Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta

by Carpenter, Stephen

  A medevac helicopter would not respond to the Rangers because Spillane was dead and not wounded. The Project Delta advisors, already in despair over his loss, were even more incensed that they couldn’t get his body taken care of in the timely fashion due a fallen warrior. The following morning the U.S. advisors carried Mickey’s body toward a road and watched as a helicopter landed. A LT in starched and pressed jungle fatigues and spit shined jungle boots walked over to tell them that they could not take the body and then left. The men then carried Mickey’s body out to a highway where they flagged down a truck and took his body to the 3rd Field Hospital in Saigon.61.62,63,66

  The Americans were quartered in an empty warehouse on the MACV compound and the 81st rangers were quartered around a loose perimeter. The U.S. advisors were permitted to use the MACV officer’s club annex for food, drink and to relax between operations, as there were no other facilities available. The advisors were able to shower and clean up then go to the officers’ club for a sandwich and beer. While there, SSG Dave Ryder and SSG Dennis McVey saw the LT that had landed in the helicopter earlier that day come into the club and go to the bar. They walked up to the bar and flanked him, Ryder on his left, McVey on his right, and said hello. The LT answered, and they asked if he was the guy that they saw that morning. He answered in the affirmative and apologized that they could not help them, but they had to get the movies and mail to MACV Headquarters first. Ryder and McVey then urinated in his jungle fatigue shirt side pockets while he stood dumbfounded. They walked away and the LT stood there for a few seconds, then walked out of the club without saying a word. Project Delta advisors were informed that they were no longer welcome in the club. Their collective response was that they were OK with that as they were particular about who they drank with.66

  The name of Paul D. Spillane is inscribed on Panel 50W, Line 99 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  During the Saigon operation the Rangers discovered a VC/NVA bunker complex and found a dozen US 7.62 mm M60 ammo cans in one bunker. When they pulled them out and opened them, they found them full of brand new 500 piaster notes with the Bank of Cholon wrappers still on them. This immediately got the attention of the ARVN Rangers, especially the officers. They had a hurried conference and got on the radio and in no time a helicopter showed up with an ARVN Brigadier General. The money cans were loaded and never seen by U.S. advisors again.61,66

  After finishing the rocket belt operation, the 81st Rangers and the Delta advisors were moved to the Tay Ninh area. They spent a few days at the B-32 team site for briefings, rest and refit. SSG McVey had an opportunity to visit the 45th Surgical Hospital in Tay Ninh, make some contacts and get some needed medical supplies. The Rangers then moved to the Trang Sup A camp, A – 301, which was located on hwy 781 northwest of Tay Ninh, and near Nui Ba Den. Trang Sup was a Mobile Strike Force training and operations camp. Delta and the Rangers got briefed on a new mission and departed for Nui Ba Den or “Black Virgin Mountain” or the “Black Widows Mountain” depending on which legend one preferred.66

  The mission was to patrol the area around the mountain, secure the mountain and gather intelligence. Part of the unit went in by helicopter on top of the mountain then patrolled down. Part of the unit went in by truck to the base of the mountain on the west side by the Cambodian Border to act as a blocking force for the troops coming down the mountain. Nui Ba Den is a 3,000 foot tall mountain that is basically a pile of huge granite boulders with slopes of 45–50 degrees and steeper and is filled with tunnels and caverns. It sits on a large flat plain and has a vista of 30 or more miles in any direction from the top. It is also covered in trees and brush making it very difficult to move around the terrain. The mountain is located about 18 miles east of the Cambodian border in what was called the “Parrots Beak” and/or “the Iron Triangle” in III Corps, War Zone C.

  The Rangers were successful in finding enemy locations, made some contacts and captured some arms and equipment. One of the items captured was a wooden case filled with NVA stick grenades which was brought back to the Trang Sup Camp at the end of the operation. SSG McVey thought it would be good to have some unarmed grenades to use for trading material to “get stuff” for the project from the Air Force or other organizations. He started to disassemble and remove the TNT and cap from the grenades when the A – 301 Team Sergeant told him to “get the hell out of his building to do that.” McVey went out and sat on top of the perimeter defense wall to spend the afternoon disarming the case of grenades, luckily with no mishaps. The disarmed grenades were used to trade for supply items not normally available to Delta through military supply channels.66

  CHAPTER XV: TET COUNTEROFFENSIVE

  “Counteroffensive, Phase V”, 1 July 1968 - 1 November 1968. During this period a country-wide effort was begun to restore government control of territory lost to the enemy since the Tet offensive. The enemy attempted another such offensive on 17-18 August but his efforts were comparatively feeble and were quickly overwhelmed by Allied forces.

  In the fall of 1968 the South Vietnamese government, with major U.S. support, launched an accelerated pacification campaign. All friendly forces were coordinated and brought to bear on the enemy in every tactical area of operation. In these intensified operations, friendly units first secured a target area, then Vietnamese government units, regional forces/popular forces, police and civil authorities screened the inhabitants, seeking members of the Viet Cong infrastructure. This technique was so successful against the political apparatus that it became the basis for subsequent friendly operations. Government influence expanded into areas of the countryside previously dominated by the Viet Cong to such an extent that two years later at least some measure of government control was evident in all but a few remote regions.65

  Operation Alamo (5-68) was conducted from August 30th through September 30th, 1968. Project Delta was OPCON first to III Corps and then to the 5th ARVN Infantry Division. The mission was to conduct reconnaissance and interdiction missions along the Cambodian border west of Saigon in the Parrot’s Beak. The 281st AHC was authorized to operate in I Corps and II Corps tactical zones and was thus prevented from supporting Delta in III IV Corps. The 195th AHC provided minimal support and the Project found itself reliant upon back channel arrangements with the 1st U.S. Infantry Division. A total of thirteen Recon missions, fourteen Roadrunner missions, two Nung BDA operations and four Ranger operations were conducted.73

  The FOB was established at the end of a dirt runway adjacent to an old French rubber plantation at Quan Loi. The weather was again a factor as the frequent rains turned the red clay into slippery mud and caused air activities to be delayed on occasion. The mission began on a productive note as Roadrunner Team 101 was the first to be inserted on August 30th and was extracted on September 1st with two prisoners. Recon Team 1 was inserted on September 1st and was extracted on September 3rd with a prisoner. The remaining teams in the field were extracted after making contact with enemy troops and being compromised. Recon Team 3 found a large fortified area that had been recently occupied. The Nung platoon was inserted and linked with Team 3 to exploit the area. The base area was found to be 15,000 square meters in size and held 30 houses, each capable of providing quarters for 25 to 30 men.73

  On September 6th, 5th Company, 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion was inserted along with the prisoner captured by Team 1. On the 7th the Company’s rear element was fired upon by three NVA. The 1st Platoon returned fire, killing two. As the prisoner led them toward an enemy hospital, the Rangers were again fired upon by four VC as they negotiated an old mine field. The hospital was abandoned and run down. It was located underground, but was not concealed, although it could not be detected from the air.73

  On September 12th Team 7 reported watching several VC around a cluster of buildings that contained many 82mm mortar rounds and tubes, 122mm rockets and a quantity of AK 47 rifles. The team soon found itself surrounded and remained hidden as they called for a reaction force. The Nung platoon was inserted o
n the 12th and linked with Team 7. The Delta combined force secured the area and was soon in contact with an estimated 30 VC. They called for more reinforcements and the 1st Company, 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion was inserted on the 13th. The Rangers came under heavy fire on the insertion LZ. After the fire was suppressed by gunships the Rangers linked with Team 7 and the Nungs. On the 14th the Delta force was attacked from the front and rear resulting in five Rangers wounded and one killed. Later that afternoon the 3rd and 5th Companies were inserted to reinforce the ground forces. The Rangers loaded the captured ordnance aboard CH-47 helicopters over the next two days. The captured ordnance included RPG-7 rockets (51 cases, 306 rounds, B-40 Rockets (406 cases, 2,436 rounds), anti-tank grenades (28 cases, 336 each), 60 mm Mortar rounds (94 cases, 1,128 rounds), 82 mm Mortar rounds (143 cases, 573 rounds), ChiCom TNT (61 cases, 4,575 blocks), AK-47 ammunition (399 cases, 574,500 rounds). A number of mortar tubes and AK rifles were also captured. Contact with the enemy continued sporadically throughout the removal operation.73

  SSG Dennis McVey recalled that the enemy ordnance was removed to the FOB and stacked in a secure area. After about twenty CH-47 loads were brought out, someone realized that the stockpiled munitions would make a very nice target for the enemy. A direct hit would be devastating to the FOB. It was decided to remove the munitions from the FOB by truck and destroy the quantities at the capture site rather than remove any more.66

  McVey also recounts one of the many serious situations that were made humorous after the fact. “While at Quan Loi I went out with the rangers to do an area recon and SFC Billy V. Bean was one of the ranger advisors. We got into contact and I got behind a huge tree for cover, but Billy Bean ran into me and knocked me out from behind the tree and into the dirt. He hit me so hard that it knocked the breath out of me and before I caught my breath and got up it was all over. Billy thought it was funny. I did not. We found an old abandoned and derelict French truck and some caches with ammunition and old bolt action French rifles obviously from the Viet Minh-French era. What was interesting was the woven split bamboo trails and roads constructed in the jungle to make travel easier. The trees were tied together at the top to form a roof like structure to obscure view from overhead; some of the trail/roads were 8’ – 10’ wide.”66

  On September 24th Recon Team 9 and Roadrunner Team 102 each captured a prisoner and were extracted. On September 26th Recon Team 1 reported being in contact with the enemy and requested extraction. They reported three enemy killed and U.S. senior advisor Lawrence “Tiny” Young received a gunshot wound to the forehead above the right eye. Tiny shrugged it off and continued to run missions.73

  The Project Delta Commander, Major Robert May, wrote a scathing after action report to this operation. High on his list of unsatisfactory efforts was the commitment of a minimum number of aircraft to the Project that caused the number of teams in the field to be reduced. The reconnaissance mission of the Project came to an abrupt halt when all aircraft were committed to support the removal of munitions from the large weapons cache discovered in the area. May further expressed dissatisfaction with the air relay aircraft and crew assigned from the Vietnamese Air Force. They averaged less than eight hours a day on station, thus depriving the teams on the ground of reliable radio communication.

  He was very critical of the small size of the assigned AO and the way the ARVN Commander decided to divide it into two sections in order to support his own ground operation. May opined that the small area deprived Delta of most of its options to keep the operation clandestine and the arbitrary division of the AO enabled the enemy to shift his operations to the area that Delta was denied. May revealed that an Operations Order for Operation Alamo was requested but was never issued and in fact never existed. MACV had issued a letter assuring May that requisite support would be available but never followed up with any assignments. Delta had to rely on its back channel communication to request support from the 1st U.S. Infantry Division, a unit that performed well.

  In his report, May saved the best for last. He presented detailed documentation of the Project’s effort to establish reliable communication with III Corps and with 5th Special Forces Group. After much discussion and disappointing response from III Corps, a call sign and frequency was finally established with the 5th ARVN Division Signal Center. Another day passed before a compatible key code was produced for encoding Delta’s messages. Delta attempted to pass a high priority message and could not break through the chatter on the communications network; long agonizing personal chatter punctuated by an occasional low priority message. Totally enraged, May collected a series of high priority messages and compared their time of transmittal to their time of receipt at 5th Special Forces Group Headquarters and documented the average transpired time as 23 hours and 25 minutes. Project Delta closed the FOB and headed home.73

  Operation Alamo identified two major enemy units, the 368th Local Forces Battalion and the 168th Local Forces Battalion, and their subordinate elements through interrogation of prisoners and captured documents. Because of a large number of base sites, hospitals, large food caches, and ammunition caches found in the area, it was felt that the general area of the Song Be River South from Cambodia to E-W Highway 13 was a possible new enemy base area. In addition, four major infiltration routes were confirmed. A large number of high speed trails with bamboo matting were also found.40

  Operation Warbonnet (6-68) began on October 13th with the installation of a Mission Support Site (MSS) at Da Nang and preliminary movement of equipment from Quan Loi to An Hoa. The FOB did not become operational until October 30th. Between October 30th and November 14th nine Recon missions and six Roadrunner missions were conducted. The missions were frequently postponed and delayed due to heavy rain and ground fog in the AO. During this short operation, contact with enemy forces ranging in size from one individual to a platoon, were frequent and caused teams to be extracted after compromise.

  It was determined that enemy political and military organizations existed in all parts of the AO. There was evidence that the area was heavily used by both VC and NVA troops. Units identified in the AO included the C27 production unit normally responsible for growing food, providing shelter and guiding infiltrators through the area. Due to the large number of enemy troop sightings, enemy contacts, secondary explosions and agent reports it was determined that the area was used primarily as a headquarters area for training, regrouping, food cache, hospital area and quartermaster depot. The village of My Hiep was determined to be occupied and engaged in agricultural production. Project Delta identified two major infiltration routes within the AO; Highway 14 and the Song Cai River. The enemy demonstrated an ability to maintain simple communications while tracking and pursuing Delta teams by firing groups of single shots and beating sticks together.74

  Medic Dennis McVey recalls that the FOB was set up at an old unfinished factory site and coal mine next to the 3rd Marine Division Base Camp in I Corps. “It was very wet and muddy. The Marine LRRP teams had suffered heavy losses due to their tactics, but were unwilling to take advice from Delta or adopt some of Delta’s methods. The Marines used the same insertion and extraction LZs repeatedly. They would insert teams by Sea Knight Helicopters with the team hanging from ropes or ladders, so they were exposed to weather which put them in a tired and weakened condition before ever getting on the ground. They could also be seen by everyone in the AO and the enemy knew exactly how many were being inserted. I remember that we traded quart bottles of Ten High Whisky with Marines for their M-79’s as theirs were the ones with the wooden stocks instead of the newer plastic stocks. Delta would cut the barrels down and cut the stocks into pistol grips to create an M-79 pistol that was easier to carry than a full sized M-79. Delta could not cut down the plastic stocks as they were hollow. We also traded some whisky for a Marine motorized mule and hid it in a conex box by standing it on end and taking it back to Nha Trang. I also remember that the Marines had no sandbagged tents, just fighting bunkers. That left them unprotecte
d during mortar/rocket attacks. There were several 122 mm rockets fired into the Marine base while we were there but only one rocket hit in our area. It was a memorable event as it was aimed at the Marine base but fell short and landed in our FOB. The thing that made it memorable was the guy (not a Delta member) that was sitting on a pile of coal with no shirt on when the rocket hit the coal pile. He instantly turned black, peppered with bits of coal and coal dust; no serious injuries but his whole chest, arm, neck and face were tattooed with coal.”66

  In another scathing after action report Major May pulled no punches in criticizing the fact that a FAC aircraft assigned to support Warbonnet was sidelined for maintenance for five of the fifteen days of the operation. This not only compromised the safety of the teams on the ground, it deprived the Project of its important photographic intelligence gathering ability. Just as Delta began closing on FOB An Hoa, orders were received from 5th Special Forces Group Headquarters that Project Delta would return to III Corps and continue to operate from Quan Loi. As a result the aircraft scheduled to lift the Rangers from Nha Trang to An Hoa were cancelled, leaving the FOB without proper security for nearly a week. The operation was declared a go at An Hoa and the move to the new FOB continued. After Warbonnet had been in progress for a week, another message came ordering Delta back to III Corps. Delta cancelled all insertions and began preparations to be operational in III Corps within a week. Within a few days Major May was instructed to continue the mission at An Hoa until November 15th. An obviously frustrated May finished his AAR with the following, “When newly assigned officers are placed in high staff positions which could influence the deployment of Project Delta it is recommended they receive a complete briefing on Project Delta. This should be considered a part of the in-country briefing and should be given by Project