Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta

by Carpenter, Stephen

  “For the next 30 minutes or so, there was a lull in radio communication with SGT Hiner. At the end of this time, MAJ Murphy (the commander of the 1st Cavalry flight group) came on the air and informed me that he was airborne and was going to try and come in from the north. I told him that it was impossible to get in from that direction due to bad weather, that he would have to come up the valley. MAJ Murphy informed me that he had tried to come in that way but had drawn a lot of ground fire. I then told him that I had made several trips up and down the valley to guide the rocket ships in and that he would have to come up this way. He came back and said that he was on the way. At this time, I informed SGT Hiner to hang on a little longer that the reaction force was in the air and would be at his location shortly. At this time, the helicopters informed me that they were at 2500 feet above the clouds and wanted me to find a hole in the clouds to lead them through. At this time, I informed SGT Hiner that I would have to leave for a few minutes to guide the helicopters in.

  “After I picked up the helicopters and brought them into the general area, I fired my last two smoke rockets into an LZ I selected for the reaction force. As soon as the reaction force landed, I told MAJ Murphy to take his helicopters to the south side of the valley, because another reaction force was coming in on the north side of the valley. The reaction force under LT Holland from Project Delta threw a yellow smoke grenade on the LZ and informed me that he was on the ground and didn’t want any shooting in the general area, and that the LZ was secured for the second reaction force. (The second reaction force was from the 1st Cav.) I passed this information on to CAPT Carter from Project Delta who was with the second reaction force. I then told LT Holland to take a heading of 360 degrees to SGT Hiner’s position.

  “At this time, I received a call from SGT Hiner stating that he was again being fired upon by the VC from the southwest. At this time, I started buzzing to the southwest of his position at tree top level trying to scare the VC off. I remained above his position for an unknown length of time, then I couldn’t raise SGT Hiner on the radio, I then tried to make radio contact with LT Holland without success, then I was able to make contact with CAPT Carter. CAPT Carter informed me that his reaction force was on the ground and had the LZ secured and would remain on the LZ until LT Holland needed him or called for help. About this time, I received a call from LT Holland asking me how far away they were from SGT Hiner’s position. I then asked LT Holland to mark his position with smoke, after the smoke I told him to take a heading of zero three zero degrees and he started moving again. I then informed CAPT Carter that I had located an LZ to the north of his position approximately 150 meters that one helicopter could get in and out and could be used to exfiltrate the dead and wounded. He acknowledged this and said he would move north and secure it.

  “SGT Hiner came back up on the radio and asked where the reaction force was, and how soon it would reach him. I then informed him that the reaction force was approximately 200 meters from his position, moving on a heading of zero three zero degrees. SGT Hiner also informed me that he was not receiving any fire from the VC at this time. At this time, LT Holland marked his position again with smoke and I directed him on a new heading of zero five zero degrees and told him that he was approximately 100 meters from SGT Hiner’s position. I then passed this information on to SGT Hiner. Hiner at this time faded out on the radio. LT Holland told me to tell Hiner to throw a smoke grenade and fire three shots into the air to mark with. SGT Hiner replied that he would. I passed this on to LT Holland, by this time, I could see LT Holland’s force closing on the team’s position. LT Holland requested that I buzz the team position and cut my engine when I was over the position, this I did for approximately 5 minutes. Then I called a helicopter in and had him to hover over the position for approximately 10 minutes. This guided LT Holland force to the team’s exact location and linkup was effected at approximately 1430 hours.”25

  Team 3, code named Roadrunner, was led by SFC Marcus Huston. Huston recalls the mission as follows:25 “Team #3 “Roadrunner” was infiltrated into the operational area at last light 271900. We moved northeast for approximately 200 meters and I decided to stop because the going was rough and it was dark. We remained here and made contact by radio at 280720 at which time, I reported my location, negative contact and direction of movement. At 280730 we began moving northeast and moved in this general direction until we came to a stream. We stopped just short of the stream where we observed a trail running along the side of this stream. I also noticed fresh dirt a few feet back in the woods. I wanted to check these holes and the area farther back up the hill. I posted SFC Hodgson about 20 meters further down the hill and just off the trail to observe same, so that we would not be surprised by someone coming up the trail.

  “The other men then took up positions along the trail to cover while I checked the hill for more positions. I told SGT Badolati to come with me to check the hill as he was second in command, experienced and I respected his judgment. We found the hill saturated with holes approximately 2 feet deep and a foot wide. All the dirt was fresh as if the holes had been dug the previous day. SGT Badolati and I returned to the edge of the trail and had no sooner joined the remainder of the team when SFC Hodgson began firing to his front down the trail. I immediately pulled him back past us and then SGT Badolati and I sprayed the area down the trail in case there were more VC. (This took place at coordinates BS715170, time 280930.) I quickly conferred with SFC Hodgson and he stated that he had killed the first two VC and wounded the third. I heard what I thought was voices and more movement back down the trail so I told the team to move out fast across the stream and up the hill on the other side. I did not lead at this time as I wanted to make sure we weren’t being followed and attempt to cover our trail.

  “If there were more VC on the trail, they did not pursue us immediately. I felt at this time that we had been compromised but, was not certain at this time that I would ask for exfiltration. We continued moving up the hill and observed freshly dug holes (foxholes) saturating the whole area. We also noticed a couple of machine gun positions, clothes and rice baskets. I immediately told the team not to pick up anything as it may be booby trapped. From this hill, SSG Terry informed me that he saw a large force (estimated at thirty to forty) of VC moving towards the hill.

  “From this point on, there was no doubt that we had been compromised and that we had to move fast and try to evade the VC. We moved until approximately 1200 hours, at which time I wanted to make radio contact and request exfiltration. We hadn’t been stopped more than five minutes when we received a hail of fire from about 20 meters away and from above us. SSG Badolati was hit in the left upper arm with such force that it looked like it almost severed his arm. When he was hit, it knocked him back past me. He remained on his feet and continued back through the woods. At the same time that SSG Badolati was hit, a round knocked SFC Hodgson’s weapon from his hands with such force that it knocked him back past me where he landed on his back. I asked him if he was hit and he said no so I told him to move out.

  “During this time, the other men and myself returned the fire. After SSG Badolati and SFC Hodgson moved to the rear, I sprayed the area through the woods as I could as I could see no one. I then began pulling back and SSG McKeith covered me as I did so. We moved approximately 30 meters and seeing that we were all together, I told SFC Hodgson to assist SSG Badolati as SFC Hodgson was unarmed. SFC Hodgson applied a tourniquet to SSG Badolati’s arm and we began moving again. We moved on for another four or five hundred meters and stopped to attempt radio contact with anyone. At this time, I saw that the only radio we had was an HT-1. I began calling “Flaming Arrow”. The only reply I heard was “Alpha Mike”. I gave the radio to MSG Gray and told the others we had to keep moving. SFC Hodgson told me that SSG Badolati was still losing blood so I told him to put two tourniquets on his arm, which he did, and SSG Badolati asked for morphine. To the best of my knowledge, morphine was administered four times.

  “We continu
ed to move generally north, out of our TAOR. My plan was to move north, then West and finally South to re-enter our TAOR and get to the emergency RV point. We continued on for about two hundred meters coming to a wall made out of rock. This wall was approximately three feet high and 18 inches thick and ran as far as we could see through the woods. I felt that this wall not only afforded us a position where we could stop to attend to SSG Badolati’s arm but a fairly good defensive position as well. I hoped that we could ambush them and hurt them bad enough that they would stop pursuit. We had no more than got settled in this position when a hail of fire came at us through the woods. We immediately returned the fire, and I turned and told SSG Badolati to start moving and we would catch him. I turned back to fire again and saw that the other three men were gone. (MSG Gray, SSG Terry, and SFC Hodgson who were closer to the wall than I when the firing broke out.) I then sprayed the area again above the wall and began moving back. SSG McKeith, who was behind me, covered me and we joined SSG Badolati and continued to move. I asked SSG McKeith if he had seen the other three men, and he stated that he had seen them leave the wall and start up the hill away from us. I then remembered the CS grenade I had and gave it to SSG McKeith to throw behind us, which he did. We did not hear any more movement behind us after he threw the grenade.

  “We, SSG Badolati, SSG McKeith and I, continued to move until we came to a stream bed. I decided to use this stream bed to cover our trail and try to lose the VC if they were still following. At this point, we observed a helicopter coming up the valley and at the same time approximately 30 to 50 VC moved out into the open and fired on the helicopter. These VC were well armed, equipped with complete web equipment and caps. They looked to be PAVN. We continued to move for about 50 meters when SSG Badolati said he could go no further and asked us to leave him. At this point we, SSG McKeith and myself, knew we had to stop.

  “We selected a position about two or three feet up the bank which was fairly well concealed with shrubs and boulders. We were right on the bend in the stream and felt that if they were following that we might be able to kill enough that they would leave us alone. SSG McKeith and I positioned ourselves on each side of SSG Badolati and laid out our extra magazines and hand grenades and planned on taking a “few” with us. We arrived at this location at approximately 1500 hours and remained there until 1730 hours. During this time, we continually checked SSG Badolati and it seemed that he had lost all the blood he was going to lose, as the bleeding had stopped. We thought that he had died several times between 1700 and 1715 hours and at 1715 we were sure tha the was gone. We remained until 1730 hours discussing our plans. I thought it best to move as high as we could get, as fast as we could go and take the most difficult route getting there. (We left SSG Badolati’s body along the edge of the stream at a junction. The junction was very prominent forming a Y. The body was left about 3 to 4 feet up the bank in shrubbery and boulders. Directly above the spot is a house about 10 to 15 feet from the bank.)

  “We moved until it got so dark that we couldn’t see and decided to stop for the night. We began moving at about 290600 and moved uphill until about 1510 hours. We wanted to continue moving South towards our emergency RV point, but decided that since we were on a hill and it was open (elephant grass) that we might be able to attract the attention of somebody flying over. A few minutes later, we could hear an L-19 in the area and saw him flying off to the north of us. After about five passes, he finally turned straight toward us and spotted our panel. We knew then that he would be calling back for a helicopter. At about 1610 hours, firing broke out about 100 meters to the East of us and slightly down the hill. The rounds were snapping pretty close to us and we thought they were after us. (I later found out it was my other three men when MSG Gray was picked up.) We considered running again, but knew that if we moved from this spot we might never get picked up. We quickly decided it was either here or nowhere for a pickup.

  “During this firing, it sounded like someone was firing back at the VC, whom we could hear shouting further down the hill. We thought it might be our other three men and I told SSG McKeith to get on the chopper first, as we could hear it coming. I got a red smoke grenade ready to throw as soon as I got on the chopper. Once I was on the chopper, I told the pilots and gunners that there were VC on the ground firing. I threw the smoke as we flew down the hill. I waited a while in case it was our men back up the hill. I wanted to make sure I didn’t throw red smoke on them. SSG McKeith and I were returned to base, and we immediately informed TOC about the fire fight and that it might be our men. They returned to the area and checked but could not find them. After checking with MSG Gray, he confirmed that it was him and the other two men who were being chased by the VC.

  “During this entire patrol, voices could be heard in the valley and they seemed to be directing others. I feel that about ninety percent of the people there are people who live in the valley and the other ten percent are units that are passing through. From the moment that SSG Badolati was hit, he seemed to sense that he was not going to make it and he told me so. I told him that we would make it out but he wanted me to leave him even before the team was split. He said the team would have a better chance of getting out if we left him. He continued begging me to leave him and save ourselves. He then stated that he knew he was going to die and that he didn’t want to take us with him. The last words I recall him saying were “save yourselves”. SSG Badolati knew that if he stopped, we all would stop and we couldn’t afford to do this. I feel that SSG Badolati saved my team from complete annihilation by his determination to keep going and save us.”25

  Master Sergeant Wiley Gray’s account is as follows:25 “After being hit at the stone wall by the VC for the second time, SGT Terry and I fired one magazine each, then seeing SFC Hodgson moving out to the West, we followed him thinking the rest of the team was also moving. SGTs Huston, McKeith and Badolati were to our rear when the firing started and we couldn’t see them. We took it for granted when we saw SFC Hodgson moving out that the rest of the team was also moving. After about 15 minutes, we stopped and discovered that the rest of the team was split.

  “A few minutes later, we heard firing to the North in the valley and assumed that the rear or other half of the team was being exfiltrated. We moved about 100 yards further West and came across a trail junction. One foxhole was located above the junction with good fields of fire down both trails. We remained here until about 1900 hours in a position where we could observe this foxhole. About 1845 hours, we saw two VN wearing black pass by, one had a light weight poncho (Delta type). I figured that this came from some of the equipment that we dropped during the first fire fight. These two men were moving north. At 1900 hours, we moved South and then West and spent the night. During the night we heard troop movements below us and dogs barking.

  “At first light on the 29th, we moved West until we crossed a trail in the vicinity of coordinates BS719172 at approximately 0800 hours. After crossing this trail, we crawled into the elephant grass to observe the trail facing North. We were all facing the North and within arm’s reach of one another. Once during the day, we heard troops behind us. Around 1600 hours, I observed three VC dressed in black in the prone position and four standing, two in gray or Khaki uniform, all within four feet of us on the right or right rear. I tapped SGT Terry on the left leg and told him VC and to fire at which time I grabbed my M-16 which was on my left side and came up on one knee and starting firing at the VC standing. Three of these fell. I heard SGT Terry yell that he was hit. I looked down and saw him holding his right side with both hands and blood coming through his fingers. I then saw his body hump again like he took another round and then he lay still. I looked behind me and saw that SFC Hodgson was gone.

  “I ran to the West for about 20 feet through the elephant grass and fell down facing to the East and waited in ambush for the VC to follow me. At this time, I heard one pistol shot, which I believe to have been made by a 9mm pistol. This shot came from directly across the trail from me, and s
omeone gasped. Approximately one minute later, I heard a burst of three shots and then two that sounded like they came from an M-16 rifle. They sounded like they came from where I had left SGT Terry’s body. At this time, armed helicopters starting firing in that direction and the VC stopped firing. (I later found out the choppers were exfiltrating SFC Huston and SSG McKeith whom had heard us firing and told the gunners to fire in that direction. I know that the firing from the choppers saved my life.)

  “After about five minutes, the choppers left the area and I could hear the VC cutting poles. I assumed this was to carry their dead and wounded off on litters. Around 1200 hours, I heard movement to my rear and saw five people within five feet of me. I cut loose with one magazine and then rolled down the hill for approximately 30 feet and waited in ambush. About 5 minutes later, I heard movement coming down the path I had made when I dived off the hill. I saw two men armed, in khaki or gray with gray hats on. I let them get within six feet of me and I shot both of them and started rolling down the hill again. At this time, the VC opened up with everything they had for approximately three minutes. I waited in ambush again and I heard someone issuing orders in a real sharp voice at my previous position and then again I heard movement and saw two more men dressed in gray coming down the path I had made. I again let them get within six feet of me and killed them both. One of these men had on a “SAM BROWN” type belt with a shoulder strap. I then rolled down the hill again only this time I crawled under some grass and as I went into the grass, I pulled the grass in behind me. In about 15 minutes, I heard more orders being given and then saw movement on both sides of me and to the rear. I then heard noises I thought to be them setting up some type of crew served weapon off to the West of my position. I heard someone above me say two words in English, “American and Officer”.