delta would have its own U.S. air assets by the time the new year rolled around.21,22,23

  CHAPTER VII: 1966; COUNTER OFFENSIVE

  The third named campaign of the Vietnam War was “Counteroffensive”, 25 December 1965 - 30 June 1966. Following the U.S. victory in the Ia Drang Valley, American forces for the remainder of 1965 and well into 1966 sought to keep the enemy off balance while building base camps and logistical installations. This involved search and destroy operations to protect the logistical bases under construction along the coast and the base camps for incoming U.S. units in the provinces near Saigon.

  Also of particular concern to the American military mission was the protection of the government and the people of South Vietnam. To accomplish the tasks outlined U.S. efforts were concentrated in the most vital and heavily populated regions. The III Marine Amphibious Force supported the South Vietnamese I Corps in the northern provinces; the I Field Force supported the Vietnamese II Corps in the central region; and the II Field Force supported the South Vietnamese III Corps around Saigon. Consequently, the major battles of the year occurred in these critical areas. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, the Korean 2d Marine Brigade, and the ARVN 47th Regiment began Operation VAN BUREN on 19 January to locate and destroy the North Vietnamese 95th Regiment, which was believed to be in the Tuy Hoa Valley. Their mission included protecting the rice harvest produced in the coastal region. The successful execution of these assignments resulted in serious enemy losses. During 20-23 January, a temporary cease fire was proclaimed in honor of the lunar new year (Tet), although minor clashes continued throughout this period.

  During February and March, U.S. intelligence reported heavy North Vietnamese Army infiltration from Laos and across the demilitarized zone into Quang Tri Province. Only the South Vietnamese 1st Division and a single U.S. marine battalion were deployed to the province. However, to defend against this threatened invasion the bulk of the U.S. 3d Marine Division and the first U.S. Army combat units, the 173d Airborne Brigade, were moved into the northern provinces. On April 12, U.S. B-52s based on Guam bombed infiltration routes near the Laos border in the first use of these weapons against NVA . Throughout this phase of the campaign, the enemy continued to take refuge in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. Driving the enemy back removed the threat of harassment of the populace by North Vietnamese regular forces and curbed local guerrilla activity.65

  Since much of the planned construction was to be around populated areas many of the efforts to clear the enemy concentrated around cities and the transportation routes near them. On December 29th, 1965, Project Delta was alerted to assist the U.S. 1st Infantry Division on Operation Crimp to clear an area around Cu Chi, near Saigon. Three recon teams were initially sent to the area but were soon diverted to support Operation Mallet, an effort to clear Highway 15 from Bien Hoa to Vung Tau.24 Three additional Delta recon teams were sent to the FOB at Di An on January 4th, 1966. Project Delta had been in the process of training soldiers from the 1st Infantry Division in long range reconnaissance techniques at the Delta compound in Nha Trang. It was determined that these personnel would participate in Operation Mallet as part of Delta’s recon force. For this operation the first six teams inserted consisted of U.S. advisors and Nungs from Project Delta. Three additional teams were made up of Project Delta team leaders and 1st Infantry Division soldiers. All of these teams were comprised of five men or less and only two indigenous, at most, were on any given team.

  Major Beckwith had formed a less than flattering opinion of the abilities of his Vietnamese counterparts and was leaning strongly toward running all American teams. The 145th Aviation Platoon from Nha Trang was assigned to support Project Delta on a permanent basis. Also temporarily attached to the Project were two Forward Air Controllers (FACs) from the 21st Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS), Captains Ken Kerr and Jim Ahmann. Absent on this operation were the 91st Airborne Rangers. The 1st Infantry Division’s 2nd Brigade provided an immediate action force to respond in case a recon team needed to be extracted by a larger force. On January 8th, Team 1 (Marcus Huston, Robert Price, Robert Whitis and two Nungs) was inserted on an LZ 2,500 meters from the intended LZ and were forced to cover a lot of ground in order to get into their own AO. They observed some enemy activity and were extracted on January 12th. Also on January 8th, Teams 2 (David Disharoon, Billy Mckeith, Norman Dupuis and two Nungs) and 3 (Brooke Bell, Guy Holland, Charles McDonald and one Nung) were inserted. Team 2 discovered a VC platoon and, utilizing the newly assigned FAC, called in a successful airstrike on the enemy, killing fifteen. They then encountered six VC and killed five of them in a brief firefight before seeking an LZ for extraction. The team estimated fifty VC had surrounded the LZ at the time of extraction and they called for another airstrike. They estimated twenty five enemy killed by air. Team 3 made contact with an estimat
ed force of two platoons of VC and called for an air strike. The airstrike was delivered and an estimated twenty VC were killed. Teams 4 (Marlin Cook, Agostino Chiarello, Donald Stultz and one Nung), 5 (George Hoagland, Charles Hiner, Donald Dotson and one Nung), and 6 (Frank Badolati, Ronald Terry, Charles McDonald and two Nungs) were inserted on January 10th. All three teams reported signs of recent activity but no contact with the enemy, other than visual, occurred. Teams 7 (Lucius Untalan and Charles Gray from Delta, John Sanders, Richard Finlan and William Allen from 1st Division), 8 (Lloyd Fisher and Guy Holland from Delta, Walter Korber, Clarence Pitts and Howard Stanfield from 1st Division) and 9 (Walter Shumate and Marlin Cook from Delta, Frederick Evans, Donald Wombaugh and Willis Conley from 1st Division) were inserted on January 15th. All three teams reported no enemy activity and were extracted on the 17th due to uncoordinated air, artillery and foot patrols by the 1st Infantry Division into the recon teams’ Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). Overall, the operation was a success. Attachment of the FACs had immediate and positive effect on the Project’s ability to complete their missions. Attachment of the 145th Aviation Platoon provided an opportunity for Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) to be developed for insertions, extractions, and emergent situations. The attached personnel from the 1st Infantry Division performed efficiently in the field after receiving training in long range patrolling from Project Delta. LT Guy Holland, assigned as the Officer In Charge (OIC) of Recon, became the first officer to perform as a regular member of a recon team.24

  From January 26th to March 6th, 1966, an operation was conducted by the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) on the Bong Son Plain to search out and destroy NVA and VC strongholds and encampments. The operation was initially called Operation Masher but the name was subsequently changed to the less aggressive Operation White Wing by President Johnson. The area of the operation included the An Lao Valley, historically an impenetrable enemy stronghold with very strong local support from the inhabitants. Project Delta was tasked with performing reconnaissance missions to locate the enemy and direct air attacks upon them. This operation proved to be one of the darkest in Project Delta’s history.

  From the statement of Captain A.J. “Bo” Baker:25

  “On 24 January 1966, Project Delta was given the mission by Field Forces Vietnam of supporting the 1st Air Cavalry Division with reconnaissance teams during Operation “Masher” in Binh Dinh Province. In coordination with the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry, it was decided that Project Delta would be given a TAOR in the northern end of the An Lao Valley. The mission of the Project was to surveil the main routes leading into this area to determine if Viet Cong or North Vietnamese units were using them to reinforce or to withdraw from the US Marine force pushing south toward the valley and from the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry and the Vietnamese Airborne Brigade pushing north. Intelligence on the TAOR assigned the Project was limited; available information came from unconfirmed agent reports. Red Haze missions could not be flown because of bad weather. However, we knew that the Viet Cong were in complete control of the valley and that the population supported them completely. It was also learned that the last time a friendly unit had operated in this area was 1958. ARVN personnel at the 22nd Division Headquarters in Qui Nhon felt that at least 2 regiments would have to be used in order to go into the An Lao Valley. Bad weather was forecast for the time period that the teams would be operating in the valley; this would severely limit air support and communications for these teams.

  The Delta staff, after considering these intelligence factors, decided to brief the members of the reconnaissance section on the situation and to ask for volunteers for the mission. After briefing the men on the situation, 3 teams of 17 men volunteered to go on this mission. Each of the 3 teams was infiltrated into its operational area by a single helicopter at last light, the night of 27 January 1966.

  Team One made contact with a 3-man Viet Cong patrol at 0930 hours on the 28th. Casualties were listed as 1 VC KIA, 2 VC WIA, 1 American wounded. Because the team’s presence in the area had been compromised, Team One was exfiltrated at 1620 hours on the 28th.

  Team Two, at 1040 hours 29 January, while stopped to listen, was attacked by a Viet Cong force of unknown strength. Of the 6 team members, 2 were killed and 2 wounded in the initial burst of heavy automatic fire. After 4 hours of fighting, airstrikes forced the Viet Cong to break contact, leaving 4 Americans dead and 2 wounded. The wounded and bodies were exfiltrated at 1500 hours.

  Team Three first engaged the enemy at 0930 on the 28th. The team was hit a second time at 1230 and one American was wounded (he died 5 hours later from loss of blood). Later that day, the team was hit a third time and was split into 2 three-man groups. On the 29th one of these groups made contact with base and was exfiltrated at 1630 hours. The remaining 3 men were hit by a VC force at 1600 hours and 2 of the men are now Missing in Action and believed to be dead. The third man continued to evade. On the 30th, he engaged the VC 3 more times before being exfiltrated at 1730 hours. Casualties were 9 VC KIA, 7 VC WIA, 1 American dead and 2 missing.

  Casualty totals for the 17 Americans committed were 5 KIA, 3 WIA, 2 MIA. Team Composition:

  Team 1: *Keating, Henry A. SFC, Whitis, Robert P. SFC, Dupuis, Norman C. SSG WIA, Bell, Brooke A. SSG, Chiarello, Agostino, SSG

  Team 2: *Webber, Frank J. Jr. SFC WIA, Cook, Marlin C. SFC KIA, Dotson, Donald L. SSG KIA, Hoagland, George A. SSG KIA, Hancock, Jesse L. SFC KIA, Hiner, Charles F. SSG WIA

  Team 3: *Huston, Marcus L. SFC, McKeith, Billy A. SSG, Gray, Wiley W. MSG, Terry, Ronald T. SSG MIA, Hodgson, Cecil J. SFC MIA, Badolati, Frank N. SSG KIA

  *Team Leader”25

  Author’s Note:

  In many of the descriptions of missions conducted by Project Delta, various locations are described by the use of six and eight digit coordinates such as BS746197. For the purpose of this explanation, ignore the letters and focus on the numbers. They represent positions on the east-west axis and the north-south axis of the 1:50,000 scale topographic map. Each square on the map represents 1 kilometer in distance. Thus, 746 represents a point 6/10 of the distance between the 74 and 75 lines on the map. The 197 represents a point 7/10 of the distance between the 19 and 20 lines on the map. Where the two intersect is the identified location on the ground.

  Likewise, many times that are recorded are represented by a Date Time Group (DTG). These will appear in a format such as 271858. Normally recorded as military time using a 24 hour clock, 271858 would be interpreted as the 27th day of the current month at 6:58 PM. In reports such as team debriefings, the month was normally omitted. In other reports, the month was included in the DTG as a suffix, such as 271858 Jan.

  SFC Henry Keating was the Team Leader of Team 1, code named Eskimo.25 Keating recalls the team’s mission in the An Lao Valley: “Team “Eskimo” was infiltrated into the operational area at last light 271858, Team members were: SFC Keating (Team Leader), SFC Whitis, SSG Bell, SSG Dupuis and SFC Chiariello. From the infiltration point which was at coordinates BS746197, we moved into on the west side of the LZ and moved north about 300 meters, where we stopped for the night. At 280650, we moved northeast to coordinates BS737204, which we reached at 0850 hours. I climbed a tree so I could observe the valley to the east. From this position, I was able to observe the valley from coordinates BS745204 to coordinates BS743211.

  “The trails shown on the map appeared well used, the rice paddies were under cultivation, however, I saw no people. The fog closed into the valley at 0920 hours, so I decided to move north to coordinate BS747210, where we would be close enough to the trails in the valley to hear any movement on them. At 280930 hours, SSG Dupuis who was my point man and I saw three VC about 16 meters to our left front (coordinates BS736202). One VC was carrying a US Carbine and when he started to raise his weapon, we brought him under fire, we hit the one carrying the carbine and when he fell, one of the others picked it up and fired one or two shots. At this time, SSG Dupuis threw a grenade and the firing ceased. I also threw another
grenade and saw the wounded man fall out of the bush and into the trail. At this time, I sent two of my men around the right flank of the VC and we moved into their position.

  “The VC laying in the trail was dead and we found two trails of blood leading away from the area so we decided that we had wounded the other two. One of the VC was wearing khaki shorts with a black cotton top, the others were wearing complete black pajamas. None of them had any web equipment of any kind. I checked the dead man and he had nothing at all on his person. I decided to move north and start evading in case there were any more in the area.

  “SSG Dupuis informed me that he had been hit in the head. I found that he had a piece of shrapnel in head above his left ear. He said that it was making him dizzy so I moved SSG Bell up to the point. We moved about 500 meters to coordinates BS744207, we stopped to listen for any movement to our rear. Hearing none, I decided to send a spot report back to FOB. I was unable to make contact, so we moved on to the North. As we moved north, we started seeing a lot of trails that had been well used. These trails ran generally northeast to Southwest. I decided to move to the West side of the ridge to try and get away from all these trails. We crossed the ridge at coordinates BS733206 and moved to coordinate BS730206, where I again stopped and tried to make radio contact without success.

  “From this position, I was able to observe in the valley to the West. I saw that the rice paddies were under cultivation and that the houses shown on the map at coordinates BS725208 were there, but I saw no people. We moved north to coordinate BS729208, the time was 1200 hours. I again tried to make radio contact with FOB. I made contact with the air relay and sent our report, at this time, he tried to locate our position on the ground. They tried for about two hours without success due to poor weather. They informed me that they had to refuel, but would be back in 45 minutes.