by Dwayne Day
CORONA revolutionized intelligence. Whereas in 1949 and 1953 the United States learned of Soviet nuclear weapons tests only after they had occurred, in 1964 the United States learned of the Chinese development of an atomic bomb before it had been tested and used this information to blunt the propaganda effect of the Chinese achievement. Satellite reconnaissance enabled the United States to determine that there was no missile gap, and therefore to lower dramatically the number of missiles built to counterbalance the Soviet threat. Satellite reconnaissance also provided a firm basis for arms control, since it removed most of the guesswork from assessments of Soviet strategic capabilities. The supreme value of satellite reconnaissance was that, unlike some human agents, satellite photographs did not lie.
Satellite reconnaissance had a profound effect upon the conduct of the Cold War. Yet, except for Lyndon Johnson’s off-the-record but widely quoted remarks in 1967, no American president officially mentioned reconnaissance satellites until Jimmy Carter in 1978. The existence of the super-secret organization responsible for managing the U.S. spy satellite program was not officially admitted until 1992. Everything about reconnaissance satellites was cloaked within a heavy veil of secrecy. That has now changed.
A PROGRAM DECLASSIFIED
In September 1996, the White House issued a new statement of National Space Policy. That statement acknowledged that “the United States conducts satellite photoreconnaissance for peaceful purposes, including intelligence collection and monitoring arms control agreements.”2 This acknowledgment represented the formal lifting of the security veil behind which the U.S. program of photoreconnaissance from orbit had operated since 1958.
An early CORONA payload and reentry vehicle. The reentry vehicle is the gray nose section. The camera’s lens cover is not visible in this photo. Early versions of the CORONA payload were small compared to those produced a decade later. (Photo courtesy of A. Roy Burks)
As Albert Wheelon, one of those most involved in creating a continuing program of reconnaissance satellites, says in chapter 2 of this volume,
When the American government eventually reveals the [full range of] reconnaissance systems developed by this nation, the public will learn of space achievements every bit as impressive as the Apollo Moon landings. One program proceeded in utmost secrecy, the other on national television. One steadied the resolve of the American public; the other steadied the resolve of American presidents.3
CORONA
Central to the overall reconnaissance satellite effort was a program known as CORONA. (It is U.S. Intelligence Community practice that the code names of specific programs or projects are always capitalized, whereas other military space programs at that time were usually capitalized, but not always in public documents.) CORONA had its origins in proposals first developed at the RAND Corporation, the civilian “think tank” that supported Air Force strategic planning. As it considered possible security-related and military uses of space in the early 1950s, RAND studied a series of technologically ambitious ideas that were embodied in a comprehensive Air Force reconnaissance satellite effort known as WS (Weapons System) 117L. This program was formally initiated in late 1956.
During 1957, several individuals at RAND developed the concept of a technologically simpler photoreconnaissance satellite that would return exposed film to Earth in a reentry capsule rather than send it back electronically. This concept was made part of the overall WS-117L effort in the fall of 1957. This was still an Air Force program, conceived by Air Force contractors to serve what was fundamentally an Air Force mission. The WS-117L program was large and ambitious, and the film-return satellite was simply one small part of it.
In the intense re-examination of U.S. security needs that followed the Soviet Union’s launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in August 1957 and, much more visibly, the first artificial satellite, Sputnik I, on October 4 of the same year, the Eisenhower administration decided to move as quickly as possible to create a U.S. photoreconnaissance satellite capability. Eisenhower’s advisers seized on the RAND concept for a film-return satellite, and suggested that it be pursued on a high-priority basis, separately from the WS-117L effort, in the highest possible secrecy and under different management arrangements. The intent was to have this “interim” program obtain information about Soviet strategic capabilities as quickly as possible, with the more capable satellites that were part of WS-117L replacing the interim program as soon as possible.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved this plan in February 1958. He decided that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would have the lead role in the program, but that the program would be managed jointly by the CIA and the Air Force. This was similar to the management arrangement that had been put in place for the highly classified U-2 reconnaissance airplane program in 1954, which had worked quite well in the succeeding three years. CORONA was intended to copy that success; it was not clear at the time to anyone involved that it was anything more than a temporary program to bridge the gap until the more sophisticated Air Force reconnaissance satellites were developed.
What in 1958 was intended as an “interim” program, however, lasted 14 years. The program was given the code name CORONA; one of the individuals drafting the initial program directive chose the name as he looked down at his typewriter. (One of the leading typewriter brands was called Smith-Corona.)4 In order to disguise the actual nature of the program, early flights were identified as part of an engineering test and biomedical science satellite program called Discoverer. In all, there were 145 CORONA launches, the first in February 1959 (only 12 months after the program had been approved) and the last in May 1972. Illustrating just how important CORONA was to U.S. security requirements and thus how determined the Eisenhower administration was to see it succeed, the program was supported through twelve mission failures before the first successful recovery of a satellite reentry vehicle in August 1960. While today many talk of the amazing success of CORONA, it is easy to forget that in the early days it was plagued by one problem after another. Thus, while some have called CORONA a triumph of American technology, the achievement came only through perseverance.
The program collectively known as CORONA was comprised of six similar but distinct satellite models and three different intelligence objectives. In 1962, a system of designating these separate models was put into use. The satellites were called KEYHOLE (indicating their use to obtain overhead imagery), abbreviated KH. Each satellite model was given a number; thus the first three CORONA models were retroactively designated KH-1, KH-2, and KH-3. At the time the new identification system was put into use, the model being developed was KH-4. Improved versions of this model were later identified as KH-4A and KH-4B. All of these satellites were intended to return film containing images of areas of strategic interest to U.S. policymakers and security planners.
Two similar satellite models were developed by the same government-contractor team and considered part of the overall CORONA program: the Army’s KH-5 satellite carrying the ARGON mapping camera, and the KH-6 LANYARD wide-area “spotting” system. After twelve launches under the KH-5 designation, ARGON’s objectives were subsumed into overall CORONA missions. LANYARD was basically an attempt to make use of the hardware remaining from a canceled Air Force program (called SAMOS) that had been part of the WS-117L effort. The KH-6 was a temporary program and its early missions proved problematic; the program was halted after only three launches.
A CORONA film-return bucket descending after reentry, as seen from a recovery aircraft.
Although history often focuses on the more dramatic “firsts” of the space race, it is also important to identify the ones that represented true pioneering work in space technology. CORONA achieved a number of notable firsts: first photoreconnaissance satellite; first recovery of an object from space (and first mid-air recovery of an object from space); first mapping of Earth from space; first stereo-optical data from space; and first program to fly more than 100 missions in space. In all, some 12
0 of the 145 CORONA missions were complete or partial successes. CORONA resulted in the exposure of over 2.1 million feet (almost 400 miles) of film and took over 800,000 photographs.5 CORONA photographed a total land area of 557 million square miles.6
Beyond the sheer physical achievements of the program were its achievements in the intelligence realm. CORONA resolved the “missile gap” question (determining that there indeed was one, but in favor of the United States). It also located all Soviet ICBM sites, all intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites, all antiballistic missile (ABM) sites, and all warship bases, submarine bases, and previously unknown military and industrial complexes. It also provided information about the size and deployment of Soviet conventional military bases and dramatically improved mapping data on all of these targets.
The value of this information to U.S. national security cannot be overemphasized. Prior to the development of CORONA, the United States was planning to defend itself, and to fight if attacked, without knowing even the basic capabilities of its adversaries; essentially it was blind. In an era of strategic bombers and hydrogen weapons, this was a most dangerous position. Within this environment, the military leadership demanded that the country prepare for the worst-case scenario. A number of expensive arms programs were begun because of this lack of data.
CORONA removed this uncertainty. Its very first successful mission, in August 1960, immediately demonstrated the value of satellite reconnaissance. This mission returned more imagery of the Soviet Union than the twenty-four previous U-2 missions over the Soviet Union combined. It revealed sixty-four new Soviet airfields and twenty-six new surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites—all in one mission. Estimates of Soviet capabilities in the late 1950s were stated in vague terms with low confidence. Estimates of the locations of key targets were accurate to only several miles at best, and up to two dozen miles at worst. American strategic forces, particularly ballistic missiles, could not have been targeted accurately without overhead reconnaissance information and thus could have been rendered militarily useless.
A C-130 Hercules aircraft catching a descending CORONA film-return bucket. A nylon cable strung between two metal poles trailing the plane would catch the parachute lines. Crewmen would then winch the payload into the airplane. The entire recovery procedure required a highly skilled crew.
By the mid- to late 1960s, all of this uncertainty was gone. Estimates of the numbers of key weapons were stated in precise numbers with high confidence. The geodetic coordinates of targets were known to within several hundred feet. The U.S. strategic deterrent was dramatically enhanced.
OPENING UP INTELLIGENCE FILES
As mentioned earlier, a volume of this character would not have been possible just a short time ago. On February 22, 1995, President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 12951 on “Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-Based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems.” That executive order, in turn, was part of a general movement toward openness in previously highly classified areas. During the last few years, the Intelligence Community has declassified and released for public examination and use vast quantities of once highly sensitive records and imagery. More material has been released to the National Archives since the mid-1990s than in all of the previous decades since the end of World War II and the beginnings of the modern U.S. intelligence establishment. Although scholars and other researchers continue to hope for even broader access to the enormous quantities of still sensitive and protected records, and some will never be satisfied with the results, many of them recognize that no other foreign intelligence service in the world has carried out a sustained and systematic declassification program like that of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
As of mid-1997, the CIA alone had released approximately a quarter-million pages of records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, about 14,000 pages of intelligence records for inclusion in the Department of State’s Foreign Relations of the United States series, and thousands of pages of declassified articles from the professional journal Studies in Intelligence. Valuable intelligence histories, virtually the entire archives of the pre-CIA Office of Strategic Services, and more than 450 National Intelligence Estimates related to the Soviet Union and international communism are available at the National Archives. The National Security Agency has released all of the VENONA transcripts, a total of 2,900 Soviet intelligence messages.7 So the declassification of CORONA and its results are just part of a larger movement.
In addition, a large volume of additional intelligence records is currently in the queue for declassification review. This material includes all of the analyses on the Soviet Union completed by the CIA’s Intelligence Directorate from the late 1940s to the demise of the USSR. Records of early Cold War covert actions, including the 1954 actions against the Arbenz government in Guatemala and the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, have had a high priority for review and release. Future declassifications will also include the reconnaissance satellite programs that followed CORONA.
In recent years, the stimulus for declassifying historical intelligence records has generally come from one of four sources: (1) legislative mandate; (2) executive order; (3) the recommendations of an independent panel of scholars who advise the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI); or (4) wholly voluntary initiatives by the Intelligence Community. (In addition, of course, large quantities of records, both historical and contemporary, are released in compliance with specific requests under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act legislation.)
The release of voluminous records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy is a prominent example of a legislatively mandated declassification program. The Assassination Records Review Board was established by legislation that passed the Congress unanimously in 1992 and was signed into law by President George Bush. Members of the board, who have unprecedented authority to contest Intelligence Community decisions regarding the withholding of information relating to the assassination, were subsequently appointed by President Clinton.
Legislation passed in October 1991 also set out rather elaborate procedures for declassifying historically valuable intelligence records. The Foreign Relations Authorization Acts for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 specify how departments, agencies, and other entities of the U.S. government shall cooperate with the Office of the Historian at the State Department “by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to U.S. foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records” for inclusion in the widely used volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States.
CORONA took its first image, pictured here, on August 18, 1960. The white strip at the center of the photo is the Mys Schmidta airfield in the northern Soviet Union. The quality of the resolution that photo interpreters and analysts had to work with originally was quite limited—resolution was 35–40 feet. Later CORONA images had resolution as good as six feet. (Photo courtesy National Photographic Interpretation Center)
Within the Intelligence Community, the CIA has been the agency most affected by this legislation. In response, a number of steps have been taken; support for the Foreign Relations series has been considerably expanded. For example, State Department historians have been provided full access to CIA records relevant to planned volumes in the series. They also have access to CIA finding aids and, in contrast to past practice, now are using citations to CIA archives in the volumes. CIA staff historians in the agency’s Center for the Study of Intelligence assist at every stage in the research and editing of Foreign Relations volumes that include intelligence records.
President Clinton’s 1995 Executive Order 12958 prescribes ambitious declassification review programs and objectives that have been adopted by intelligence agencies. The CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence has responsibility for historical or systematic declassification of records that are at least 25 years old; a separate staff has been established to conduct automatic declassification reviews. The two components work closely toge
ther in order to facilitate declassification and release of the largest possible quantities of records.
A third, and increasingly important, means of identifying and recommending historical intelligence records for declassification review is the external Historical Review Panel that advises the DCI. This panel of distinguished American scholars was enlarged and began to meet regularly in 1995. During each of the panel’s biannual meetings that year, members met with then-CIA Director John Deutch, and two of their initial recommendations for priority declassification review topics—DCI records from the late 1940s through 1962, and intelligence analysis on the Soviet Union from the late 1940s through August 1991—are currently being implemented.
Some of the largest and most significant declassification review priorities of U.S. intelligence agencies fall into the fourth category, voluntary review. These priorities have been devised and implemented because of the commitment of recent DCIs to greater openness by the Intelligence Community. Beginning with Robert M. Gates, who in February 1992 publicly articulated a comprehensive openness agenda, DCIs and other senior CIA officials have directed wholly voluntary releases of records and imagery. These materials are freely accessible at the National Archives and elsewhere to any interested scholar or researcher.
HOW THE CORONA IMAGERY WAS DECLASSIFIED
By far the largest single voluntary declassification project undertaken thus far has been the release of more than 2 million linear feet (800,000 photographs) of original imagery taken from space by the CORONA reconnaissance satellites. This was far from a straightforward undertaking. Any declassification review of intelligence records by definition is arduous and fraught with problems that arise from the statutory responsibility of CIA directors to protect intelligence sources and methods. For example, the identities of individuals from foreign countries who have cooperated with U.S. intelligence organizations will not be revealed, even decades after that cooperation ended. Similarly, intelligence methodologies and technical capabilities must be protected, often for extended periods of time, because compromising them could provide enemies of the United States with the ability to take offensive or defensive actions detrimental to U.S. interests or citizens.