The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics)

by Mckeon, Richard

  An additional paradox is that the soul should consist of the ‘elements’, (10) or that it should be one of them. How are the soul’s ‘alterations’ to take place? How, e. g., is the change from being musical to being unmusical, or how is memory or forgetting, to occur? For clearly, if the soul be Fire, only such modifications will happen to it as characterize Fire qua Fire: while if it be compounded out of the ‘elements’, only the corporeal modifications will occur in it. (15) But the changes we have mentioned are none of them corporeal.

  7 The discussion of these difficulties, however, is a task appropriate to a different investigation:45 let us return to the ‘elements’ of which bodies are composed. The theories that ‘there is something common to all the “elements” ’, and that ‘they are reciprocally transformed’, are so related that those who accept either are bound to accept the other as well. Those, on the other hand, who do not make their coming-to-be reciprocal—who refuse to suppose that any one of the ‘elements’ comes-to-be out of any other taken singly, (20) except in the sense in which bricks come-to-be out of a wall—are faced with a paradox. How, on their theory, are flesh and bones or any of the other compounds to result from the ‘elements’ taken together?

  Indeed, the point we have raised constitutes a problem even for those who generate the ‘elements’ out of one another. In what manner does anything other than, and beside, the ‘elements’ come-to-be out of them? Let me illustrate my meaning. Water can come-to-be out of Fire and Fire out of Water; for their substratum is something common to them both. But flesh too, presumably, and marrow come-to-be out of them. (25) How, then, do such things come-to-be? For (a) how is the manner of their coming-to-be to be conceived by those who maintain a theory like that of Empedocles? They must conceive it as composition—just as a wall comes-to-be out of bricks and stones: and the ‘Mixture’, of which they speak, will be composed of the ‘elements’, these being preserved in it unaltered but with their small particles juxtaposed each to each. That will be the manner, presumably, (30) in which flesh and every other compound results from the ‘elements’. Consequently, it follows that Fire and Water do not come-to-be ‘out of any and every part of flesh’. For instance, although a sphere might come-to-be out of this part of a lump of wax and a pyramid out of some other part, it was nevertheless possible for either figure to have come-to-be out of either part indifferently: that is the manner of coming-to-be when ‘both Fire and Water come-to-be out of any and every part of flesh’. (35) Those, however, who maintain the theory in question, are not at liberty to conceive that ‘both come-to-be out of flesh’ in that manner, but only as a stone and a brick ‘both come-to-be out of a wall’—viz. [334b] each out of a different place or part. Similarly (b) even for those who postulate a single matter of their ‘elements’ there is a certain difficulty in explaining how anything is to result from two of them taken together—e. g. from ‘cold’ and ‘hot’, or from Fire and Earth. For if flesh consists of both and is neither of them, (5) nor again is a ‘composition’ of them in which they are preserved unaltered, what alternative is left except to identify the resultant of the two ‘elements’ with their matter? For the passing-away of either ‘element’ produces either the other or the matter.

  Perhaps we may suggest the following solution. (i) There are differences of degree in hot and cold. Although, therefore, when either is fully real without qualification, the other will exist potentially; yet, when neither exists in the full completeness of its being, (10) but both by combining destroy one another’s excesses so that there exist instead a hot which (for a ‘hot’) is cold and a cold which (for a ‘cold’) is hot; then what results from these two contraries will be neither their matter, nor either of them existing in its full reality without qualification. There will result instead an ‘intermediate’: and this ‘intermediate’, according as it is potentially more hot than cold or vice versa, (15) will possess a power-of-heating that is double or triple its power-of-cooling, or otherwise related thereto in some similar ratio. Thus all the other bodies will result from the contraries, or rather from the ‘elements’, in so far as these have been ‘combined’: while the ‘elements’ will result from the contraries, in so far as these ‘exist potentially’ in a special sense—not as matter ‘exists potentially’, but in the sense explained above. And when a thing comes-to-be in this manner, (20) the process is ‘combination’; whereas what comes-to-be in the other manner46 is matter. Moreover (ii) contraries also ‘suffer action’, in accordance with the disjunctively-articulated definition established in the early part of this work.47 For the actually-hot is potentially-cold and the actually-cold potentially-hot; so that hot and cold, unless they are equally balanced, are transformed into one another (and all the other contraries behave in a similar way). It is thus, (25) then, that in the first place the ‘elements’ are transformed; and that 48 out of the ‘elements’ there come-to-be flesh and bones and the like—the hot becoming cold and the cold becoming hot when they have been brought to the ‘mean’. For at the ‘mean’ is neither hot nor cold. The ‘mean’, however, is of considerable extent and not indivisible.49 Similarly, it is qua reduced to a ‘mean’ condition that the dry and the moist, as well as the contraries we have used as examples, (30) produce flesh and bone and the remaining compounds.

  8 All the compound bodies—all of which exist in the region belonging to the central body—are composed of all the ‘simple’ bodies. For they all contain Earth because every ‘simple’ body is to be found specially and most abundantly in its own place. (35) And they all contain Water because (a) the compound must possess a definite outline and Water, alone of the ‘simple’ bodies, is readily adaptable in shape: moreover (b) Earth has no power of cohesion without the moist. [335a] On the contrary, the moist is what holds it together; for it would fall to pieces if the moist were eliminated from it completely.

  They contain Earth and Water, then, for the reasons we have given: and they contain Air and Fire, (5) because these are contrary to Earth and Water (Earth being contrary to Air and Water to Fire, in so far as one Substance can be ‘contrary’ to another). Now all compounds presuppose in their coming-to-be constituents which are contrary to one another: and in all compounds there is contained one set of the contrasted extremes.50 Hence the other set51 must be contained in them also, so that every compound will include all the ‘simple’ bodies.

  Additional evidence seems to be furnished by the food each compound takes. (10) For all of them are fed by substances which are the same as their constituents, and all of them are fed by more substances than one. Indeed, even the plants, though it might be thought they are fed by one substance only, viz. by Water, are fed by more than one: for Earth has been mixed with the Water. That is why farmers too endeavour to mix before watering.52

  Although food is akin to the matter, (15) that which is fed is the ‘figure’—i. e. the ‘form’—taken along with the matter. This fact enables us to understand why, whereas all the ‘simple’ bodies come-to-be out of one another, Fire is the only one of them which (as our predecessors also assert) ‘is fed’. For Fire alone—or more than all the rest—is akin to the ‘form’ because it tends by nature to be borne towards the limit. Now each of them naturally tends to be borne towards its own place: but the ‘figure’—i. e the ‘form’—of them all is at the limits. (20)

  Thus we have explained that all the compound bodies are composed of all the ‘simple’ bodies.

  9 Since some things are such as to come-to-be and pass-away, (25) and since coming-to-be in fact occurs in the region about the centre, we must explain the number and the nature of the ‘originative sources’ of all coming-to-be alike: for a grasp of the true theory of any universal facilitates the understanding of its specific forms.

  The ‘originative sources’, then, of the things which come-to-be are equal in number to, and identical in kind with, those in the sphere of the eternal and primary things. For there is one in the sense of ‘matter’, (30) and a seco
nd in the sense of ‘form’: and, in addition, the third ‘originative source’ must be present as well. For the two first are not sufficient to bring things into being, any more than they are adequate to account for the primary things.

  Now cause, in the sense of material origin, for the things which are such as to come-to-be is ‘that which can be-and-not-be’: and this is identical with ‘that which can come-to-be-and-pass-away’, since the latter, while it is at one time, at another time is not, (For whereas some things are of necessity, viz. the eternal things, others of necessity are not. And of these two sets of things, (35) since they cannot diverge from the necessity of their nature, it is impossible for the first not to be and impossible for the second to be. [335b] Other things, however, can both be and not be.) Hence coming-to-be and passing-away must occur within the field of ‘that which can be-and-not-be’. (5) This, therefore, is cause in the sense of material origin for the things which are such as to come-to-be; while cause, in the sense of their ‘end’, is their ‘figure’ or ‘form’—and that is the formula expressing the essential nature of each of them.

  But the third ‘originative source’ must be present as well—the cause vaguely dreamed of by all our predecessors, definitely stated by none of them. On the contrary (a) some amongst them thought the nature of ‘the Forms’ was adequate to account for coming-to-be. (10) Thus Socrates in the Phaedo first blames everybody else for having given no explanation;53 and then lays it down that ‘some things are Forms, others Participants in the Forms’, and that ‘while a thing is said to “be” in virtue of the Form, it is said to “come-to-be” qua “sharing in”, to “pass-away” qua “losing”, the Form’. (15) Hence he thinks that ‘assuming the truth of these theses, the Forms must be causes both of coming-to-be and of passing-away’.54 On the other hand (b) there were others who thought ‘the matter’ was adequate by itself to account for coming-to-be, since ‘the movement originates from the matter’.

  Neither of these theories, however, is sound. For (a) if the Forms are causes, why is their generating activity intermittent instead of perpetual and continuous—since there always are Participants as well as Forms? Besides, (20) in some instances we see that the cause is other than the Form. For it is the doctor who implants health and the man of science who implants science, although ‘Health itself’ and ‘Science itself’ are as well as the Participants: and the same principle applies to everything else that is produced in accordance with an art. (25) On the other hand (b) to say that ‘matter generates owing to its movement’ would be, no doubt, more scientific than to make such statements as are made by the thinkers we have been criticizing. For what ‘alters’ and transfigures plays a greater part55 in bringing things into being; and we are everywhere accustomed, in the products of nature and of art alike, to look upon that which can initiate movement as the producing cause. Nevertheless this second theory is not right either. (30)

  For, to begin with, it is characteristic of matter to suffer action, i. e. to be moved: but to move, i. e. to act, belongs to a different ‘power’. This is obvious both in the things that come-to-be by art and in those that come-to-be by nature. Water does not of itself produce out of itself an animal: and it is the art, not the wood, (35) that makes a bed. Nor is this their only error. They make a second mistake in omitting the more controlling cause: for they eliminate the essential nature, i. e. the ‘form’. [336a] And what is more, since they remove the formal cause, they invest the forces they assign to the ‘simple’ bodies—the forces which enable these bodies to bring things into being—with too instrumental a character. For ‘since’ (as they say) ‘it is the nature of the hot to dissociate, of the cold to bring together, and of each remaining contrary either to act or to suffer action’, (5) it is out of such materials and by their agency (so they maintain) that everything else comes-to-be and passes-away. Yet (a) it is evident that even Fire is itself moved, i. e. suffers action. Moreover (b) their procedure is virtually the same as if one were to treat the saw (and the various instruments of carpentry) as ‘the cause’ of the things that come-to-be: for the wood must be divided if a man saws, must become smooth if he planes, (10) and so on with the remaining tools. Hence, however true it may be that Fire is active, i. e. sets things moving, there is a further point they fail to observe—viz. that Fire is inferior to the tools or instruments in the manner in which it sets things moving.

  As to our own theory—we have given a general account of the causes in an earlier work,56 and we have now explained and distinguished the ‘matter’ and the ‘form’.57

  10 Further, since the change which is motion has been proved58 to be eternal, (15) the continuity of the occurrence of coming-to-be follows necessarily from what we have established: for the eternal motion, by causing ‘the generator’59 to approach and retire, will produce coming-to-be uninterruptedly. At the same time it is clear that we were also right when, in an earlier work,60 we called motion (not coming-to-be) ‘the primary form of change’. (20) For it is far more reasonable that what is should cause the coming-to-be of what is not, than that what is not should cause the being of what is. Now that which is being moved is, but that which is coming-to-be is not: hence, also, motion is prior to coming-to-be.

  We have assumed, and have proved,61 that coming-to-be and passing-away happen to things continuously; and we assert that motion causes coming-to-be. (25) That being so, it is evident that, if the motion be single, both processes cannot occur since they are contrary to one another: for it is a law of nature that the same cause, provided it remain in the same condition, always produces the same effect, so that, from a single motion, either coming-to-be or passing-away will always result. The movements must, on the contrary, be more than one, (30) and they must be contrasted with one another either by the sense of their motion62 or by its irregularity:63 for contrary effects demand contraries as their causes.

  This explains why it is not the primary motion that causes coming-to-be and passing-away, but the motion along the inclined circle:64 for this motion not only possesses the necessary continuity, but includes a duality of movements as well. [336b] For if coming-to-be and passing-away are always to be continuous, there must be some body always being moved (in order that these changes may not fail) and moved with a duality of movements (in order that both changes, not one only, may result). Now the continuity of this movement is caused by the motion of the whole: but the approaching and retreating of the moving body are caused by the inclination.65 For the consequence of the inclination is that the body becomes alternately remote and near; and since its distance is thus unequal, (5) its movement will be irregular. Therefore, if it generates by approaching and by its proximity, it—this very same body—destroys by retreating and becoming remote: and if it generates by many successive approaches, its also destroys by many successive retirements. (10) For contrary effects demand contraries as their causes; and the natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be occupy equal periods of time. Hence, too, the times—i. e the lives—of the several kinds of living things have a number by which they are distinguished: for there is an Order controlling all things, and every time (i. e. every life) is measured by a period. Not all of them, however, are measured by the same period, but some by a smaller and others by a greater one: for to some of them the period, (15) which is their measure, is a year, while to some it is longer and to others shorter.

  And there are facts of observation in manifest agreement with our theories. Thus we see that coming-to-be occurs as the sun approaches and decay as it retreats; and we see that the two processes occupy equal times. For the durations of the natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be are equal. (20) Nevertheless it often happens that things pass-away in too short a time. This is due to the ‘intermingling’ by which the things that come-to-be and pass-away are implicated with one another. For their matter is ‘irregular’, i. e. is not everywhere the same: hence the processes by which they come-to-be must be ‘irregular’ too, i. e. some too quick and others t
oo slow. Consequently the phenomenon in question occurs, because the ‘irregular’ coming-to-be of these things is the passing-away of other things.

  Coming-to-be and passing-away will, as we have said, (25) always be continuous, and will never fail owing to the cause we stated.66 And this continuity has a sufficient reason on our theory. For in all things, as we affirm, Nature always strives after ‘the better’. Now ‘being’ (we have explained elsewhere67 the exact variety of meanings we recognize in this term) is better than ‘not-being’: but not all things can possess ‘being’, (30) since they are too far removed from the ‘originative source’. God therefore adopted the remaining alternative, and fulfilled the perfection of the universe by making coming-to-be uninterrupted: for the greatest possible coherence would thus be secured to existence, because that ‘coming-to-be should itself come-to-be perpetually’ is the closest approximation to eternal being.