Although his engineering staff had previously suggested that the Russbach line should be fortified, Wimpffen had rejected the idea, asserting that this would dishearten the troops. This failure to strengthen a naturally strong position would cost the Austrians dearly. Belatedly, on 4 July, Charles had issued orders for redoubts to be built in front of I, II and IV Corps, but with neither engineers nor tools available, little was accomplished. Finally, becoming aware that an all-out French attack was imminent and that the stakes were high indeed, at 7 that evening he sent an urgent message to John: ‘The battle here on the Marchfeld will determine the fate of our Dynasty … I request you march at once, leaving behind all baggage and impediment and join my left wing.’13 The archduke expected John to cover the 24 miles rapidly and to arrive the next day. In the event, the message arrived only at 6 the next morning and then, moving with no particular haste and requiring a second order sent on the morning of the 5th, it took John nineteen hours to get his troops moving. Finally, aware that something big was afoot, at 11 p.m. on the 4th and again at 2.30 a.m. on the 5th, Charles ordered all guns of VI Corps to fire a one-hour barrage against the Lobau, the French-occupied islands and the bridges in the Stadlau branch.14 Needless to say this blind area-fire had no practical effect and did not disturb the crossing. French amphibious assault troops were already ashore at 9 p.m. on the extreme left of the Austrian line.
From the outset, if the French crossed to the north bank in substantial numbers and in good order, given the abilities of the two commanders and their chief subordinates the outcome of the battle was not really in doubt. Napoleon disposed of superior numbers, especially in cavalry and guns, and never wavered from his objective. Archduke Charles, by contrast, vacillated between offensive and defensive battle plans and only on the night of the French crossing decided on a defensive–offensive strategy. However, his intentions were certainly not made clear to his forward elements. Telling them to ‘offer determined resistance’ in the end led to the near destruction of the Advance Guard, while VI Corps and the Cavalry Reserve spent much of the day needlessly manoeuvring, suffering losses but hardly delaying the French deployment.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Wagram: The first day
THE OPPOSING ARMIES
Shortly after noon on 4 July, Napoleon issued an order of the day for his army. ‘Soldiers,’ it went, ‘one month after Austria has declared war against us, we have entered its capital, have destroyed its best troops, have taken more than 200 guns and 60 flags and have captured 100,000 prisoners.’ Only the Danube’s high water and rapid flow had delayed final victory, but with bridges built and other preparations in place, ‘we now shall move on the enemy and destroy the power which for 15 years has menaced our fatherland and our children’.1
During the afternoon, as French troops moved to their embarkation points and bridge-crossing locations, the searing heat of the last three weeks was broken by a series of heavy thunderstorms. With bucketing rain and occasional thunder lasting well into the night, further observations from the Bisamberg became impossible, hiding the final French preparations and blinding the Austrian command. In accordance with Napoleon’s meticulously prepared plans, the first wave across the third arm of the Danube consisted of three corps. Oudinot’s 2 Corps and Masséna’s 4 Corps were the first to cross to the north bank, followed within hours by Davout’s 3 Corps. Their mission was to gain room to deploy the Army of Germany on the Marchfeld. This required driving the Austrian Advance Guard from its forward positions, including Gross Enzersdorf, and pushing Klenau’s VI Corps east beyond Essling and Aspern. Earlier Oudinot would execute the initial crossings on the right, clearing the minor Austrian outposts, and then drive north-east towards Wittau and Rutzendorf. In the centre Davout, on the right of the battle line, was to swing north, while Oudinot was to deploy in the direction of Gross Enzersdorf. On the left, Masséna was to follow the river, support Oudinot, take Essling and Aspern and drive Klenau’s VI Corps towards the Bisamberg. After the capture of Gross Enzersdorf, projected for about 9 a.m. on the 5th, the three corps with their attached cavalry were to align and then pivot east from Gross Enzersdorf to gain room to deploy the army in line of battle on the Marchfeld.
Behind the first line, with additional bridges built, a second line deployed, with the Saxon Corps on the left, the Army of Italy in the centre and the Imperial Guard on the right. A third line was constituted by the heavy cavalry reserve. Napoleon’s objective was achieved. All the crossings and the initial engagements were successful. By the afternoon of 5 July, Napoleon had the great bulk of his forces, 134,000 infantry, 27,600 cavalry and 433 guns, not including the Lobau batteries, deployed on the Marchfeld.
Excluding V Corps, which would not participate in the fighting, and Archduke John’s small army, which arrived too late to affect the outcome, Charles disposed of a total about 140,000 effectives. This included 121,500 infantry in 160 2/3rd battalions, 14,700 mounted men in 150 squadrons and 414 guns. Although, as is common, the figures given by the various authorities and even archival records differ, it is clear that in contrast to Aspern–Essling Napoleon enjoyed a substantial numerical advantage, especially in cavalry.2
Nordmann had only assumed command of the Advance Guard and the weak and poorly sited defensive earthworks nos. 6–16 at 5 p.m. on 4 July. Even when reinforced by two infantry brigades and two hussar regiments, his force was far too weak to offer the ‘protracted and determined’ resistance ordered by Charles at 6 p.m. on 4 July. Including the guns in works nos. 7–16, Nordmann had only forty-eight guns and some 14,240 men, a total of four brigades including five good Landwehr battalions, two Jäger battalions and one regiment of Wallach-Illyrian Grenzer. Covering the stretch between VI Corps at Essling and work no. 8, he had the eight squadrons of the Hessen–Homburg Hussars. His main force was posted at Gross Enzersdorf, a small town but defensible with a crenellated wall, ditch and flood dyke and a walled cemetery on an elevation. Brigade Mayer, including two excellent infantry regiments, IR 4 Hoch und Deutschmeister and IR 47 Kerpen, was stationed between work no. 8 and Gross Enzersdorf, while the battalions of Brigade Riese were formed behind the town. Along the shallow parapets connecting works nos. 8 and 9, the latter almost levelled by the French bombardment on 2 July, there was IR 58 Beaulieu, while Gross Enzersdorf was held by IR 44 Bellegarde. Two Grenzer battalions supported by two squadrons each of the Stipsicz and Primatial Hussars held works nos. 14 and 15 south of Enzersdorf, while the road to Wittau was held by IR 64 Chasteler. Finally there were the small outposts. Two companies of the 1st Jäger battalion were at the Uferhaus, another two companies were in the Hanselgrund, and one and a half companies occupied work no. 16. At Mühlleiten there was a half company of 7th Jäger Battalion, small detachments held various hamlets, and one company occupied the manor house at Sachsengang. The balance of Nordmann’s cavalry patrolled the banks of the Danube eastwards. Clearly, except for the concentration of troops and works around Gross Enzersdorf, this disposition offered no hope for ‘determined and protracted resistance’, though a few positions held through the night and into the early morning. Advance Corps had been deployed for outpost duty only. The decision to have the main army stand on the defence had been taken only late the evening of 4 July and the Advance Corps now had to fight where it stood.
THE NIGHT CROSSINGS, 4 JULY
With a cold rain mixed with hail pelting down, at 8 p.m. Colonel Conroux of Tharreau’s division, Oudinot’s 2 Corps, embarked 1,500 voltigeurs in five large flatboats that had been specially furnished with bulletproof bulwarks. Their task was to cross from the south-east shore of the Lobau near the outflow of the Stadlau branch to the Hanselgrund. There they were to seize the small 3-pounder-armed Austrian work no. 16 and drive off its garrison, just one and half companies of the 1st Jäger battalion. Eight gunboats of Captain Baste’s flotilla, armed with 6-pounders and some boat howitzers, supported their passage while the two remaining boats of his flotilla were to bombard the shoreline near the Mühlau salie
nt. A six-gun battery posted on the Lobau was to provide additional suppressive fire. Although detected on their final approach at about 9.30 p.m., the supporting fire silenced the small Austrian 3-pounder battery. After landing, the French light infantry, distinguished in the darkness by white armbands and ordered to advance with the bayonet only, drove the vastly outnumbered defenders north through the dense woods. Encountering little further resistance, the assault cleared the Hanselgrund up to the ‘canal’, the Steigbügel creek that divided the island from the mainland. Meanwhile, in less than two hours Oudinot’s engineers had completed a pontoon bridge allowing the bulk of his corps to cross to the left bank. Leaving behind his 1,450-strong Portuguese Legion to fortify the bridgehead, Oudinot split his corps, ordering one division north along the river towards the Maison Blanche, a second north-east towards the small town of Mühlleiten. In fact, the speedy progress of Masséna’s corps compelled the Austrians to hastily evacuate the Maison Blanche position, allowing Oudinot to direct his entire corps to push towards Mühlleiten. After throwing three small bridges across the canal, Tharreau’s division had already cleared the Hanselgrund. Meanwhile, Captain Baste proceeded as ordered north to occupy the Rohrhaufen, a swampy islet in the Stadlau branch opposite the Steigbügel, where he landed some 100 musket-armed sailors and established a small battery covering the left flank of Oudinot’s advance and then serving to protect Masséna’s crossings.
By 10 p.m., with the success of Oudinot’s crossing assured, the French batteries on the north-east of the Lobau, on the Ile de Moulin and on the Ile Alexandre, opened a heavy and steady bombardment against Austrian positions and troops in the Essling–Gross Enzersdorf area. Soon thereafter, Masséna’s 4 Corps began to cross from the Ile Alexandre to the left bank just below the Maison Blanche, encountering only minor resistance. First across, embarking from the lower end of the Ile Alexandre and ordered to establish a small bridgehead, was Colonel Sainte-Croix with 2,500 voltigeurs and ten guns from Boudet’s division, 100 rounds per piece, carried in five specially constructed barges also with bulletproof shielding. Simultaneously, the ingenious one-piece bridge anchored on the Ile Alexandre was put to use. With Napoleon present – the French emperor was extraordinarily active all night – Captain Heckman of the engineers swung the bridge out into the stream where the current unfolded it across to the opposite bank, where it was secured by heavy ropes. The entire manoeuvre took but five minutes and even before the bridge was fully anchored the first of Masséna’s infantry columns pounded across. Additional troops, infantry and artillery, were transferred by boats and rafts, and using pre-positioned materials within an hour engineers completed seven further boat and raft bridges, each immediately secured by a fortified bridgehead. Across poured the rest of Masséna’s corps, the rear elements of Boudet’s division, followed by Molitor and Saint-Cyr divisions, Marulaz’s light horse brigade and Lasalle’s attached light cavalry division.
Conspicuous in his open carriage, Masséna, surrounded by his staff officers and with his physician in attendance to change compresses, followed the first divisions. With Napoleon determined to avoid shortages of ammunition on the far side, each division was followed by ammunition wagons. Throughout the crossings, rain and thunder continued, while massed bands struck up martial airs and the troops sung ‘Partant pour La Syrie,’ a popular marching song. Including Legrand’s division, by 4 a.m. on 5 July Masséna’s entire corps was across and forming up in the Schusterau. He placed his divisions at right angles to the waterway. Boudet on the left, then Molitor and Saint-Cyr, with Legrand on the right, relieved from his duties in the Mühlau where he had been replaced by a number of Rhine Confederation units which arrived only during the afternoon of the 5th. His corps cavalry brigade under Marulaz, joined by Lasalle’s light cavalry divisions, was posted on the extreme left along the Danube. Pushing north, Masséna moved to take Gross Enzersdorf.
Almost simultaneously, Davout had begun to transfer his 3 Corps, perhaps the best line formation in the army, and his attached cavalry to the left bank. His four infantry divisions, Morand, Friant, Gudin and Puthod, crossed in the order they arrived, followed by his three attached cavalry divisions, two of dragoons commanded by General Grouchy and a light division, chasseurs à cheval and hussars, under Louis-Pierre Montbrun. Davout’s powerful corps was to anchor the right wing of Napoleon’s line of battle with his attached cavalry ranging to the east to intercept the possible arrival of Archduke John’s army. Having been assigned a crossing just south of Masséna’s and marching on Wittau and Probstdorf, his troops moving east crossed Oudinot’s column moving north, causing a two-hour delay. But this was only a minor planning mistake. Sorted out by experienced officers, the crossing had largely been accomplished to plan, and with additional bridges completed from the north-east shore of the Lobau, the entire second line arrived in the early afternoon.
GAINING DEPLOYMENT ROOM
During the night and early morning the vastly outmatched and surprised Austrian command had offered little effective opposition, though individual units and soldiers, especially the Jäger battalions, operating in small clumps in the woods, had fought well. The first major French objective was Gross Enzersdorf where Nordmann had positioned the bulk of his troops around the town and in the surrounding works, especially nos. 14 and 15 to the south. Behind the town the Brigades Riese and Mayer formed up in reserve. With the dawn, there came an end to the rain and the promise of an extremely hot day. Nordmann ordered IR 58 Beaulieu of Riese’s brigade to charge the advancing French columns with the bayonet. Despite initial success, the attack was driven back with heavy casualties, and by 6 a.m. the regiment had to retreat to Stadl-Enzersdorf. At the same time Masséna took the partially demolished and staunchly defended works in the vicinity, clearing the way for an attack on Gross Enzersdorf. Heavily pounded by twelve heavy mortars and six 24-pounders emplaced on the Lobau, the town was soon in flaming ruins, though the attack, spearheaded by the 46th Line led by Saint-Croix and supported by Saint-Cyr’s division, met with stiff and determined resistance. By 8 a.m., however, the crenellated town walls were stormed. Most of the defenders got away, but many were taken prisoner. Nearby Pouzet Island was also taken and a new bridge, completed by evening, thrown across to the north bank. Nordmann now withdrew to Essling with orders from Klenau, who throughout the morning maintained an unwarranted and over-optimistic assessment of the situation, to continue tenacious resistance.
Oudinot meanwhile had encountered determined opposition at Sachsengang, a strongly built two-storey stone manor with a tower and a modest moat on the road to Wittau. This position was held by the 7th Jäger Battalion with two 3-pounder guns and reinforced by elements of the 1st Jäger Battalion that had retired from Mühlleiten. Surrounded and attacked by Tharreau’s division, though Oudinot’s main body moved on, the position surrendered only at 2.30 a.m. on 5 July when its ammunition was exhausted. But this small delay had hardly interfered with the French deployment on the edge of the Marchfeld plain. On Nordmann’s far left wing the Primatial and Stipsicz Hussars of Frelich’s brigade, considering themselves in danger of being cut off, had retired north until they found support from advanced units of Rosenberg’s IV Corps at Rutzendorf. On the right wing, in accordance with Klenau’s orders, the Austrian Advance Guard was making a slow fighting retreat east towards Aspern, defending works nos. 8 to 6, all fairly good positions but, facing the river, now attacked in the flank.
At 10 a.m. there was a short halt in the French forward movement to sort out troops and to redistribute munitions from the ammunition carts that had followed each division and rations from the supply wagons. Crucially, though, Napoleon now had his corps deployed, as planned, facing north. With Gross Enzersdorf as the pivot, the French battle line formed to move across the Marchfeld. The line up was as follows: Masséna’s 4 Corps on the left; Oudinot with 2 Corps in the centre, where he had taken up his position by 8 a.m.; and Davout’s 3 Corps, its cavalry division probing east looking for John’s expected arrival,
advancing well beyond Wittau on the right. Additional corps had transferred during the morning and afternoon and began to form the second battle line. Eugène’s Army of Italy arrived at noon. It was followed some hours later by Pacthod’s small division, only two brigades strong, of Grenier’s corps. Bernadotte’s 9 Corps reached its position at 2 p.m., the Imperial Guard and the Cavalry Reserve at 4 p.m. Marmont and Wrede had crossed to the Lobau ready to enter combat the next day. Shortly after noon, Napoleon, soon joined by the Imperial Guard, as always in full dress, had taken up his position on a hillock some 700 yards west of Aderklaa behind Oudinot’s corps, from where he gave orders to continue the advance swinging north across the Marchfeld towards the Russbach plateau.
THE AUSTRIANS DRIVEN FROM THE RIVER LINE
On the Austrian side there had been confusion. Informed of the French crossings at 5 a.m., Charles had ordered an all-out alert and tried to speed up his belated and futile efforts to dig redoubts, each large enough for 400 men and five guns, in front of the Russbach position. He also sent another messenger to John, still over 20 miles away, to urge speed. On the other hand, as late as 6 a.m. on 5 July Nordmann and Klenau had reported to army headquarters that they did not expect a major attack that morning, an opinion supported by Wimpffen who had ridden forward to Gross Enzersdorf. At 6.30 a.m. Charles therefore ordered the Advance Guard and VI Corps to hold their positions tenaciously, an order that may have encouraged both Klenau and Nordmann to expect support by the main army. But this did not happen. After the loss of Gross Enzersdorf, Nordmann took advantage of the pause in French movement to redeploy his remaining troops between work no. 8 at Essling to Rutzendorf, with cavalry positioned at both flanks. Klenau’s VI Corps was positioned to the west of Essling with Splenyi’s brigade under orders to fall on the French left as it advanced. But it was a battered force and at this point Charles or Klenau – the senior field commander on the spot, but not a man to take the initiative – should have ordered Nordmann to extricate himself. Instead Charles merely sent elements of Liechtenstein’s Cavalry Reserve forward to prevent Nordmann from being cut off. FML Schwarzenberg and FML Nostitz with seven regiments of light horse took up station at Pysdorf. GM Roussel d’Hurbal’s brigade of two cuirassier regiments went to Neu Wirtshaus, and the four cuirassier regiments of Brigades Lederer and Kroyher were kept in reserve at Raasdorf to shield the Advance Guard’s flank during an eventual retreat. As it turned out, Nordmann’s troops, moving in masses to hold off cavalry and supported by some forty-eight guns, took the brunt of Napoleon’s main attack, in the process suffering major losses. Further west, Masséna, pivoting on Boudet division, spread his divisions to the right, advancing with Molitor’s division pushing on Hirschstetten, Saint-Cyr on Breitenlee and Legrand towards Süssenbrunn. Only Boudet continued to push west. This relieved pressure on Klenau, whose rearguard held work nos. 2 and 3 at Aspern until 5 p.m. and allowed VI Corps to make an orderly retreat, forming masses to hold off Lasalle’s and Marulaz repeated cavalry charges. As at Aspern, steady masses deterred cavalry and Klenau reached Stammersdorf about 8 p.m.
The Emperor's Last Victory Page 15