by Dwayne Day
SMITHSONIAN HISTORY OF AVIATION SERIES
Von Hardesty and Michael H. Gorn, Series Editors
On December 17, 1903, human flight became a reality when Orville Wright piloted the Wright Flyer across a 120-foot course above the sands at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. That awe-inspiring 12 seconds of manned, powered flight inaugurated a new technology and a new era. The airplane quickly evolved as a means of transportation and a weapon of war. Flying faster, farther, and higher, airplanes soon encircled the globe, dramatically altering human perceptions of time and space. The dream of flight appeared to be without bounds. Having conquered the skies, the heirs to the Wrights eventually orbited the Earth and landed on the Moon.
Aerospace history is punctuated with many triumphs, acts of heroism, and technological achievements. But that same history also showcases technological failures and the devastating impact of aviation technology in modern warfare. As adapted to modern life, the airplane—as with many other important technological breakthroughs—mirrors both the genius, as well as the darker impulses of its creators. For millions, however, commercial aviation provides safe, reliable, and inexpensive travel for business and leisure.
This book series chronicles the development of aerospace technology in all its manifestations and subtlety. International in scope, this scholarly series includes original monographs, biographies, reprints of out-of-print classics, translations, and reference materials. Both civil and military themes are included, along with a systematic study of the cultural impact of the airplane. Together, these diverse titles contribute to our overall understanding of aeronautical technology and its evolution.
Advisory Board: Roger E. Bilstein, University of Houston at Clear Lake; Horst Boog, historian, Germany; Emmanuel Chadeau, Université Charles de Gaulle; Tom D. Crouch, National Air and Space Museum; Carl-Fredrik Geust, historian, Finland; Michael H. Gorn, historian; John T. Greenwood, Center for Military History; Cargill Hall, Air Force History Support Office; James R. Hansen, Auburn University; Von Hardesty, National Air and Space Museum; Roger D. Launius, National Air and Space Administration, chief historian; W. David Lewis, Auburn University; Donald S. Lopez, National Air and Space Museum; Felix C. Lowe, publisher, South Carolina; John H. Morrow, University of Georgia; Richard J. Overy, King’s College, London; Dominick A. Pisano, National Air and Space Museum; Christine White, Pennsylvania State University; E. T. Wooldridge, National Air and Space Museum
© 1998 by Smithsonian Institution
All rights reserved
Copy Editor: Initial Cap Editorial Services
Production Editors: Ruth Thomson and Robert A. Poarch
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Eye in the sky : the story of the Corona spy satellites / edited by
Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell.
p. cm. — (Smithsonian history of aviation series).
ISBN 1-56098-830-4 (cloth: alk. paper)
eBook ISBN: 978-1-58834-518-9
1. Project Corona (United States)—History. 2. Space surveillance—United States—History. I. Day, Dwayne A. II. Logsdon, John M., 1937– . III. Latell, Brian. IV. Series.
UG1523.E94 1998
327.12—dc21 97-19238
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data available
For permission to reproduce illustrations appearing in this book, please correspond directly with the owners of the works, as listed in the individual captions. Smithsonian Books does not retain reproduction rights for these illustrations individually, or maintain a file of addresses for photo sources.
v3.1
Dedicated to the CORONA Pioneers
CONTENTS
Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
DWAYNE A. DAY, JOHN M. LOGSDON, AND BRIAN LATELL
PART ONE. THE CORONA STORY
1. Strategic Intelligence and U.S. Security: The Contributions of CORONA
ERNEST R. MAY
2. CORONA: A Triumph of American Technology
ALBERT D. WHEELON
3. The Development and Improvement of the CORONA Satellite
DWAYNE A. DAY
4. Postwar Strategic Reconnaissance and the Genesis of CORONA
R. CARGILL HALL
5. A Strategy for Reconnaissance: Dwight D. Eisenhower and Freedom of Space
DWAYNE A. DAY
6. The National Reconnaissance Office: Its Origins, Creation, and Early Years
GERALD HAINES
7. Zenit: The Soviet Response to CORONA
PETER A. GORIN
PART TWO. VOICES OF THE CORONA PIONEERS
8. CORONA and the U.S. Presidents
9. The Origin and Evolution of the CORONA System
10. CORONA and the Revolution in Mapmaking
11. Exploiting CORONA Imagery: The Impact on Intelligence
Appendix A. Program Overview and Camera Data
Appendix B. Launch Listings
JONATHAN MCDOWELL
Notes
Contributors
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
An edited book on a long-secret topic such as the first U.S. photoreconnaissance satellite is clearly the product of many more people than the volume’s essay authors and editors. First of all, the information required to make this book possible had to be declassified, and thus we want to acknowledge those in the White House, Congress, and the Intelligence Community who have led the movement toward increased openness—particularly Vice-President Al Gore and former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates. We wish to thank everyone who provided photographs for possible inclusion, information on topics covered, or comments on the manuscript as it evolved. Many of these individuals are mentioned by name below or in the individual essays, but we have not mentioned everyone who deserves credit for helping to create or improve this book. We owe them all a debt of gratitude.
The chain of events that led to Eye in the Sky began with a conversation between one of us, Dwayne A. Day, and Carole Minor, then academic coordinator for the Center for the Study of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency. Carole enthusiastically agreed with Dwayne’s suggestion that an already planned conference marking the declassification of the CORONA program and imagery be cohosted by the Space Policy Institute of George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs and held on the GW campus. That conference, which took place in May 1995, was a great success, prompting a decision to continue the collaboration by coediting this book. Carole stayed involved with the conference and its follow-up activities, and was a source of invaluable assistance and good advice throughout.
R. Cargill Hall suggested after the conference that its proceedings could form the basis for an interesting and valuable book, and he pointed us to Von Hardesty of the National Air and Space Museum, who is the editor of the Smithsonian Institution Press series on aerospace history. Von recognized the merit of such a book and he introduced us to Mark Hirsch of the Press, who guided the book proposal and manuscript through the review and acceptance process. We did not always agree with Mark’s ideas on an initial hearing, but they have had a strong influence on making the book not just a record of conference proceedings, but primarily a set of original essays on CORONA and strategic intelligence. The two anonymous reviewers of the prospectus for the book also provided ideas that we were happy to incorporate into the book’s design.
A number of people provided help in gathering photographs from the volume. They include Sam Welch at the National Archives, a
nd Guy Aceto, who facilitated access to the photo collection of Air Force magazine. Dino Brugioni, James Plummer, Chris Pocock, Charles Vick, and A. Roy Burks provided photographs from their cherished personal collections. The Space and Missile Systems History Office at Los Angeles Air Force Base also was very helpful. Dick Wollensak of Itek also provided valuable material.
The National Reconnaissance Office, just emerging from more than three decades of highly classified existence, initially was somewhat skeptical of the cooperation between the Space Policy Institute and the CIA in organizing the 1995 conference and then this book. For an organization whose very existence had been officially denied for so long, acceding the open discussion of former state secrets was not easy. But NRO has been rapidly adjusting to new realities, and has been helpful in providing material for this work. Special mention should be made of former NRO public affairs officer Katherine Schneider and historian Gerald Haines, who led us to useful material and answered questions about the early years of the NRO.
At the Space Policy Institute, David Onkst has served as almost a fourth editor of this book. In particular, he took the lead in putting together the excerpts from the remarks of speakers at the May 1995 conference that comprise Part Two of this book, and he prepared the index. Anne Marie Burns, Garth Henning, and Bridget Ziegelaar also helped along the way.
At the Center for the Study of Intelligence, several people were vital to making the 1995 CORONA conference possible and thereby providing much of the impetus and substance for this book. In July 1993 David Gries, who was the center’s director from 1992 to 1994, called the first exploratory meeting to discuss a CORONA conference; he guided the delicate detailed planning for such a conference for more than a year. David Doyle, A. Roy Burks, and Mary Burns provided the glue that held the conference organizing process together. Kevin C. Ruffner was the CIA historian who edited the illuminating volume CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program, which was distributed at the conference. That book of declassified intelligence documents laid the foundation for this study of CORONA.
For the Smithsonian Institution Press, Therese Boyd provided skillful editing of the manuscript and Ruth Thomson guided the book through the publication process.
The lasting value of this book will be based on the accounts of the CORONA program and the Cold War environment within which it emerged and was implemented that are provided by the essay authors in part 1 of the book and the representatives of the CORONA Pioneers—the informal group of those who worked in secrecy to bring the program to fruition—whose accounts of their part in the effort are included in Part Two. As editors, we have learned from them all. Our thanks are just a small portion of the gratitude owed by U.S. citizens to all the CORONA Pioneers, and to those that followed them throughout the lifetime of the program.
Dwayne A. Day
John M. Logsdon
Brian Latell
ABBREVIATIONS
ABM antiballistic missile
ARC Ad Hoc Requirements Committee
ARDC Air Research and Development Command
ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency
CEP circular error probable
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
COMOR Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
DDE Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
DoD Department of Defense
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
IGY International Geophysical Year
IMC image motion compensation
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
LC Library of Congress
NARA National Archives and Records Administration
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NRO National Reconnaissance Office
PFIAB President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
SAC Strategic Air Command
SAM surface-to-air missile
SIRC Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee
SRV satellite recovery vehicle
TCP Technological Capabilities Panel
USGS U.S. Geological Survey
USIB U.S. Intelligence Board
DWAYNE A. DAY, JOHN M. LOGSDON, AND BRIAN LATELL
INTRODUCTION
I wouldn’t want to be quoted on this but we’ve spent 35 or 40 billion dollars on the space program. And if nothing else had come out of it except the knowledge we’ve gained from space photography, it would be worth 10 times what the whole program has cost. Because tonight we know how many missiles the enemy has and, it turned out, our guesses were way off. We were doing things we didn’t need to do. We were building things we didn’t need to build. We were harboring fears we didn’t need to harbor. Because of satellites, I know how many missiles the enemy has.
President Lyndon Johnson, March 16, 19671
Satellite reconnaissance profoundly affected the Cold War, but it existed in such secrecy that its contributions to international stability during that conflict have been largely unheralded. This book, the first comprehensive work about the early U.S. reconnaissance satellite programs based on authoritative sources, is intended to correct that. Although scholars and popular writers have written about reconnaissance, none have had the access to the official records and personnel that the editors and contributors of this book possessed. The information on these pages is based on formerly top secret records. Many of the photographs have never been published before. Many of the people quoted here are legends within the Intelligence Community but virtually unknown outside it. This is the first time they have spoken in an unclassified format. Consequently, this book is the first full account of the most significant development in intelligence in the twentieth century—the reconnaissance satellite.
Discoverer IV, CORONA Mission 9001, lifting off on June 25, 1959. This was the first rocket to carry a reconnaissance payload. However, the Agena upper stage malfunctioned and the satellite did not enter orbit. (Photo courtesy of Air Force magazine)
THE IMPACT OF PEARL HARBOR
The December 1941 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was one of the most profound events in American history. In military terms, the attack was not terribly successful. Most of the ships “sunk” at Pearl Harbor were raised and repaired within months, and the attack only served to invite the wrath of a sleeping giant. Within less than four years, the United States emerged as the predominant military and economic power on the planet.
Yet Pearl Harbor had an effect far beyond its immediate military impact. It served as a forceful warning of the dangers of a surprise attack. Members of the military and intelligence communities applied what they learned from this lesson in different ways.
For many in the military, the lesson meant to be prepared for all contingencies. The natural inclination for military leaders was to plan for the worst-case scenario. Pearl Harbor meant more aircraft, more tanks, more ships, better security, and peace through strength. It meant that the United States needed forces able to strike back at an adversary hard and immediately. It meant that the United States needed to be so strong that no sane adversary would consider attacking it. Furthermore, this lesson meant that the price of security was measured in material things, such as defense budgets and weapons systems.
For many in the Intelligence Community, even within the intelligence branches of the U.S. military, Pearl Harbor was a warning of the dangers of not knowing what America’s potential adversaries were planning and capable of doing. The ability to know what the enemy could and would do did not necessarily mean that the country required large military forces. Accurate intelligence meant that the country could plan better and more economically. Intelligence was a “force multiplier”—it dramatically enhanced the power of existing forces and illustrated how they could be employed more wisely.
Early developments in the Cold War enhanced these differing lessons. The Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949 was only one of the first harsh warnings. U.S
. leaders were not only surprised by the Soviets’ rapid development of the atomic bomb (made possible through Soviet acquisition of American bomb plans), but also shocked, albeit to a lesser extent, that they learned of the Soviet bomb only after it had been successfully tested. In 1950, North Korean forces, with the approval of Josef Stalin, invaded South Korea and sent another shock through the American military and intelligence systems. In 1953 the Soviets detonated a hydrogen bomb; once again the United States detected this only after the fact. The United States was now faced with an adversary that could attack at any moment with weapons of incredible destructive power.
The military’s response was to call for more bombers, more nuclear weapons, and the capability to survive a Soviet first strike and to hit back with a massive retaliatory strike. The Intelligence Community’s response was to develop better intelligence on the Soviet Union and to start learning what the Soviets were preparing to do before they actually did it.
These two attitudes prevailed during the formative years of the Cold War and collectively shaped the American response to the Soviet threat. It was because of Pearl Harbor, the Soviet development of atomic and hydrogen weapons, and the invasion of Korea that the United States began to seek the means to carry out strategic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. It was for these reasons that the United States developed the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, and for these reasons that the United States developed a reconnaissance satellite program known as CORONA. That program is the focus of this book.