But those who say the Forms exist, in one respect are right, in giving the Forms separate existence, if they are substances; but in another respect they are not right, because they say the one over many is a Form. (30) The reason for their doing this is that they cannot declare what are the substances of this sort, the imperishable substances which exist apart from the individual and sensible substances. They make them, then, the same in kind as the perishable things (for this kind of substance we know)—‘man-himself’ and ‘horse-itself’, adding to the sensible things the word ‘itself’. Yet even if we had not seen the stars, none the less, I suppose, would they have been eternal substances apart from those which we knew; so that now also if we do not know what non-sensible substances there are, yet it is doubtless necessary that there should be some. [1041a]—Clearly, then, (5) no universal term is the name of a substance, and no substance is composed of substances.
17 Let us state what, i. e. what kind of thing, substance should be said to be, taking once more another starting-point; for perhaps from this we shall get a clear view also of that substance which exists apart from sensible substances. Since, then, substance is a principle and a cause, (10) let us pursue it from this starting-point. The ‘why’ is always sought in this form—‘why does one thing attach to some other?’ For to inquire why the musical man is a musical man, is either to inquire—as we have said—why the man is musical, or it is something else. (15) Now ‘why a thing is itself’ is a meaningless inquiry (for [to give meaning to the question ‘why’] the fact or the existence of the thing must already be evident—e. g. that the moon is eclipsed—but the fact that a thing is itself is the single reason and the single cause to be given in answer to all such questions as ‘why the man is man, or the musician musical’,69 unless one were to answer ‘because each thing is inseparable from itself, and its being one just meant this’; this, however, is common to all things and is a short and easy way with the question). (20) But we can inquire why man is an animal of such and such a nature. This, then, is plain, that we are not inquiring why he who is a man is a man. We are inquiring, then, why something is predicable of something (that it is predicable must be clear; for if not, the inquiry is an inquiry into nothing). e. g. why does it thunder? This is the same as ‘why is sound produced in the clouds?’ Thus the inquiry is about the predication of one thing of another. (25) And why are these things, i. e. bricks and stones, a house? Plainly we are seeking the cause. And this is the essence (to speak abstractly), which in some cases is the end, e. g. perhaps in the case of a house or a bed, (30) and in some cases is the first mover; for this also is a cause. But while the efficient cause is sought in the case of genesis and destruction, the final cause is sought in the case of being also.
[1041b] The object of the inquiry is most easily overlooked where one term is not expressly predicated of another (e. g. when we inquire ‘what man is’), because we do not distinguish and do not say definitely that certain elements make up a certain whole. But we must articulate our meaning before we begin to inquire; if not, the inquiry is on the border-line between being a search for something and a search for nothing. Since we must have the existence of the thing as something given, clearly the question is why the matter is some definite thing; e. g. why are these materials a house? Because that which was the essence of a house is present. And why is this individual thing, (5) or this body having this form, a man? Therefore what we seek is the cause, i. e. the form, by reason of which the matter is some definite thing; and this is the substance of the thing. Evidently, then, in the case of simple terms no inquiry nor teaching is possible; our attitude towards such things is other than that of inquiry. (10)
Since that which is compounded out of something so that the whole is one, not like a heap but like a syllable—now the syllable is not its elements, ba is not the same as b and a, nor is flesh fire and earth (for when these are separated the wholes, i. e. the flesh and the syllable, no longer exist, but the elements of the syllable exist, and so do fire and earth); the syllable, (15) then, is something—not only its elements (the vowel and the consonant) but also something else, and the flesh is not only fire and earth or the hot and the cold, but also something else:—if, then, that something must itself be either an element or composed of elements, (1) if it is an element the same argument will again apply; for flesh will consist of this and fire and earth and something still further, (20) so that the process will go on to infinity. But (2) if it is a compound, clearly it will be a compound not of one but of more than one (or else that one will be the thing itself), so that again in this case we can use the same argument as in the case of flesh or of the syllable. But it would seem that this ‘other’ is something, and not an element, (25) and that it is the cause which makes this thing flesh and that a syllable. And similarly in all other cases. And this is the substance of each thing (for this is the primary cause of its being); and since, while some things are not substances, as many as are substances are formed in accordance with a nature of their own and by a process of nature, their substance would seem to be this kind of ‘nature’,70 which is not an element but a principle. (30) An element, on the other hand, is that into which a thing is divided and which is present in it as matter; e. g. a and b are the elements of the syllable.
* * *
1 Cf. v. 7.
2 The schools of Miletus and Elea.
3 The Pythagoreans and Empedocles.
4 Anaxagoras and the Atomists.
5 The Pythagoreans.
6 The school of Xenocrates.
7 1028b 33–6.
8 It seems convenient here to translate thus the phrase translated in v. 18 as ‘in virtue of itself’.
9 i. e. this identification does not give the essence of ‘surface’ (for ‘surface’ is repeated) but it gives the essence of ‘white’, since this is not repeated but replaced by an equivalent.
10 i. e. compounds of substance with the other categories.
11 sc. of the word ‘Iliad’.
12 Cf. Pl. Soph. 237, 256 ff.
13 i. e. it is known to be unknown.
14 a 17-b13.
15 1030 a17-b13.
16 The Ideas or things-themselves.
17 The essences.
18 i. e. the Idea of good (l. 5).
19 i. e. as immanent in particulars.
20 sc. who is white.
21 sc. and so ad infinitum. As an infinite process is absurd, why take the first step that commits you to it—why say that the essence of horse is separate from the horse?
22 i. e. if the essence of one is different from the one, the essence of the essence of one is different from the essence of one.
23 Cf. vi. 1025b 22.
24 For the theory of these Cf. Phys. ii. 5, 6.
25 Cf. b23–30, 1034a 9–21, b 4–7.
26 sc. not the thinking, Cf. ll. 15–17.
27 i. e. the minimum necessary basis.
28 From the proportion established, warmth : health :: stones : house, and from the next paragraph, it would appear that warmth is treated as the matter which when specialized in a particular way becomes health.
29 Cf. 1032a 17.
30 i. e. including form as well as matter (Cf. 1029a 3).
31 a 25.
32 sc. as well as the matter.
33 i. e. the artist, or the father, turns a mere piece of matter into a qualified piece of matter.
34 sc. for building.
35 i. e. an element of it pre-existing in the things themselves (Cf. 1032b 26–1033a I, 1034a 12).
36 sc. of the rubber’s hand.
37 i. e. essence.
38 Cf. 1033b 33.
39 Cf. a9–32.
40 And therefore not without soul.
41 sc. to put it more widely so as to include the vegetable world.
42 Aristotle is thinking of Pythagoreans.
43 This probably includes Plato himself.
44 Cf. Pl. Theaet. 147 D; Soph. 218 B; Pol 257 C; Epp. 358 D.
45 Cf. a 34–b 7.
46 1035a 30–b 3.
47 Cf. 1036a 16–17, viii. 1043b 2–4.
48 i. e. as man = soul + body, Socrates = this soul + this body.
49 Cf. xiii, xiv.
50 Cf. vii. 12, viii. 6.
51 Ch. 4.
52 Chs. 10, 11.
53 Ch. 5.
54 Ch. 6.
55 Cf. An. Post. ii. 3–10, 13.
56 Cf. ib. 97a 29.
57 That of ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’.
58 Chs. 4–6, 10–12.
59 Ch. 3.
60 1029a 2–3, 23–4.
61 Cf. i. 990b 17.
62 Thales is said to have defined number as ‘a system of units’.
63 Cf. 1031a 11–14.
64 Cf. vii. 15, viii. 6.
65 Ch. 8.
66 i. e. the Ideas.
67 Cf. l. 17.
68 sc. at night.
69 sc. and therefore in this case, when the fact is known, there is no question as to the ‘why’.
70 sc. the formal cause. Cf. v. 1014b 36 in contrast with ib. 27.
BOOK H (VIII)
1 [1042a] We must reckon up the results arising from what has been said, and compute the sum of them, and put the finishing touch to our inquiry. (5) We have said that the causes, principles, and elements of substances are the object of our search.1 And some substances are recognized by every one, but some have been advocated by particular schools. Those generally recognized are the natural substances, i. e. fire, earth, water, air, &c., the simple bodies; secondly, plants and their parts, (10) and animals and the parts of animals; and finally the physical universe and its parts; while some particular schools say that Forms and the objects of mathematics are substances.2 But there are arguments which lead to the conclusion that there are other substances, the essence and the substratum. Again, in another way the genus seems more substantial than the various species, (15) and the universal than the particulars.3 And with the universal and the genus the Ideas are connected; it is in virtue of the same argument that they are thought to be substances. And since the essence is substance, and the definition is a formula of the essence, for this reason we have discussed definition and essential predication.4 Since the definition is a formula, and a formula has parts, (20) we had to consider also with respect to the notion of ‘part’, what are parts of the substance and what are not, and whether the parts of the substance are also parts of the definition.5 Further, too, neither the universal nor the genus is a substance;6 we must inquire later into the Ideas and the objects of mathematics;7 for some say these are substances as well as the sensible substances.
But now let us resume the discussion of the generally recognized substances. (25) These are the sensible substances, and sensible substances all have matter. The substratum is substance, and this is in one sense the matter (and by matter I mean that which, not being a ‘this’ actually, is potentially a ‘this’), and in another sense the formula or shape (that which being a ‘this’ can be separately formulated), (30) and thirdly the complex of these two, which alone is generated and destroyed, and is, without qualification, capable of separate existence; for of substances completely expressible in a formula some are separable and some are not.
But clearly matter also is substance; for in all the opposite changes that occur there is something which underlies the changes, e. g. in respect of place that which is now here and again elsewhere, (35) and in respect of increase that which is now of one size and again less or greater, and in respect of alteration that which is now healthy and again diseased; and similarly in respect of substance there is something that is now being generated and again being destroyed, and now8 underlies the process as a ‘this’ and again9 underlies it in respect of a privation of positive character. [1042b] And in this change the others are involved. But in either one or two of the others this is not involved; for it is not necessary if a thing has matter for change of place that it should also have matter for generation and destruction. (5)
The difference between becoming in the full sense and becoming in a qualified sense has been stated in our physical works.10
2 Since the substance which exists as underlying and as matter is generally recognized, and this is that which exists potentially, (10) it remains for us to say what is the substance, in the sense of actuality, of sensible things. Democritus seems to think there are three kinds of difference between things; the underlying body, the matter, is one and the same, but they differ either in rhythm, i. e. shape, or in turning, i. e. position, or in inter-contact, i. e. order.11 But evidently there are many differences; for instance, some things are characterized by the mode of composition of their matter, (15) e. g. the things formed by blending, such as honey-water; and others by being bound together, e. g. a bundle; and others by being glued together, e. g. a book; and others by being nailed together, e. g. a casket; and others in more than one of these ways; and others by position, e. g. threshold and lintel (for these differ by being placed in a certain way); and others by time, (20) e. g. dinner and breakfast; and others by place, e. g. the winds; and others by the affections proper to sensible things, e. g. hardness and softness, density and rarity, dryness and wetness; and some things by some of these qualities, others by them all, and in general some by excess and some by defect. Clearly, then, the word ‘is’ has just as many meanings; a thing is a threshold because it lies in such and such a position, (25) and its being means its lying in that position, while being ice means having been solidified in such and such a way. And the being of some things will be defined by all these qualities, because some parts of them are mixed, others are blended, others are bound together, others are solidified, (30) and others use the other differentiae; e. g. the hand or the foot requires such complex definition. We must grasp, then, the kinds of differentiae (for these will be the principles of the being of things), e. g. the things characterized by the more and the less, or by the dense and the rare, and by other such qualities; for all these are forms of excess and defect. (35) And anything that is characterized by shape or by smoothness and roughness is characterized by the straight and the curved. [1043a] And for other things their being will mean their being mixed, and their not being will mean the opposite.
It is clear, then, from these facts that, since its substance is the cause of each thing’s being, we must seek in these differentiae what is the cause of the being of each of these things. Now none of these differentiae is substance, even when coupled with matter, (5) yet it is what is analogous to substance in each case; and as in substances that which is predicated of the matter is the actuality itself, in all other definitions also it is what most resembles full actuality. e. g. if we had to define a threshold, we should say ‘wood or stone in such and such a position’, and a house we should define as ‘bricks and timbers in such and such a position’ (or a purpose may exist as well in some cases), and if he had to define ice we should say ‘water frozen or solidified in such and such a way’, (10) and harmony is ‘such and such a blending of high and low’; and similarly in all other cases.
Obviously, then, the actuality or the formula is different when the matter is different; for in some cases it is the composition, in others the mixing, and in others some other of the attributes we have named. And so, of the people who go in for defining, those who define a house as stones, (15) bricks, and timbers are speaking of the potential house, for these are the matter; but those who propose ‘a receptacle to shelter chattels and living beings’, or something of the sort, speak of the actuality. Those who combine both of these speak of the third kind of substance, which is composed of matter and form (for the formula that gives the differentiae seems to be an account of the form or actuality, (20) while that which gives the components is rather an account of the matter); and the same is true of the kind of definitions which Archytas used to accept; they are accounts of the combined form and matter. e. g. what is still weather? Absence of motion in a large expanse of air; air is the matter, and absence of motion is the actuality and substa
nce. (25) What is a calm? Smoothness of sea; the material substratum is the sea, and the actuality or shape is smoothness. It is obvious then, from what has been said, what sensible substance is and how it exists—one kind of it as matter, another as form or actuality, while the third kind is that which is composed of these two.
3 We must not fail to notice that sometimes it is not clear whether a name means the composite substance, (30) or the actuality or form, e. g. whether ‘house’ is a sign for the composite thing, ‘a covering consisting of bricks and stones laid thus and thus’, or for the actuality or form, ‘a covering’, and whether a line is ‘twoness in length’ or ‘twoness’, and whether an animal is ‘a soul in a body’ or ‘a soul’; for soul is the substance or actuality of some body. (35) ‘Animal’ might even be applied to both, not as something definable by one formula, but as related to a single thing. But this question,12 while important for another purpose, is of no importance for the inquiry into sensible substance; for the essence certainly attaches to the form and the actuality. [1043b] For ‘soul’ and ‘to be soul’ are the same, but ‘to be man’ and ‘man’ are not the same, unless even the bare soul is to be called man; and thus on one interpretation the thing is the same as its essence, and on another it is not.
If we examine13 we find that the syllable does not consist of the letters + juxtaposition, (5) nor is the house bricks + juxtaposition. And this is right; for the juxtaposition or mixing does not consist of those things of which it is the juxtaposition or mixing. And the same is true in all other cases; e. g. if the threshold is characterized by its position, the position is not constituted by the threshold, but rather the latter is constituted by the former. Nor is man animal + biped, (10) but there must be something besides these, if these are matter—something which is neither an element in the whole nor a compound, but is the substance; but this people eliminate, and state only the matter. If, then, this is the cause of the thing’s being, and if the cause of its being is its substance,14 they will not be stating the substance itself.
The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) Page 113