The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics)

by Mckeon, Richard

  And, in general, if only the sensible exists, (30) there would be nothing if animate things were not; for there would be no faculty of sense. Now the view that neither the sensible qualities nor the sensations would exist is doubtless true (for they are affections of the perceiver), but that the substrata which cause the sensation should not exist even apart from sensation is impossible. For sensation is surely not the sensation of itself, (35) but there is something beyond the sensation, which must be prior to the sensation; for that which moves is prior in nature to that which is moved, and if they are correlative terms, this is no less the case. [1011a]

  6 There are, both among those who have these convictions and among those who merely profess these views, some who raise a difficulty by asking, who is to be the judge of the healthy man, (5) and in general who is likely to judge rightly on each class of questions. But such inquiries are like puzzling over the question whether we are now asleep or awake. And all such questions have the same meaning. These people demand that a reason shall be given for everything;42 for they seek a starting-point, and they seek to get this by demonstration, (10) while it is obvious from their actions that they have no conviction. But their mistake is what we have stated it to be; they seek a reason for things for which no reason can be given; for the starting-point of demonstration is not demonstration.

  These, then, might be easily persuaded of this truth, (15) for it is not difficult to grasp; but those who seek merely compulsion in argument seek what is impossible; for they demand to be allowed to contradict themselves—a claim which contradicts itself from the very first.43—But if not all things are relative, but some are self-existent, not everything that appears will be true; for that which appears is apparent to some one; so that he who says all things that appear are true, (20) makes all things relative. And, therefore, those who ask for an irresistible argument, and at the same time demand to be called to account for their views, must guard themselves by saying that the truth is not that what appears exists, but that what appears exists for him to whom it appears, and when, and to the sense to which, and under the conditions under which it appears. And if they give an account of their view, but do not give it in this way, they will soon find themselves contradicting themselves. (25) For it is possible that the same thing may appear to be honey to the sight, but not to the taste, and that, since we have two eyes, things may not appear the same to each, if their sight is unlike. For to those who for the reasons named some time ago44 say that what appears is true, (30) and therefore that all things are alike false and true, for things do not appear either the same to all men or always the same to the same man, but often have contrary appearances at the same time (for touch says there are two objects when we cross our fingers, while sight says there is one),45—to these we shall say ‘yes, (35) but not to the same sense and in the same part of it and under the same conditions and at the same time’, so that what appears will be with these qualifications true. [1011b] But perhaps for this reason those who argue thus not because they feel a difficulty but for the sake of argument, should say that this is not true, but true for this man. And as has been said46 before, they must make everything relative—relative to opinion and perception, (5) so that nothing either has come to be or will be without some one’s first thinking so. But if things have come to be or will be,47 evidently not all things will be relative to opinion.—Again, if a thing is one, it is in relation to one thing or to a definite number of things; and if the same thing is both half and equal, it is not to the double that the equal is correlative.48 If, then, in relation to that which thinks, man and that which is thought are the same, man will not be that which thinks, (10) but only that which is thought. And if each thing is to be relative to that which thinks, that which thinks will be relative to an infinity of specifically different things.

  Let this, then, suffice to show (1) that the most indisputable of all beliefs is that contradictory statements are not at the same time true, and (2) what consequences follow from the assertion that they are, and (3) why people do assert this. Now since it is impossible that contradictories should be at the same time true of the same thing, (15) obviously contraries also cannot belong at the same time to the same thing. For of contraries, one is a privation no less than it is a contrary—and a privation of the essential nature; and privation is the denial of a predicate to a determinate genus. If, then, it is impossible to affirm and deny truly at the same time, (20) it is also impossible that contraries should belong to a subject at the same time, unless both belong to it in particular relations, or one in a particular relation and one without qualification.49

  7 But on the other hand there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate. This is clear, in the first place, if we define what the true and the false are. (25) To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true; so that he who says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is false; but neither what is nor what is not is said to be or not to be.50—Again, the intermediate between the contradictories will be so either in the way in which grey is between black and white,51 (30) or as that which is neither man nor horse is between man and horse. (a) If it were of the latter kind, it could not change into the extremes (for change is from not-good to good, or from good to not-good), but as a matter of fact when there is an intermediate it is always observed to change into the extremes. For there is no change except to opposites52 and to their intermediates. (35) (b) But if it is really intermediate,53 in this way too there would have to be a change to white, which was not from not-white; but as it is, this is never seen.[1012a]—Again, every object of understanding or reason the understanding either affirms or denies—this is obvious from the definition—whenever it says what is true or false. When it connects in one way by assertion or negation, it says what is true, (5) and when it does so in another way, what is false.—Again, there must be an intermediate between all contradictories, if one is not arguing merely for the sake of argument; so that it will be possible for a man to say what is neither true nor untrue, and there will be a middle between that which is and that which is not, so that there will also be a kind of change intermediate between generation and destruction.—Again, in all classes in which the negation of an attribute involves the assertion of its contrary, (10) even in these there will be an intermediate; for instance, in the sphere of numbers there will be number which is neither odd nor not-odd. But this is impossible, as is obvious from the definition.—Again, the process will go on ad infinitum, and the number of realities will be not only half as great again, but even greater. For again it will be possible to deny this intermediate with reference both to its assertion and to its negation,54 and this new term will be some definite thing; for its essence is something different. (15)—Again, when a man, on being asked whether a thing is white, says ‘no’, he has denied nothing except that it is; and its not being is a negation.

  Some people have acquired this opinion as other paradoxical opinions have been acquired; when men cannot refute eristical arguments, (20) they give in to the argument and agree that the conclusion is true. This, then, is why some express this view; others do so because they demand a reason for everything.55 And the starting-point in dealing with all such people is definition. Now the definition rests on the necessity of their meaning something; for the form of words of which the word is a sign will be its definition.56—While the doctrine of Heraclitus, (25) that all things are and are not, seems to make everything true, that of Anaxagoras, that there is an intermediate between the terms of a contradiction, seems to make everything false; for when things are mixed, the mixture is neither good nor not-good, so that one cannot say anything that is true.

  8 In view of these distinctions it is obvious that the one-sided theories which some people express about all things cannot be valid—on the one hand the theory that nothin
g is true (for, (30) say they, there is nothing to prevent every statement from being like the statement ‘the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side’), on the other hand the theory that everything is true. These views are practically the same as that of Heraclitus; for he who says that ‘all things are true and all are false’ also makes each of these statements separately, (35) so that since they are impossible, the double statement must be impossible too. [1012b]—Again, there are obviously contradictories which cannot be at the same time true—nor on the other hand can all statements be false; yet this would seem more possible in the light of what has been said.—But against all such views we must postulate, as we said above,57 not that something is or is not, (5) but that something has a meaning, so that we must argue from a definition, viz. by assuming what falsity or truth means. If that which it is true to affirm is nothing other than that which it is false to deny, it is impossible that all statements should be false; for one side of the contradiction must be true. Again, (10) if it is necessary with regard to everything either to assert or to deny it, it is impossible that both should be false; for it is one side of the contradiction that is false.—Therefore all such views are also exposed to the often expressed objection, that they destroy themselves. For he who says that everything is true makes even the statement contrary to his own true, (15) and therefore his own not true (for the contrary statement denies that it is true), while he who says everything is false makes himself also false.58—And if the former person excepts the contrary statement, saying it alone is not true, while the latter excepts his own as being not false, none the less they are driven to postulate the truth or falsity of an infinite number of statements; for that which says the true statement is true is true, (20) and this process will go on to infinity.

  Evidently, again, those who say all things are at rest are not right, nor are those who say all things are in movement. For if all things are at rest, the same statements will always be true and the same always false—but this obviously changes; for he who makes a statement, (25) himself at one time was not and again will not be. And if all things are in motion, nothing will be true; everything therefore will be false. But it has been shown that this is impossible. Again, it must be that which is that changes; for change is from something to something. But again it is not the case that all things are at rest or in motion sometimes, and nothing for ever; for there is something which always moves the things that are in motion, (30) and the first mover is itself unmoved.

  * * *

  1 With 1004a 2–9 Cf. iii. 995b 10–13, 997a 15–25, vi. 1.

  2 i. e. iii. 995b 18–27, 997a 25–34.

  3 sc. which they do not do.

  4 The Pythagoreans.

  5 Parmenides in the ‘Way of Opinion’.

  6 The Platonists.

  7 Empedocles.

  8 With 1003b 22–1005a 18 Cf. iii. 995b 18–27, 997a 25–34. With the whole ch. Cf. xi. 3.

  9 With 1005a 19–b2 Cf. xi. 4.

  10 The reference may be to Antisthenes.

  11 With ch. 3 Cf. iii. 995b 6–10, 996b 26–997a 15. With 1005b 8–34 Cf. xi. 1061b 34–1062a 2 (with 1005b 23–6 Cf. 1002a 31–5).

  12 Apparently a loose reference to 1005b 23–5.

  13 The Megaric school may be referred to.

  14 With ll. 5–18 Cf. xi. 1062a 2–5.

  15 For ‘so and not so’ Cf. Pl. Theaet. 183 A.

  16 a21, 31.

  17 ll. 11–15.

  18 in a 31 f.

  19 1006b 17.

  20 With 1006a 18–1007a Cf. xi. 1062a 5–20 (with 1006b 28–34 Cf. 1062a 20–3).

  21 sc. and hence (on the view attacked) should be compatible with it.

  22 i. e. in the direction of predicates, which are naturally wider or higher than the subject.

  23 Sense (1) reduces to sense (2), and in this an infinite number of accidents combined together is impossible; there must be substance somewhere.

  24 sc. ‘trireme’.

  25 With 1007b 18–1008a 2 Cf. xi. 1062a 23–30.

  26 sc. that the thing is a man and a not-man.

  27 With ll. 6–7 Cf. xi. 1062a 36–b 7.

  28 1006b 17, 1007a 6.

  29 With ll. 12–27 Cf. xi. 1063a 28–35.

  30 With ll. 16–22 Cf. xi. 1063b 7–16.

  31 With ll. 6–16, 22–30 Cf. xi. 1062b 12–24.

  32 With ll. 30–6 Cf. xi. 1062b 24–33.

  33 With a38–b 33 Cf. xi. 1063a 35–b 7.

  34 Cf. 1009a 32.

  35 Epicharmus may have said that Xenophanes’ views were ‘neither plausible nor true’, or that they were ‘true but not plausible’.

  36 With ll. 22–5 Cf. xi. 1063a 22–8.

  37 With ll. 25–32 Cf. xi. 1063a 10–17.

  38 Cf. 1009a 36–8.

  39 Cf. Theaetetus 178 B–179 A.

  40 e. g. the awareness which smell gives us of savour and of odour respectively.

  41 With ll. 1–26 Cf. xi. 1062b 33–1063a 10.

  42 The reference may be to Antisthenes.

  43 With ll. 3–16 Cf. xi. 1063b 7–16.

  44 Cf. 1009a 38–1010a 15.

  45 With ll. 31–4 Cf. xi. 1062b 33–1063a 10.

  46 a 19 f.

  47 sc. without some one’s first thinking so.

  48 sc. but the equal to the equal, the half to the double.

  49 With ll. 17–22 Cf. xi. 1063b 17–19.

  50 sc. by those who say there is an intermediate between contradictories. Hence such a statement is neither true nor false, which is absurd.

  51 Though of course it differs from this case in being between contradictories, not contraries.

  52 sc. contrary, not contradictory opposites.

  53 sc. as grey is between black and white.

  54 i. e. if there is a term B which is neither A nor not-A, there will be a new term C which is neither B nor not-B.

  55 The reference may be to Antisthenes.

  56 With 1011b 23–1012a 24 Cf. xi. 1063b 19–24.

  57 Cf. 1006a 18–22.

  58 With a 24–b 18 Cf. xi. 1063b 24–35 (with b 13–18 Cf. 1062b 7–9).

  BOOK Δ (V)

  1 ‘Beginning’ means (1) that part of a thing from which one would start first, (35) e. g. a line or a road has a beginning in either of the contrary directions. [1013a] (2) That from which each thing would best be originated, e. g. even in learning we must sometimes begin not from the first point and the beginning of the subject, but from the point from which we should learn most easily. (3) That from which, as an immanent part, a thing first comes to be, e. g. as the keel of a ship and the foundation of a house, (5) while in animals some suppose the heart, others the brain, others some other part, to be of this nature. (4) That from which, not as an immanent part, a thing first comes to be, and from which the movement or the change naturally first begins, as a child comes from its father and its mother, and a fight from abusive language. (10) (5) That at whose will that which is moved is moved and that which changes changes, e. g. the magistracies in cities, and oligarchies and monarchies and tyrannies, are called archai and so are the arts, and of these especially the architectonic arts. (15) (6) That from which a thing can first be known—this also is called the beginning of the thing, e. g. the hypotheses are the beginnings of demonstrations. (Causes are spoken of in an equal number of senses; for all causes are beginnings.) It is common, then, to all beginnings to be the first point from which a thing either is or comes to be or is known; but of these some are immanent in the thing and others are outside. (20) Hence the nature of a thing is a beginning, and so is the element of a thing, and thought and will, and essence, and the final cause—for the good and the beautiful are the beginning both of the knowledge and of the movement of many things.

  2 ‘Cause’ means (1) that from which, as immanent material, (25) a thing comes into being, e. g. the bronze is the cause of the statue and the silver of the saucer, and so are the classes which include these. (2) The form or pattern, i. e. the definition of the essence, and the
classes which include this (e. g. the ratio 2:1 and number in general are causes of the octave), and the parts included in the definition. (3) That from which the change or the resting from change first begins; e. g. the adviser is a cause of the action, (30) and the father a cause of the child, and in general the maker a cause of the thing made and the change-producing of the changing. (4) The end, i. e. that for the sake of which a thing is; e. g. health is the cause of walking. For ‘Why does one walk?’ we say; ‘that one may be healthy’; and in speaking thus we think we have given the cause. (35) The same is true of all the means that intervene before the end, when something else has put the process in motion, as e. g. thinning or purging or drugs or instruments intervene before health is reached; for all these are for the sake of the end, though they differ from one another in that some are instruments and others are actions. [1013b]

  These, then, are practically all the senses in which causes are spoken of, and as they are spoken of in several senses it follows both that there are several causes of the same thing, (5) and in no accidental sense (e. g. both the art of sculpture and the bronze are causes of the statue not in respect of anything else but qua statue; not, however, in the same way, but the one as matter and the other as source of the movement), and that things can be causes of one another (e. g. exercise of good condition, and the latter of exercise; not, however, in the same way, but the one as end and the other as source of movement). (10)—Again, the same thing is the cause of contraries; for that which when present causes a particular thing, we sometimes charge, when absent, with the contrary, e. g. we impute the shipwreck to the absence of the steersman, whose presence was the cause of safety; and both—the presence and the privation—are causes as sources of movement. (15)