The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics)

by Mckeon, Richard

  [1024a] Again (3), of quanta that have a beginning and a middle and an end, those to which the position does not make a difference are called totals, and those to which it does, wholes. Those which admit of both descriptions are both wholes and totals. These are the things whose nature remains the same after transposition, but whose form does not, e. g. wax or a coat; they are called both wholes and totals; for they have both characteristics. (5) Water and all liquids and number are called totals, but ‘the whole number’ or ‘the whole water’ one does not speak of, except by an extension of meaning. To things, to which qua one the term ‘total’ is applied, the term ‘all’ is applied when they are treated as separate; ‘this total number’, ‘all these units. (10)’

  27 It is not any chance quantitative thing that can be said to be ‘mutilated’; it must be a whole as well as divisible. For not only is two not ‘mutilated’ if one of the two ones is taken away (for the part removed by mutilation is never equal to the remainder), but in general no number is thus mutilated; for it is also necessary that the essence remain; if a cup is mutilated, it must still be a cup; but the number is no longer the same. (15) Further, even if things consist of unlike parts, not even these things can all be said to be mutilated, for in a sense a number has unlike parts (e. g. two and three) as well as like; but in general of the things to which their position makes no difference, e. g. water or fire, none can be mutilated; to be mutilated, things must be such as in virtue of their essence have a certain position. Again, they must be continuous; for a musical scale consists of unlike parts and has position, (20) but cannot become mutilated. Besides, not even the things that are wholes are mutilated by the privation of any part. For the parts removed must be neither those which determine the essence nor any chance parts, irrespective of their position; e. g. a cup is not mutilated if it is bored through, but only if the handle or a projecting part is removed, (25) and a man is mutilated not if the flesh or the spleen is removed, but if an extremity is, and that not every extremity but one which when completely removed cannot grow again. Therefore baldness is not a mutilation.

  28 The term ‘race’ or ‘genus’ is used (1) if generation of things which have the same form is continuous, e. g. ‘while the race of men lasts’ means ‘while the generation of them goes on continuously’. (30)—(2) It is used with reference to that which first brought things into existence; for it is thus that some are called Hellenes by race and others Ionians, because the former proceed from Hellen and the latter from Ion as their first begetter. And the word is used in reference to the begetter more than to the matter, though people also get a race-name from the female, (35) e. g. ‘the descendants of Pyrrha’.—(3) There is genus in the sense in which ‘plane’ is the genus of plane figures and ‘solid’ of solids; for each of the figures is in the one case a plane of such and such a kind, and in the other a solid of such and such a kind; and this is what underlies the differentiae. [1024b] Again (4), in definitions the first constituent element, (5) which is included in the ‘what’, is the genus, whose differentiae the qualities are said to be.—‘Genus’ then is used in all these ways, (1) in reference to continuous generation of the same kind, (2) in reference to the first mover which is of the same kind as the things it moves, (3) as matter; for that to which the differentia or quality belongs is the substratum, which we call matter.

  Those things are said to be ‘other in genus’ whose proximate substratum is different, (10) and which are not analysed the one into the other nor both into the same thing (e. g. form and matter are different in genus); and things which belong to different categories of being (for some of the things that are said to ‘be’ signify essence, others a quality, (15) others the other categories we have before distinguished16); these also are not analysed either into one another or into some one thing.

  29 ‘The false’ means (1) that which is false as a thing, and that (a) because it is not put together or cannot be put together, (20) e. g. ‘that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side’ or ‘that you are sitting’; for one of these is false always, and the other sometimes; it is in these two senses that they are non-existent. (b) There are things which exist, but whose nature it is to appear either not to be such as they are or to be things that do not exist, e. g. a sketch or a dream; for these are something, but are not the things the appearance of which they produce in us. (25) We call things false in this way, then—either because they themselves do not exist, or because the appearance which results from them is that of something that does not exist.

  (2) A false account is the account of non-existent objects, in so far as it is false. Hence every account is false when applied to something other than that of which it is true; e. g. the account of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. In a sense there is one account of each thing, i. e. the account of its essence, but in a sense there are many, (30) since the thing itself and the thing itself with an attribute are in a sense the same, e. g. Socrates and musical Socrates (a false account is not the account of anything, except in a qualified sense). Hence Antisthenes was too simple-minded when he claimed that nothing could be described except by the account proper to it—one predicate to one subject; from which the conclusion used to be drawn that there could be no contradiction, and almost that there could be no error. But it is possible to describe each thing not only by the account of itself, (35) but also by that of something else. This may be done altogether falsely indeed, but there is also a way in which it may be done truly; e. g. eight may be described as a double number by the use of the definition of two.

  [1025a] These things, then, are called false in these senses, but (3) a false man is one who is ready at and fond of such accounts, not for any other reason but for their own sake, and one who is good at impressing such accounts on other people, just as we say things are false, (5) which produce a false appearance. This is why the proof in the Hippias that the same man is false and true is misleading. For it assumes that he is false who can deceive17 (i. e. the man who knows and is wise); and further that he who is willingly bad is better.18 This is a false result of induction—for a man who limps willingly is better than one who does so unwillingly—by ‘limping’ Plato means ‘mimicking a limp’, (10) for if the man were lame willingly, he would presumably be worse in this case as in the corresponding case of moral character.

  30 ‘Accident’ means (1) that which attaches to something and can be truly asserted, but neither of necessity nor usually, e. g. if some one in digging a hole for a plant has found treasure. This—the finding of treasure—is for the man who dug the hole an accident; for neither does the one come of necessity from the other or after the other, (15) nor, if a man plants, does he usually find treasure. And a musical man might be pale; but since this does not happen of necessity nor usually, (20) we call it an accident. Therefore since there are attributes and they attach to subjects, and some of them attach to these only in a particular place and at a particular time, whatever attaches to a subject, but not because it was this subject, or the time this time, or the place this place, will be an accident. Therefore, too, there is no definite cause for an accident, but a chance cause, i. e. an indefinite one. Going to Aegina was an accident for a man, if he went not in order to get there, (25) but because he was carried out of his way by a storm or captured by pirates. The accident has happened or exists—not in virtue of the subject’s nature, however, but of something else; for the storm was the cause of his coming to a place for which he was not sailing, and this was Aegina.

  ‘Accident’ has also (2) another meaning, i. e. (30) all that attaches to each thing in virtue of itself but is not in its essence, as having its angles equal to two right angles attaches to the triangle. And accidents of this sort may be eternal, but no accident of the other sort is. This is explained elsewhere.19

  * * *

  1 This (i. e. ‘growth’) is the etymological sense of physis. Phuesthai, ‘to grow’, has u long in most of its forms.

  2 Matter and form.


  3 sc. the same category.

  4 i. e. the categories.

  5 ix. 7.

  6 The Pythagoreans and Plato.

  7 Cf. viii. 1042a 29.

  8 Such attributes are hot and cold, wet and dry, rough and smooth, hard and soft, white and black, sweet and bitter. The more important pairs of contraries, in Aristotle’s view, are the first two.

  9 We cannot say grey and white are opposites, but we say the constituents of grey (black and white) are opposites.

  10 This definition is wider than the previous one, since it includes species subordinate one to the other.

  11 Cf. a 25–31 in distinction from 31–35.

  12 The reference is to squares and cubes.

  13 i. e. ‘animal’.

  14 i. e. if they are only distinguishable, not distinct.

  15 Cf. 1016a 4.

  16 1017a 24–27.

  17 Hippias Minor 365–9.

  18 Ib. 371–6.

  19 An. Post. i. 75a 18–22, 39–41, 76b 11–16.

  BOOK E (VI)

  1 [1025b] We are seeking the principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them qua being. For, while there is a cause of health and of good condition, and the objects of mathematics have first principles and elements and causes, (5) and in general every science which is ratiocinative or at all involves reasoning deals with causes and principles, more or less precise, all these sciences mark off some particular being—some genus, (10) and inquire into this, but not into being simply nor qua being, nor do they offer any discussion of the essence of the things of which they treat; but starting from the essence—some making it plain to the senses, others assuming it as a hypothesis—they then demonstrate, more or less cogently, the essential attributes of the genus with which they deal. It is obvious, therefore, (15) that such an induction yields no demonstration of substance or of the essence, but some other way of exhibiting it. And similarly the sciences omit the question whether the genus with which they deal exists or does not exist, because it belongs to the same kind of thinking to show what it is and that it is.

  And since natural science, like other sciences, is in fact about one class of being, (20) i. e. to that sort of substance which has the principle of its movement and rest present in itself, evidently it is neither practical nor productive. For in the case of things made the principle is in the maker—it is either reason or art or some faculty, while in the case of things done it is in the doer—viz. will, for that which is done and that which is willed are the same. (25) Therefore, if all thought is either practical or productive or theoretical, physics must be a theoretical science, but it will theorize about such being as admits of being moved, and about substance-as-defined for the most part only as not separable from matter. Now, we must not fail to notice the mode of being of the essence and of its definition, for, without this, inquiry is but idle. Of things defined, (30) i. e. of ‘whats’, some are like ‘snub’, and some like ‘concave’. And these differ because ‘snub’ is bound up with matter (for what is snub is a concave nose), while concavity is independent of perceptible matter. [1026a] If then all natural things are analogous to the snub in their nature—e. g. nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and, in general, animal; leaf, root, bark, and, in general, plant (for none of these can be defined without reference to movement—they always have matter), it is clear how we must seek and define the ‘what’ in the case of natural objects, (5) and also that it belongs to the student of nature to study even soul in a certain sense, i. e. so much of it as is not independent of matter.

  That physics, then, is a theoretical science, is plain from these considerations. Mathematics also, however, is theoretical; but whether its objects are immovable and separable from matter, is not at present clear; still, it is clear that some mathematical theorems consider them qua immovable and qua separable from matter. But if there is something which is eternal and immovable and separable, (10) clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science—not, however, to physics (for physics deals with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For physics deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable but presumably do not exist separately, but as embodied in matter; while the first science deals with things which both exist separately and are immovable. (15) Now all causes must be eternal, but especially these; for they are the causes that operate on so much of the divine as appears to us.1 There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, physics, and what we may call theology, since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of this sort. And the highest science must deal with the highest genus. (20) Thus, while the theoretical sciences are more to be desired than the other sciences, this is more to be desired than the other theoretical sciences. For one might raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i. e. some one kind of being; for not even the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect—geometry and astronomy deal with a certain particular kind of thing, (25) while universal mathematics applies alike to all. We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, (30) and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being—both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being.2

  2 But since the unqualified term ‘being’ has several meanings, of which one was seen3 to be the accidental, and another the true (‘non-being’ being the false), while besides these there are the figures of predication (e. g. the ‘what’, (35) quality, quantity, place, time, and any similar meanings which ‘being’ may have), and again besides all these there is that which ‘is’ potentially or actually:—since ‘being’ has many meanings, we must first say regarding the accidental, that there can be no scientific treatment of it. [1026b] This is confirmed by the fact that no science—practical, (5) productive, or theoretical—troubles itself about it. For on the one hand he who produces a house does not produce all the attributes that come into being along with the house; for these are innumerable; the house that has been made may quite well be pleasant for some people, hurtful to some, and useful to others, and different—to put it shortly—from all things that are; and the science of building does not aim at producing any of these attributes. (10) And in the same way the geometer does not consider the attributes which attach thus to figures, nor whether ‘triangle’ is different from ‘triangle whose angles are equal to two right angles’.—And this happens naturally enough; for the accidental is practically a mere name. And so Plato4 was in a sense not wrong in ranking sophistic as dealing with that which is not. (15) For the arguments of the sophists deal, we may say, above all with the accidental; e. g. the question whether ‘musical’ and ‘lettered’ are different or the same, and whether ‘musical Coriscus’ and ‘Coriscus’ are the same, and whether ‘everything which is, but is not eternal, has come to be’, with the paradoxical conclusion that if one who was musical has come to be lettered, he must also have been lettered and have come to be musical—and all the other arguments of this sort; the accidental is obviously akin to non-being. (20) And this is clear also from arguments such as the following: things which are in another sense come into being and pass out of being by a process, but things which are accidentally do not. But still we must, as far as we can, say further, (25) regarding the accidental, what its nature is and from what cause it proceeds; for it will perhaps at the same time become clear why there is no science of it.

  Since, among things which are, some are always in the same state and are of necessity (not necessity in the sense of compulsion but that which we assert of things because they cannot be otherwise), (30) and some are not of necessity nor always, but for the most part, this is the principle and this the cause of the existence of the accidental; f
or that which is neither always nor for the most part, we call accidental. For instance, if in the dog-days there is wintry and cold weather, we say this is an accident, but not if there is sultry heat, (35) because the latter is always or for the most part so, but not the former. And it is an accident that a man is pale (for this is neither always nor for the most part so), but it is not by accident that he is an animal. [1027a] And that the builder produces health is an accident, because it is the nature not of the builder but of the doctor to do this—but the builder happened to be a doctor. Again, a confectioner, aiming at giving pleasure, may make something wholesome, but not in virtue of the confectioner’s art; and therefore we say ‘it was an accident’, and while there is a sense in which he makes it, in the unqualified sense he does not. For to other things answer faculties productive of them, (5) but to accidental results there corresponds no determinate art nor faculty; for of things which are or come to be by accident, the cause also is accidental. Therefore, since not all things either are or come to be of necessity and always, but the majority of things are for the most part, the accidental must exist; for instance a pale man is not always nor for the most part musical, (10) but since this sometimes happens, it must be accidental (if not, everything will be of necessity). The matter, therefore, which is capable of being otherwise than as it usually is, must be the cause of the accidental. (15) And we must take as our starting-point the question whether there is nothing that is neither always nor for the most part. Surely this is impossible. There is, then, besides these something which is fortuitous and accidental. But while the usual exists, can nothing be said to be always, or are there eternal things? This must be considered later,5 but that there is no science of the accidental is obvious; for all science is either of that which is always or of that which is for the most part. (20) (For how else is one to learn or to teach another? The thing must be determined as occurring either always or for the most part, e. g. that honey-water is useful for a patient in a fever is true for the most part.) But that which is contrary to the usual law science will be unable to state, i. e. when the thing does not happen, e. g. ‘on the day of new moon’; for even that which happens on the day of new moon happens then either always or for the most part; but the accidental is contrary to such laws. (25) We have stated, then, what the accidental is, and from what cause it arises, and that there is no science which deals with it.