The McMahon Line- a Century of Discord

by J J Singh

  Moreover, the British would take action to ensure the fulfilment of all guarantees by China, as per the Adhesion Agreement of 1906. Alarmed by the aggressive forward policy unleashed by the Manchu Empire in the wake of the Younghusband expedition of 1903–04, which was followed up in a more robust manner by the regime of the new republic during 1910–11, British India reacted vigorously, first by ejecting the policy of non-interference, and second by endeavouring to define the frontier with Tibet by reaching out to the less explored or unknown tribal territories on the southern slopes of the Himalayas. The Chinese actions had been prompted by an apprehension that Britain might grab central Tibet or assume the position of protector of Tibet, while the British reaction was spurred by a similar concern that China might take over Tibet, or that an emboldened Russia might stake her claim for Tibet to be included in its sphere of influence. In an era of power-play politics, the vacuum created by a powerless and vulnerable Tibet heralded its own dynamics.

  These were the principal reasons behind the genesis of the tripartite conference. Initially, the British only wanted to play the role of an honest broker and offer benevolent assistance to the two warring sides, but eventually they realized that without their active participation, the negotiations between China and Tibet would be interminable and may end up with a situation not to Britain’s liking.

  The Chinese, being masters at strategic procrastination and prevarication, most reluctantly agreed to participate in this tripartite conference. They sought every method to change its format or to delay the convening of the event. For a change, Whitehall stood by the Government of India and refused to yield to China or allow itself to get disoriented by the diversionary tactics of the Chinese on matters such as the issue of the three plenipotentiaries being equals, or having separate bilateral conferences with Britain and Tibet and not necessarily in India, or the sequencing of the agenda. The Chinese insisted on discussing the status of Tibet before anything else, whereas the British were clear that the geographical expanse and boundaries of Tibet had to be decided first and foremost. The Tibetans held the same view as the British. It had to be conveyed to the Chinese in a firm manner that past precedence, such as the equation between the Tibetan and Chinese representatives during the 1908 Trade Agreement—where the Tibetans participated as subordinates of the Chinese—did not hold good in the present circumstances, when Tibet had literally declared its independence and there were no Chinese left in that country, not even the Amban! And there was no question of any bipartite agreement between Britain and China, as the Tibetans were certainly not going to honour it.

  At times, when the Chinese failed to see reason, they were told that Britain would go ahead and deliberate directly with Tibet, and that China would have to forego its suzerain status vis-à-vis Tibet. Besides, they were also told the British would not lift the embargo on travel through India to Tibet and would also withhold recognition of the new republic. The Chinese were therefore left with no choice but to sit at the table with the Tibetans and the British on an equal footing to discuss issues relating to Tibet.

  During the in-house discussions at Whitehall in the spring of 1913, Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State, appeared a bit apprehensive about Britain having a permanent representative in Lhasa before making amendments to the accord of 1907 with Russia, although he was on board in principle. On the other hand, as brought out by Alastair Lamb in his comprehensive account, The McMahon Line, Vol. II, p. 466, Lionel Abrahams, like other officials at the India Office, was more emphatic when he said:

  … the whole lesson of the last ten years, it may possibly be said, is that Tibet cannot stand alone; that it must be subject to some influence; and that we cannot allow that influence to be other than British; and that British influence can only be maintained by a British agency in some form or other at the capital (Lhasa).

  As far as the Tibetans were concerned, having thrown off the Chinese yoke they wanted to assert their independence and, if possible, following the Mongolian example, have no Chinese presence anywhere in Tibet proper. However, unlike the Russians, the British were not prepared to stick their neck out beyond a point. And that limit was the supply of arms, ammunition and military training to Tibet, but definitely not an armed intervention in support of the Tibetans. In fact, the British were keen that Tibet remain fully autonomous but under Chinese suzerainty.

  The salient features of the British memorandum of 1912 relating to the status of Tibet and Chinese suzerain powers are as follows:

  While Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was acknowledged, active intervention by China in the internal affairs of Tibet beyond the scope of the Adhesion Agreement of 1906 had never been nor would be recognized.

  President Yuan Shih-k’ai’s declaration of 21 April 1912 that Tibet was to be regarded as a proper province of China and the conduct of Chinese officials in Tibet were strongly objected to.

  Positioning of an Amban with an escort as an adviser to the Tibetan government on foreign relations was acceptable, whereas stationing of a large number of troops in Lhasa or elsewhere in Tibet was not acceptable.

  Recognition by the British government of the Chinese republic would be contingent on a written agreement on the above lines, up to which time all communications via India to Tibet would remain closed to the Chinese.

  India considered Tibet as a strategic buffer, and consequent to the Younghusband mission, the Chinese woke up to the reality of Tibet being a strategic ‘back-door’. As argued by Heather Spence:

  … if the back-door was open and occupied by a foreign power, China would be exposed and vulnerable. The Chinese contention that the British in India coveted Tibet and would later use it as a base to attack China proper became an important ingredient in Anglo-Chinese relations. During the 1930s this matter, once again, became a major issue.4

  Unstated and un-delimited formally till the second decade of the twentieth century, the boundary between Tibet and India, as it existed naturally, was in fact also the ethnic, cultural and traditional divide between the two neighbours. Portents of the future presence of the Chinese at India’s portals along the vast northern frontier began to grip the minds of British planners for the first time, bringing to the fore the vulnerability of British India’s north-eastern frontiers and raising questions about the British policy of non-interference in Tibetan affairs. A militarily weak and pacific Tibet had posed no threat to the British Indian empire so far, but during 1905–11 the situation had changed radically. Ironically, it was the British who facilitated the re-emergence of Chinese power in Tibet by weakening the apparatus of the Tibetan state and lowering the stature of the Dalai Lama. Heather Spence has lucidly described the predicament of Britain in formulating afresh a policy on Tibet during 1912–13: ‘The conceptual basis of Britain’s new policy was flawed: Britain wanted Tibet as a buffer but was not prepared to give the support necessary for it to remain independent (emphasis added).’ The predicament of the British was that ‘on one hand they were committed by a promise to the Lhasa government to support Tibet in upholding her practical autonomy, which was of importance to the security of India, and, on the other hand, Britain’s alliance with China made it difficult to give effective material support to Tibet’.5

  According to Spence, ‘What the British wanted was to create a balance. That is to say, give just enough support so that Tibet could protect India’s Himalayan border without the British having to commit themselves to a major defensive initiative.’6 It has then been reasoned by Spence that ‘the ultimate objective was to get the Chinese to sign an agreement which would secure for the British stability in Central Asia. British tactics were impotent and the foreign office adopted a wait-and-see approach which dissolved into a dormancy policy.’7

  The British imperialists found it expedient to follow a policy of carving out territories as informal assets or spheres of influence, where power without responsibility would be the underlying concept. To reinforce her argument, Spence has quoted from an article by Gallagher and Rob
inson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, Economic History Review, 1953-54: ‘To consider imperialism only by the criterion of formal control was rather like judging the size and character of icebergs solely from the parts above the water-line.’8

  Fundamentally, the British policy was to establish a stable environment in the heart of Asia, with an autonomous Tibet under the suzerainty of China, and at the same time ensure the security of India’s northern borders. ‘Such a conditional policy safeguarded British economic interest in China as well as the national security of the Indian Empire,’ said D. Norbu in his book The Europeanisation of Sino-Tibetan Relations. And, as rightly deduced by Spence, that was ‘the least expensive and most practical policy for Britain’.9

  As far as Britain’s relations with Tibet and China were concerned, the dilemma Whitehall faced was indeed very complex. It was an act of balancing on a tightrope. With Russia, it meant remaining within the bounds of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and bringing to an end the Great Game in Central Asia, and with China it was to safeguard British investments and trading interests. At the same time, implementation of the carefully nuanced British policy of ‘Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty’ posed a constant challenge to both the home government in London and the Government of India. The viceroy, in his farewell message to the Dalai Lama in 1912, who was then returning to Tibet from his exile in Darjeeling, categorically emphasized the British policy on the matter:

  … the desire of the Government of India was to see the internal autonomy of Tibet under Chinese suzerainty, but without Chinese interference, so long as cordial relations were preserved between India and Tibet and treaty obligations were duly performed.10

  As was borne out by subsequent events, the Chinese had no intentions of giving up their claim of sovereignty over the whole of Tibet. The declaration by President Yuan Shih-k’ai on 27 April 1912 making Tibet an integral part of China was a clear indicator, if any was needed, of the Chinese grand design to incorporate Tibet into its mainland.

  Tibet had also now become the focus of attention of other world powers, namely, Japan, France and the USA. Britain did not display sufficient will to support the Tibetans all the way, as the Russians did with the Mongolians. Consequently, China was quick to discern Britain’s predicament from the clauses of ‘self-denial’ in Britain’s treaties with China and Russia of 1906 and 1907 respectively. China took full advantage of the situation to re-establish its hold on Tibet in a ruthless manner under the leadership of Chao Erh-feng and General Chung Ying. The Chinese addressed not just the bordering areas along the Marches and Amdo and Kham provinces, but gradually advanced to Tibet proper. Eventually, in 1910, this exercise took the Chinese invading forces, led by General Chung Ying, right up to Lhasa and the Potala Palace, compelling the hapless thirteenth Dalai Lama to flee once again, this time south to British India. The absence of the Grand Lama from the scene of action once again gave the Chinese an opportunity to usurp power and consolidate their authority over all of Tibet. During this period, the immeasurable contribution of the forceful and intrepid Chao Erh-feng in giving effect to the transformation of Chinese power in Tibet from ‘a fictional suzerainty’, as described by Curzon, to actual sovereignty by 1910–11 needs to be recognized. It is another matter that destiny ended the meteoric rise of Chao. The imperial decree by the Manchu court hastily deposing the Dalai Lama and ordering for his successor to be found was an ill-advised step not accepted by the Tibetans, and this resulted in huge embarrassment for the Chinese.

  The imperial decree of 25 February 1910 also thoroughly denounced the conduct of the Dalai Lama since his return to Tibet (after his first exile) for its ‘pride, extravagance, lewdness, sloth, vice, and perversity’. It accused him of being ‘violent and disorderly, disobedient to the Imperial Commands, and oppressive towards the Tibetans (emphasis added)’.11 Justifying the movement of Chinese troops up to Lhasa, the proclamation said:

  Szechuan troops have now been sent into Tibet for the special purpose of preserving order and protecting the Trade Marts. There was no reason for the Tibetans to be suspicious of their intentions. But the Dalai Lama spread rumours, became rebellious, defamed the Amban, refused supplies, and would not listen to reason … He has been guilty of treachery, and has placed himself beyond the pale of Our Imperial favour.12

  In fact, the decree commanded that wherever the Dalai Lama went, he should be treated as a ‘commoner’. ‘These powerful words, which left no doubt as to what the Chinese thought of the thirteenth Dalai Lama, were communicated on 26 February to the British Legation in Peking and to the Foreign Office in London.’13

  This was the second instance of the Dalai Lama’s deposition by the Chinese, the first having happened when he fled to Mongolia in 1904. These depositions were unsuccessful in diminishing the image of the Grand Lama amongst the people of Tibet and Mongolia, but they did dent the reputation of the Manchu emperor. It had become clear to the Chinese that the Dalai Lama would not dance to their tune. ‘At the moment when his deposition was thus being announced by the Chinese, the Dalai Lama had taken up temporary residence in Darjeeling, and had informed Lord Minto that “I now look to you for protection, and I trust that the relation between the British Government and Tibet will be that of a father to his children”.’14

  After the First World War, the dynamics of power play by the important nations left no choice for Britain but to sacrifice Tibet in order to safeguard her ‘wider commercial interests’ in China. Slowly but surely, the decline of the British Empire began. Consequently, Britain chose to support the nationalistic Chinese regime.

  10

  Eastern Himalayan Frontier

  For a clearer understanding of this frontier zone, it is necessary to have a good knowledge of the terrain and of the people inhabiting the Himalayan watershed east of Bhutan and right up to Burma. The eastern Himalayas are a continuation of the great Himalayan chain that stretches from Kashmir to Myanmar in an arc, forming the natural divide between the Tibetan plateau and India, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar. The historical, cultural and traditional boundary generally lay along the highest crest line of the Himalayas, broken here and there by some river valleys that cut across the Himalayas and whose waters flow into India. These river valleys facilitated interaction, and at times migration, of people and trade, from south to north, and vice versa. Religion, particularly Buddhism, was taken by Indian saints to Tibet, from where it seeped down in the reverse direction in certain areas. However, the major portion of this frontier lies along rocky and snow-covered mountains, 4,500 to 7,000 metres high. Glaciated areas too are found at a few places here. All this forms an impregnable barrier, except for a few high-altitude passes and rivers that cut across this mountain chain. This natural barrier has been aptly described by the historian John Lall: ‘Perhaps nowhere else in the world has such a long frontier been unmistakably delineated by nature itself.’1

  From Bhutan to Burma, the Himalayas stretch across 1,070 kilometres, most of which remained unexplored territory till the early twentieth century. Between the southern edge of the Tibetan plateau and the Himalayan watershed is the Tsangpo Valley, which ascends gradually from its base at about 3,600 metres to the Himalayan watershed. This region, located north of the Himalayas and lying from west to east, comprises the areas of southern Tibet, namely Monyul, Takpo, Kongbo, Poyul or Pome/Pomed, Pemakoichen and Zayul. And to the south of the eastern Himalayan crest or watershed is the tribal belt, some 110–190 kilometres, going down to the Brahmaputra plains. These areas did not have precise geographical definitions or limits. This frontier zone stretching over 1,000 kilometres can be divided into two parts for ease of description and analysis. Going from west to east is, first, the region from Bhutan to the Siang Valley and then the region from Siang Valley to the Myanmar frontier.

  Bhutan to Siang Valley

  Monyul, the ‘place of the Monpas’, is spread over a large area. Tibetan texts and other local dialects have used the ethnic name Monpa (Monba) ever since
the eighth century, referring to the people inhabiting this area south of the main Himalayan chain. It is not therefore surprising that one can find Monpas in Bhutan, Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh (going eastwards from Tawang up to Pachakshiri in the upper Siyom Valley and even Pemakoichen). Bordering eastern Bhutan, the people of Tawang, Dirang and Kalaktang in West Kameng district of Arunachal Pradesh are called Monpa2 too, and are governed by the lamas of Tawang (Figure 10).

  The northern slopes of the main Himalayas are mostly devoid of vegetation, except for the lower-altitude valleys, and are inhabited by Tibetans. The people who lived in the Pomed region were called ‘Pobas’, and were, for all practical purposes, almost independent under the nominal control of Lhasa. They were notorious for robbing travellers passing through their region, taking away their valuables and horses.

  On the southern side there is a mountainous, hilly and densely forested tribal belt. Amongst the rainiest parts of the Indian subcontinent, this region has climate zones varying from the alpine to the subtropical. It has rainforests, and rivers and streams cascading down from about 6,000 metres to as low as 300 metres; it is perhaps the only part of the world with such geographical variation across such a small area. Besides the Monpas, Membas and other Buddhist clans, fierce tribes known as the Lao Kha,3 also referred to as ‘Lopas’ by the Tibetans, live in this southern Himalayan region. They include the Miri, Aka, Dafla (Nyishi), Abor, Mishmi and other tribes, who were generally described as ‘savage’ or ‘uncivilized’ in the past. With their unique culture and traditions, they are distinct from both the Tibetans in the north and the plainsmen of Assam. As a policy, this tribal belt was loosely administered by the British. The tribal population zealously guarded their territories and way of life, and it was the Assamese they generally interacted with.