The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics)

by Mckeon, Richard

  [1075b] Empedocles38 also has a paradoxical view; for he identifies the good with love, but this is a principle both as mover (for it brings things together) and as matter (for it is part of the mixture). (5) Now even if it happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as mover, still the being, at least, of the two is not the same. In which respect then is love a principle? It is paradoxical also that strife should be imperishable; the nature of his ‘evil’ is just strife.

  Anaxagoras makes the good a motive principle; for his ‘reason’ moves things. But it moves them for an end, which must be something other than it, except according to our way of stating the case; for, on our view, the medical art is in a sense health. (10) It is paradoxical also not to suppose a contrary to the good, i. e. to reason. But all who speak of the contraries make no use of the contraries, unless we bring their views into shape. And why some things are perishable and others imperishable, no one tells us; for they make all existing things out of the same principles. Further, some make existing things out of the non-existent; and others to avoid the necessity of this make all things one. (15)

  Further, why should there always be becoming, and what is the cause of becoming?—this no one tells us. And those who suppose two principles must suppose another, a superior principle, and so must those who believe in the Forms; for why did things come to participate, or why do they participate, in the Forms? And all other thinkers39 are confronted by the necessary consequence that there is something contrary to Wisdom, (20) i. e. to the highest knowledge; but we are not. For there is nothing contrary to that which is primary; for all contraries have matter, and things that have matter exist only potentially; and the ignorance which is contrary to any knowledge leads to an object contrary to the object of the knowledge; but what is primary has no contrary.

  Again, if besides sensible things no others exist, there will be no first principle, (25) no order, no becoming, no heavenly bodies, but each principle will have a principle before it, as in the accounts of the theologians and all the natural philosophers. But if the Forms or the numbers are to exist, they will be causes of nothing; or if not that, at least not of movement. Further, how is extension, i. e. a continuum, to be produced out of unextended parts? For number will not, either as mover or as form, produce a continuum. (30) But again there cannot be any contrary that is also essentially a productive or moving principle; or it would be possible not to be.40 Or at least its action would be posterior to its potency. The world, then, would not be eternal. But it is; one of these premisses, then, must be denied. And we have said how this must be done.41 Further, in virtue of what the numbers, (35) or the soul and the body, or in general the form and the thing, are one—of this no one tells us anything; nor can any one tell, unless he says, as we do, that the mover makes them one. And those who say42 mathematical number is first and go on to generate one kind of substance after another and give different principles for each, make the substance of the universe a mere series of episodes (for one substance has no influence on another by its existence or non-existence), and they give us many governing principles; but the world refuses to be governed badly. [1076a]

  ‘The rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be.’43

  * * *

  1 This is an implication of the ordinary type of judgement, ‘x is not white’.

  2 The Platonists.

  3 The three views appear to have been held respectively by Plato, Xenocrates, and Speusippus.

  4 sc. an undifferentiated unity.

  5 i. e. the principles which are elements and those which are not.

  6 i. e. the efficient cause is identical with the formal.

  7 i. e. the causes of substance are the causes of all things.

  8 i. e. the division into potency and actuality stands in a definite relation to the previous division into matter, form, and privation.

  9 e. g. the proximate causes of a child are the individual father (who on Aristotle’s view is the efficient and contains the formal cause) and the germ contained in the individual mother (which is the material cause).

  10 In l. 17.

  11 In 1070b 17.

  12 Cf. 1069a 30.

  13 Anaxagoras.

  14 Cf. De Caelo, iii. 300b 8.

  15 Cf. Timaeus, 30 A.

  16 Cf. Phaedrus, 245 C; Laws, 894 E.

  17 Cf. Timaeus, 34 B.

  18 Cf. 1071b 22–26.

  19 i. e. the sphere of the fixed stars.

  20 i. e. the sun. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. ii. 336a 23 ff.

  21 i. e. the outer sphere of the universe, that in which the fixed stars are set.

  22 If it had any movement, it would have the first. But it produces this and therefore cannot share in it; for if it did, we should have to look for something that is prior to the first mover and imparts this motion to it.

  23 sc. because they are activities or actualities.

  24 Cf. 1075a 36.

  25 Cf. vii. 1028b 21, xiv. 1091a 34, 1092a 11.

  26 i. e. the animal or plant is more beautiful and perfect than the seed.

  27 i. e. impossible without.

  28 The reference is to Plato (Cf. Phys. 206b 32).

  29 Cf. Phys. viii. 8, 9; De Caelo, i. 2, ii. 3–8.

  30 This is to be understood as a general term including both fixed stars and planets.

  31 Cf. ll. 5–11.

  32 i. e. inwards from, the universe being thought of as a system of concentric spheres encircling the earth.

  33 In 1073b 35, 38–1074a 4.

  34 sc. in order that higher forms of being may be produced by new combinations of the elements.

  35 i. e. the substratum.

  36 The reference is to Platonists.

  37 The reference is to the Pythagoreans and Speusippus; Cf. xii. 1072b 31.

  38 Cf. i. 985a 4.

  39 The special reference is to Plato; Cf. Rep. 477.

  40 Since contraries must contain matter, and matter implies potentiality and contingency.

  41 Cf. 1071b 19, 20.

  42 Speusippus is meant; Cf. vii. 1028b 21, xiv. 1090b 13–20.

  43 Cf. Iliad, ii. 204.

  BOOK M (XIII)

  1 We have stated what is the substance of sensible things, dealing in the treatise on physics1 with matter, and later2 with the substance which has actual existence. (10) Now since our inquiry is whether there is or is not besides the sensible substances any which is immovable and eternal, and, if there is, what it is, we must first consider what is said by others, so that, if there is anything which they say wrongly, we may not be liable to the same objections, while, if there is any opinion common to them and us, we shall have no private grievance against ourselves on that account; for one must be content to state some points better than one’s predecessors, (15) and others no worse.

  Two opinions are held on this subject; it is said that the objects of mathematics—i. e. numbers and lines and the like—are substances, and again that the Ideas are substances. (20) And since (1) some recognize these as two different classes—the Ideas and the mathematical numbers, and (2) some recognize both as having one nature, while (3) some others say that the mathematical substances are the only substances,3 we must consider first4 the objects of mathematics, not qualifying them by any other characteristic—not asking, for instance, whether they are in fact Ideas or not, or whether they are the principles and substances of existing things or not, (25) but only whether as objects of mathematics they exist or not, and if they exist, how they exist. Then after this we must separately consider5 the Ideas themselves in a general way, and only as far as the accepted mode of treatment demands; for most of the points have been repeatedly made even by the discussions outside our school, and, further, the greater part of our account must finish by throwing light on that inquiry, (30) viz. when we examine6 whether the substances and the principles of existing things are numbers and Ideas; for after the discussion of the Ideas this remains as a third inquiry.

  If the objects of mathematics exist, they
must exist either in sensible objects, as some say, or separate from sensible objects (and this also is said by some); or if they exist in neither of these ways, (35) either they do not exist, or they exist only in some special sense. So that the subject of our discussion will be not whether they exist but how they exist.

  2 That it is impossible for mathematical objects to exist in sensible things, and at the same time that the doctrine in question is an artificial one, has been said already in our discussion of difficulties7; we have pointed out that it is impossible for two solids to be in the same place, and also that according to the same argument the other powers and characteristics also8 should exist in sensible things and none of them separately. [1076b] This we have said already. But, further, it is obvious that on this theory it is impossible for any body whatever to be divided; for it would have to be divided at a plane, (5) and the plane at a line, and the line at a point, so that if the point cannot be divided, neither can the line, and if the line cannot, neither can the plane nor the solid. What difference, then, does it make whether sensible things are such indivisible entities, or, without being so themselves, have indivisible entities in them? The result will be the same; if the sensible entities are divided the others will be divided too, (10) or else not even the sensible entities can be divided.

  But, again, it is not possible that such entities should exist separately. For if besides the sensible solids there are to be other solids which are separate from them and prior to the sensible solids, it is plain that besides the planes also there must be other and separate planes and points and lines; for consistency requires this. (15) But if these exist, again besides the planes and lines and points of the mathematical solid there must be others which are separate. (For incomposites are prior to compounds; and if there are, prior to the sensible bodies, bodies which are not sensible, by the same argument the planes which exist by themselves must be prior to those which are in the motionless solids. (20) Therefore these will be planes and lines other than those that exist along with the mathematical solids to which these thinkers assign separate existence; for the latter exist along with the mathematical solids, while the others are prior to the mathematical solids.) (25) Again, therefore, there will be, belonging to these planes, lines, and prior to them there will have to be, by the same argument, other lines and points; and prior to these points in the prior lines there will have to be other points, though there will be no others prior to these. Now (1) the accumulation becomes absurd; for we find ourselves with one set of solids apart from the sensible solids; three sets of planes apart from the sensible planes—those which exist apart from the sensible planes, (30) and those in the mathematical solids, and those which exist apart from those in the mathematical solids; four sets of lines, and five sets of points. With which of these, then, will the mathematical sciences deal? Certainly not with the planes and lines and points in the motionless solid; for science always deals with what is prior. (35) And (2) the same account will apply also to numbers; for there will be a different set of units apart from each set of points, and also apart from each set of realities, from the objects of sense and again from those of thought; so that there will be various classes of mathematical numbers.

  Again, how is it possible to solve the questions which we have already enumerated in our discussion of difficulties9? For the objects of astronomy will exist apart from sensible things just as the objects of geometry will; but how is it possible that a heaven and its parts—or anything else which has movement—should exist apart? Similarly also the objects of optics and of harmonics will exist apart; for there will be both voice and sight besides the sensible or individual voices and sights. [1077a] Therefore it is plain that the other senses as well, and the other objects of sense, will exist apart; for why should one set of them do so and another not? And if this is so, (5) there will also be animals existing apart, since there will be senses.

  Again, there are certain mathematical theorems that are universal, (10) extending beyond these substances. Here then we shall have another intermediate substance separate both from the Ideas and from the intermediates—a substance which is neither number nor points nor spatial magnitude nor time. And if this is impossible, plainly it is also impossible that the former entities should exist separate from sensible things.

  And, in general, conclusions contrary alike to the truth and to the usual views follow, if one is to suppose the objects of mathematics to exist thus as separate entities. (15) For because they exist thus they must be prior to sensible spatial magnitudes, but in truth they must be posterior; for the incomplete spatial magnitude is in the order of generation prior, but in the order of substance posterior, as the lifeless is to the living.

  Again, by virtue of what, and when, (20) will mathematical magnitudes be one? For things in our perceptible world are one in virtue of soul, or of a part of soul, or of something else that is reasonable enough; when these are not present, the thing is a plurality, and splits up into parts. But in the case of the subjects of mathematics, which are divisible and are quantities, what is the cause of their being one and holding together?.

  Again, the modes of generation of the objects of mathematics show that we are right. For the dimension first generated is length, then comes breadth, lastly depth, and the process is complete. If, then. (25) that which is posterior in the order of generation is prior in the order of substantiality, the solid will be prior to the plane and the line. And in this way also it is both more complete and more whole, because it can become animate. How, on the other hand, could a line or a plane be animate? The supposition passes the power of our senses. (30)

  Again, the solid is a sort of substance; for it already has in a sense completeness. But how can lines be substances? Neither as a form or shape, as the soul perhaps is, nor as matter, like the solid; for we have no experience of anything that can be put together out of lines or planes or points, while if these had been a sort of material substance, (35) we should have observed things which could be put together out of them.

  Grant, then, that they are prior in definition. [1077b] Still not all things that are prior in definition are also prior in substantiality. For those things are prior in substantiality which when separated from other things surpass them in the power of independent existence, but things are prior in definition to those whose definitions are compounded out of their definitions; and these two properties are not co-extensive. For if attributes do not exist apart from their substances (e. g. (5) a ‘mobile’ or a ‘pale’), pale is prior to the pale man in definition, but not in substantiality. For it cannot exist separately, but is always along with the concrete thing; and by the concrete thing I mean the pale man. Therefore it is plain that neither is the result of abstraction prior nor that which is produced by adding determinants posterior; for it is by adding a determinant to pale that we speak of the pale man. (10)

  3 It has, then, been sufficiently pointed out that the objects of mathematics are not substances in a higher degree than bodies are, and that they are not prior to sensibles in being, but only in definition, and that they cannot exist somewhere apart. But since it was not possible for them to exist in sensibles either,10 (15) it is plain that they either do not exist at all or exist in a special sense and therefore do not ‘exist’ without qualification. For ‘exist’ has many senses. For just as the universal propositions of mathematics deal not with objects which exist separately, apart from extended magnitudes and from numbers, but with magnitudes and numbers, not however qua such as to have magnitude or to be divisible,11 (20) clearly it is possible that there should also be both propositions and demonstrations about sensible magnitudes, not however qua sensible but qua possessed of certain definite qualities. For as there are many propositions about things merely considered as in motion, apart from what each such thing is and from their accidents, (25) and as it is not therefore necessary that there should be either a mobile separate from sensibles, or a distinct mobile entity in the sensibles, so too in the case of mobiles th
ere will be propositions and sciences, which treat them however not qua mobile but only qua bodies, or again only qua planes, or only qua lines, (30) or qua divisibles, or qua indivisibles having position, or only qua indivisibles. Thus since it is true to say without qualification that not only things which are separable but also things which are inseparable exist (for instance, that mobiles exist), it is true also to say without qualification that the objects of mathematics exist, and with the character ascribed to them by mathematicians. And as it is true to say of the other sciences too, without qualification, (35) that they deal with such and such a subject—not with what is accidental to it (e. g. not with the pale, if the healthy thing is pale, and the science has the healthy as its subject), but with that which is the subject of each science—with the healthy if it treats its object qua healthy, with man if qua man:—so too is it with geometry; [1078a] if its subjects happen to be sensible, though it does not treat them qua sensible, the mathematical sciences will not for that reason be sciences of sensibles—nor, (5) on the other hand, of other things separate from sensibles. Many properties attach to things in virtue of their own nature as possessed of each such character; e. g. there are attributes peculiar to the animal qua female or qua male (yet there is no ‘female’ nor ‘male’ separate from animals); so that there are also attributes which belong to things merely as lengths or as planes. And in proportion as we are dealing with things which are prior in definition and simpler, our knowledge has more accuracy, (10) i. e. simplicity. Therefore a science which abstracts from spatial magnitude is more precise than one which takes it into account; and a science is most precise if it abstracts from movement, but if it takes account of movement, it is most precise if it deals with the primary movement, for this is the simplest; and of this again uniform movement is the simplest form.