The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics)

by Mckeon, Richard

  Further, if one body is in continuity with another, (35) it is not moved in that but with that. On the other hand it is moved in that if it is separate. It makes no difference whether what contains is moved or not.

  [211b] Again, when it is not separate it is described as a part in a whole, as the pupil in the eye or the hand in the body: when it is separate, as the water in the cask or the wine in the jar. For the hand is moved with the body and the water in the cask.

  It will now be plain from these considerations what place is. (5) There are just four things of which place must be one—the shape, or the matter, or some sort of extension between the bounding surfaces of the containing body, or this boundary itself if it contains no extension over and above the bulk of the body which comes to be in it.

  Three of these it obviously cannot be:

  (1) The shape is supposed to be place because it surrounds, (10) for the extremities of what contains and of what is contained are coincident. Both the shape and the place, it is true, are boundaries. But not of the same thing: the form is the boundary of the thing, the place is the boundary of the body which contains it.

  (2) The extension between the extremities is thought to be something, because what is contained and separate may often be changed while the container remains the same (as water may be poured from a vessel)—the assumption being that the extension is something over and above the body displaced. (15) But there is no such extension. One of the bodies which change places and are naturally capable of being in contact with the container falls in—whichever it may chance to be.

  If there were an extension which were such as to exist independently and be permanent, (20) there would be an infinity of places in the same thing. For when the water and the air change places, all the portions of the two together will play the same part in the whole which was previously played by all the water in the vessel; at the same time the place too will be undergoing change; so that there will be another place which is the place of the place, and many places will be coincident. (25) There is not a different place of the part, in which it is moved, when the whole vessel changes its place: it is always the same: for it is in the (proximate) place where they are that the air and the water (or the parts of the water) succeed each other, not in that place in which they come to be, which is part of the place which is the place of the whole world.

  (3) The matter, too, might seem to be place, at least if we consider it in what is at rest and is thus separate but in continuity. (30) For just as in change of quality there is something which was formerly black and is now white, or formerly soft and now hard—this is just why we say that the matter exists—so place, because it presents a similar phenomenon, is thought to exist—only in the one case we say so because what was air is now water, (35) in the other because where air formerly was there is now water. [212a] But the matter, as we said before,5 is neither separable from the thing nor contains it, whereas place has both characteristics.

  Well, then, if place is none of the three—neither the form nor the matter nor an extension which is always there, different from, and over and above, the extension of the thing which is displaced—place necessarily is the one of the four which is left, namely, (5) the boundary of the containing body at which it is in contact with the contained body. (By the contained body is meant what can be moved by way of locomotion.)

  Place is thought to be something important and hard to grasp, both because the matter and the shape present themselves along with it, and because the displacement of the body that is moved takes place in a stationary container, for it seems possible that there should be an interval which is other than the bodies which are moved. (10) The air, too, which is thought to be incorporeal, contributes something to the belief: it is not only the boundaries of the vessel which seem to be place, but also what is between them, regarded as empty. Just, in fact, as the vessel is transportable place, so place is a non-portable vessel. So when what is within a thing which is moved, is moved and changes its place, (15) as a boat on a river, what contains plays the part of a vessel rather than that of place. Place on the other hand is rather what is motionless: so it is rather the whole river that is place, because as a whole it is motionless.

  Hence we conclude that the innermost motionless boundary of what contains is place. (20)

  This explains why the middle of the heaven and the surface which faces us of the rotating system are held to be ‘up’ and ‘down’ in the strict and fullest sense for all men: for the one is always at rest, while the inner side of the rotating body remains always coincident with itself. (25) Hence since the light is what is naturally carried up, and the heavy what is carried down, the boundary which contains in the direction of the middle of the universe, and the middle itself, are down, and that which contains in the direction of the outermost part of the universe, and the outermost part itself, are up.

  For this reason, too, place is thought to be a kind of surface, and as it were a vessel, i. e. a container of the thing.

  Further, (30) place is coincident with the thing, for boundaries are coincident with the bounded.

  5 If then a body has another body outside it and containing it, it is in place, and if not, not. That is why, even if there were to be water which had not a container, the parts of it, on the one hand, will be moved (for one part is contained in another), while, on the other hand, (35) the whole will be moved in one sense, but not in another. For as a whole it does not simultaneously change its place, though it will be moved in a circle: for this place is the place of its parts. [212b] (Some things are moved, not up and down, but in a circle; others up and down, such things namely as admit of condensation and rarefaction.)

  As was explained,6 some things are potentially in place, others actually. So, when you have a homogeneous substance which is continuous, (5) the parts are potentially in place: when the parts are separated, but in contact, like a heap, they are actually in place.

  Again, (1) some things are per se in place, namely every body which is movable either by way of locomotion or by way of increase is per se somewhere, but the heaven, as has been said,7 is not anywhere as a whole, nor in any place, if at least, as we must suppose, (10) no body contains it. On the line on which it is moved, its parts have place: for each is contiguous to the next.

  But (2) other things are in place indirectly, through something conjoined with them, as the soul and the heaven. The latter is, in a way, in place, for all its parts are: for on the orb one part contains another. That is why the upper part is moved in a circle, while the All is not anywhere. (15) For what is somewhere is itself something, and there must be alongside it some other thing wherein it is and which contains it. But alongside the All or the Whole there is nothing outside the All, and for this reason all things are in the heaven; for the heaven, we may say, is the All. Yet their place is not the same as the heaven. It is part of it, the innermost part of it, which is in contact with the movable body; and for this reason the earth is in water, (20) and this in the air, and the air in the aether, and the aether in heaven, but we cannot go on and say that the heaven is in anything else.

  It is clear, too, from these considerations that all the problems which were raised8 about place will be solved when it is explained in this way:

  (1) There is no necessity that the place should grow with the body in it,

  (2) Nor that a point should have a place,

  (3) Nor that two bodies should be in the same place, (25)

  (4) Nor that place should be a corporeal interval: for what is between the boundaries of the place is any body which may chance to be there, not an interval in body.

  Further, (5) place is also somewhere, not in the sense of being in a place, but as the limit is in the limited; for not everything that is is in place, but only movable body.

  Also (6) it is reasonable that each kind of body should be carried to its own place. For a body which is next in the series and in contact (not by compulsion) is akin, (30) and bodies which are united do not affec
t each other, while those which are in contact interact on each other.

  Nor (7) is it without reason that each should remain naturally in its proper place. For this part has the same relation to its place, (35) as a separable part to its whole, as when one moves a part of water or air: so, too, air is related to water, for the one is like matter, the other form—water is the matter of air, air as it were the actuality of water, for water is potentially air, while air is potentially water, though in another way. [213a]

  These distinctions will be drawn more carefully later.9 On the present occasion it was necessary to refer to them: what has now been stated obscurely will then be made more clear. (5) If the matter and the fulfilment are the same thing (for water is both, the one potentially, the other completely), water will be related to air in a way as part to whole. That is why these have contact: it is organic union when both become actually one.

  This concludes my account of place—both of its existence and of its nature. (10)

  6 The investigation of similar questions about the void, also, must be held to belong to the physicist—namely whether it exists or not, and how it exists or what it is—just as about place. The views taken of it involve arguments both for and against, in much the same sort of way. (15) For those who hold that the void exists regard it as a sort of place or vessel which is supposed to be ‘full’ when it holds the bulk which it is capable of containing, ‘void’ when it is deprived of that—as if ‘void’ and ‘full’ and ‘place’ denoted the same thing, though the essence of the three is different.

  We must begin the inquiry by putting down the account given by those who say that it exists, (20) then the account of those who say that it does not exist, and third the current view on these questions.

  Those who try to show that the void does not exist do not disprove what people really mean by it, but only their erroneous way of speaking; this is true of Anaxagoras and of those who refute the existence of the void in this way. (25) They merely give an ingenious demonstration that air is something—by straining wine-skins and showing the resistance of the air, and by cutting it off in clepsydras. But people really mean that there is an empty interval in which there is no sensible body. They hold that everything which is is body and say that what has nothing in it at all is void (so what is full of air is void). (30) It is not then the existence of air that needs to be proved, but the non-existence of an interval, different from the bodies, either separable or actual—an interval which divides the whole body so as to break its continuity, as Democritus and Leucippus hold, and many other physicists—or even perhaps as something which is outside the whole body, which remains continuous. [213b]

  These people, then, have not reached even the threshold of the problem, but rather those who say that the void exists.

  (1) They argue, for one thing, (5) that change in place (i. e. locomotion and increase) would not be. For it is maintained that motion would seem not to exist, if there were no void, since what is full cannot contain anything more. If it could, and there were two bodies in the same place, it would also be true that any number of bodies could be together; for it is impossible to draw a line of division beyond which the statement would become untrue. If this were possible, (10) it would follow also that the smallest body would contain the greatest; for ‘many a little makes a mickle’: thus if many equal bodies can be together, so also can many unequal bodies.

  Melissus, indeed, infers from these considerations that the All is immovable; for if it were moved there must, he says, be void, but void is not among the things that exist.

  This argument, then, is one way in which they show that there is a void.

  (2) They reason from the fact that some things are observed to contract and be compressed, (15) as people say that a cask will hold the wine which formerly filled it, along with the skins into which the wine has been decanted, which implies that the compressed body contracts into the voids present in it.

  Again (3) increase, too, is thought to take place always by means of void, for nutriment is body, and it is impossible for two bodies to be together. (20) A proof of this they find also in what happens to ashes, which absorb as much water as the empty vessel.

  The Pythagoreans, too, (4) held that void exists and that it enters the heaven itself, which as it were inhales it, from the infinite air. Further it is the void which distinguishes the natures of things, (25) as if it were like what separates and distinguishes the terms of a series. This holds primarily in the numbers, for the void distinguishes their nature.

  These, then, and so many, are the main grounds on which people have argued for and against the existence of the void.

  7 As a step towards settling which view is true, (30) we must determine the meaning of the name.

  The void is thought to be place with nothing in it. The reason for this is that people take what exists to be body, and hold that while every body is in place, void is place in which there is no body, so that where there is no body, there must be void.

  Every body, again, they suppose to be tangible; and of this nature is whatever has weight or lightness. [214a]

  Hence, by a syllogism, what has nothing heavy or light in it, is void.

  This result, then, as I have said, is reached by syllogism. It would be absurd to suppose that the point is void; for the void must be place which has in it an interval in tangible body. (5)

  But at all events we observe then that in one way the void is described as what is not full of body perceptible to touch; and what has heaviness and lightness is perceptible to touch. So we would raise the question: what would they say of an interval that has colour or sound—is it void or not? Clearly they would reply that if it could receive what is tangible it was void, (10) and if not, not.

  In another way void is that in which there is no ‘this’ or corporeal substance. So some say that the void is the matter of the body (they identify the place, too, with this), and in this they speak incorrectly; for the matter is not separable from the things, (15) but they are inquiring about the void as about something separable.

  Since we have determined the nature of place, and void must, if it exists, be place deprived of body, and we have stated both in what sense place exists and in what sense it does not, it is plain that on this showing void does not exist, (20) either unseparated or separated; for the void is meant to be, not body but rather an interval in body. This is why the void is thought to be something, viz. because place is, and for the same reasons. For the fact of motion in respect of place comes to the aid both of those who maintain that place is something over and above the bodies that come to occupy it, and of those who maintain that the void is something. They state that the void is the condition of movement in the sense of that in which movement takes place; and this would be the kind of thing that some say place is. (25)

  But there is no necessity for there being a void if there is movement. It is not in the least needed as a condition of movement in general, for a reason which, incidentally, escaped Melissus; viz. that the full can suffer qualitative change.

  But not even movement in respect of place involves a void; for bodies may simultaneously make room for one another, (30) though there is no interval separate and apart from the bodies that are in movement. And this is plain even in the rotation of continuous things, as in that of liquids.

  And things can also be compressed not into a void but because they squeeze out what is contained in them (as, for instance, when water is compressed the air within it is squeezed out); and things can increase in size not only by the entrance of something but also by qualitative change; e. g. if water were to be transformed into air. [214b]

  In general, both the argument about increase of size and that about the water poured on to the ashes get in their own way. (5) For either not any and every part of the body is increased, or bodies may be increased otherwise than by the addition of body, or there may be two bodies in the same place (in which case they are claiming to solve a quite general difficulty, but are not
proving the existence of void), or the whole body must be void, if it is increased in every part and is increased by means of void. The same argument applies to the ashes.

  It is evident, (10) then, that it is easy to refute the arguments by which they prove the existence of the void.

  8 Let us explain again that there is no void existing separately, as some maintain. If each of the simple bodies has a natural locomotion, e. g. fire upward and earth downward and towards the middle of the universe, (15) it is clear that it cannot be the void that is the condition of locomotion. What, then, will the void be the condition of? It is thought to be the condition of movement in respect of place, and it is not the condition of this.

  Again, if void is a sort of place deprived of body, when there is a void where will a body placed in it move to? It certainly cannot move into the whole of the void. The same argument applies as against those who think that place is something separate, (20) into which things are carried; viz. how will what is placed in it move, or rest? Much the same argument will apply to the void as to the ‘up’ and ‘down’ in place, as is natural enough since those who maintain the existence of the void make it a place.

  And in what way will things be present either in place or in the void? For the expected10 result does not take place when a body is placed as a whole in a place conceived of as separate and permanent; for a part of it, (25) unless it be placed apart, will not be in a place but in the whole. Further, if separate place does not exist, neither will void.

  If people say that the void must exist, as being necessary if there is to be movement, what rather turns out to be the case, if one studies the matter, is the opposite, that not a single thing can be moved if there is a void; for as with those who for a like reason say the earth is at rest, (30) so, too, in the void things must be at rest; for there is no place to which things can move more or less than to another; since the void in so far as it is void admits no difference.