The McMahon Line- a Century of Discord

by J J Singh

  Although on the surface relations between the two Great Lamas were cordial, the undercurrents spoke a different language. En route from India to Lhasa in June 1912, the Dalai Lama was welcomed by the Tashi Lama and his officials at Ralung, where they apparently discussed various matters, which might probably have included the Panchen Lama’s justification of his conduct during the period of the Dalai Lama’s sojourn in Mongolia and China, and later, during his exile in India. The Dalai Lama believed the Tashi Lama had acquiesced to the Chinese to some extent, going along with their government and administration during the period of his exiles, even though the Tashi Lama had refused to occupy the Dalai Lama’s seat or participate in the ill-advised search and appointment of a successor to the Dalai Lama, as demanded by the Chinese. As a matter of fact, some of the lamas from Tashilhunpo had bent over backwards to please their Chinese overlords. The Dalai Lama was also furious with the followers of the Panchen Lama who, along with some monks of Loseling and Drepung monasteries, failed to reinforce the efforts of the Tibetan volunteer army to throw out the Chinese during 1912–13. The pro-Chinese monastery at Tengyeling gave shelter to the Chinese soldiers, and this led to a long Tibetan siege of the monastery before the soldiers’ eventual capitulation.

  His monastery unable to meet the financial demands of Lhasa and already in arrears, because of which some of his representatives were imprisoned at Lhasa in 1922, the Panchen Lama decided to flee to Mongolia and China with his key followers. The pretext he used to move northwards towards Kumbum in December 1923 was ingenious: to collect donations from his adherents. The Dalai Lama wasn’t able to prevent him from doing this, and the true intentions of the Tashi Lama dawned on him much later.

  After a brief sojourn in Mongolia, the Panchen Lama showed up at Peking in February 1924. The Chinese bestowed on him honours such as the title of ‘Complete Lord of the Religion of the Conqueror’ (the Buddhist religion),18 and exploited his presence in Peking to the hilt by indulging in political intrigues and power play with him. Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama, having decried the Panchen Lama’s ‘selfishness’, made alternative arrangements for administration of Tashilhunpo monastery without replacing the incumbent Lama.19 The Tibetan culture, though medieval in many respects, permitted a wonderful practice of public criticism or satire in poetic form. An example of this was the street song aimed at the Panchen Lama’s ‘duplicitous’ conduct during the Dalai Lama’s exile:

  The bird known as magpie (the Panchen Lama)

  Has a body that is half black and half white.

  After the great cuckoo bird (the Dalai Lama) arrives,

  we will slowly be able to have discussions.20

  The absence of the Panchen Lama, the second most revered reincarnated lama of Tibet, certainly had its impact on the Tibetan people at large. The conservative elements of Tibetan society, mainly the leading monks, found fault with the modernizing policies of the Dalai Lama. This growing resentment, a fair amount of which was directed against the British for their imperialistic tendencies, nearly led to an armed confrontation between the military hierarchy and the lamas in Lhasa and a mini-revolt in the Pomed region, because of which the local ruler, the Kanam Deba, fled to Assam. The Dalai Lama was thus confronted with one of his greatest challenges. He overcame the crisis by demoting key military and civil officials and reversing most of the recent irksome and unpopular policy changes21. The English school being run at Gyantse under the tutelage of Frank Ludlow was shut down in 1926. Upon his dismissal on 28 October that year, he (Ludlow) wrote in his diary:

  It seems that the Indian govt can do nothing right for Tibet. We lend them Laden La to train their police and they allow all his good work in Lhasa to rot. We train officers for their army and they are dismissed wholesale. We try to run a school for them and they throw it to the dogs… They will regret their decision one day when they are Chinese slaves once more as they assuredly will be.22

  At one stage, when the Chiang Kai-shek regime had taken control in China in 1929 the Panchen Lama went to the extent of exhorting the Chinese ‘to take charge of affairs in Tibet. To the chagrin of the Dalai Lama, the Chinese hosted the Panchen Lama for well over a decade till his death at Jyekundo on 1 December 1937.’23

  As mentioned earlier, the Chinese, British, Russians, and to some extent the Japanese too, indulged in political games and intrigue with the two lamas. The British invited the Tashi Lama to India during 1904–06 when the Dalai Lama had fled to Mongolia. He was given lavish presents and hosted extravagantly during his visits to religious and other places in India. The Russians intrigued with the Dalai Lama during his exile at Urga in Mongolia. Dorjieff was the conduit through which the Lama kept in touch with the Kremlin. The Chinese, not to be left behind, received the Dalai Lama warmly, although they granted him a status that was a couple of notches below the recognition awarded to the Great Fifth, taking advantage of his helplessness as an exile. The mandarins at Peking tried their best to win him over by other inducements. However, when the Chinese army under Chao Erh-feng invaded Lhasa in 1910, the Dalai Lama was literally driven into the arms of the British. Over the next two years and thereafter, the Dalai Lama gained the trust and support of the British. During this time, the Panchen Lama was given greater prominence by the Chinese but ignored by the British, who relegated him to the sidelines. On the Grand Lama’s jubilant return in 1913 to Lhasa—when, for the first time after 1727, Tibet was rid of Chinese power and presence from its soil—Dorjieff was back to his Russian intrigues and the Japanese had found a niche in Tibet by providing one or two military advisers and material help. One of them, Yajima Yasujiro, was a veteran of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, and helped train the Tibetan army from 1913 to 1919. Another, Aoki Bunkyo, a monk, ‘translated Japanese army manuals into Tibetan’.24 The third was Togan Tada, a Japanese monk who stayed for eleven years in the Sera monastery. Besides studying, he could have been politicking too, as surmised by Bell in a note to the Indian government on 6 February 1921: ‘Japanese, as a rule, find it difficult to abstain from politics.’25

  The internal strife and schisms in the Chinese polity after Yuan Shih-kai’s downfall, Tibet’s dependence on the British, and the British Empire’s geographical proximity and ease of access to Tibet made Britain the paramount power and wielder of influence in Tibet for the next four decades (that too without its assumption of any responsibility). This was despite the power play and intrigues by other powers. With a faction-ridden power like China held at bay and a benign and peaceful Tibet as neighbour, India’s northern border remained secure. Now a complacency set in, to the extent that there were hardly any efforts made by the British to penetrate the densely forested wildernesses of the tribal areas and to change or modify their policy of ‘loose political control’ of the north-eastern frontier tracts south of the Himalayas.

  The situation along the Sino-Tibet frontier, though largely peaceful, remained tense, and there was skirmishing in some of the disputed areas in eastern Tibet. The absence of a mutually acceptable and well-defined boundary between China and Tibet was the root cause of this violence. The Dalai Lama continued to press for ratification of the McMahon Convention and its ‘blue line’, with certain changes, but to no avail. He also wished that the Panchen Lama should return to Tashilhunpo. However, the Tibetans had made it clear that the Panchen Lama would not be allowed to enter Tibet accompanied by a Chinese escort, as was insisted on by the Panchen Lama himself and his hosts. The Tibetans even suggested that he could return by the sea route, enter Tibet through India and proceed directly to Shigatse. The Dalai Lama had laid down two conditions for the Panchen Lama’s return: first, that he would have to pay the normal tax dues as well as the ‘new tax’ to finance the ‘national defence programme’; and second, that he would be allowed entry into Tibet accompanied by his Tibetan retinue alone, and not with an armed Chinese escort.26 The Panchen Lama was unable to have his terms for return to Tashilhunpo accepted by the Tsongdu, despite much effort. He passed away at Jyekundo in Novembe
r 1937, ‘to the mingled sorrow and relief of the Tibetan people’.27

  The Chiang Kai-shek government made many overtures to engage with the Dalai Lama directly, as they considered Tibet an integral part of China and believed it was unnecessary to involve the British in Sino-Tibetan matters. In this regard, two delegations were sent to Lhasa during 1929–30. One was led by Liu Man-ch’ing, a half-Chinese born in Lhasa of a Tibetan mother, who was tasked to convey the message of Chiang Kai-shek that Tibetans should ‘rejoin the family of the Republic as brothers’.28 The second mission arrived at Lhasa on 16 January 1930. This one was empowered to engage in a dialogue for direct settlement of Tibetan issues and was led by a Tibetan, Yungon Dzasa, the head abbot of the Yung-ho Kung temple at Peking. He had been appointed head abbot by the Dalai Lama himself. These delegations and initiatives were well received, but the Dalai Lama was not prepared to accept the terms offered by Chiang Kai-shek. According to Bell, the Dalai Lama ‘was determined to free Tibet as far as possible from the Chinese rule’ and believed that the ‘majority of the Tibetan race were with him’. Bell has recounted the words of the Dalai Lama describing the way of Chinese strategic thinking:

  The Chinese way … is to say or do something mild at first, then to wait a bit, and, if it passes without objection, to say or do something stronger. If this is objected to, they reply that what they said or did has been misinterpreted and really meant nothing.29

  This observation perhaps holds good to this day!

  With his understanding of the Chinese mind, the Grand Lama was able to keep Tibet free of Chinese presence ‘by creating a balance of power between China and India’, in the process being ‘able to maintain Tibet’s independence’.30 It would not be an exaggeration to say that during the last two decades (1913–1933) of his life, Tibet was de facto an independent kingdom.

  Tibet witnessed a period of relative peace and stability after the Simla Conference, if one did not consider the skirmishes on its eastern frontiers with China. Peace was elusive in the Kham and southern Amdo regions, as there did not appear to be much central control over the provinces of Szechuan and Yunnan, where only the writ of the regional warlords and generals could run. There were many warring factions among them which did not see eye to eye with Chiang Kai-shek, and before him with President Yuan Shih-k’ai, and waged internecine wars for petty gains. Because of their expansionist tendencies they posed a constant security threat to the eastern frontiers of Tibet. The thirteenth Dalai Lama therefore had no choice but to strengthen and modernize his army. He was able to do this in a fairly satisfactory manner, primarily because of the help provided by the British. Ironically, at the same time, Great Britain did not want to make Tibet so strong that it could stake a claim for total independence from China.

  During the final phase of his reign, the Dalai Lama had a team of three powerful confidants—Kunphela, Lungshar, and Tsarong—apart from his young prime minister, Silon Langdun, who was also his nephew. Though the three confidants worked closely, there was a deep undercurrent of rivalry among them. Tsarong, though at one time very powerful, had been removed from the position of commander-in-chief of the army in the purge of British-trained leadership from the modernized Tibetan army. He had also been demoted from the Kashag. Lungshar, given the rank of Tsepon (finance minister), was made responsible for the military in Tsarong’s place. Although he too was removed from that position for nearly starting a war with Nepal over the arrest of Sherpa Gyalpo for illegal commercial activity from the precincts of the Nepalese resident in Lhasa without the approval of the Dalai Lama, he retained his power and status, being a Tsepon. Kunphela, holding the rank of Khenche (senior abbot), was the powerful chief of the mint and had the responsibility of ‘importation and distribution of arms and ammunition’. As a means of gaining more power, he created a new regiment called Drong Drak Makhar, comprising the sons of the elite. Lungshar believed Kunphela was instrumental in his dismissal and nursed a grudge against him.31

  The era of the thirteenth Dalai Lama ended on 17 December 1933, when he left for the ‘honorable field’. A Tibetan proverb aptly sums up the predicament of the Tibetans, now that the British were not holding their hand firmly:

  Sheep that trusted in the pasture

  O’er the precipice were hurled.32

  Two years before his death, the Dalai Lama wrote a testament for his people. This was published in a small book of nine pages, known amongst Tibetans as the ‘Precious Protector’s Ka Chem’. First, the Dalai Lama described his personal life and experiences, including the hardships he suffered during his two periods of exile from his country. Then he articulated his concern about the future threat to the Tibetan religion, culture and way of life from communism, both from without and within. The communists were destroying monasteries in Mongolia, he wrote, and the search for the reincarnation of Jetsun Dampa of Urga had been ‘disallowed’.33 He advised Tibetans to ‘maintain friendly relations with Britain and China, both of which have powerful armies’.34 He said in warning: ‘Unless we can guard our own country, it will now happen that the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lamas, the Father and the Son, the holders of the Buddhist faith, the glorious rebirths will be broken down and left without a name.’35 He exhorted young and vigorous Tibetans to enlist in the army to defend the nation: ‘High officials, low officials, and peasants must all act in harmony to bring happiness to Tibet.’36

  His passing away created a leadership void and a state of instability and uncertainty in Tibet. A struggle for power instantly ensued. According to Tibetan tradition, a regent had to be selected. At the same time, the search had begun for the Dalai Lama’s reincarnated successor. Within two months, the Tsongdu, probably influenced by Lungshar, nominated the young and inexperienced incarnate Lama of Reting as the regent.37 The scheming and vengeful Lungshar wanted to discredit Kunphela, and as a first step towards this called for the mass resignation of the entire Drong Drak Makhar regiment. With the backing of the important monasteries, it did not take long for Lungshar to become the power centre. Sidelining the Kashag (council of ministers), Lungshar was able to win over the support of the Tsongdu, whose members were promised an important role in the future political dispensation that he planned for Tibet. He was able to completely overshadow Kunphela by laying the blame on him for not informing anybody of the Dalai Lama’s illness and for the inadequate medical attention that the Dalai Lama got. As a punishment, the Tsongdu was possibly prevailed upon by Lungshar to exile Kunphela to Kongbo in south Tibet.38 Thereafter, till his dramatic downfall, Lungshar was one of most powerful men in Lhasa.

  As these events unfolded, Lungshar’s ambitious plan to overthrow the present government by arresting the regent and ministers and to create a republic, wherein the council or Kashag was subordinated to the Tsongdu, was exposed. His diabolical plan of assassinating Kalon Trimon, an important minister and a respected conservative (who was also Lonchen Shatra’s principal guide at the Simla Conference), whom he considered a major obstacle in his chosen path, was also simultaneously unravelled. Lungshar was arrested and, having been found guilty of treason, was blinded39 and sentenced to life imprisonment. His lust for power ended his regal dreams within a brief span of four months. Tibet emerged from this quagmire quite unnerved, but was kept afloat by the state institutions such as the Kashag and the Tsongdu, who functioned along the guidelines contained in the Dalai Lama’s testament. During this period, the irksome shadow of the Panchen Lama, which was ensconced in China, loomed large over the political horizon in Tibet. The Panchen Lama spent his time engineering clever plots against the Lhasa regime till his passing away in 1937 in Jyekundo on the Chinese-held western frontier. As prophesied, he never returned to Tashilhunpo.40

  This situation in Tibet continued for more than a decade and a half, till the Chinese military takeover in 1951 snatched the country’s autonomous existence of near freedom. The Chinese violated all the existing agreements and promises it had made with Tibet and Britain by this invasion.

  The d
eath of the Dalai Lama was just the kind of opportunity the Chinese republic was waiting for to re-establish its presence in Tibet proper. The Tibetan government had not permitted any Chinese to enter Tibet for official or other purposes since 1912. Chinese traders and merchants were perhaps the only exceptions. Trying to take advantage of the special circumstances, the Chinese government sought permission to send a mission to ‘offer religious tribute and condolences for the late Dalai Lama’. Given the religious and ceremonious tenor of the request, it was difficult for the Tibetans to refuse them. Accordingly, in April 1934, a high-powered delegation led by General Huang Mu-sung arrived in Lhasa. Having gone through the formalities that protocol demanded, Huang got down to his real mission of making the Tibetans acknowledge the overlordship of China and become an equal member of the republic under the ambit of the ‘five races’ policy.

  Despite his intense cajoling and lavish inducements, he was unable to get any worthwhile commitment or concessions from the Tibetans. It is to the credit of the Kashag and the Tsongdu that the Tibetans held on to the conditions stipulated in the Simla Convention of 1914, making it clear that they were not prepared to forsake their fully auotonomous character. They also emphasized that the ‘British Government should be a party to any agreement reached between Tibet and China’.41 Despite the numerous discussions he had with the Tibetans, General Huang was unable to secure any commitment from them beyond what was in the 1914 Convention, be it concessions on the Sino-Tibet boundary or status of Tibet. Taking no chances, Williamson, the political officer in Sikkim, sent his representative, Rai Bahadur Norbu Dhondup, to keep a close watch on the activities of the Chinese mission at Lhasa.