The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics)

by Mckeon, Richard

  7 Things are said to ‘be’ (1) in an accidental sense, (2) by their own nature.

  (I) In an accidental sense, e. g., we say ‘the righteous doer is musical’, and ‘the man is musical’, and ‘the musician is a man’, (10) just as we say ‘the musician builds’, because the builder happens to be musical or the musician to be a builder; for here ‘one thing is another’ means ‘one is an accident of another’. So in the cases we have mentioned; for when we say ‘the man is musical’ and ‘the musician is a man’, (15) or ‘he who is pale is musical’ or ‘the musician is pale’, the last two mean that both attributes are accidents of the same thing; the first that the attribute is an accident of that which is; while ‘the musical is a man’ means that ‘musical’ is an accident of a man. (In this sense, too, the not-pale is said to be, because that of which it is an accident is.) Thus when one thing is said in an accidental sense to be another, (20) this is either because both belong to the same thing, and this is, or because that to which the attribute belongs is, or because the subject which has as an attribute that of which it is itself predicated, itself is.

  (2) The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication;4 for the senses of ‘being’ are just as many as these figures. (25) Since, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its ‘where’, others its ‘when’, ‘being’ has a meaning answering to each of these. For there is no difference between ‘the man is recovering’ and ‘the man recovers’, nor between ‘the man is walking’ or ‘cutting’ and ‘the man walks’ or ‘cuts’; and similarly in all other cases. (30)

  (3) Again, ‘being’ and ‘is’ mean that a statement is true, ‘not being’ that it is not true but false—and this alike in the case of affirmation and of negation; e. g. ’Socrates is ‘musical’ means that this is true, or ‘Socrates is not-pale’ means that this is true; but ‘the diagonal of the square is not commensurate with the side’ means that it is false to say it is.

  (4) Again, ‘being’ and ‘that which is’ mean that some of the things we have mentioned ‘are’ potentially, (35) others in complete reality. [1017b] For we say both of that which sees potentially and of that which sees actually, that it is ‘seeing’, and both of that which can actualize its knowledge and of that which is actualizing it, that it knows, (5) and both of that to which rest is already present and of that which can rest, that it rests. And similarly in the case of substances; we say the Hermes is in the stone, and the half of the line is in the line, and we say of that which is not yet ripe that it is corn. When a thing is potential and when it is not yet potential must be explained elsewhere.5

  8 We call ‘substance’ (1) the simple bodies, (10) i. e. earth and fire and water and everything of the sort, and in general bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and divine beings, and the parts of these. All these are called substance because they are not predicated of a subject but everything else is predicated of them.—(2) That which, being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, (15) is the cause of their being, as the soul is of the being of an animal.—(3) The parts which are present in such things, limiting them and marking them as individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed, as the body is by the destruction of the plane, as some6 say, and the plane by the destruction of the line; and in general number is thought by some6 to be of this nature; for if it is destroyed, (20) they say, nothing exists, and it limits all things.—(4) The essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing.

  It follows, then, that ‘substance’ has two senses, (A) the ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (B) that which, being a ‘this’, is also separable7—and of this nature is the shape or form of each thing. (25)

  9 ‘The same’ means (1) that which is the same in an accidental sense, e. g. ‘the pale’ and ‘the musical’ are the same because they are accidents of the same thing, and ‘a man’ and ‘musical’ because the one is an accident of the other; and ‘the musical’ is ‘a man’ because it is an accident of the man. (30) (The complex entity is the same as either of the simple ones and each of these is the same as it; for both ‘the man’ and ‘the musical’ are said to be the same as ‘the musical man’, and this the same as they.) This is why all of these statements are made not universally; for it is not true to say that every man is the same as ‘the musical’ (for universal attributes belong to things in virtue of their own nature, (35) but accidents do not belong to them in virtue of their own nature); but of the individuals the statements are made without qualification. [1018a] For ‘Socrates’ and ‘musical Socrates’ are thought to be the same; but ‘Socrates’ is not predicable of more than one subject, and therefore we do not say ‘every Socrates’ as we say ‘every man’.

  Some things are said to be the same in this sense, (5) others (2) are the same by their own nature, in as many senses as that which is one by its own nature is so; for both the things whose matter is one either in kind or in number, and those whose essence is one, are said to be the same. Clearly, therefore, sameness is a unity of the being either of more than one thing or of one thing when it is treated as more than one, i. e. when we say a thing is the same as itself; for we treat it as two.

  Things are called ‘other’ if either their kinds or their matters or the definitions of their essence are more than one; and in general ‘other’ has meanings opposite to those of ‘the same’. (10)

  ‘Different’ is applied (1) to those things which though other are the same in some respect, only not in number but either in species or in genus or by analogy; (2) to those whose genus is other, and to contraries, and to all things that have their otherness in their essence.

  Those things are called ‘like’ which have the same attributes in every respect, (15) and those which have more attributes the same than different, and those whose quality is one; and that which shares with another thing the greater number or the more important of the attributes (each of them one of two contraries) in respect of which things are capable of altering, is like that other thing.8 The senses of ‘unlike’ are opposite to those of ‘like’.

  10 The term ‘opposite’ is applied to contradictories, (10) and to contraries, and to relative terms, and to privation and possession, and to the extremes from which and into which generation and dissolution take place; and the attributes that cannot be present at the same time in that which is receptive of both, are said to be opposed—either themselves or their constituents. Grey and white colour do not belong at the same time to the same thing; hence their constituents are opposed.9

  The term ‘contrary’ is applied (1) to those attributes differing in genus which cannot belong at the same time to the same subject, (25) (2) to the most different of the things in the same genus, (3) to the most different of the attributes in the same recipient subject, (4) to the most different of the things that fall under the same faculty, (30) (5) to the things whose difference is greatest either absolutely or in genus or in species. The other things that are called contrary are so called, some because they possess contraries of the above kind, some because they are receptive of such, some because they are productive of or susceptible to such, or are producing or suffering them, or are losses or acquisitions, or possessions or privations, of such. Since ‘one’ and ‘being’ have many senses, (35) the other terms which are derived from these, and therefore ‘same’, ‘other’, and ‘contrary’, must correspond, so that they must be different for each category.

  The term ‘other in species’ is applied to things which being of the same genus are not subordinate the one to the other, or which being in the same genus have a difference,10 or which have a contrariety in their substance; and contraries are other than one another in species (either all contraries or those which are so called in the primary sense11), and so are those things whose definitions differ in the infima spe
cies of the genus (e. g. man and horse are indivisible in genus but their definitions are different), (5) and those which being in the same substance have a difference. [1018b] ‘The same in species’ has the various meanings opposite to these.

  11 The words ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ are applied (1) to some things (on the assumption that there is a first, i. e. a beginning, in each class) because they are nearer some beginning determined either absolutely and by nature, (10) or by reference to something or in some place or by certain people; e. g. things are prior in place because they are nearer either to some place determined by nature (e. g. the middle or the last place), or to some chance object; and that which is farther is posterior. (15) —Other things are prior in time; some by being farther from the present, i. e. in the case of past events (for the Trojan war is prior to the Persian, because it is farther from the present), others by being nearer the present, i. e. in the case of future events (for the Nemean games are prior to the Pythian, if we treat the present as beginning and first point, because they are nearer the present).—Other things are prior in movement; (20) for that which is nearer the first mover is prior (e. g. the boy is prior to the man); and the prime mover also is a beginning absolutely.—Others are prior in power; for that which exceeds in power, i. e. the more powerful, is prior; and such is that according to whose will the other—i. e. the posterior—must follow, so that if the prior does not set it in motion the other does not move, (25) and if it sets it in motion it does move; and here will is a beginning.—Others are prior in arrangement; these are the things that are placed at intervals in reference to some one definite thing according to some rule, e. g. in the chorus the second man is prior to the third, and in the lyre the second lowest string is prior to the lowest; for in the one case the leader and in the other the middle string is the beginning.

  These, (30) then, are called prior in this sense, but (2) in another sense that which is prior for knowledge is treated as also absolutely prior; of these, the things that are prior in definition do not coincide with those that are prior in relation to perception. For in definition universals are prior, in relation to perception individuals. And in definition also the accident is prior to the whole, e. g. ‘musical’ to ‘musical man’, (35) for the definition cannot exist as a whole without the part; yet musicalness cannot exist unless there is some one who is musical.

  (3) The attributes of prior things are called prior, e. g. straightness is prior to smoothness; for one is an attribute of a line as such, and the other of a surface.

  [1019a] Some things then are called prior and posterior in this sense, others (4) in respect of nature and substance, i. e. those which can be without other things, while the others cannot be without them—a distinction which Plato used. (5) (If we consider the various senses of ‘being’, firstly the subject is prior, so that substance is prior; secondly, according as potency or complete reality is taken into account, different things are prior, for some things are prior in respect of potency, others in respect of complete reality, e. g. in potency the half line is prior to the whole line, and the part to the whole, and the matter to the concrete substance, but in complete reality these are posterior; for it is only when the whole has been dissolved that they will exist in complete reality. (10)) In a sense, therefore, all things that are called prior and posterior are so called with reference to this fourth sense; for some things can exist without others in respect of generation, e. g. the whole without the parts, and others in respect of dissolution, e. g. the part without the whole. And the same is true in all other cases.

  12 ‘Potency’ means (1) a source of movement or change, (15) which is in another thing than the thing moved or in the same thing qua other; e. g. the art of building is a potency which is not in the thing built, while the art of healing, which is a potency, may be in the man healed, but not in him qua healed. ‘Potency’ then means the source, in general, of change or movement in another thing or in the same thing qua other, and also (2) the source of a thing’s being moved by another thing or by itself qua other. (20) For in virtue of that principle, in virtue of which a patient suffers anything, we call it ‘capable’ of suffering; and this we do sometimes if it suffers anything at all, sometimes not in respect of everything it suffers, but only if it suffers a change for the better.—(3) The capacity of performing this well or according to intention; for sometimes we say of those who merely can walk or speak but not well or not as they intend, that they cannot speak or walk. (25) So too (4) in the case of passivity.—(5) The states in virtue of which things are absolutely impassive or unchangeable, or not easily changed for the worse, are called potencies; for things are broken and crushed and bent and in general destroyed not by having a potency but by not having one and by lacking something, (30) and things are impassive with respect to such processes if they are scarcely and slightly affected by them, because of a ‘potency’ and because they ‘can’ do something and are in some positive state.

  ‘Potency’ having this variety of meanings, so too the ‘potent’ or ‘capable’ in one sense will mean that which can begin a movement (or a change in general, for even that which can bring things to rest is a ‘potent’ thing) in another thing or in itself qua other; and in one sense that over which something else has such a potency; and in one sense that which has a potency of changing into something, (35) whether for the worse or for the better (for even that which perishes is thought to be ‘capable’ of perishing, for it would not have perished if it had not been capable of it; [1019b] but, as a matter of fact, it has a certain disposition and cause and principle which fits it to suffer this; sometimes it is thought to be of this sort because it has something, (5) sometimes because it is deprived of something; but if privation is in a sense ‘having’ or ‘habit’, everything will be capable by having something, so that things are capable both by having a positive habit and principle, and by having the privation of this, if it is possible to have a privation; and if privation is not in a sense ‘habit’, ‘capable’ is used in two distinct senses); and a thing is capable in another sense because neither any other thing, (10) nor itself qua other, has a potency or principle which can destroy it. Again, all of these are capable either merely because the thing might chance to happen or not to happen, or because it might do so well. This sort of potency is found even in lifeless things, e. g. in instruments; for we say one lyre can speak, and another cannot speak at all, if it has not a good tone.

  Incapacity is privation of capacity—i. e. of such a principle as has been described—either in general or in the case of something that would naturally have the capacity, (15) or even at the time when it would naturally already have it; for the senses in which we should call a boy and a man and a eunuch ‘incapable of begetting’ are distinct.—Again, to either kind of capacity there is an opposite incapacity—both to that which only can produce movement and to that which can produce it well. (20)

  Some things, then, are called adunata in virtue of this kind of incapacity, while others are so in another sense; i. e. both dunaton and adunaton are used as follows. The impossible is that of which the contrary is of necessity true, e. g. that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side is impossible, (25) because such a statement is a falsity of which the contrary is not only true but also necessary; that it is commensurate, then, is not only false but also of necessity false. The contrary of this, the possible, is found when it is not necessary that the contrary is false, e. g. that a man should be seated is possible; for that he is not seated is not of necessity false. (30) The possible, then, in one sense, as has been said, means that which is not of necessity false; in one, that which is true; in one, that which may be true.—A ‘potency’ or ‘power’12 in geometry is so called by a change of meaning. (35)—These senses of ‘capable’ or ‘possible’ involve no reference to potency. But the senses which involve a reference to potency all refer to the primary kind of potency; and this is a source of change in another thing or in the same thing qua other. [1020a] For other
things are called ‘capable’, some because something else has such a potency over them, some because it has not, some because it has it in a particular way. The same is true of the things that are incapable. (5) Therefore the proper definition of the primary kind of potency will be ‘a source of change in another thing or in the same thing qua other’.

  13 ‘Quantum’ means that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts of which each is by nature a ‘one’ and a ‘this’. (10) A quantum is a plurality if it is numerable, a magnitude if it is measurable. ‘Plurality’ means that which is divisible potentially into non-continuous parts, ‘magnitude’ that which is divisible into continuous parts; of magnitude, that which is continuous in one dimension is length, in two breadth, in three depth. Of these, limited plurality is number, limited length is a line, breadth a surface, depth a solid.

  Again, some things are called quanta in virtue of their own nature, others incidentally; e. g. the line is a quantum by its own nature, (15) the musical is one incidentally. Of the things that are quanta by their own nature some are so as substances, e. g. the line is a quantum (for ‘a certain kind of quantum’ is present in the definition which states what it is), and others are modifications and states of this kind of substance, e. g. much and little, long and short, broad and narrow, (20) deep and shallow, heavy and light, and all other such attributes. And also great and small, and greater and smaller, both in themselves and when taken relatively to each other, are by their own nature attributes of what is quantitative; but these names are transferred to other things also. (25) Of things that are quanta incidentally, some are so called in the sense in which it was said that the musical and the white were quanta, viz. because that to which musicalness and whiteness belong is a quantum, and some are quanta in the way in which movement and time are so; for these also are called quanta of a sort and continuous because the things of which these are attributes are divisible. (30) I mean not that which is moved, but the space through which it is moved; for because that is a quantum movement also is a quantum, and because this is a quantum time is one.