In My Time

by Dick Cheney

  I could see the North Koreans hitting the rewind button in mid-January 2009, shortly before President Obama was sworn into office, when they demanded that the United States normalize relations with them before they would consider abandoning their nuclear weapons:

  • In April 2009 they tested a Taepodong 2 intercontinental ballistic missile.

  • In May 2009 they tested a second nuclear weapon.

  • In September 2009 they announced they were in the final stages of enriching uranium and weaponizing plutonium.

  • In March 2010 a North Korean submarine torpedoed and sank a South Korean vessel, killing forty-six sailors.

  • In November 2010 they invited a visiting American delegation to view their uranium enrichment program, unveiling two thousand gas centrifuges operating at the Yongbyon facility, site of the old plutonium reactor on which we had been so focused.

  • In November 2010, days after they unveiled their centrifuge operation, North Korea launched a massive artillery barrage at a South Korean island, killing two South Korean marines and two civilians.

  • And in February 2011, Director of National Intelligence Jim Clapper said in testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the North Koreans did indeed have a uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon, a disclosure that “supports the United States’ longstanding assessment that the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] has pursued a uranium-enrichment capability.”

  In addition, Clapper said that given the “scale of the facility and the progress the DPRK has made in construction, it is likely North Korea has been pursuing enrichment for an extended period of time. If so, there is a clear prospect that the DPRK has built other uranium enrichment related facilities in its territory.”

  AS I HAVE NOTED before, we accomplished a great deal in our first years in office in slowing the proliferation of nuclear materials and technology. As we dealt with North Korea, particularly throughout 2007 and 2008, the president would sometimes refer to one of those accomplishments—getting the Libyans to turn over their nuclear materials—and say he was looking for the North Koreans to have their “Qaddafi moment.” That is what we all hoped to achieve, and I don’t believe the president himself ever lost sight of that as the objective. But I think Secretary Rice and Assistant Secretary Hill did. For them, the agreement seemed to become the objective, and we ended up with a clear setback in our nonproliferation efforts.

  In early 2001 the president had it exactly right when he decided to set a new course for dealing with North Korea and made other countries, most importantly China, a part of the negotiations. When our diplomats began meeting bilaterally with the North Koreans again, sometimes in contravention of their instructions, China was essentially sidelined, as were our allies the Japanese and the South Koreans. We missed a number of important opportunities to use our leverage to get them to play a more constructive role. There is no question but that the challenge of North Korea’s nuclear program was one of the toughest we faced during our time in office. As we worked to meet this challenge, I wish the president had been better served by his State Department team.

  THE STORY OF OUR diplomacy with North Korea, particularly in the second term of the Bush presidency, carries with it important lessons for American leaders and diplomats of the future. First is the importance of not losing sight of the objective. In this case, the president had made clear that our goal was getting the North Koreans to give up their nuclear weapons program. However, as negotiations proceeded, the State Department came to regard getting the North Koreans to agree to something, indeed anything, as the ultimate objective. That mistake led our diplomats to respond to Pyongyang’s intransigence and dishonesty with ever greater concessions, thereby encouraging duplicity and double-dealing. And in the end it led them to recommend we accept an agreement that didn’t accomplish the president’s goal and even set it back. A good model for future leaders is Ronald Reagan’s approach at the Reykjavik Summit with Gorbachev in 1986. He wasn’t so desperate for an agreement that he would take whatever he could get. He would not concede America’s right to missile defense, and when the Soviets refused to grant that point, he ended the talks.

  This leads to the second and related lesson. The most effective diplomacy happens when America negotiates from a position of strength. If we remember that our ultimate goal is the substantive one of denuclearization and we are willing to walk away rather than accept a partial, untrue, or damaging agreement, we are in a much stronger position. At the same time, if our adversaries understand we will not compromise on fundamental principles and that we will use military force if necessary, they are much more likely to do business at the negotiating table. That is why I argued that we should have taken action ourselves to destroy the North Korean–built nuclear reactor in the Syrian desert. It would have sent an unmistakable message to the Syrians, the Iranians, and the North Koreans that our words meant something, that we would not tolerate the proliferation of nuclear technology. Such a message might well have encouraged those nations to take advantage of the opportunity to reach a diplomatic agreement rather than risk military action. The effect of U.S. military action was seen clearly, for example, when Muammar Qaddafi watched the United States liberate Iraq and then called to say he’d like to give up his nuclear weapons program.

  The third lesson is that red lines must mean something. In the aftermath of 9/11, President Bush put in place an effective nonproliferation policy that yielded results. We dedicated ourselves to preventing terrorists and terror-sponsoring states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. When the North Koreans tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006, President Bush warned that we would hold them fully accountable for the consequences of any proliferation, especially to states like Syria and Iran. Six months later, when we discovered they were proliferating to Syria, we should have held them accountable and did not. The lesson for other rogue nations might unfortunately be that they need not worry about threats from America. When our actions don’t match our rhetoric, diplomacy becomes much more difficult, and ultimately it becomes more likely that terror-sponsoring states will feel they can defy the will of the United States with impunity.

  Fourth, effective diplomacy requires that we think strategically. The president did just this when he insisted in 2001 that we get the Chinese engaged in our efforts to convince the North Koreans to give up their nuclear program. We also brought in the Russians, the Japanese, and the South Koreans. The president saw that North Korea was already so isolated and under such extensive sanctions that the United States alone had little ability to bring significant pressure to bear. However, a multilateral approach that included China might well have the ability to pressure Pyongyang. We lost opportunities to encourage the Chinese to play a more constructive role. In the immediate aftermath of North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, for example, the Chinese were upset, particularly because Pyongyang gave them only an hour’s notice of the test. We should have used that moment of leverage to bring our partners in the six-party talks together—with the Chinese in the lead—to put true pressure on the North Koreans. Another moment of maximum leverage was when we discovered the existence of the nuclear reactor that the North Koreans were building in Syria. Again, we should have immediately taken the information to the Chinese and worked together with them to develop a strategic plan to accomplish our objective. Instead, with Assistant Secretary Chris Hill determined to have bilateral discussions with the North, we sidelined the Chinese, ensuring that they would not be as effective a partner for us as they could have been.

  Fifth, America’s position in the world is strengthened when we stand with allies. In this instance we failed to do that, instead sidelining two key allies—the Japanese and the South Koreans—in our bilateral dealings with the North. Accepting a fundamentally flawed “agreement” also meant that we turned our back on an issue of critical importance to the Japanese, one that we had committed to helping them resolve: the return of their lost children.

>   Finally, effective diplomacy requires that our diplomats study and learn from our history. In this case, recent history with North Korea was a pretty effective guide to how they would behave. They signed the Agreed Framework in 1994 during the Clinton administration and immediately began violating its terms, demanding payment and looking for ways to use the negotiations to blackmail the United States. We now know the North was actively working to enrich uranium and proliferating with the Syrians while they were party to the Agreed Framework. They behaved the same way with us and have brought out all their threats and demands again for the Obama administration. They have learned now, through Republican and Democratic administrations, that this is an effective way to operate. It yields concessions from the West while they continue to develop nuclear weapons. I hope a future president and secretary of state will break the cycle. This is particularly important because in the area of nonproliferation, as in so much else, the United States must lead. If we do not hold the line, few others will.

  History in a broader sense is also important. In every administration, Republican and Democrat, there is often an inclination on the part of the State Department to make preemptive concessions to bad actors in the hope that their behavior will change. I often wondered what historical lessons or examples my State Department colleagues were drawing on as they advocated such policies. If they had been able to point to something, to say, well, here is where it worked in the past, I might have viewed their efforts differently. Sadly, the history is clear. Policies that ignore or reward dangerous behavior by our adversaries do not work. Concessions delivered out of desperation in the naive hope that despots will respond in kind tend not to enhance the security of the United States.

  CHAPTER SIXTEEN

  Endings

  According to the Constitution, the vice president is also president of the Senate, and in the early days of the country, that gave the vice president quite a lot to do. The first vice president, John Adams, even participated in debate on issues that came before the Senate, although after a friend advised him that his lengthy disquisitions were stoking resentment, he eased off. By my time, the position of Senate president had pretty much boiled down to casting tie-breaking votes—a job not to be disdained. My ability to cast those votes gave Americans the Bush tax cut that they still enjoy as I write.

  In 2008, I found something else I could do as president of the Senate. It all began when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the District of Columbia’s ban on handguns. In an eloquent decision written by Judge Laurence Silberman, the court held that the right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment is an individual right and that the D.C. handgun ban violated that right. The Supreme Court had agreed to hear the case and the Justice Department filed an amicus brief, which was no surprise, but the position that the department took was unexpected. Instead of affirming the Court of Appeals decision, the Justice Department argued that it was too broad and asked that the Supreme Court send the case back to the lower courts. This stance seemed inconsistent with the president’s previous position on the Second Amendment, and it was certainly inconsistent with my view.

  One evening in early February, David Addington got a call from Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison’s office. A staff person told Addington that a number of members of the House and Senate were preparing to file an amicus brief in support of the D.C. Circuit decision and wondered if, by any chance, I might be interested in signing on. Addington had the brief sent over, read it, and then called to see what I’d like to do. It wasn’t a hard decision. I signed on, joining fifty-five senators and 250 House members, as “President of the United States Senate, Richard B. Cheney.”

  When the brief arrived at the court, the fact that I had joined it was pretty big news. It generated a front-page story in the Washington Post headlined, “Cheney Joins Congress in Opposing D.C. Gun Ban: Vice President Breaks with Administration.” White House chief of staff Josh Bolten wasn’t happy. He came to my office to tell me he needed to tell Addington that we’d committed a “process foul.” I wasn’t sure what that meant but told Josh to be my guest. Addington, who was always careful to protect the institution of the vice presidency, listened and then explained to Josh, with a smile, I’m sure, that he worked for the vice president, not the president’s chief of staff, and that the Senate functions of the vice president were the vice president’s business.

  Most others around the West Wing seemed pleased. Barry Jackson, who had replaced Karl Rove as the president’s political advisor, said he was delighted to see that I’d taken a firm position in support of the Second Amendment. The president never said a word to me about it. I don’t know to this day whether he’d signed off on the Justice Department position or left it to Josh Bolten. But it was a mistake. There was no reason for us to back off our strong support of the Second Amendment. And the Supreme Court agreed, affirming the Court of Appeals decision on June 26, 2008. Justice Antonin Scalia later joked that the Court was unsure how to rule until, thankfully, “the vice president’s brief showed up.”

  AT 3:00 P.M. ON Thursday, March 20, 2008, my helicopter touched down at Bagram Air Base, twenty-seven miles north of Kabul. Built primarily during the Soviet invasion, Bagram is today one of America’s largest military bases in Afghanistan. I joined some of our troops for dinner that night. Often when I was visiting troops in the field, I would participate in reenlistment and award ceremonies. It was an honor to watch young soldiers on the front lines raise their hands and take an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. In the awards ceremonies I was often asked to pin medals on soldiers who had demonstrated exemplary bravery and courage under fire. No ceremony I participated in as vice president was more memorable than the one at Bagram Air Base that evening.

  On April 25, 2007, Specialist Monica Brown, a nineteen-year-old army medic from Lake Jackson, Texas, had been traveling in a convoy at dusk in Afghanistan’s Paktika Province, when the vehicle behind her struck an improvised explosive device, seriously injuring all five soldiers inside. The convoy immediately came under small-arms fire. Without hesitation, Brown and her platoon sergeant, Staff Sergeant Jose Santos, jumped from their vehicle and ran back to the burning Humvee. As vehicles in the convoy attempted to maneuver to provide cover for Brown to care for the patients, the insurgents began firing mortar rounds. Under heavy fire, Brown, with no regard for her own safety, loaded the wounded into a vehicle to move them a short distance away and directed other soldiers to assist her in stabilizing them and preparing them for evacuation. One of the injured soldiers, Specialist Jack Bodami, said this about her: “To say she handled herself well would be an understatement. It was amazing to see her keep completely calm and take care of our guys with all that going on around her. Of all the medics we’ve had with us throughout the year, she was the one I trusted the most.”

  For her bravery, Specialist Brown became only the second woman since World War II to be awarded a Silver Star.

  At Bagram Air Force Base, Afghanistan, pinning the Silver Star on Specialist Monica Brown, only the second woman to be awarded the Silver Star since World War II, for her bravery in combat. (Official White House Photo/David Bohrer)

  After her citation was read, I pinned the medal on Specialist Brown. Her commanders were lined up nearby, and there wasn’t a dry eye among them. I noticed that my lead Secret Service agent, Pat Caldwell, also had tears in his eyes. He whispered something to his number two, Special Agent Dale Pupillo, and left the dining hall, putting Dale in charge. Pat had been awarded a Silver Star in Vietnam when he, too, was nineteen years old. As David Addington explained to Specialist Brown, watching another young American soldier in a combat zone receive the same award was understandably emotional for Caldwell. When he came back inside, Brown walked over and embraced him. They shared a bond that crossed generations.

  A few days after the actions for which Specialist Brown won her Silver Star, the army transferred her, because army regulations prohibit women from
participating in combat missions. As secretary of defense and as vice president, I had supported the ban on women in combat units. Increasingly, though, soldiers like Monica Brown find themselves on the front lines, and her heroism made me think our policy ought to be adjusted. It needs to reflect the changing nature of twenty-first-century war, in which combat and noncombat, frontline and rear, are not always so easy to delineate. Brown’s own commander said this about her: “Our regular medic was on leave at the time. We had other medics to choose from, but Brown had shown us that she was more technically proficient than any of her peers.” I thought it was a mistake that she was pulled out of her unit.

  THIS VISIT IN MARCH 2008 was my fourth trip to Afghanistan as vice president. Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, the U.S. military, our coalition partners, and the Afghan people had accomplished much, overthrowing the Taliban, denying al Qaeda the bases from which they had planned the attacks of 9/11, and capturing or killing many of al Qaeda’s top leaders. The Afghan people had elected a president and a parliament. The United States and our allies had delivered billions of dollars in economic assistance to support Afghanistan’s new leadership and their efforts to build a free, secure, and sovereign nation.

  Despite these many accomplishments, by 2006 we were seeing a very worrisome trend. Violence, which decreased during the winter months, when the weather made fighting difficult, increased significantly in the spring and summer, and each year brought more attacks than the one before. Al Qaeda and the Taliban had retaken key strongholds, and at the end of 2006, President Bush had ordered a troop increase from 21,000 to 31,000 over two years.

  In early 2007, I had traveled to the region for talks with Presidents Karzai and Musharraf. I brought CIA Deputy Director Steve Kappes with me to Pakistan in 2007, and we discussed with Musharraf the matter of the tribal areas on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan, which both the Taliban and al Qaeda were using to regroup and rearm before crossing the border to attack again. Musharraf had tried to work out a deal whereby he would agree that Pakistani troops would not interfere in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas if the tribal leaders would deny safe haven to al Qaeda and the Taliban. The deal did not work. And although Musharraf continued to express support for our efforts in our private meetings, increasingly his commitments were not translating into action from his government.