Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta

by Carpenter, Stephen

  The intelligence garnered from Operation Sultan indicated that the enemy was present in all areas of the AO. Documents captured contained both personal and military correspondence. Elements of the 32nd NVA Regiment were indeed present in the AO. The number of letter box numbers and unit designations found in personal correspondence indicated that elements of the 66th NVA Regiment had been transferred to the 32nd NVA Regiment to replace the over 1600 men lost in the Battle of Dak To. The absence of agricultural activities throughout the AO and the presence of numerous high speed travel routes indicated that the replenished 32nd NVA Regiment had relocated from the Plei Trap Valley westward to stage for their next offensive from Cambodia.58

  On New Year’s Day, 1968, an Operations Order was issued for Operation Sultan II. The FOB was established at the Special Forces Camp at New Plei Djereng. The operation was a continuation of Operation Sultan to identify the suspected enemy buildup in the Central Highlands. Very little record exists of missions run from the FOB at Plei Djerang. The following is a recollection of Gary Nichols, who served in Project Delta from 1966 to 1970.

  “In January 1968, Project Delta was working the tri-border area out of Plei Djereng. A couple recon teams were already on the ground and Doc Simpson and I were scheduled to infiltrate that night. Everything had gone well on our recon flight. We managed to select the primary, secondary and alternate landing zones. All three were on the western side of our AO, close to the Cambodian border and close together. We had already discussed the possibility of a ladder extraction if there were any problems. The team was ready and just before last light we took off for our primary LZ. On final approach, flying tree top level, the pilot pulled up right on the LZ and just before the skid touched ground, muzzle flashes and NVA started coming from the wood lines (thank God none of us jumped out). As we hastily departed, door gunners returned fire and we could hear the clunk of bullets striking the chopper body. When we landed at the FOB and inspected the chopper for damage it was discovered that one of the incoming rounds had almost cut through the rear rotary blade cable. Fortunate for us it didn’t let go until we got home. Needless to say I don’t think there was a happy face amongst us when we were told that a decision to infiltrate the same area, different LZ was on for the next night.

  “The following night we departed as scheduled and everything was going fine, until the chopper was hovering over the LZ. The point man jumped (requiring the five of us to follow) and while the chopper was leaving we heard shots, people yelling and dogs barking. We took off like a bat out of hell for cover and it was only a miracle that we ran to a place in the tree line where there were no enemy. Throwing caution to the wind we ran as fast as we could, through brush and trees hoping all the noise they were making would cover up all the noise we were making.

  “We followed a small brook for a while and spread our special recipe seasoning (garlic, onion, salt and pepper) in strategic places behind us as we traveled (didn’t last long). That night, all night, we heard people with dogs looking for us. We determined the dogs were not trained trackers or they would have found us by now, unfortunately even mutts get lucky sometimes. With first light came overcast skies (which stayed with us for the entire time out) and the sounds of people and dogs moving above and below us. This continued for three days, keeping us in check. We were under a triple canopy and the closest place we could be extracted was back from whence we came, so we moved straight up the mountain stopping at the military crest. On the second day we were out of water (it was hot, humid, and the continuous trek up the mountain took most of our water, the rest went to make our small bag (one days ration, the size of your fist) of dehydrated rice with dried minnows soluble (disgusting mixture, filled you up, no one wanted seconds). As we quietly laid in wait for the NVA to leave we had nothing to do but look and listen. One of the VNSF must have brought an extra canteen of water, which he so diligently sipped one capful at a time day and night. He finally ran out of water on the third day, just prior to his scheduled demise by the rest of the team. After three days without water, it became the only thought occupying our minds. We couldn’t sleep, couldn’t eat, our tongues were swollen, it was hard to talk and difficult to breathe.

  “The Sounds of dogs and people searching had ceased. Where they went was a mystery and at that point we didn’t care. The decision to split the team by sending two people for water wasn’t easy. We knew we couldn’t remain in the present location and because of the weather, terrain and condition of the team (weak from hunger, thirst, no water) it would be suicide if we moved as a team and got caught in the open. Although the two going for water wouldn’t have a radio, they would be traveling light and could possibly out run anyone who may detect them. So with these assumptions one VNSF and I emptied our rucksacks, took all the canteens and went in search of water (I left the radio with Doc). Off we went moving along the military crest until we came to a small crevice leading down the side of the mountain, although dry it held promise that past rain fall had followed its path down the mountain, so down the mountain we went. The grade was steep and movement was slow and hazardous. We came to an area where the trees were sparse with a single canopy and stopped there to take a short break. Through the trees and vegetation we could see the valley floor and spotted two men with rifles, off in the distance moving away from us. We watched and after a few minutes continued down the mountain another 100 meters. That’s when we came upon the mud hole of our dreams, no more then a small indentation in the run off; it was enough to have collected water at some time in the past and now became our salvation. From this point on I have lapses in my memory. I remember the VN and me digging in mud and sucking water. I think the two of us forgot where we were and instead focused on drinking as much water as we could. After filling the canteens we started back up the mountain, back tracking the crevice. That night was a feast to remember, finally water to wet our parched throats and to mix up our rice and minnow gourmet meal (we hadn’t eaten in days). The next day everyone felt better, still weak but with renewed hope we started down to the valley floor. The weather was still overcast, but we could hear FAC flying. We quickly set up to make radio contact and get a fix on our location so we could request extraction.

  “Unfortunately we were in the low ground under a thick canopy and the sky was overcast. Doc was communicating with FAC and I was attempting to get FACs attention with my flare gun. After numerous tries, unable to get through the canopy I got out the strobe light, this seemed futile under this canopy and didn’t do any good either. Doc told me to try the strobe light in conjunction with the survival mirror, the rest is history. FAC directed us to a LZ, and we were extracted without incident.”106

  With indications that a major offensive was brewing, Project Delta closed the FOB at Plei Djerang and headed for Nha Trang.

  CHAPTER XIV: 1968, TET

  The sixth named campaign of the Vietnam War was “Tet Counteroffensive”, 30 January 1968-1 April 1968. On 29 January 1968 the Allies began the Tet-Lunar New Year expecting the usual 36-hour peaceful holiday truce. Because of the threat of a large-scale attack and communist buildup around Khe Sanh, the cease fire order was issued in all areas over which the Allies were responsible with the exception of I Corps, south of the Demilitarized Zone.

  Determined enemy assaults began in the northern and Central provinces before daylight on 30 January and in Saigon and the Mekong Delta regions that night. Some 84,000 VC and North Vietnamese attacked or fired upon 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 64 of 242 district capitals and 50 hamlets. In addition, the enemy raided a number of military installations including almost every airfield. The actual fighting lasted three days; however Saigon and Hue were under more intense and sustained attack.

  The attack in Saigon began with a sapper assault against the U.S. Embassy. Other assaults were directed against the Presidential Palace, the compound of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and nearby Ton San Nhut air base.

  At Hue, eight enemy battalions infiltrated
the city and fought the three U.S. Marine Corps, three U.S. Army and eleven South Vietnamese battalions defending it. The fight to expel the enemy lasted a month. American and South Vietnamese units lost over 500 killed, while VC and North Vietnamese battle deaths may have been somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000.

  Heavy fighting also occurred in two remote regions: around the Special Forces camp at Dak To in the central highlands and around the U.S. Marines Corps base at Khe Sanh. In both areas, the allies defeated attempts to dislodge them. Finally, with the arrival of more U.S. Army troops under the new XXIV Corps headquarters to reinforce the marines in the northern province, Khe Sanh was abandoned.

  Tet proved a major military defeat for the communists. It had failed to spawn either an uprising or appreciable support among the South Vietnamese. On the other hand, the U.S. public became discouraged and support for the war was seriously eroded. U.S. strength in South Vietnam totaled more than 500,000 by early 1968. In addition, there were 61,000 other allied troops and 600,000 South Vietnamese.

  The Tet Offensive also dealt a visibly severe setback to the pacification program, as a result of the intense fighting needed to root out VC elements that clung to fortified positions inside the towns. For example, in the densely populated delta there had been approximately 14,000 refugees in January; after Tet some 170,000 were homeless. The requirement to assist these persons seriously inhibited national recovery efforts.65

  On January 30th, 1968 the Communists launched their TET general offensive across South Vietnam. Caught celebrating the lunar New Year, the Saigon government was initially ill prepared to counter the VC/NVA attacks. When the Tet Offensive began, Project Delta was in Nha Trang. When Nha Trang was hit on the first day, the LLDB Headquarters was protected by the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, recently returned from Plei Djerang. At only 60 percent strength the Airborne Rangers turned in an excellent performance, pushing the major Communist elements out of Nha Trang in less than a day. The battle, however, cost the life of the battalion commander and wounded the four company commanders.68

  Project Delta was dispatched to the beleaguered I Corps area for Operation Samurai IV (2-68) from March 4th to April 4th, 1968. The NVA forces had successfully utilized Highway 547 in western Thua Thien Province as a major infiltration route to Hue from Laos. Hue became the scene of a long and vicious battle depicted in several Hollywood features. Much of the true story of the Battle of Hue is not widely known in the United States. For a Vietnamese perspective of the events of early 1968 see Appendix IV.

  Major Allen briefed the Deputy Commander, MACV, General Creighton Abrams and his staff on the concepts to be employed during Samurai IV. The operation would be punctuated with frequent enemy contacts and sightings and would again demonstrate the skill and ingenuity of this small legion of professionals. Once again a Company of the Mobile Strike Force A-503 (Mike Force) would accompany Delta as an exploitation and reaction force.69

  On March 5th, 1968, Recon Team 2 (SSG Edward Cook, SSG Jimmy Cooley, SP5 Albert Merriman) infiltrated their assigned AO with the mission of observing activity along Highway 547 and Highway 547A west of Hue and east of the Ashau Valley. The team moved several hundred meters to a hidden point overlooking an area where the highway crossed the Rao Nai and looped sharply to the east toward Hue. Just a few hundred meters to the north the Rao Nho intersected the Rao Nai from the west. Highway 547A followed the Rao Nho valley. No sooner had the team established its Remain Over Night (RON) position than they heard a single vehicle from the direction of Highway 547 to the east. The team also heard five single rifle shots from the same location.

  The next morning the team moved north and west toward Highway 547A and received instructions to halt and hide for the remainder of the day. This type of instruction was not unusual when other Project Delta elements were being infiltrated or extracted or otherwise required the air assets of the Project. The team stayed in that position overnight and during the hours of darkness heard 14 trucks moving west to east along the highway at twenty minute intervals. The trucks sounded like ¾ ton or 2 ½ ton trucks. The team remained in the same position all of that day and through the following night. During this time they heard numerous small arms fire in single shots and groups of up to six shots that seemed like signal shots. The team was again instructed to remain in the same position overnight.

  At 0450 hours on the morning of the 9th the team heard more trucks moving west to east on highway 547A. At 0730 hours Team 2 was given the go ahead to continue the mission. All during the day the team heard voices from the general direction of the highway and managed to avoid contact until late afternoon when they came across two NVA soldiers at a distance of 5 meters and took them under fire, killing one and wounding the other. Team 2 withdrew to a good hiding place and listened as signal shots were fired from the direction of the enemy contact. Near dusk the team heard five trucks moving from east to west along the highway.

  At 0445 hours on the 10th the team heard three more trucks traveling west to east. As daylight approached the team prepared to move back toward the highway. They came across a small stream and decided to explore further. Within several meters they discovered eight huts that showed signs of use within the previous 24 hours. They found bloody bandages, khaki uniforms and several documents. Team 2 moved to their RON and between 1830 hours and 0200 hours on the 11th they heard 14 trucks moving west to east on Highway 547A. The team moved closer to the road and by late afternoon was hidden within a few meters of it.

  They continued to hear sporadic small arms fire and an occasional explosion, some within 150 meters of their position. They soon discerned that some of the small arms fire coincided with the movement of vehicles on the road, indicating a pattern of signals. On March 11th Team 2 again heard three trucks heading west to east accompanied by small arms signals along the route. This time they were able to identify trucks traveling in the opposite direction some 45 minutes later as the same trucks by their distinctive engine sounds. On the morning of the 12th Team 2 heard a heavy machine gun being fired from the direction of the explosions they had heard earlier. The team was extracted without incident.69

  While Team 2 was gathering information in the Rao Nho Valley the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion was alerted to respond to a FAC sighting of a convoy of six enemy trucks and 200 enemy troops along Highway 547 in the Rao Nai Valley to their east. FAC had directed an air strike on the convoy and destroyed several trucks and an unknown number of enemy soldiers. The 1st and 5th Companies were inserted together along Highway 547 while 3rd Company was inserted 3 kilometers to the southwest along the highway to act as a blocking force and trap any enemy attempting to flee that way.69 The 91st was inserted without incident and began moving to a better location along the road. Senior Ranger Advisor LT Tom Humphus recalls that, in spite of the noise involved in the insertion of two companies at his location, there was no response or indication of awareness from the enemy. The two companies took positions on opposite sides of the road in a rough “L” shaped ambush and set up to wait for the enemy. Humphus and his second in command, WO Cedric “Shorty” Turner, assigned from the Australian SAS, took position with the LLDB Company Commander behind a banyan tree. SSG Phil Salzwedel, the U.S. enlisted advisor, and SGT Little J. Jackson, the Delta medic, were located to their right in a shallow depression.

  Shortly before dark the left flank of the 5th Company signaled that they saw enemy movement on the road. A squad of NVA walked down the road unaware of the Ranger presence. All but one were walking at sling arms. One carried his weapon casually at his side. When someone opened fire the squad was a little left of center, between both legs of the ambush, meaning that any fire directed by either Company would intersect the other Company’s position. Three of the NVA were killed immediately. As the one NVA fell, he managed to fire a burst of random shots as he died that struck SGT Jackson in the chest and SSG Salzwedel in the arm.

  The remaining NVA took cover in the ditch below 5th Company’s position, thus positioning
themselves in the only area protected from direct fire by either Company. As the NVA randomly fired in both directions the Rangers proceeded to return fire, effectively firing on each other. LT Humphus called for support from the 281st AHC who laid down 40 mm cannon fire and succeeded in silencing the enemy fire. After tending to the minor wounds incurred by the two Companies firing toward each other, Humphus repeatedly tried to get a medevac in for SGT Jackson but was told to wait for first light.

  The Rangers remained on high alert, knowing full well that the noise of the helicopter cannon fire had surely alerted the NVA. Again, no enemy response was forthcoming. About two hours after dark LT Humphus and WO Turner observed someone light a cigarette on the edge of the road, a serious breach of security protocol. Turner identified the smoker as LT Lam, the Executive Officer of 5th Company. Suddenly an individual clad in black pajamas appeared, walking up the road toward Lam. LT Lam calmly asked who he was and the man responded by shining a flashlight on his own face, giving his name and asking who Lam was. LT Lam calmly said, “I am Lieutenant Lam, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion,” and shot the man in the head with his .45. Lam had not removed the cigarette from his mouth during the whole encounter and continued to smoke it until it was gone.

  Again the U.S. advisors feared they had been compromised and again nothing happened until first light. As dawn broke the Rangers heard the sound of a single truck coming from the west. It would travel for a distance, stop and blow the horn, and then continue coming down the road. It passed through the ambush position to a small stream that had a submerged bridge constructed as a crossing and then turned around and headed back to the west. The truck was apparently an advance element checking the road and signaling at intervals to let the convoy know the path was clear. Shortly after the truck passed, Shorty Turner informed Humphus that SGT Little J. Jackson had died of his wounds.