THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RIVER
While Napoleon has spent six weeks preparing for his next attempt to cross the Danube, the Austrians wasted much of the same period. They did nothing to prevent Napoleon’s converting the Lobau into a fortified base or to summon all possible reinforcements. Charles continued his attempts to exploit his success at Aspern–Essling as the basis for peace negotiations, but, lacking support from his imperial brother and undercut by the war faction, was losing control over his subordinates, his generals as well as his extraordinarily self-willed and uncooperative brothers. Personal rivalry and dissension reappeared in the Austrian high command and government. While Quartermaster-General Wimpffen was preening himself as the victor of Aspern–Essling and became ever more arrogant, Hiller was sulky and told all who would listen that the French could have been annihilated if his corps had not been held back from pushing his final attack. On 24 May Archduke Charles took the Emperor Francis, Foreign Minister Stadion and other dignitaries on a tour of the battlefield. Here in the broiling sun were those corpses and horse cadavers that had not yet been buried, and Charles apparently wanted to impress his brother and his entourage with the horrors of war and make them amenable to peace negotiations. Hiller, however, spoiled his efforts. This, the general argued, was not the time for peace but the very moment ‘to ring the tocsin, mobilize every available man and attack the enemy with your courageous army’. In a week, so the general asserted, ‘the enemy will be destroyed and Your Majesty can dictate peace terms’. The emperor and Stadion seemed impressed by the argument; the archduke remained silent. On 26 May, during a war council at headquarters now in Breitenlee, Hiller again pressed for an offensive. If an attack into the Lobau appeared too risky, then the army should march to Pressburg and cross the river into the rear of the enemy, while 30,000 men were to deliver a diversion from their present positions. The last proposal met opposition from Wimpffen who argued that if the army were defeated at Pressburg it would be pushed into Hungary, leaving Bohemia, the province with the most resources and remaining magazines, uncovered. In the end nothing was resolved.
But the army could not remain for long in the battle zone along the river where during the unseasonably hot weather the presence of dead bodies in the sweltering heat – men and horses alike – created an increasing health hazard. On 24 May Archduke Charles had issued orders to bury them, a slow process not finished until 13 June. Meanwhile, leaving behind only Hiller’s VI Corps and the Advance Guard along the river, he had retired the bulk of his army to the edge of the Marchfeld, establishing his headquarters first at Markgrafneusiedl, then, after an accidental fire destroyed the village, at Deutsch-Wagram. I, II and IV Corps camped on the escarpment plain beyond the Russbach, while III Corps, soon to be joined by V Corps called in from guarding the Danube near Linz, took station on the slopes of the Bisamberg. The Reserve Corps, the cavalry and the grenadier battalions were quartered in the villages of the plain below.
Despite his defensive victory, Charles found himself in a difficult situation. He realized that none of the grand strategic assumptions made when war had been decided on had come true. Aspern–Essling had not been enough to convince potential allies to join Austria. Prussia had not joined the war. There was no general uprising in Germany. Russia, a French ally, albeit an uncertain one, was becoming more aggressive in Galicia, supporting the Poles invading from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The promised British diversionary attack into the Low Countries had not materialized. On 23 June the archduke wrote to the Emperor Francis that ‘the first battle lost is a death sentence for the Monarchy’. Some days later he wrote to Field-Marshal Duke Albert, his uncle and close friend, with whom he maintained close relations throughout his career, that, if unavoidable, he would ‘strike one more blow against the French, though you may rest assured that I shall risk nothing or as little as possible’.9 Austria, he continued, cannot continue to fight on several fronts and ‘only a major success against Napoleon can save the war’. But he considered the outcome of another major battle as most doubtful.
Tactically the Austrian staff was well informed of French preparations on the Lobau and Charles was also aware of his own army’s shortcomings. There was considerable traffic between Napoleon’s camp and the other side of the Danube, while pickets along the river and above all the observatory on the Bisamberg could see the French preparations. ‘The steady work of the carpenters and shipwrights,’ one contemporary, Varnhagen von Ense, noted, ‘the arrival of artillery and ammunition wagons – none of this escaped our notice.’10 While Austrian observers on the Bisamberg could observe traffic across the main arm of the Danube and then in the plain of the Marchfeld, from the roof of the Maison Blanche (Uferhaus to the Austrians) it was possible to see only a short distance into the densely wooded east shore of the Lobau. In any case, with most of the troop movements conducted at night during the critical last days before the second crossing, much of the final concentration escaped observation.
THE AUSTRIAN BATTLE PLANS
The Austrian army had suffered substantial losses at Aspern-Essling and replacements and reinforcements were trickling in only slowly. Given this situation, Archduke Charles was in no mood to chance another major battle, and certainly not in a position to take the offensive. The question was how best to fight a defensive battle. Charles expected a renewed French attack, but he and his staff believed it would come across from the Lobau north, essentially in the same direction as on 20 May. He pulled back his main body to the line of the Russbach-Bisamberg, leaving only VI Corps and the Klenau’s Advance Guard to watch the river line and begin construction of a chain of sixteen defensive redoubts. The former quartermaster-general, von Heldenfeld, who had been one of the young archduke’s military mentors, observed rather scathingly that only Turks would throw up such poorly designed earthworks.11 Not always well sited and providing no all-round protection, the majority of these rather weak works, emplacing some seventy-two field pieces, were concentrated between Aspern and Gross Enzersdorf. The last work, located at the extreme left of the Austrian line, was established below the Ile Alexandre in the Hanselgrund, an area of meadow and brush near the junction of the Stadlau branch into the Danube. But this left a 3-mile stretch along the water unprotected. Curiously, although it would have been feasible within three weeks, Charles made no effort to draw on the heavy artillery available in the arsenals in Bohemia and Moravia to strengthen his works along the river line.
The archduke was concerned with strengthening his army but he was unwilling and unable to concentrate all available major combat formations. From Linz, he brought the bulk of Kolowrat’s III Corps, but left about a third behind. Then there was FML Ignaz Gyulai’s corps near Graz, about 20,000 strong, also left in place. Also not available were two mixed detachments under Generals Ende and von Radivojevic, some 12,000 men, who in June had been sent from northern Bohemia to raid into Saxony and the Main region in the hopes of raising the population. Although initially well received, their appeals for volunteers yielded but a total of eighty-six men, illustrating that hopes of a popular rising in Germany were illusory. Clearly he could not recall Archduke Ferdinand’s corps from Galicia. Though on 2 July the Emperor Francis, never shy of interfering in military affairs and of bypassing Charles, would write to Wimpffen, that ‘unless you intend to conduct a major action in the next few days, 12–15,000 men should be sent to Galicia’.12 Meanwhile, Hungary provided the noble mounted insurrectio, the old feudal levy called out by Archduke Palatine Joseph, but who was reluctant to make demands for more men and was not inclined to cooperate with either John or Charles. In any case, the mounted insurrectio and the Portal militia, untrained infantry, lacked combat capabilities and the palatine feared that further call-ups might only provoke uprisings. This left Archduke John’s Army of Inner Austria, repeatedly defeated but still 11,000 foot, 2,200 horse, and 34 guns and now encamped near Pressburg with a small bridgehead across the Danube. Although relations between the two brothers were strained, the archd
uke counted on John to reinforce his left wing during the coming battle but would be disappointed.
Charles, however, was able to find reinforcements from the Landwehr units of Lower Austria, Bohemia and Moravia. Individuals were used as filler replacements and thirty-one Landwehr battalions, not all well trained, were brigaded with regular formations. Initially there were some jurisdictional problems because the Bohemians and Moravians quite properly objected to serving outside the boundaries of their kingdom, but after being assured of equal treatment with the line infantry they came willingly enough and in the end all, especially the Vienna Landwehr Volunteer battalions, fought well. By the first week of July Charles had 119,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry and 414 guns, not counting V Corps, which would not participate in the fighting and was left on the Bisamberg to protect a line of retreat into Moravia and Bohemia if necessary, or John’s army, which arrived too late. Although Charles was clearly weaker than his enemy, the court strategists in Vienna continued to interfere. Bypassing the commander-in-chief, Minister Stadion kept insisting that the situation was better than pictured by Charles, and maintained a private correspondence with Wimpffen claiming that if the main army was not prepared to challenge the enemy, at least it could send reinforcements to Saxony and Galicia. None the less, though hampered by intrigues at court and dissension among his commanders, it is also clear that Charles did not put in every ounce of effort to prepare for battle. He was never a commander willing to risk all in order to gain a decisive victory, and as late as the first days of July he remained preoccupied with the hope that Napoleon would negotiate.
As was, and remains, common in many armies, Charles did use the time before battle to smarten up his troops. There was much drilling and many inspections, and to deal with what appeared a deterioration of discipline Charles reintroduced corporal punishment, abolished in his army code only two years earlier. Not too much should be made of this. Napoleon also tightened up discipline and threatened – and carried out – draconian punishments for looting and desertion at this time. More important was that despite shortcomings exhibited in the Austrian army in Bavaria and at Aspern–Essling, no effort was made to improve skirmishing, the control of large formations or staff procedures. Fighting instructions issued on 5 June merely restated points made before the war, though there was one, mainly administrative, change. Charles had abolished the corps designation and reintroduced columns operating under a centralized battle command, but nothing else had changed and the designation corps will continue to be used here. The reorganization made the conduct of operations even more sluggish, especially when corps commanders were reminded to keep their formations aligned with adjoining formations, though at the same time also told not to follow this rule too rigidly. If a neighbouring formation was forced back, commanders were not to conform but to act against the flanks of the enemy force pursuing the retiring column. This of course made sense, but what remains less easy to understand was Charles’s neglect to fortify the defensive positions of his army in depth. Although he had plenty of civilian labour available, he did not employ it. Beyond the thin chain of earthworks between Aspern–Essling–Gross Enzersdorf along the Stadlau branch, nothing was done to fortify the Russbach position until 4 July, when it was too late. There was also no effort made to fortify any of the small villages and hamlets such as Mühlleiten on the left or Aderklaa in the centre, on the generally featureless Marchfeld plain, located on a small elevation and surrounded by a dam.
A partial explanation may be that the Austrian high command had failed to come up with a single battle plan. Basically there were three options. Charles was above all concerned not to risk his army and he wanted to be able to break off the battle at any point. This precluded fighting close to the river, an area exposed to the heavy French batteries and with wooded terrain, cut up by rivulets, brush and small streams and with few roads, ground in which the French, better at fighting in open order, had the clear advantage. Also, in the event of a retreat becoming necessary, the army would suffer heavy losses extricating itself from this position. Giving battle further up in the open and basically flat terrain of the Marchfeld was more suited to the Austrian fighting methods but, given the pronounced superiority of the French cavalry and artillery it was also extremely risky. The third option was to let the French penetrate to the edge of the Marchfeld and oblige them to attack the excellent defensive position on the far edge of the Russbach plateau from Wagram to Markgrafneusiedl on the left of the Austrian line. Strong forces, the Reserve Cavalry and the Grenadier Corps, would bar this position against an envelopment from the plain while at the same time a strong right wing stationed on the lower slopes of the Bisamberg would hit the French flank. The position remained vulnerable and exposed on the left where the Russbach plateau gently sloped down to the plain, enabling the position to be outflanked, but Charles was confident that Archduke John’s army marching up from Pressburg would extend the line to the river.
There are strong indications that Charles, expecting the French to attack north into the Mühlau, repeating their May operation, initially favoured bringing up the entire arm down the Marchfeld close to the river. It would appear that the archduke had decided to repeat the Aspern model, intending to smash the enemy with his back to the river. This was a sound manoeuvre in the event Napoleon did indeed cross north into the Mühlau, but even then needed better odds, especially in cavalry and artillery, than he had available. When on 1 and 2 July Napoleon’s feints indicated such a move, on 2 July Archduke Charles did advance his main forces on a broad front, with the main concentration between Essling and Gross Enzersdorf, his troops arriving in their new positions by sundown. The French bombardment commencing about noon that day convinced him that this was dangerous and, with the Bisamberg observatory reporting that while there was heavy vehicular traffic across the bridges into the Lobau no concentration of troops was visible, he became uncertain. The next morning, 3 July, he retired the bulk of his troops to their previous positions and returned his headquarters, which had advanced to Breitenlee, back to Deutsch-Wagram.
Only the Advance Guard, now commanded by FML Armand von Nordmann, a French emigré and an able officer, who took command when Klenau became commander of VI Corps after Hiller departed, remained on the east end of the river line. The Advance Guard, reinforced by brigades from III, IV, and V Corps, numbered just short of 12,000 foot, 2,500 horse and 48 guns, and covered the line from Essling down towards the outflow of the Stadlau ranch into the Danube. Klenau’s VI Corps, 12,500 foot, 1,300 cavalry, 1,400 artillery and 64 guns, was deployed from Essling west to Am Spitz. The bulk of the army, II, III and IV Corps, comprising 72 battalions, 22 squadrons and 196 guns (a total of 63,115 foot, 2,110 horse and 164 guns), was placed in the Russbach line, with I Corps at Wagram, II at Baumersdorf, and IV above Markgrafneusiedl. With its steep bank on the far side, the Russbach, complemented by boggy terrain and heavy brush along its course, was a substantial obstacle, but the plateau position could have been improved by fortifications. Then too on its right around Gerasdorf, the terrain provided no substantial defensive assets. Here Charles placed his Reserve Cavalry with his Grenadier Corps in reserve. Finally, III Corps, some 16,000 infantry, 668 cavalry and 58 guns, was stationed at Hagenbrunn and the east slopes of the Bisamberg. He stationed V Corps, only 7,500 infantry and 12 guns strong, though with an additional brigade from III Corps attached, with detachments guarding the Danube upstream at Krems on the Bisamberg. It was not included in the battle plan but was assigned to protect an eventual line of retreat.
The final decision, reached only on the evening of 4 July, called for the Advance Guard and VI Corps, supported by the Reserve Cavalry, to offer the most protracted resistance against a French advance, cause delay, disorder and inflict casualties and then fall back. Nordmann was to retire towards Markgrafneusiedl and Klenau to fall back to Stammersdorf, aligning with III Corps to his left. These dispositions created an extended line over 13 miles wide, with the left and the right wings at sharp ang
les to each other, though the apex was weak. It was planned that if Napoleon attacked the Russbach line the Austrian right wing would fall on his flank, but if he turned towards the Bisamberg then the heavy Austrian left would attack his flank. The basic plan was sound, but it took no account of the slow Austrian staff work and the difficulty of coordinating two widely separated wings. Above all it needlessly exposed the Advance Guard and VI Corps. If the objective was merely to delay the French advance, then fewer troops would have sufficed. But if resistance was protracted, then the 25,000 men of these formations were too weak in number and would suffer heavy casualties to no great effect.
To keep the Austrians in doubt about his intentions for as long as possible, on 2 July Napoleon ordered Berthier to open negotiations regarding an exchange of prisoners on 4 July, a move that seemed to confirm the archduke’s hope that a peaceful solution was still possible. But it was just another ruse and he was duped. In the morning of 4 July, the Bisamberg observatory signalled the approach of large numbers of troops from the road east along the Danube: Davout’s 3 Corps and the Army of Italy. Also a few hours earlier the heavy French batteries on the Lobau and adjoining islands bombarded Aspern and Essling and demolished work no. 11, west of Gross Enzersdorf. At about 2 p.m., a sudden thunderstorm left the Bisamberg observatory unable to see the French movements. It made little difference. The archduke realized that the feared battle had already begun and that by now it was too late to change his dispositions.
The Emperor's Last Victory Page 14