Iraq- The West Shakes Up The Middle East

by Patrick Cockburn

  Cockburn: Interesting that Mr Obama should have given this such a high profile, but it will be popular. And his remarks refer to some of the most heavily populated Muslim countries, whose traditions are different from the Arab world and Iran.

  Sunday, 28 June 2009

  HOW BRIBERY BECAME A WAY OF LIFE

  'I paid $800 to get my job," says Ahmed Abdul, a technician working for Karada municipality in Baghdad. "People know this is wrong, but there is no way round it." In Iraq corruption is pervasive at every level.

  "Corruption exists all over the world but is at its worst here," laments Ateej Saleh Midhat, a 26-year-old employee of the state-owned Rafidain Bank. "In 2008 and 2009 it was difficult for any graduate to have a job without paying $500 [£300] to $1,500 according to what kind of job it was. But what about the people who cannot afford to pay?"

  Iraq is the world's premier kleptomaniac state. According to Transparency International, the only counties deemed more crooked than Iraq are Somalia and Burma, while Haiti and Afghanistan rank just behind. In contrast to Iraq, which enjoys significant oil revenues, none of these countries has much money to steal.

  Iraqis resent paying a bribe for almost everything, but do not see what they can do about it. Nor will they believe that the government is serious in its claim to be clamping down on corruption until senior officials are punished. The first sign that this might be beginning to happen came last month when the former minister of trade, Abdul Falah al-Sudani, was arrested after the plane on which he was travelling to Dubai was dramatically turned round in mid-air and ordered to return to Baghdad. The trade ministry is known to Iraqis as "the ministry of corruption" because it runs the $6 billion food rationing system, which gives endless opportunities for profiting by taking bribes from suppliers or sending tainted goods to the shops.

  The trade ministry scandal had already become very public when Mr Sudani's guards shot it out at the ministry headquarters with police come to arrest 10 officials, who were able to escape through a back entrance during the gun battle. A video circulated from phone to phone in Baghdad shows trade ministry officials cavorting with prostitutes at a party.

  The corruption most Iraqis run into is at a humbler level and usually means that the smallest bureaucratic hurdle can be overcome only with a bribe. Several years ago the government starting issuing special passports, which were supposedly more secure than before. But since the easiest way to obtain one is through a bribe, in which case few questions are asked, the new passports are even more insecure than their predecessors. The same is true of other identity documents. If a bribe is not paid to facilitate such transactions, officials subject their victim to bureaucratic harassment until he or she pays up.

  It is not just that Iraqis object to paying off officials; they are not sure they will get what they pay for. Laila Fadel Amr is a young housewife who graduated from a teacher training institute in 2005, but has never held a job since. “I didn't want to join any of the Islamic parties," she says. "And I didn't want to pay my money for a job and then find that promises were not kept." If a job is obtained, the bribe-giver has to start taking backhanders to pay back money borrowed for the original bribe.

  Iraq has offered extraordinary opportunities for fraud since the fall of Saddam Hussein. War diverted attention from theft and made it difficult to monitor what was really going on. In one notorious case in 2004-05, the government allocated $1.3 billion for weapons purchases. These were carried out by the then head of military procurement, Ziyad Cattan, a Polish- Iraqi who had once run a pizza parlour outside Bonn. The minister of defence was Hazem al-Shalaan, who had been involved in property in a small way in London in the 1990s. Little equipment was ever received by the Iraqi military aside from some Soviet helicopters too antique to fly and second-hand vehicles deemed obsolete by the Pakistani army.

  The height of the violence in Iraq in 2004-07 made it highly dangerous to check if goods paid for by the government had ever been delivered or even existed. One instance now being investigated concerns $600m in food rations supposedly sent to Anbar and other Sunni provinces when they were part-controlled by the insurgents. They may never have reached shops to be distributed to needy customers.

  Iraq was not always uniquely corrupt. Its 1970s administration was probably more efficient and honest than that in most oil-producing countries: the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 criminalised Iraqi society.

  UN sanctions imposed a tight economic siege and were designed to keep oil revenue out of the hands of the ruling elite. Extended over 13 years they destroyed society and the economy. The government had no money to pay its employees. The currency collapsed. A university professor suddenly found he was paid the equivalent of $5 a month and was not allowed to resign from government service. One I knew called Jawad succeeded in retiring only by faking a heart attack and paying off doctors to produce charts showing he was about to expire. Since they were not paid by the government, state employees simply charged the public for any services they provided. Though officials are now quite well paid, this system still goes on.

  Saddam Hussein and his lieutenants quickly found ways of evading sanctions by controlling the black market. Uday, Saddam's eldest son, was paid millions of dollars by cigarette importers. Russian oil brokers kicked back on contracts they were awarded, so money went to the government in Baghdad and not to the UN as it was meant to under the oil-for-food programme. The men who had orchestrated these black market deals quickly established the same sort of corrupt relationship with post-Saddam governments.

  As Iraq was impoverished by sanctions street robberies and burglaries became common. In a country which had had little civil crime, taxi drivers began carrying pistols. To stem criminal violence the government started amputating the ears and hands of thieves and televising the gory results.

  By 2003 millions of impoverished Iraqis would do anything for a living. With the fall of Baghdad they had their opportunity. The beneficiaries of the looting of Iraq were nicknamed alhawasim- "the finalists" - a joking reference to Saddam's boast that the US invasion would see "the final battle". They stole and, since they viewed the US-installed Iraqi government as illegitimate and an American puppet, they thought they were right to steal. This attitude has not died away.

  As violence ebbed from its 2006- 07 high point, Iraqis have become more resentful at corruption and theft. They know that many officials and politicians own luxury villas in Jordan and Egypt. Reconstruction is painfully slow as money allocated to it vanishes. Many families react to a relative being imprisoned by immediately finding out how much they have to pay to get him freed. Political parties use ministries they control as a source of plunder and patronage.

  Even the best connected have to pay. The relative of one man, a life-long opponent of Saddam Hussein, was shot and badly wounded this year. The man knew everybody in the top ranks of government and was promised a prompt investigation. He had a strong suspicion about who might have carried out the attempted assassination, but found the police and judges involved were moving very slowly. He suspected some conspiracy by his political enemies and consulted his lawyer, who laughed at his suspicions. "No, there is a simpler reason why the police and the judge aren't doing anything to find the gunmen," the lawyer said. “They are waiting for you to bribe them before they start their investigation."

  Tuesday, 30 June 2009

  MISSION ACCOMPLISHED?

  More than six years after US forces captured Baghdad, American combat troops will withdraw from all Iraqi cities and towns by tonight, handing over full control to the 600,000-strong Iraqi army and police and marking a crucial step in Iraq's return to independence.

  Iraqi state television has been showing a clock with an Iraqi flag marking the time that remains until the US pullout with the words: "June 30: National Sovereignty Day". The Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who, although closely allied to the US, nevertheless calls its departure a "great victory", has declared today a national holiday.<
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  US troops have mostly already left the towns and cities where they were once the predominant military force. For months, it has been uncommon to see US patrols on the streets in Baghdad, though they have been more visible in Mosul in northern Iraq where there is more fighting.

  The Pentagon is intent on avoiding any dramatic television pictures showing Americans in retreat which might stir memories of the fall of Saigon in 1975. It will keep 130,000 soldiers in bases outside urban areas until September and then steadily withdraw all combat troops from Iraq by August 2010 and remaining forces by the end of 2011.

  The US is already seeing its power drain away as Iraqis take on board that American troops really are going. Mr Maliki is seeking to burnish his nationalist credentials by claiming it was he who forced the US to accept a timetable for the end of the occupation during lengthy and rancorous negotiations for a US-Iraq "status of forces agreement" signed by George Bush last year. President Barack Obama is sticking rigorously to this timetable.

  A small number of US troops will remain behind but their presence will be low key and largely invisible. Convoys from Camp Victory, the US base at Baghdad airport, will travel to the Green Zone in central Baghdad only at night. In Mosul, US vehicles must have signs saying they are not part of a combat force. In rural areas, US combat operations can continue only with the permission of the Iraqi government.

  Six years ago, Iraqis generally welcomed the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. But, unlike the US troop presence in Afghanistan, the US occupation was largely unpopular, according to opinion polls. Sectarian and ethnic divisions within Iraq were deepened by the occupation because each of the three big communities responded differently to it: Kurds supported it, Sunni Arabs fought against it and the Shia Arab majority co-operated with it in order to establish their rule. Having taken power, the Shia now want the Americans out, while many Sunni, defeated in the sectarian civil war between 2005 and 2007, are fearful of losing US protection.

  The days immediately prior to the pullout saw a sharp increase in violence with some 250 Iraqis killed, mostly by vehicle-borne bombs targeting crowded Shia markets and worshippers leaving mosques. These atrocities have provoked doubts about whether or not the Iraqi security forces are capable of dealing with al-Qa'ida, the presumed perpetrators. Sadly, experience shows that neither Iraqi nor American security can stop bombs aimed at civilians.

  Al-Qa'ida's aim in attacking the Shia is to provoke reprisals by the Shia-dominate security forces against the Sunni community, which might then become frightened enough to turn back to al-Qa'ida gunmen for defence. This could happen, but so far Iraqi government forces have not taken the bait.

  Security is much improved in Baghdad and central Iraq compared to two years ago, when 3,000 people were being killed every month. But the improvement is only in contrast to the slaughter of the recent past. Baghdad may now be safer than Mogadishu, but it is still more dangerous than Kabul. The 2.2 million refugees who fled to Jordan and Syria are not returning in large numbers.

  The refugees are not coming back because they are still dubious about security and living conditions. Electricity supply is better this year, but is still not permanent. There is a continuing lack of clean water. Iraq now has no fewer than 18 million mobile phones compared to none under Saddam, though the reliability and quality of the service has dropped alarmingly in the last year. Some two million people have jobs with the government and are well paid, but there is little other secure employment.

  Iraqi society, infrastructure and economy were shattered by 30 years of war and sanctions. The US occupation failed to rebuild what was destroyed and, in many ways, exacerbated Iraq's problems. In the next few days, the oil ministry will begin awarding contracts to international oil companies, first to stop the fall in output from its giant fields, and then to raise production. Successful reconstruction will be the key to Iraq's long-term stability.

  Friday, 14 August 2009

  ONLY TIME CAN HEAL SOME IRAQI WOUNDS

  Life in Iraq is getting better. Take one example: two or three years ago, tattoo artists in Baghdad were working overtime giving distinctive tattoos to men who feared they would be killed in the Sunni-Shia sectarian slaughter. Aware that the faces of so many who died were being mutilated, potential victims wanted their families to be able to identify their bodies through a special mark known only to close relatives. One man had an olive tree tattooed on to his body because his father had planted one on the day he was born.

  This grisly ritual is no longer taking place because Iraq is now a safer place than it was at the height of the sectarian bloodbath in 2005-7, when 3,000 bodies a month were being stacked up in the morgues. Tattooists report that their clients are today seeking to be marked with the image of a falcon, tiger or dragon for solely decorative reasons.

  The point is that security in Iraq is improving, but from a very low base. Baghdad is safer than it used to be though this still leaves it as one of the most dangerous cities in the world, certainly worse than Kabul, with perhaps only Mogadishu in Somalia edging it into second place.

  Iraq still suffers from horrendous levels of violence and this has never really abated, despite propaganda lauding the achievements of the American military "surge" which supposedly brought peace to much of the country. The media, both foreign and domestic, was suddenly full of feelgood stories such as the beginning of the return of five million refugees to their homes, though in practice few have come back.

  By over-selling the extent to which Iraq had returned to peace since 2007, the Iraqi and American governments have left themselves open to the perception that an upsurge in bombing over the past month means the country is returning to war. The Iraqi Interior Ministry says 450 civilians were killed in June, double the figure for the previous month, and a further 566 civilians died in July after US troops pulled out of Iraqi cities on 1 June.

  On returning from Iraq, people used to ask me hopefully if "things are getting better there" post-surge. I would routinely explain that "better" Baghdad might be, but it was still pretty bad. A more common query these days concerns whether or not "security is disintegrating now that the Americans have left the cities". There have certainly been more devastating bomb explosions and more people are being killed or injured. But the Americans were never able to stop this at the height of their strength in Iraq.

  Regardless of who handles security, it is impossible to stop trucks packed with explosives or individual suicide bombers blowing up in market places, shrines, mosques or bus stations where they will cause maximum civilian casualties.

  The targets are almost invariably Iraq's Shia majority and the aim is to provoke the Shia into retaliation against the Sunni minority, who then might return to supporting al-Qa'ida in Iraq, or look for backing from a foreign state. So far the Iraqi Shia have not risen to the bait.

  The spectacular recent bombings divert attention away from the fact that the two wars which convulsed Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the US military in 2003 are largely over. The first was by the Sunni Arabs (20 per cent of the population) against the American occupation and was waged from 2003 to about halfway through 2007.

  It was effectively ended by the outcome of a second conflict, this time an extraordinarily bloody civil war between Sunni and Shia (60 per cent of the population). It was the Shia victory in this war, fought primarily in Baghdad and central Iraq, which forced the Sunni insurgents to end their guerrilla struggle against the Americans.

  Neither war looks likely to reignite or return to its former level of violence. The American forces are going. Their combat forces will be out of Iraq in a year's time. All troops will be gone by the end of 2011.

  The Iraqi government is strictly interpreting the Status of Forces Agreement signed by the US and Iraq last year so that it limits and controls American military actions. Some US officers have suggested withdrawing earlier than planned, rather than see their troops confined to bases as if they were prisoners.


  The American military withdrawal stabilises Iraq to a degree never admitted by protagonists of the original invasion. Foreign occupation deepened sectarian and ethnic hatreds because the three main Iraqi communities took radically different attitudes towards it. The Kurds supported it (though Kurdistan was not occupied), the Sunni fought it, and the Shia co-operated with it, just so long as they needed to do so to take power through winning elections and forming a government.

  The American occupation destabilised Iraq in a second way because it frightened Iraq's neighbours. This is scarcely surprising since the neo-cons in Washington openly sought regime change in Tehran and Damascus, as well as Baghdad. So long as an American land army was in Iraq, they were always going to foster Sunni and Shia guerrilla groups attacking US troops.

  As the Americans depart, there are several dangers for Iraq. One is that the Sunni states will refuse to accept the first Shia-dominated government in the Arab world since Saladin overthrew the Fatimids, and that they will support Sunni resistance to it. The second danger is that the victors, in this case the Arabs and Kurds who make up the present coalition government in Baghdad, will fall out and come to blows.

  The Iraqi Kurds' quarrel with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is over control of the disputed territories, including Kirkuk, captured by the Kurds in 2003. Separate armed forces, loyal to Baghdad and the Kurds respectively, are seeking to dominate this no-man's land. Each side is making serious threats, but both may ultimately pull their punches because they have so much to lose in a real war in which neither could win a decisive victory.

  Wednesday, 16 September 2009