(This, then, must either be eternal or it must be destructible without being ever in course of being destroyed, (15) and must have come to be without ever being in course of coming to be. But it has been proved and explained elsewhere15 that no one makes or begets the form, but it is the individual that is made, i. e. the complex of form and matter that is generated. Whether the substances of destructible things can exist apart, is not yet at all clear; except that obviously this is impossible in some cases—in the case of things which cannot exist apart from the individual instances, (20) e. g. house or utensil. Perhaps, indeed, neither these things themselves, nor any of the other things which are not formed by nature, are substances at all; for one might say that the nature in natural objects is the only substance to be found in destructible things.)
Therefore the difficulty which used to be raised by the school of Antisthenes and other such uneducated people has a certain timeliness. They said that the ‘what’ cannot be defined (for the definition so called is a ‘long rigmarole’16) but of what sort a thing, (25) e. g. silver, is, they thought it possible actually to explain, not saying what it is, but that it is like tin. Therefore one kind of substance can be defined and formulated, i. e. the composite kind, whether it be perceptible or intelligible; but the primary parts of which this consists cannot be defined, (30) since a definitory formula predicates something of something, and one part of the definition must play the part of matter and the other that of form.
It is also obvious that, if substances are in a sense numbers, they are so in this sense and not, as some say,17 as numbers of units. (35) For a definition is a sort of number; for (1) it is divisible, and into indivisible parts (for definitory formulae are not infinite), and number also is of this nature. And (2) as, when one of the parts of which a number consists has been taken from or added to the number, it is no longer the same number, but a different one, even if it is the very smallest part that has been taken away or added, so the definition and the essence will no longer remain when anything has been taken away or added. [1044a] And (3) the number must be something in virtue of which it is one, and this these thinkers cannot state, what makes it one, if it is one (for either it is not one but a sort of heap, or if it is, (5) we ought to say what it is that makes one out of many); and the definition is one, but similarly they cannot say what makes it one. And this is a natural result; for the same reason is applicable, and substance is one in the sense which we have explained, and not, as some say, by being a sort of unit or point; each is a complete reality and a definite nature. (10) And (4) as number does not admit of the more and the less, neither does substance, in the sense of form, but if any substance does, it is only the substance which involves matter. Let this, then, suffice for an account of the generation and destruction of so-called substances—in what sense it is possible and in what sense impossible—and of the reduction of things to number.
4 Regarding material substance we must not forget that even if all things come from the same first cause18 or have the same things for their first causes, (15) and if the same matter serves as starting-point for their generation, yet there is a matter proper to each, e. g. for phlegm the sweet or the fat, and for bile the bitter, (20) or something else; though perhaps these come from the same original matter. And there come to be several matters for the same thing, when the one matter is matter for the other; e. g. phlegm comes from the fat and from the sweet, if the fat comes from the sweet; and it comes from bile by analysis of the bile into its ultimate matter. For one thing comes from another in two senses, either because it will be found at a later stage, or because it is produced if the other is analysed into its original constituents. (25) When the matter is one, different things may be produced owing to difference in the moving cause; e. g. from wood may be made both a chest and a bed. But some different things must have their matter different; e. g. a saw could not be made of wood, nor is this in the power of the moving cause; for it could not make a saw of wool or of wood. But if, as a matter of fact, the same thing can be made of different material, clearly the art, i. e. the moving principle, (30) is the same; for if both the matter and the moving cause were different, the product would be so too.
When one inquires into the cause of something, one should, since ‘causes’ are spoken of in several senses, state all the possible causes. e. g. what is the material cause of man? Shall we say ‘the menstrual fluid’? What is the moving cause? Shall we say ‘the seed’? The formal cause? His essence. (35) The final cause? His end. But perhaps the latter two are the same.—It is the proximate causes we must state. [1044b] What is the material cause? We must name not fire or earth, but the matter peculiar to the thing.
Regarding the substances that are natural and generable, if the causes are really these and of this number and we have to learn the causes, we must inquire thus, if we are to inquire rightly. (5) But in the case of natural but eternal substances another account must be given. For perhaps some have no matter, or not matter of this sort but only such as can be moved in respect of place. Nor does matter belong to those things which exist by nature but are not substances; their substratum is the substance. e. g. what is the cause of eclipse? What is its matter? There is none; the moon is that which suffers eclipse.19 (10) What is the moving cause which extinguished the light? The earth. The final cause perhaps does not exist. The formal principle is the definitory formula, but this is obscure if it does not include the cause.20 e. g. what is eclipse? Deprivation of light. But if we add ‘by the earth’s coming in between’, this is the formula which includes the cause. (15) In the case of sleep it is not clear what it is that proximately has this affection. Shall we say that it is the animal? Yes, but the animal in virtue of what, i. e. what is the proximate subject? The heart or some other part. Next, by what is it produced? Next, what is the affection—that of the proximate subject, not of the whole animal? Shall we say that it is immobility of such and such a kind? Yes, but to what process in the proximate subject is this due?
5 Since some things are and are not, (20) without coming to be and ceasing to be, e. g. points, if they can be said to be, and in general forms (for it is not ‘white’ that comes to be, but the wood comes to be white, if everything that comes to be comes from something and comes to be something), (25) not all contraries can come from one another, but it is in different senses that a pale man comes from a dark man, and pale comes from dark. Nor has everything matter, but only those things which come to be and change into one another. Those things which, without ever being in course of changing, are or are not, have no matter.
There is difficulty in the question how the matter of each thing is related to its contrary states. (30) e. g. if the body is potentially healthy, and disease is contrary to health, is it potentially both healthy and diseased? And is water potentially wine and vinegar? We answer that it is the matter of one in virtue of its positive state and its form, and of the other in virtue of the privation of its positive state and the corruption of it contrary to its nature. It is also hard to say why wine is not said to be the matter of vinegar nor potentially vinegar (though vinegar is produced from it), (35) and why a living man is not said to be potentially dead. In fact they are not, but the corruptions in question are accidental, and it is the matter of the animal that is itself in virtue of its corruption the potency and matter of a corpse, and it is water that is the matter of vinegar. [1045a] For the corpse comes from the animal, and vinegar from wine, as night from day. And all the things which change thus into one another must go back to their matter; e. g. if from a corpse is produced an animal, the corpse first goes back to its matter, (5) and only then becomes an animal; and vinegar first goes back to water, and only then becomes wine.
6 To return to the difficulty which has been stated21 with respect both to definitions and to numbers, what is the cause of their unity? In the case of all things which have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts, (10) there is a cause
; for even in bodies contact is the cause of unity in some cases, and in others viscosity or some other such quality. And a definition is a set of words which is one not by being connected together, like the Iliad, but by dealing with one object.—What, then, is it that makes man one; why is he one and not many, (15) e. g. animal + biped, especially if there are, as some say, an animal-itself and a biped-itself? Why are not those Forms themselves the man, so that men would exist by participation not in man, nor in one Form, but in two, animal and biped, and in general man would be not one but more than one thing, animal and biped?
Clearly, then, if people proceed thus in their usual manner of definition and speech, (20) they cannot explain and solve the difficulty. But if, as we say, one element is matter and another is form, and one is potentially and the other actually, the question will no longer be thought a difficulty. (25) For this difficulty is the same as would arise if ‘round bronze’ were the definition of ‘cloak’;22 for this word would be a sign of the definitory formula, so that the question is, what is the cause of the unity of ‘round’ and ‘bronze’? The difficulty disappears, because the one is matter, the other form. What, then, causes this—that which was potentially to be actually—except, (30) in the case of things which are generated, the agent? For there is no other cause of the potential sphere’s becoming actually a sphere, but this was the essence of either.23 Of matter some is intelligible, some perceptible, and in a formula there is always an element of matter as well as one of actuality; e. g. the circle is ‘a plane figure’.24 (35) But of the things which have no matter, either intelligible or perceptible, each is by its nature essentially a kind of unity, as it is essentially a kind of being—individual substance, quality, or quantity (and so neither ‘existent’ nor ‘one’ is present in their definitions), and the essence of each of them is by its very nature a kind of unity as it is a kind of being—and so none of these has any reason outside itself for being one, nor for being a kind of being; [1045b] for each is by its nature a kind of being and a kind of unity, (5) not as being in the genus ‘being’ or ‘one’ nor in the sense that being and unity can exist apart from particulars.
Owing to the difficulty about unity some speak of ‘participation’, and raise the question, what is the cause of participation and what is it to participate; and others speak of ‘communion’, (10) as Lycophron says knowledge is a communion of knowing with the soul; and others say life is a ‘composition’ or ‘connexion’ of soul with body. Yet the same account applies to all cases; for being healthy, too, will on this showing be either a ‘communion’ or a ‘connexion’ or a ‘composition’ of soul and health, and the fact that the bronze is a triangle will be a ‘composition’ of bronze and triangle, and the fact that a thing is white will be a ‘composition’ of surface and whiteness. (15) The reason is that people look for a unifying formula, and a difference, between potency and complete reality. But, as has been said,25 the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and the other actually. Therefore it is like asking what in general is the cause of unity and of a thing’s being one; for each thing is a unity, (20) and the potential and the actual are somehow one. Therefore there is no other cause here unless there is something which caused the movement from potency into actuality. And all things which have no matter are without qualification essentially unities.
* * *
1 Cf. vii. 1.
2 Cf. vii. 2.
3 Cf. vii. 3. 1028b 33–6.
4 Cf. vii. 4–6, 12, 15.
5 Cf. vii. 10, 11.
6 Cf. vii. 13, 14, 16. 1040b 16–1041a 5.
7 Cf. xiii and xiv.
8 sc. in the case of destruction.
9 sc. in the case of generation.
10 Cf. Phys. 225a 12–20, De Gen, et Corr. 317a 17–31.
11 Cf. i. 985b 13–19.
12 sc. whether the name means the form or the concrete thing.
13 Aristotle returns to the subject discussed in ch. 2.
14 Cf. v. 1017b 14–15.
15 Cf. vii. 8.
16 sc. and therefore cannot give the essence, which is simple.
17 The Pythagoreans and Platonists (Cf. xiii. 6, 7).
18 sc. material cause.
19 i. e. the substratum of a substance is bare matter, but the substratum of an attribute is a determinate substance such as the moon.
20 sc. the efficient cause.
21 Cf. vii. 12, viii. 1044a 2–6.
22 Cf. vii. 1029b 28, de Int. 18a 19.
23 i. e. it was the essence of the potential ball to become an actual ball, and of the actual ball to be produced from a potential ball.
24 Aristotle does not give the whole definition, but only the genus, or ‘material’ element.
25 Cf. a23–33.
BOOK Θ (IX)
1 We have treated1 of that which is primarily and to which all the other categories of being are referred—i. e. of substance. (30) For it is in virtue of the concept of substance that the others also are said to be—quantity and quality and the like; for all will be found to involve the concept of substance, as we said in the first part of our work.2 And since ‘being’ is in one way divided into individual thing, quality, and quantity, and is in another way distinguished in respect of potency and complete reality, (35) and of function, let us now add a discussion of potency and complete reality. And first let us explain potency in the strictest sense, which is, however, not the most useful for our present purpose. [1046a] For potency and actuality extend beyond the cases that involve a reference to motion. But when we have spoken of this first kind, we shall in our discussions of actuality3 explain the other kinds of potency as well.
We have pointed out elsewhere4 that ‘potency’ and the word ‘can’ have several senses. (5) Of these we may neglect all the potencies that are so called by an equivocation. For some are called so by analogy, as in geometry we say one thing is or is not a ‘power’ of another by virtue of the presence or absence of some relation between them. But all potencies that conform to the same type are originative sources of some kind, (10) and are called potencies in reference to one primary kind of potency, which is an originative source of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other. For one kind is a potency of being acted on, i. e. the originative source, in the very thing acted on, of its being passively changed by another thing or by itself qua other; and another kind is a state of insusceptibility to change for the worse and to destruction by another thing or by the thing itself qua other by virtue of an originative source of change. In all these definitions is implied the formula of potency in the primary sense. (15)—And again these so-called potencies are potencies either of merely acting or being acted on, or of acting or being acted on well, so that even in the formulae of the latter the formulae of the prior kinds of potency are somehow implied.
Obviously, then, in a sense the potency of acting and of being acted on is one (for a thing may be ‘capable’ either because it can itself be acted on or because something else can be acted on by it), (20) but in a sense the potencies are different. For the one is in the thing acted on; it is because it contains a certain originative source, and because even the matter is an originative source, that the thing acted on is acted on, and one thing by one, another by another; for that which is oily can be burnt, and that which yields in a particular way can be crushed;5 and similarly in all other cases. (25) But the other potency is in the agent, e. g. heat and the art of building are present, one in that which can produce heat and the other in the man who can build. And so, in so far as a thing is an organic unity, it cannot be acted on by itself; for it is one and not two different things. And ‘impotence’ and ‘impotent’ stand for the privation which is contrary to potency of this sort, (30) so that every potency belongs to the same subject and refers to the same process as a corresponding impotence. Privation has several senses; for it means (1) that which has not a certain quality and (2) that which might naturally have it but has not it, either (a) in general or (b)
when it might naturally have it, and either (α) in some particular way, e. g. when it has not it completely, or (β) when it has not it at all. And in certain cases if things which naturally have a quality lose it by violence, (35) we say they have suffered privation.
2 Since some such originative sources are present in soulless things, and others in things possessed of soul, and in soul, and in the rational part of the soul, clearly some potencies will be non-rational and some will be accompanied by a rational formula. [1046b] This is why all arts, i. e. all productive forms of knowledge, are potencies; they are originative sources of change in another thing or in the artist himself considered as other.
And each of those which are accompanied by a rational formula is alike capable of contrary effects, (5) but one non-rational power produces one effect; e. g. the hot is capable only of heating, but the medical art can produce both disease and health. The reason is that science is a rational formula, and the same rational formula explains a thing and its privation, only not in the same way; and in a sense it applies to both, (10) but in a sense it applies rather to the positive fact. Therefore such sciences must deal with contraries, but with one in virtue of their own nature and with the other not in virtue of their nature; for the rational formula applies to one object in virtue of that object’s nature, and to the other, in a sense, accidentally. For it is by denial and removal that it exhibits the contrary; for the contrary is the primary privation, (15) and this is the removal of the positive term. Now since contraries do not occur in the same thing, but science is a potency which depends on the possession of a rational formula, and the soul possesses an originative source of movement; therefore, while the wholesome produces only health and the calorific only heat and the frigorific only cold, (20) the scientific man produces both the contrary effects. For the rational formula is one which applies to both, though not in the same way, and it is in a soul which possesses an originative source of movement; so that the soul will start both processes from the same originative source, having linked them up with the same thing.6 And so the things whose potency is according to a rational formula act contrariwise to the things whose potency is non-rational; for the products of the former are included under one originative source, the rational formula. (25)
The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) Page 114