The McMahon Line- a Century of Discord
Page 6
The advance of the British force over 256 kilometes of Tibetan territory for the final phase of ‘Mission Lhasa’ commenced on 14 July 1904. Macdonald took with him two companies of mounted infantry, three infantry battalions, a battery and a half of mountain artillery, half a company of sappers, logistic echelons numbering about 2,000 combatants and an equal number of camp followers, and a large number of pack animals.3 He anticipated some opposition at the Karo La which had been cleared by Lieutenant Colonel Brander’s force just over two months ago. He also gave utmost importance to seizing intact the ferry site and boats at Chaksam. The force carried four Berthon boats for crossing the Tsangpo river. Both tasks were accomplished without much difficulty as abundant precautions had been taken to ensure minimum casualties if opposed. Had the British force’s crossing of the Tsangpo been opposed and the ferry site along with the boats not handed over to them on a platter, there would have been a considerable number of casualties and delay in the mission reaching Lhasa. However, it soon became clear that there existed no plans by the Tibetan army to hold the river and thwart the mission’s crossing of this formidable obstacle. The Tibetan military leadership had apparently given up, but being afraid of the repercussions of disobeying the lama elite, token resistance was put up at a few places, Karo La being an example.
Eventually, on 3 August, the Younghusband mission reached the capital of mystical Tibet, Lhasa, the ‘Forbidden City’, and the phenomenon of The Nechung Oracle—a sacred ‘spirit’ that appears through a medium, a person called Kuoten—was being unveiled to the world by an alien force without the need for secrecy and disguise adopted by previous adventurers to the city. Brigadier Macdonald set up camp about 2.5 kilometres away from the Potala Palace of the Dalai Lama. It is true that on many occasions and at many places along the mission’s adventurous journey, the Grand Lama’s envoys met with Younghusband and enjoined upon him to desist from advancing to the sacred city of Lhasa and to return. They indicated their readiness to hold negotiations at the camp site itself. However, after having given them adequate time, including a few weeks at Gyantse, Younghusband saw the futility of such an exercise because of the lack of earnestness on the part of the Tibetans to resolve the matters he had come to fix. He also realized that they were not adequately empowered to conclude meaningful treaties. He had therefore made up his mind to hold talks only on reaching Lhasa.
Figure 5: The Potala Palace, Lhasa, the Forbidden City
Younghusband was not taken by surprise when it was confirmed on his arrival at Lhasa that the Dalai Lama had already fled. He was given an indication of this by the Ta Lama and his delegation at Chaksam ferry around the end of July when the British forces were crossing the Tsangpo. The delegation that met him at the crossing site comprised the Grand Lama’s chamberlain, the abbott of Drepung, the largest monastery of Lhasa, and many others who prayed that the mission should not proceed further and should carry out negotiations at that spot itself. The same delegation reappeared once again when the force camped on the outskirts of Lhasa on 2 August, and made the same appeal!
On 30 July, when it had become clear that the British force was determined to continue its advance up to Lhasa, the Dalai Lama, along with Dorjieff and a small retinue, sped northwards towards Mongolia. Before leaving, the Dalai Lama handed over his seal to the Ti Rimpoche, the head lama of Ganden monastery, telling him that he was proceeding on a ‘religious retreat’.4
On 4 August 1904, the British mission, led by an impressive and disciplined force, paraded down the streets of Lhasa up to the Chinese residency to return the call made by the Amban the previous day. The procession was led by the Amban’s bodyguard and pikemen in traditional costume and weapons. It made its way to the Yamen, where they were given a ceremonial reception at the Amban’s residence.5 The procession’s subtle show of force and its imperial regalia, combined with Chinese acceptance of British intervention in the very shadow of the Potala Palace, left the Tibetans awestruck.
During the next few weeks, Younghusband held negotiations with the Tibetans and the Chinese Amban, Yu T’ai, and was able to hammer out this Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904, a treaty which not only fulfilled, to a large extent, the mandate given to him, but went far beyond it in some respects. Both Curzon and Younghusband were looking to maintain some sort of permanent British presence in Tibet, contrary to the policy enunciated by Whitehall. Expectedly, the home government took no time to water down certain provisions of this treaty, much to the disappointment of Younghusband.
There were two principal goals which Great Britain had set out to achieve through the Younghusband mission. The first was to establish their predominant position in the region because of the British Indian empire’s geographical proximity to the heart of Tibet, and therefore to impress upon the Tibetans the need to respect the Sino-British treaty of 1890 and the Trade Agreement of 1893. This would end the vacillation of the Tibetans as far as accepting the Sikkim–Tibet boundary was concerned, and facilitate establishment of a trade mart and related facilities for the British at Yatung. The second was part of the agenda of the Great Game—to put an end to Russian influence and intrigue in Tibet, facilitated particularly by the cosy relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Russian Buriat monk Dorjieff, and to stop the reported arms deliveries from Russia to Lhasa.
The Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904
Thubten Gyatso, the thirteenth Dalai Lama, quietly slipped out of the Potala Palace as news of the impending crossing of the Tsangpo river by Younghusband’s invading force reached Lhasa. He fled to Urga in Mongolia in the company of the enigmatic Dorjieff as he neither wanted to be taken prisoner nor be a party to any British-imposed agreement or treaty. Before leaving Tibet, he sent for the hugely revered Ti Rimpoche, but, to the Rimpoche’s consternation, departed before he could reach the palace. However, the Dalai Lama left his seals for the Rimpoche and a letter appointing him as the acting regent, advising him to ‘face the Mission in his [Grand Lama] stead, and settle up the dispute as best he could’.6
In the absence of the Grand Lama, Younghusband’s task of clinching an abiding and authoritative treaty was rendered extremely difficult. Undeterred, however, he single-handedly coined the treaty and the various articles it contained. He had no doubt deftly and firmly handled the consultations and negotiations with the Tibetans and the Chinese Amban. It was Younghusband’s stroke of genius to have carried the Amban, Yu T’ai, with him all along, and to have garnered his support to get the Tibetans around too. In fact, he zealously induced the Tibetans to accept the treaty, even though some of its provisions far exceeded his brief. In a letter to his wife, he is reported to have said that he pushed the treaty ‘down the Tibetans’ throat’. His strategy went further, to acquire an endorsement of the Chinese Amban on the treaty, and he may well have succeeded but for the last-minute instructions received by Yu T’ai from Peking not to endorse the treaty. In the event, this paved the way for direct negotiations between Britain and Tibet, thereby setting a precedent.
In a formal ceremony conducted in the durbar hall of the Potala Palace on 7 September 1904, the Anglo-Tibetan treaty was read out in Tibetan and signed by stamping the respective nations’ seals on the huge scroll of paper bearing the text of the treaty in three parallel columns in English, Chinese and Tibetan. The procedure and sequence of the signing ceremony were very elaborate and impressive, and the hall was filled with the officers and troops of the British mission on one side and the Tibetans on the other. To one side of the high table were seated the high-ranking officers and elite of the township of Lhasa. These included the Nepalese resident and the Bhutanese representative. The Tibetans were told to affix their seals first—the council (Kashag), followed by the abbots of the three great monasteries, Drepung, Ganden (also known as Gahldan) and Sera, and the national assembly (Tsongdu), comprising high-ranking secular and monastic officials. Then there were representatives of prominent monasteries who also affixed their seals to the document. After this the acting regent, Lo-Sang Gyal-
Tsen (Ti Rimpoche), affixed the Dalai Lama’s seal to the treaty, and, finally, Younghusband signed and placed his seal as commissioner on behalf of Great Britain. He handed over the document to Ti Rimpoche, saying a peace had now been made which he hoped would never be broken again.
Salient features of the treaty
The treaty comprised ten articles preceded by a brief elucidation of the state of affairs and difficulties in the observance of the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 which the Tibetans had refused to validate. The stated aim of the convention was to ‘restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties’.7 It was agreed to respect the frontier between Sikkim and Tibet and open forthwith the trade marts at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok with resident British agents and free access to British and Tibetan subjects. The 1893 Regulations would apply to these marts too, and the Tibetan government would impose no additional levies or restrictions. The agreement provided for revision of trade regulations.
The Tibetans also agreed, after sustained coaxing and veiled threats, to the demand of the British government for reparation for the Tibetan attacks on the British mission, for violation of treaty obligations and for the costs incurred on the military expedition. An amount equivalent to Rs 75 lakh was agreed to be paid by the Tibetans to the British government over a period of seventy-five years in annual instalments of Rs 1 lakh. It was also agreed that the British would continue to hold Chumbi Valley until the indemnity was paid and the trade marts established.
The ninth article of the treaty had connotations of near ‘protectorate’ status for Tibet vis-à-vis Britain as it specified primacy of British dominance in Tibetan affairs to the exclusion of all other foreign powers. Without the ‘previous consent’ of the British, the Tibetans could have no dealings with any other foreign power as far as territorial rights, internal affairs, presence of agents, financial commitments and concessions for railways, mining, roads, telegraphs or other rights were concerned.8 On the face of it, though not categorically stated, it implied that even China was excluded, and was therefore subject to the provisions of this article. The political implications of this article raised many an eyebrow and drew adverse comments from some of the major global powers of the time.
Not surprisingly, even the British government did not take kindly to Younghusband’s overenthusiastic and determined actions and policy-making initiatives, and diluted some of the provisions of the treaty while reprimanding him at the same time. Ending Curzon’s imperialistic ambitions, even though they rose from his slightly misplaced Russophobia, Younghusband’s was the last ‘out of empire’ military invasion undertaken by the British. This historic expedition not only woke up the slumbering dragon but, importantly, resulted in a paradigm shift in the relations between Tibet, China and British India.
On completion of the signing ceremony of the treaty that took over an hour and a half, Colonel Younghusband gave a speech that was interpreted simultaneously in Tibetan and Chinese. Emphasizing the important features of the treaty and their impact on the future relations between British India, Tibet and China, the commissioner assured the gathering that ‘the Treaty leaves the land, the liberties and the religion of the Tibetans untouched; that it recognises the suzerainty of China, and does not interfere with the country’s internal affairs, but confers increased facilities for trade with India; and that if they [Tibetans] honestly kept the Treaty they would find the British as good friends as they had been bad enemies’ (see Appendix 2 for text).9
Taking leave of the regent, the Amban and the other dignitaries, Younghusband’s mission and its escort returned to the camp in as much ceremonial grandeur as the circumstances permitted. The parade passed by ‘groups of Lamas and laity, who stood respectfully by, as the completion of the Treaty within the sacred walls of Potala had created a deep impression on the people’. This was followed by gestures of goodwill and bonhomie by release of prisoners by both sides, condoning of fines that the British had imposed and presentation of money and gifts to the monasteries and poor Tibetans.10 It may be of interest to note that in its mention of Chumbi Valley the Tibetan version of the treaty says Tang La (the actual watershed between Tibet and Sikkim) is the start point of the valley and Phari Dzong a part of it, contrary to what the Tibetans had believed.11
The Chinese attitude during the entire period, from the time the British initiated the move for talks at Khamba Dzong in July 1903 till their advance through the heartland of Tibet right up to Lhasa, had been contradictory and treacherous, and definitely not in keeping with their suzerain status. Exploiting the diplomatic naivety of the Tibetans, the Chinese, without conceding anything, regained their lost grip on Tibet. The debilitating effect of successive defeats inflicted by the British on the Tibetan army helped the Chinese. But the Chinese did lose face and credibility vis-à-vis the Tibetans. This was aptly demonstrated when the Chinese Amban put up a proclamation announcing the deposing of the Dalai Lama by the imperial court of China in prominent places in Tibet, only to find these posters splattered with mud or torn to pieces by the people.
However, the graduated and punctuated nature of the British ingress, the extremely short duration of the enterprise, and the lack of wholeheartedness on the part of the British gave rise to Chinese hopes that the British would eventually leave and present them later with an opportunity to deal with a weakened Tibet as they liked. The Chinese believed that as long as Tibetan autonomy was preserved and the Russians kept at bay, the British would acquiesce to Chinese control and suzerainty over Tibet. What has perhaps escaped the attention of some historians is that while formulating their strategy, the Chinese carefully monitored the proceedings of the British Parliament as well as the Western media’s views on developments in Tibet, Afghanistan, Persia and Mongolia. They had perhaps evolved a system by which they could home on to the differences relating to Tibet between the viceroy, the Government of India, the British legation in Peking, and the India and the Foreign Offices of the home government in the UK, and exploit the transparency of a democratic polity to their advantage.
For example, the massacre of hundreds of unarmed and fleeing Tibetans during the mission’s action at Guru was condemned and adversely commented on in the House of Commons and by the media. This took away some of the sheen from the achievements and recognition of the Younghusband expedition. Also, the debate on whether the British should get involved in Tibetan matters or not, and if so, what their scale of involvement should be—these were cues the Chinese were desperately looking for, and they got them on a platter, courtesy of the British parliamentary debates. As a matter of fact, this pattern continues to this date, the democratic Republic of India having replaced Great Britain!
To the utter surprise of the Tibetans the Younghusband expedition began its withdrawal from Tibet a fortnight after the treaty was signed and sealed. This unexpected development was received by the people with huge awe and relief. As planned, Brigadier Macdonald, in consultation with Younghusband, decided to move back from Lhasa on 23 September. The return journey was quite uneventful and the force reached Gyantse during 5–6 October 1904 (Figure 6). Thereafter, the mission moved in smaller groups, reeling in the protective elements deployed on the road as the rear guard withdrew. The condition of the road was much better than before. It had been worked on by the sappers, who were aided by soldiers. Their work impressed the Tibetan civilian labour. By the third week of October the mission had returned to India. In this expedition to Lhasa, every member of the mission had trekked over 1,000 kilometres in forbidding altitudes (Figure 6). In fact, some had moved even longer distances, shuttling between Gyantse and Chumbi, and later between Lhasa and Gyantse.
Figure 6: The Younghusband expedition: route and datelines
It is of interest to know that Whitehall sent a telegram on 19 September directing Younghusband to convey to the Tibetan authorities certain modifications to the terms of the treaty, which would result in dilution of some of the harsher co
nditions contained in it. These primarily involved a sizeable reduction of the indemnity and creation of a fourth trading station at Rima on the Zayul river on the Tibetan side of the north-eastern-most point along the Assam Himalayas. In a manner suggestive of disobedience, Younghusband, who received the instructions from London only on 24 September when he had left Lhasa, decided at that stage not to turn back to announce these alterations. He surmised, and rightly so, that fresh negotiations would definitely undermine the sanctity and impact of the treaty and involve a prolonged stay in Tibet for the mission.
In the final analysis, the Younghusband expedition was a turning point in Tibetan history, leading to a series of developments in the relations between Tibet, China and British India. This description of the expedition has been attempted for a clearer understanding of the events with the benefit of hindsight, keeping in mind at the same time the pulls and pressures of those times and the environment prevailing at the turn of the nineteenth century.
The mission resulted in or revealed the following:
The British Indian Empire demonstrated its reach and determination to keep outside influences away from Tibet and maintain the status quo there, i.e., Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty.
The status and authority of the Dalai Lama were undermined, as were his aspirations for greater Tibetan autonomy or independence from China, on the lines of Mongolia.
The hollowness of Chinese claims of sovereignty over Tibet was exposed. Far from protecting the Tibetans, the Chinese stood by as passive and mute spectators during Britain’s invasion of Tibet. At the same time, because the treaty gave the Amban some importance, China’s hold on Tibet was restored to some extent, allowing the Amban to play a larger role in Lhasa affairs.