The McMahon Line- a Century of Discord

by J J Singh

  Xi has emerged as the most powerful leader of China, and perhaps the world too, after the US president. Xi exhorted the PLA to ‘obey the Party’s command’ and ‘maintain excellent conduct’. At the same time he made a commitment to ‘build a powerful and modernised army, navy, air force, rocket force, and strategic support force … and create a modern combat system with distinctive Chinese characteristics. The PLA would continue to focus upon integrated joint war fighting characterised by short duration regional wars under hi-tech informatised conditions.’ Xi also said at the National Congress that China is ‘closer, more confident and more capable than ever before of making the goal of national rejuvenation a reality’. He went on to say: ‘No one should expect China to swallow anything that undermines its interests.’ Allaying the fears of its neighbours, President Xi said, ‘China’s development does not pose a threat to any other country. No matter what stage of development it reaches, China will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion.’ Importantly, he did not fail to mention the challenges of unequal development, and of corruption and contradictions in China’s system of governance, and the unstoppable tsunami of the Internet and social media, the aspirations of the people at large and of the gen-next in particular, and of acceptance of dissent by the government.

  Xi’s era has begun with his consolidation of power and strengthening of the party’s hold over the polity and the military. He has deftly weeded out those whom he could not trust, those out of sync with his ideology, and the non-performers or functionaries past their prime. His new civilian and military team comprises capable and proven men, mostly in their early sixties, who are loyal (to him as well as to the party) and will strengthen his hand in the Chinese march towards the centre stage of the globe and realization of the ‘Chinese dream’. It is apparent that he wants to have a firm grip over the military and ensure that its political orientation is made more solid. It is reckoned that Xi Jinping today wields much more power than the earlier two iconic Chinese leaders. On 25 February 2018, the Central Committee of the CPC did away with the stipulation of restricting the tenure of the president and the vice president to two terms of five years, thus paving the way for Xi Jinping’s presidency to continue indefinitely. This amendment of the constitution was overwhelmingly endorsed by the party hierarchy and instituted accordingly. Xi can therefore take bold political and diplomatic initiatives backed by military and economic muscle power as never before.28

  In Inside the Mind of Xi Jinping, China expert Francois Bougon has pointed out that ‘Xi Jinping is also a hong er dai’, literally a ‘Second-Generation Red’, and has an impressive revolutionary lineage. ‘It is his turn to make history, and hereditary legitimacy is not without significance for a leader who intends to fight on the ideological front,’ underscores Bougon.29 The high pedestal on which Xi stands today could therefore be argued as eminently justifiable.

  In order to match China’s growth, India’s current and future leadership would need to understand and learn how to deal with the Dragon’s new avatar, and work with dedication to ensure India’s rise too.

  The Chinese view of the new global order after the nineteenth National Congress of the CPC was articulated in a positive and optimistic statement by the Chinese ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui. He said, ‘The “New India” initiative proposed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the “Chinese Dream” are closely connected and can be synergised as well.’ He went on to emphasize that ‘China attaches great inspiration to China–India relations. There will be series of institutional dialogues between the two countries.’ Ambassador Luo then commented on the need to have ‘long-term goals for our relations’ on global issues, a ‘treaty of good neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation’, ‘early harvest’ on the boundary issue and ‘alignment of the Belt and Road Initiative with India’s development strategies’. He concluded by saying that India and China need to enhance mutual trust and focus on cooperation while properly managing differences, in a bid to promote China–India relations to a new level.30

  Prudence and rationality demand that we take such statements with an element of caution and avoid complacency. Yet, keeping in mind the matrix of global security and economic dynamics of the twenty-first century and the growing interconnectedness of the multipolar world, a Sino-Indian conflict is neither a viable nor a wise option, making its likelihood remote.

  PART IX

  TOWARDS RESOLUTION OF THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE

  ‘Cooperation between India and China is essential to maintain peace and stability around the world.’

  —Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India

  ‘China and India are both important engines for global growth and we are central pillars for promoting a multi-polar and globalised world. A good China–India relationship is an important and positive factor for maintaining peace and stability in the world.’

  —Xi Jinping, President of China1

  21

  India–China Boundary Negotiations

  ‘Boundary mountains or hills are such natural elevations from the common level of the ground as separate the territories of two or more states from each other. Failing special treaty arrangements, the boundary line runs on the mountain ridge along with the watershed.’2 The rationale of following the broad principle of the watershed while determining the boundary in the absence of any treaty, as defined by a world acclaimed geographer like L. Oppenheim, is sound and has stood the test of time. This principle has been applied to determine the boundaries in the case of European nations, between Spain and France, and between Chile and Argentina in South America, on the basis of the watershed formed by the Alps, Pyrenees and the Andes respectively.

  Undoubtedly, in the case of India and China, a 4,057-kilometre-long frontier can very well be delineated on this principle too, with some exceptions where geography and traditional and customary usage make it necessary. As explained earlier, the focus of this work relates mainly to the frontier of north-east India and the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. I have primarily focussed on the complexities of this boundary dispute and the measures taken by both India and China to resolve it. The geographical, historical, political and geostrategic aspects of this frontier zone have been covered in the earlier parts of this book. I believe that the lay people of both countries are ignorant or have inadequate knowledge of this Himalayan frontier, which has resulted in pressuring the decision makers in both India and China to adopt a rigid approach, with neither side ready to accommodate the other’s position on the boundary issue. This has led to the stalemate we see even to this day.

  Our nations have inherited their boundary or frontier problems from the earlier regimes, the Indians from the British in 1947 and the Chinese from the Chiang Kai-shek–led Kuomintang government in 1949. At the height of the Great Game being played out in the Pamirs, the British were not very concerned about the north-eastern part of India’s frontiers because of the absence of any external threats and the ruggedness of the terrain enhancing the inaccessibility of the region. Their attention was glued to India’s north-western frontier that was exposed to the intrigues and expansionist designs of the Russian Empire. As a result, the British were content to govern the tribal belts on the Indian side of the Himalayas under a loose form of political control, establishing ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ lines to demarcate the areas that were left to be administered by the tribes themselves. Many of the tribes had signed treaties of sorts with the British administration in Assam.

  However, an energetic projection of power by China began to take place in southern and south-eastern Tibet as a consequence of the 1904 Younghusband expedition to Lhasa. As a chain reaction, Chinese forces under General Chao Erh-feng started to assert themselves through aggressive probes in the region and made attempts to establish their hold there. Some exploratory forays were made during 1910–11 by the Chinese for the first time in history in the areas bordering the tribal territories in India’s north-east, which set alarm bells ringing in the tea gardens of Assam. Fortunately
for the Tibetans, as has been brought out earlier, the Chinese Revolution of 1911 extinguished these forays and ended the process of subjugation of Tibet. The Chinese hold on Tibet during 1912–13 was almost non-existent because of the decline of the Manchu Empire and the outbreak of civil war among the emerging Nationalist regime, the Manchu loyalists and independent regional warlords. In 1913, a ‘China-free’ Tibet under the thirteenth Dalai Lama, who had just returned from his second exile, declared its independence in a subtle and indirect manner even though the conditions in parts of Amdo and Kham region were not peaceful, sans recognition by any world power. This unstable situation encouraged the British to convene a conference with Chinese, Tibetan and British plenipotentiaries to discuss the status of Tibet and its boundaries with China and India, and other matters relating mainly to the geopolitics, economy and security of the Tibet region. Consequently, under the aegis of the British, a tripartite conference was held at Simla and Delhi, stretching from October 1913 to July 1914.

  The key players of this now historic conference were Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, the foreign secretary to the Government of India, and Lonchen Shatra and Ivan Chen, representing British India, Tibet and China respectively. McMahon was born in Simla in 1862 and had grown up in an environment that helped him understand the complicated dynamics of the South Asian frontiers and of empire building of that period. During this conference, a number of parleys, discussions, deliberations and study of historical records, including documents, maps and oral presentations, took place in eight recorded formal tripartite sessions, as described in Chapter 13. There were also many informal and secret meetings between the key players conducted in the bipartite format. Although McMahon was able to obtain the signatures or initials of the three plenipotentiaries as a token of their acceptance of the memorandum and the accompanying maps on 27 April 1914, as is evident from a close examination of the relevant documents, this agreement was, unfortunately, repudiated by the Chinese a few days later. The next two months were spent in hectic negotiations, and a concluding session of the conference was called on 3 July.

  A final agreement with maps and associated documents was signed and sealed on 3 July 1914 by McMahon and Lonchen Shatra, whereas Ivan Chen declined to be a signatory to the accord as the Chinese government refused to give their consent to it. It is remarkable that McMahon was able to draw his line with a reasonable degree of precision. This was possible thanks to the surveying and mapping done in the tribal territories during the preceding two years. Considering the difficult terrain, the lack of modern survey instruments and technology, it must be conceded that McMahon and his team did a fine job. In a memorandum signed on 28 March 1914, McMahon stated that ‘the Tibetan Government at Lhasa has fully considered this frontier question and agrees with the Tibetan plenipotentiary in recognising the line now defined as the correct boundary between Tibet and India’. However, during the discussions it was accepted by both the British and the Tibetan plenipotentiaries that ‘in the light of the more detailed knowledge’ that either side ‘may acquire in the future’ the same would be looked at positively, although ‘no obligation to do so has been mentioned in the agreement’.3 The implication of this clause was that small adjustments and corrections would be acceptable to both nations in future. This agreement between British India and Tibet in 1914 established the international boundary known as the McMahon Line from Bhutan to Burma and provided it legal sanctity.

  It bears emphasis that the present-day Tawang district was clearly shown well to the south of the McMahon Line and accepted by both sides. The Chinese delegate never protested or demurred on this issue. On the basis of such an authoritative boundary agreement and other reasons, India’s claim to the tribal territory on the southern side of the natural Himalayan divide is unexceptionable. At the same time, it is worth keeping in mind that neither the Chinese nor the Tibetans were at any time in history in occupation of any part of Lopa territory south of the Himalayan watershed (present Arunachal Pradesh), nor were they able to produce any old Tibetan map that showed the southern boundary of Tibet that included the above-mentioned areas. However, when we talk of Tibet’s southern neighbours, the views of the tribal people who are non-Tibetan and inhabit the southern slopes of the Himalayas in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh assume great importance.

  On many occasions during my gubernatorial visits to remote frontier areas during 2008–13, I was told by the tribals that even their forebears had never seen the Chinese. At quite a few places they told me that their ancestors used to grant grazing rights to the Tibetan people who came across from the northern side of the passes, receiving payment for this in coins or in kind. Without their permission no Tibetans could enter their territories. In all the surveys carried out in recent years including that by India Today magazine, the people of Arunachal Pradesh have overwhelmingly voted to remain a part of India, and have emphasized that, historically, China had neither been in contact with them nor had anything to do with their state. They acknowledge Tibetans as their neighbours, but they had very little interaction with them.

  Underscoring the patriotic fervour of the people of Arunachal, the chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Pema Khandu, commented in an April 2017 interview in India Today that the border dispute should be settled soon. However, he added unequivocally: ‘Whatever the solution, Arunachal Pradesh’s geography [political limits] must not be compromised in the bargain.’ The chief minister, himself a Monpa and a committed nationalist, belongs to Mago village, located a few kilometres from the border (McMahon Line) in Tawang district. On the fiftieth anniversary of the India–China war of 1962, the chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh paid rich tributes to the martyrs of this war, emphasizing again that ‘Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India and its citizens are very proud Indians’.4

  At the end of the First World War, the British economy (as well as other world economies) was shattered. For Britain, therefore, rebuilding its economy took precedence over other matters. It is no surprise then that Whitehall quite forgot they had a frontier issue to resolve in one of their colonies, in this case the Indo-Tibetan boundary so painstakingly evolved by McMahon in 1914. The hands of the Indian government were tied, and an ambiguous policy with respect to the British Indian Empire’s area of influence along the frontiers did not help in deciding the limits of its reach. Financial constraints were a serious handicap; most importantly, the law that no expenses be incurred on expeditions beyond the administered areas of British India without the approval of Parliament was a serious impediment. British commercial interests in China and the British investments in the Yangtze Valley, in Shanghai in particular, had an overwhelming influence on British policymaking as far as Tibet was concerned. In some respects, one could say that Great Britain had to forsake Tibet on financial considerations, besides other reasons.

  An overview of the boundary issue between India and China reveals that India’s northern boundary is essentially the end result of the impact over centuries of factors like geography, history and environment. Although most parts of the boundary had acquired traditional and customary sanctity before the subcontinent’s colonization by Britain, the rest evolved under the influence of new concepts of security introduced by the British to ward off potential threats to their empire from Central Asia (Russia) and, later, from China. Consequently, the outcome was the emergence of political boundaries largely based on the principle of the highest crest line or watershed of the northern mountain system. This principle was reinforced by the invariable congruence of the traditional boundary with the watershed. ‘The idea of a demarcated frontier is itself an essentially modern conception, and finds little or no place in the ancient world,’ Lord Curzon observed, at the beginning of the twentieth century. Until then, he pointed out, ‘it would be true to say that demarcation has never taken place in Asiatic countries except under European pressure’.5