The McMahon Line- a Century of Discord

by J J Singh

  So far as China’s consolidation of its hold over Tibet goes, it needs to recall the acts and gestures of goodwill and friendship by India in recent history, both during its rule by the British and post-Independence. British India had never coveted Tibet as a possession or even as a protectorate. Having brought Tibet to its knees, Younghusband’s expeditionary force was directed to fall back to India within a fortnight of the signing of their agreement with the Tibetans in 1904. Moreover, the terms of reparation by the Tibetans in the treaty were diluted by the British government. The seventy-five-year occupation of Chumbi Valley was reduced to three years and the amount of reparation brought down too. Of greater significance is that the prestige and position of the Chinese as the suzerain power over Tibet was lifted from the abyss it had dropped into. This was when the British Empire was at its zenith and the Ch’ing dynasty was tottering! Further, the Indian government allowed passage of Chinese officials, shipments of supplies (even for the military) and post and telegraph facilities through India via Calcutta, Siliguri and Kalimpong to Chumbi Valley and beyond to Lhasa as there were no roads in Tibet and movement along the tracks was unsafe, arduous and extremely time-consuming. This continued till the mid-1950s, when some of the roads from China to Tibet were constructed.

  To a large extent, British India and independent India helped China to re-establish and consolidate its hold on Tibet, particularly in view of Tibet having enjoyed de facto independent status from 1913 to 1951. It must not be forgotten that India facilitated the Tibetan delegation to proceed through India to Peking to formally accept to be an autonomous part of China, even though the seventeen-point agreement signed in May 1951 has remained controversial, as something done under duress.

  India’s large-heartedness and its endeavours to befriend China did not end there. As a gesture of goodwill, the Panchsheel agreement of 1954 was a classic example of India’s one-sided generosity and diplomatic naivety, one that resulted in its giving away all rights and privileges and, significantly, in ending India’s presence in Tibet without the country gaining anything as a quid pro quo. These aspects have been elaborated on here to highlight the efforts made by India for decades to build a friendly and constructive relationship with China. We can derive some satisfaction from the fact that during the past half-century or more, after the flare-up at Nathu La during 1967, we have seen peace along the disputed frontier. Although at times there has been friction on the border issue, the maturity and statesmanship of the leaders of both nations have ensured that these problems were resolved in a peaceful manner through dialogue and diplomatic exchange, as has been demonstrated during the recent stand-off at Doklam. The landmark agreements of 1993, 1996, 2003 and the signing of the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity during the visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao in April 2005, in the course of which we also signed the ‘Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles’ for resolving the boundary dispute, were aimed at maintaining tranquility on the borders while addressing the border question, and at enhancing mutual trust and understanding. The same objectives were emphasized in January 2008 during Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s visit to China. These agreements have far-reaching implications for our relations as they are not just confined to bilateral security issues, but also to many regional and global issues of concern to us.

  The leaders of our two nations have also articulated a ‘Shared Vision for the 21st Century’ (Appendix 8). We have a ‘historic opportunity’, as stated by President Xi Jinping, to settle our boundary problem and move ahead. We must also capitalize on the tremendous scope for enhancing bilateral relations by reaching a consensus on other vital global issues like maritime security, climate control, WTO, UN reforms and sustainable development. The military-to-military cooperation between the two countries could form the pivot in our relations with China to enable creation of a secure and stable environment in the region. Analysts of India–China relations see three dimensions to this relationship: adversarial or conflict-prone, competitive and cooperative. Also to be considered are the mindsets of the leadership and of the strategic elite, the media and the people at large, and to remove from their minds misconceptions and prejudices, bringing in mutual trust between the Chinese and the Indians as well as engendering national pride in them, as has been emphasized by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

  India and China inherited an undemarcated and partly delineated boundary of approximately 4,057 kilometres along the Karakoram, Kunlun and Himalayan chain of mountains. By ancient custom and tradition, as also on account of trade, the limits and boundaries of the states were known to the local inhabitants. However, there arose complexities and differences in perception pertaining to the uninhabited and high-altitude zones and areas where the rivers cut across the mountain ranges, and some spillover of populations and areas of influence occurred over the years. Also, where boundaries had been drawn on maps using antiquated survey methods and instruments or incomplete surveys a century or more ago, there is a need to rectify the errors using more scientific satellite-based systems.

  Even at the time of signing of the Simla Convention, McMahon had said that minor adjustments to the boundary would be looked at as and when additional inputs on the frontier were received. For example, leeway was provided for realignment of the border to ensure that the sacred places of the Tibetans, like Tso Karpo (‘White Lake’) and Tsari Sarpa (‘New Tsari’) were included in Tibet, even when their precise locations were not known even to the Tibetan delegation at that juncture. Southern Tibet actually relates to the areas south of Lhasa, such as Kongbo, Takpo and Pomed, which lie along the Tsangpo Valley going downstream to the famous bend of the river. The Lhasa Tibetans refer to the people of these areas as Pobas, or southerners, whose territorial limits did not extend south of the Himalayan crest. ‘South Tibet’ as a term for present-day Arunachal Pradesh was never part of the Chinese lexicon of boundary negotiations till the 1980s, and is a later invention.

  The Chinese, given their propensity to change the goalposts, have come out with a few names of their own (like ‘South Tibet’) for places in Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese claim to this ‘South Tibet’, which comprises a large part of the southern slopes of the eastern Himalayas, is not only preposterous but also without any historical basis. There has never been Chinese presence, let alone administration, in the tribal territories south of the Himalayas. The awareness levels of the elite, the political leadership—the Opposition leaders in particular—the media and the lay people of both countries have to be raised so that they understand the ground realities of the boundary problem. They are then likely to become facilitators rather than obstacles to solutions to the problem.

  As a matter of fact, today there is a Line of Actual Control which both sides have agreed to define and respect. More importantly, we have decided to maintain peace on the border. A complex dispute like this of many dimensions—historical background, nationalistic sentiments, ethnicity, settled populations and geographical principles—cannot be resolved merely at the level of officials. A mutually beneficial solution requires visionary and bold political leadership and an exceptional level of political will. A certain amount of accommodation will have to be made by both sides if we have to move forward. A bold and mutually beneficial solution can only come about in the form of a ‘high-level political coup’—a tête-à-tête executed by the apex leadership of India and China, not retarded by the cautiousness likely to be injected by officials.

  China’s vulnerable back door is exposed by an unstable Tibet. Some Chinese leaders and scholars have expressed their concern about China’s inability to fully assimilate and consolidate their hold on the Tibet region. An autonomous Tibet, which has had close and enduring historical ties with India, is seen as much of a ‘stumbling block’ in the way of improving relations between the two countries as the boundary dispute. According to recently declassified Chinese documents, the Chinese have a belief that India has always had an influence on Tibet down the ag
es; and after the Younghusband expedition, they imagined a ‘long-term design’ too1 on our part. A latent potential for unrest in Tibet, which surfaces from time to time, coupled with the fact that the Chinese efforts of the past six decades have not entirely succeeded in Sinification of Tibet, is seen as a serious security challenge by China.

  The Chinese see India as a facilitator of the Tibetan ‘government in exile’ in Dharamsala, blessed by the Dalai Lama, which is a causative factor for friction in their relationship. The Dalai Lama’s activities, though purely ecclesiastical in nature, and his religious visits to many places in India—to Arunachal Pradesh in particular—are considered by the Chinese as provocative and unfriendly acts by India. Another dimension of conflict that is talked about relates to the new reincarnation of the Dalai Lama on the eventual ‘passing on to the heavenly field’ of the current one. The Chinese government has already announced that the next Dalai Lama would be chosen by a draw at the Jokhang monastery in the heart of Lhasa and can assume his role only after their approval. This announcement has been rejected by the Dalai Lama, who has categorically stated that any candidate chosen on political grounds by the PRC shall not be recognized or accepted. The Grand Lama has clearly announced that if the institution of the Dalai Lama should continue—itself a decision to be made after consultations with the ‘high lamas’ and other stakeholders—the responsibility for discovering the reincarnation in accordance with tradition shall rest with the officials of Dalai Lama’s Phodrang Trust.2

  Even to this day the Chinese exhibit a lurking fear of India’s ability to play the Tibet or Dalai Lama card if required. Tawang did not figure at all in the Sino-Indian boundary talks initially. In fact, in the unofficial ‘east-west swap deal’ proposed by Zhou Enlai in 1960, he ‘offered to recognize India’s position in the eastern sector if India accepted China’s sovereignty over Aksai Chin area in the west’. This offer was repeated later by Deng Xiaoping in 1980, and the McMahon Line was to be accepted as the boundary in the east. These offers of a package deal were not accepted by the Indian side, which wanted to follow a ‘sector-by-sector approach’.3

  By 1985, the Chinese had changed the goalposts again and were now proposing a revised swap deal with a caveat that Tawang should be handed over to them. The inhabitants of the Tawang area are non-Tibetan Monpas who are adherents of Tibetan Buddhism. The Urgelling monastery, located a few miles from the seventeenth-century Tawang monastery, was the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama. Even though ecclesiastical dues and donations were collected by the Tibetan Dzongpens of Tsona Dzong from the Monpas of Tawang area, that did not give them temporal power over them. Let alone China, which never had any presence whatsoever in Tawang, even Tibet did not have any administrative infrastructure here. During the Simla Conference in 1914, when the Tibetan plenipotentiary raised claims for inclusion in Tibet of Batang, Litang and other Tibetan-inhabited towns and villages in the eastern frontier zone, the Chinese raised a hue and cry. Addressing the Tibetan delegation at Simla on 7 March 1914, Ivan Chen, the Chinese plenipotentiary, emphasized that ecclesiastical power does not confer territorial rights, arguing that contributions made to the monasteries cannot be construed as tax. On 13 June 1914, Sun Pao-chi, the Chinese minister for foreign affairs, unambiguously conveyed to the British minister in Peking that ‘the Tibetans affected to think that they had rights over all places inhabited by Lamaists, but this was not so. The Lamas might have ecclesiastical authority but this did not necessarily mean that these places belonged to Tibet.’4 Therefore, by the same yardstick, there is no substance in the present Chinese claim for possession of Tawang.

  The Chinese are making a desperate bid for Tawang not only for the geostrategic advantages that would accrue from its possession but also because of their apprehension that reincarnation of a future Dalai Lama could take place in the Monpa area again. It is difficult to imagine the effect such an event will have on Tibet and on Tibetans the world over. Tawang is one of the most highly populated towns in Arunachal Pradesh and the nerve centre of the Monpa area. Article VII of the ‘Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles’ signed on 11 April 2005 during the visit of Premier Wen Jiabao clearly says: ‘In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.’ (See Appendix 7.) Therefore the question of ceding Tawang area, which has a population of over 50,000, (besides other cogent reasons and logic articulated earlier in this account) to China does not arise.

  The reported possibility of Chinese diversion of waters of rivers emanating from Tibet and construction of dams on them, particularly on the Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), has led to a large degree of disquiet in India, Bangladesh and other riparian states of South-East Asia. This anxiety and alarm raised in the media is misplaced, and is based on exaggerated or incorrect reports. As has been explained earlier, there are no viable or concrete plans to divert the waters of the Tsangpo or to dam the river (only run-of-the-river power generation projects are being constructed). However, as a component of their strategy, the Chinese offer only vague or muted clarifications to these rumours, or resort to disinformation. They seem to relish indulging in mind play on their adversaries, competitors or even smaller neighbours as a tactic to exert their influence on them. The lower riparian states feel it is incumbent on a responsible China to allay their fears on the issue of river waters and to offer to share hydrological data with them.

  The political and economic imperatives of the two rising powers of Asia may lead to rivalry or competition for influence, resources and markets in the region. So it is that the maritime dimension and the security of sea corridors in the Indian and Pacific Oceans have assumed vital importance. There is a perception among some researchers from China’s strategic community that there exists a US–India–Japan–Australia strategy to contain China. Similarly, some strategic experts from India and the West have advanced and elaborated on the ‘string of pearls’ strategy of the Chinese in India’s neighbourhood. The significance and impact of the ‘Asia Pivot’ theory of the US on the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region would have to be factored in during future security calculations. There has been a considerable increase in the presence of the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean region in recent years, and India too has been making efforts to augment its naval capabilities. These are pointers that underscore the importance of the security of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) passing through the Indian Ocean and the need for India to have a dominant presence there.

  In order to offset the effect of the Malacca Straits as a choke point in its mercantile trade and SLOCs, China has already put into place a meticulous and well-thought-out strategy. This is to construct land routes at a cost of trillions of dollars, consisting of road, railway and oil pipeline corridors connecting China, Central Asia and the whole of Europe right through to Spain. There are initiatives such as the One Belt One Road (OBOR), and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) connecting the port of Gwadar (Pakistan) and passing through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to Sinkiang (China), and the road and oil pipeline connecting the port of Sittwe (Myanmar) with Kunming (China). These routes would provide China with secure alternatives to the Malacca Straits route. Recently, a freight train brought in for the first time container loads from the UK to China, from London to Yiwu. Presently, trains are being run from China to many European destinations.

  As far as India is concerned we have not agreed to be part of either the CPEC or OBOR projects, seemingly in reciprocity to China’s stand on Arunachal Pradesh and our sovereignty issue over Jammu and Kashmir. India’s strategic thinking has rightly held the belief that the special relationship between China and Pakistan has been born out of their intrinsic antagonism towards India. Accordingly, China’s strategic interests would be best served by a friendly and, to some extent, a dependent Pakistan that would not only keep India engaged in a low-intensity conflict in Kashmir by sending in terrorists and providing support to terrorist organizations, but by a
lso remaining a staunch ally to the Chinese in international matters. Obviously, this strategy has profound security connotations for India. However, to be fair to the Chinese, barring some symbolic gestures along the LAC, they have never overtly sided with Pakistan during the Indo-Pak wars of 1965, 1971 or during the conflict in Kargil. Notwithstanding the above argument, the Indian armed forces should be prepared to face a two-front war as a worst-case scenario. Consequently, India’s military needs to acquire the desired offensive, defensive and deterrence capabilities and the required political and diplomatic ‘savoir-faire’ to handle such a challenge.

  Going beyond the challenges discussed above, one can also see a number of positive factors that are likely to usher in a convergence of interests and cooperation between India and China. India has always striven to be a good neighbour, desirous of living in peace with its border states, and has no extraterritorial ambition or wish to promote its ideology and democratic path elsewhere. We were the first non-communist country after Burma to establish diplomatic relations with China on 1 April 1950. Following the five principles of peaceful coexistence or Panchsheel, India was unprepared for the rude shock and the humiliation caused by the Chinese attack in 1962. It was a reverse suffered by the nation politically, diplomatically as well as militarily. Although six decades have gone by since, the scars remain. In an attempt to heal these scars, Deng Xiaoping, in his discussions with Rajiv Gandhi during the Indian PM’s visit to China in 1988, said he had come to the conclusion that ‘Panch Sheel—the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence approved by Zhou En-lai and Nehru—could be the basis for taking forward the international dialogue’. Deng added, ‘Since both sides did not live up to these principles, Sino-Indian relations suffered a setback.’5 Perhaps the Chinese were suffering the pangs of a guilty conscience after the stab in the back inflicted by them on a trusting though complacent India. At the same time they had also unfairly accused India of interfering in their internal affairs in Tibet, and berated us for welcoming the Dalai Lama and sheltering thousands of Tibetan refugees. This further reinforces the premise that Tibet is the core problem between the two nations.