Cavalry regulations, the last issued in 1806, continued the two-squadron division as the main tactical formation with the two-deep line the standard combat formation, the thin fighting line proving a distinct disadvantage against French cavalry utilizing compact columns. An even greater disadvantage was the lack of instructions and training for multi-regiment charges, which led to the use of single regiments, even squadrons, for futile attacks. The tendency to splinter cavalry strength, though opposed by Charles, was further reinforced by corps commanders demanding cavalry flank cover during movements in column, often receiving it in the form of small detachments. As a result, instead of being able to act on the battlefield as an independent strike force, the Austrian mounted arm was becoming a support element. Its combat capabilities were further weakened when its horse artillery, only partly mounted and not trained to support charges, were increasingly used as field artillery in 1809. Finally, the cavalry was seriously short of mounts and its effective field force, on paper around 36,000, numbered only 22,000 troopers.
Charles reorganized and strengthened the artillery, making it more effective, though still not equal to that of the French. He withdrew the regimental 3-pounders and combined them into eight-gun brigade batteries; the relatively few 6-pounders were sent to the corps artillery reserve and, usually combined with two 7-pound howitzers, were classified as support batteries. To augment the heavy 12-pounders, usually two or three batteries to each corps, some 6-pounder batteries were assigned as position batteries to the corps and army reserve artillery, the latter forming the Haupt-Dispositions-Reserve. Austrian artillery was well designed and Napoleon did not hesitate to incorporate captured pieces in his artillery park.
Normally support and position batteries were employed under the direction of the corps Artilleriechef, a feasible arrangement because, fighting in compact units, frontages seldom exceeded 2,500 yards. To replace the infantrymen providing the brute force to assist the gun crews, a new body, the Artillerie-Handlanger Corps, was established. Artillery transports were militarized and cadres assigned to the batteries. Though the new artillery organization, 742 field pieces in 108 batteries, aimed to provide massed fire, this was not often realized in practice. Few senior commanders appreciated the potential – and limitations – of artillery, while individual battery commanders, often over-aged because of exceedingly slow promotions in this branch, still tended to regard each individual piece as a discrete fire element. As a result, the archduke’s instructions that artillery always should act as part of a combined arm were often disregarded. None the less, if never as flexible an instrument as the French artillery, by the end of 1809 campaign the Austrian artillery was capable of delivering heavy massed fire.
THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM
Throughout its history the Habsburg army had to face its unique nationality problem. On the highest level there was the question of the Kingdom of Hungary, whose ‘ruling nation’, nobility and clergy, repeatedly at odds with the ruling monarch in Vienna, had extracted a special military status that by 1792 had resolved itself into an uneasy truce between equals. Hungary’s contribution to the army remained disproportionately small compared with that of the other lands of the monarchy and, even in time of crisis, the crown had to negotiate and cajole for manpower and supplies rather than to command. There was also the problem of emerging nationalism. While still in a nascent stage, except perhaps among the Magyars, command of an army whose regiments variously spoke German, Czech, Flemish, Serbo-Croat, Italian, Magyar, Romanian and Polish could, one officer observed, ‘cause a singular confusion’. To overcome this, German had been introduced as the language of drill manuals, regulations and formal commands, though most officers had at least a smattering of other languages. Still, by the last decade of the eighteenth century, one officer questioned whether an army of ‘Hungarians, Croats, Transylvanians, Italians, Bohemians, Moravians, Poles, Wallachs, Slavonians, Austrians, Styrians, Tyroleans, Carnioleans, and gypsies could march under one flag and fight for a cause it knows nothing about’. But in the end it fought and, as far as the rank-and-file was concerned, fought well enough.10
NAPOLEON AT WAR
In contrast to Archduke Charles, Napoleon enjoyed supreme authority as ruler of France and commander-in-chief and was able to formulate and execute his own strategy.11 Unlike the archduke, Napoleon was prepared to take risks and, though he paid respect to the great captains of the past and recent military theorists, his strategy was always pragmatic. The destruction of the enemy’s main field force in a decisive battle rather than the occupation of enemy territory or the capture of the enemy’s capital was his main objective. The main instruments he used to achieve this were a superb staff, and the corps system he developed after 1800.
Command and control required a substantial staff apparatus, but his all-important personal staff – the Maison – remained quite small. It included Marshal Berthier, Prince of Neuchâtel, the chief-of-staff; General d’Albe, his chief topographical officer; and a small number of staff officers. In addition, there was a pool of trusted senior aides who would be sent on special missions, acting ‘in the name of the Emperor’. The emperor, however, remained his own operations officer, and Berthier did not participate in planning. Napoleon’s main combat formations were the army corps, the smallest force of all arms. Primarily infantry organizations, each consisted of two to four infantry divisions, a brigade of light cavalry and several batteries of artillery. The exact size and composition of forces allocated to each corps varied, reflecting its assignment and the talents of its commander, normally one of his marshals. As a group, Napoleon’s marshals had all seen considerable active service and displayed personal bravery in combat. That said, few were capable of independent command at the highest formation level, a fact that Napoleon, accordingly never likely to be challenged by his marshals, was more than content to accept.
There was also an independent cavalry corps. And above all there was the Imperial Guard, established in 1804. An all-arms corps d’élite, it enjoyed special privileges and, expanding steadily, it numbered about 12,000 by 1809. Though regarded as the ultimate reserve, in fact Napoleon rarely committed the Guard to combat, especially the grenadiers of the Old Guard.
To execute his desired strategic objective – a major, decisive battle – the various corps adopted a loosely quadrilateral formation, the bataillon carrée, with the self-contained corps marching within one day’s distance of each other. The first corps to come into contact with the enemy was to engage him at once, while the other corps, showing an extraordinary marching capability, would hurry to its support. When concentration had been achieved, Napoleon’s forces frequently outnumbered those of his adversaries. In battle, Napoleon would try to divide an enemy by gaining the ‘central position’ and then defeat one part of the enemy first. Alternatively, he would attempt to pin the enemy’s front and turn his flank. On the rare occasions he used frontal attacks, the results were not always satisfactory.
Napoleon generally left tactics at unit level in the hands of subordinates. The corps, and even more the divisional formations, as his basic manoeuvre elements, fought as a whole according to its training level, while the problems of communication during a large battle made personal intervention in tactical detail impractical. Generally, however, the French Army continued the skirmisher, line and column tactics introduced just before and during the Revolution, though now supplemented by Napoleon’s own innovations of great cavalry charges and the aggressive use of artillery. Underpinning the whole, however, was the remarkably effective system of conscription introduced at the start of the French revolution. Napoleon was always able to count on at least adequate levels of manpower.
NAPOLEON PREPARES FOR A NEW WAR
In early 1809, as Austria’s belligerent intentions became clear to the French emperor, a substantial proportion of the French Army, 200,000 men in all, comprising line regiments, the Imperial Guard and contingents from the minor states of the Confederation of the Rhine, were engaged
in Spain. Napoleon’s principal forces in Germany, the Army of the Rhine, brought into being after the old Grande Armée had been disbanded in October 1808, were widely dispersed and numerically weak, their main remaining combat element Marshal Davout’s 3 Corps. Clearly, substantial reinforcements were needed, but transferring them from Spain would take far too long. Realizing the need to reconstitute an army in Germany as rapidly as possible, Napoleon issued a number of important orders even before he left Spain for Paris on 17 January 1809. The Old Guard was returned to Germany, though even travelling for part of the way by requisitioned wagons and forced marches, its main elements could not arrive before the end of May. In Germany, it was to join the newly formed regiments of the Young Guard, 3,200 men raised from picked recruits.
At the same time, Napoleon recalled Marshals Lannes, Lefebvre, Bessières, and Masséna, General of Division Oudinot and other senior officers from Spain to assume new commands in Germany. He also instructed the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine to prepare their contingents. These ranged from small units combined into a single regiment to substantial forces such as the 32,000 men provided by Bavaria. The same message went to Prince Poniatowski of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and Eugène de Beauharnais, Napoleon’s able stepson and viceroy of the Kingdom of Italy.
Napoleon also made considerable efforts to raise additional troops in France to reinforce his forces in Germany. As early as September 1808, previously deferred men from the 1806–9 classes had been called up. On 15 January 1809 instructions for an advance call-up of additional recruits from the 1810 class were also issued. These men, a total of 80,000, were to provide the 3rd and 4th battalions for the infantry. At the same time, the military academies were emptied and Saint-Cyr cadets, due to graduate in May, as well as some senior sergeants, were commissioned at once. Substantial forward ammunition depots were established at Strasbourg, Augsburg and Ulm; ration stocks, biscuits and hardtack at Passau and Munich. Finally, General of Division Bertrand, inspector general of engineers, was ordered to build up large stocks of tools for all corps, repair bridgeheads along the Bavarian river and transfer 1,100 sailors to assist the engineers. By the time Napoleon reached Paris on 23 January, additional manpower, matériel, rations and other supplies were becoming available.12
On 4 March the emperor hurriedly issued orders to assemble a new army, designated La Grande Armée de l’Allemagne, by 30 March. A hastily formed organization, it necessarily showed signs of improvisation. To be sure, the main operational framework and the combat-proven leaders remained. Imperial Headquarters controlled an army cavalry reserve under Marshal Bessières, with three divisions of heavy cavalry, as well as the not yet completed army artillery reserve and the Old Guard, itself still marching east. Immediately available north of the Danube valley and now concentrating around Nuremberg, was the 60,000-strong 3 Corps, nicknamed the ‘Emperor’s X Legion’, and commanded by Davout, the Duke of Auerstädt. It consisted of four veteran French infantry divisions with its right flank covered by its two attached cavalry divisions: General Montbrun’s light cavalry and Saint-Sulpice’s heavy cavalry. A further reserve was provided by Saint-Hilaire’s infantry division, which had arrived from the shores of the Baltic in forced marches (and was assigned to 2 Corps within a week). Facing the river Inn was Lefebvre’s 7 Corps with three Bavarian divisions, while south of the Danube, with headquarters at Augsburg, Masséna was collecting his 4 Corps, including a competent Hessian brigade. Pending the arrival of Lannes, Duke of Montebello, the hastily constituted 2 Corps under General Charles, Duke of Reggio, was assembled around Ulm. Marshal Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo, was to take command of the Saxon army supported by a weak French division under General Dupas. Overall, while containing a larger proportion of raw recruits than usual and critically short of artillery, the new Army of Germany was rapidly reaching the numbers, commanders and organization to withstand an Austrian offensive.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE
Troops from the Confederation of the Rhine, the satellite Kingdom of Italy and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw constituted an important part of Napoleon’s forces during the campaign of 1809. While some German units had participated in sieges between 1805 and 1807, in 1809 nearly 100,000 men, some incorporated in French divisions and corps, others organized in their own corps and divisions, took part for the first time in major combat operations. Their divisional structures differed slightly from the French, and usually included all three combat arms: two infantry brigades, a cavalry brigade and divisional artillery. Though often resented, Napoleon stuck to his policy that all major formations would be commanded by French officers.13
Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse and Saxony furnished the most important contingents. The newly established Westphalian Kingdom had substantial forces, 25,000 men, but its best troops were engaged in Spain and its remaining troops, reinforced by Dutch regiments, saw no major combat. They were primarily engaged putting down revolts and insurrections in north Germany and forming a reserve to deal with the expected British landings. By contrast, the Bavarian army had undergone a major reform under Maximilian I Joseph (raised by Napoleon from elector to king in 1806), and saw substantial action. Bavaria had introduced conscription in 1804 with the result that by 1809 it was able to provide the largest German contingent to Napoleon’s army, 32,000 men and all trained on the French model. Its infantry component numbered thirteen line regiments and seven light infantry battalions, while the mounted arm had six regiments of horse. Its artillery regiment, reformed after 1801 by emigrant French gunners, was twenty companies strong, with twelve assigned to 7 Corps under Marshal Lefebvre, Duke of Danzig, an Alsatian by birth, German speaking and popular with his men and his Bavarian divisional commanders alike. Lefebvre’s corps was organized into three divisions, each composed of two infantry and one cavalry brigade, supported by four artillery batteries, 3-pounder light, 6-pounder line and 12-pounder reserve. Alerted initially in the summer of 1808, then placed on standby before being fully mobilized in February 1809, by 20 March, 7 Corps held a line along the Isar to the Bohemian border. As the forward element of Napoleon’s gathering army, it would take the brunt of the initial Austrian offensive.
King Friedrich of Württemberg, an absolute and domineering ruler, so fat he had to use a special cut-out table to eat, was an unlikely figure as a soldier. Under the Rheinbund treaty he was obliged to provide Napoleon with 12,000 men, which he raised by selective conscription. His officers for the most part were German and promoted by merit rather than birth. Mounted troops consisted of four light regiments, including one guard unit, while the foot consisted of seven line infantry battalions, a guard infantry battalion, four light infantry battalions, partly rifle armed, and a garrison battalion. The twenty-two guns of the artillery formed three batteries, two horse and one foot, all fielding 6-pounder guns and 7-pounder howitzers. Until February 1809 the army used Prussian drill; then it was hastily, but successfully, converted to the French combat system. Originally the Württembergers, who had gained a fine fighting record in 1807, were to be joined with some French formations and a combined force of troops from the minor states of the Rheinbund. In the end, however, they became 8 Corps, commanded by General of Division Vandamme, an efficient tactician but a crude and difficult man, detested by his German subordinates. Even so, his corps contained some of the best infantry of the Confederation troops.
Baden and Hesse troops contributed smaller numbers. Though Baden troops had not done well in earlier campaigns, the state had been compelled to send one infantry regiment to Spain. As a result there were many new conscripts among the 6,300 men incorporated into Legrand’s division of Masséna’s 4 Corps. Yet throughout the 1809 campaign, they performed all the missions assigned to them and earned extravagant praise from their French superiors. In contrast to Baden, Hesse’s small army had done well in 1806–7 – ‘brave and good soldiers’, Napoleon called them – and their small all-arms contingent, 4,300 in all, was a welcome accession to 4 C
orps, joining Saint-Cyr’s division. Their performance was excellent and praised by French commanders from Napoleon down.
By contrast, the conduct of the Saxon 9 Corps has provided the greatest controversy. Although a French ally since late 1806, its ruler had resisted all modernization. Recruitment and tactics remained based on the outdated Prussian model of the Seven Years’ War. Serfdom continued in the kingdom and entry into the officer corps was based on birth. Tactics remained linear, centralized control was paramount and initiative stifled. Even so, Saxon infantry had done well during the siege of Danzig and the cavalry had distinguished itself at the battle of Friedland.
In 1809 the Saxon army numbered twelve infantry line regiments, dressed in white uniforms, each of two battalions of five companies, including one grenadier company. In practice, the grenadiers were detached to form battalions of four companies each. Mobilization was slow and found all regiments below strength, with the shortage made good by hastily impressed recruits. Its cavalry, four heavy and five light regiments, enjoyed an excellent reputation, even though the French had confiscated most of its horses, as a result of which only twenty squadrons could be mounted and put in the field in 1809. The Saxon artillery was the weakest branch of its army. It was poorly trained and the four hastily formed batteries, each with four 8-pounder guns and two 8-pounder howitzers, were slow to manoeuvre and fire. In keeping with his principle that all major formations were to have French commanders, Napoleon appointed Bernadotte, perhaps his least reliable marshal, to head the 12,500 men of 9 Corps.
Finally, there were close to thirty small states in the Rheinbund whose populations were too small to provide viable individual units. Moreover, many of these states had already made troop contributions to the war in Spain. But Napoleon could not afford to lose the remaining manpower they represented and their individual military forces, all with different uniforms, weapons and training standards, were combined into seven, later reduced to six, Rheinbund regiments. Originally destined to join Masséna, four regiments were formed around Würzburg as a division under General of Division Rouyer and initially attached to Davout’s corps. Displaying considerable professionalism, they participated in no major battles but fought many skirmishes. They took part in the opening campaigns in Bavaria, provided a small contingent to assist in crossing the Danube at Wagram and fought well against the Tyrolean insurgents. In all, the total contribution of the Rheinbund troops was a significant addition to Napoleon’s Army of Germany, which by early April, with reinforcements arriving daily, numbered 175,000 men.
The Emperor's Last Victory Page 4