The same account may be given of harmonics and optics; for neither considers its objects qua sight or qua voice, but qua lines and numbers; but the latter are attributes proper to the former. (15) And mechanics too proceeds in the same way. Therefore if we suppose attributes separated from their fellow-attributes and make any inquiry concerning them as such, we shall not for this reason be in error, any more than when one draws a line on the ground and calls it a foot long when it is not; for the error is not included in the premisses. (20)
Each question will be best investigated in this way—by setting up by an act of separation what is not separate, as the arithmetician and the geometer do. For a man qua man is one indivisible thing; and the arithmetician supposed one indivisible thing, and then considered whether any attribute belongs to a man qua indivisible. (25) But the geometer treats him neither qua man nor qua indivisible, but as a solid. For evidently the properties which would have belonged to him even if perchance he had not been indivisible, can belong to him even apart from these attributes.12 Thus, then, geometers speak correctly; they talk about existing things, and their subjects do exist; for being has two forms—it exists not only in complete reality but also materially. (30)
Now since the good and the beautiful are different (for the former always implies conduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless things), those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the good13 are in error. For these sciences say and prove a great deal about them; if they do not expressly mention them, (35) but prove attributes which are their results or their definitions, it is not true to say that they tell us nothing about them. The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. [1078b] And since these (e. g. order and definiteness) are obviously causes of many things, evidently these sciences must treat this sort of causative principle also (i. e. the beautiful) as in some sense a cause. (5) But we shall speak more plainly elsewhere14 about these matters.
4 So much then for the objects of mathematics; we have said that they exist and in what sense they exist,15 and in what sense they are prior and in what sense not prior.16 Now, regarding the Ideas, (10) we must first examine the ideal theory itself, not connecting it in any way with the nature of numbers, but treating it in the form in which it was originally understood by those who first maintained the existence of the Ideas. The supporters of the ideal theory were led to it because on the question about the truth of things they accepted the Heraclitean sayings which describe all sensible things as ever passing away, (15) so that if knowledge or thought is to have an object, there must be some other and permanent entities, apart from those which are sensible; for there could be no knowledge of things which were in a state of flux. But when Socrates was occupying himself with the excellences of character, and in connexion with them became the first to raise the problem of universal definition (for of the physicists Democritus only touched on the subject to a small extent, (20) and defined, after a fashion, the hot and the cold; while the Pythagoreans had before this treated of a few things, whose definitions—e. g. those of opportunity, justice, or marriage—they connected with numbers; but it was natural that Socrates should be seeking the essence, for he was seeking to syllogize, and ‘what a thing is’ is the starting-point of syllogisms; for there was as yet none of the dialectical power which enables people even without knowledge of the essence to speculate about contraries and inquire whether the same science deals with contraries; for two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates—inductive arguments and universal definition, (25) both of which are concerned with the starting-point of science):—but Socrates did not make the universals or the definitions exist apart; they, (30) however, gave them separate existence, and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas. Therefore it followed for them, almost by the same argument, that there must be Ideas of all things that are spoken of universally, and it was almost as if a. man wished to count certain things, (35) and while they were few thought he would not be able to count them, but made more of them and then counted them; for the Forms are, one may say, more numerous than the particular sensible things, yet it was in seeking the causes of these that they proceeded from them to the Forms. [1079a] For to each thing there answers an entity which has the same name and exists apart from the substances, and so also in the case of all other groups there is a one over many, whether these be of this world or eternal.
Again, of the ways in which it is proved that the Forms exist, none is convincing; for from some no inference necessarily follows, (5) and from some arise Forms even of things of which they think there are no Forms. For according to the arguments from the sciences there will be Forms of all things of which there are sciences, and according to the argument of the ‘one over many’ there will be Forms even of negations, and according to the argument that thought has an object when the individual object has perished, (10) there will be Forms of perishable things; for we have an image of these. Again, of the most accurate arguments, some lead to Ideas of relations, of which they say there is no independent class, and others introduce the ‘third man’.17
And in general the arguments for the Forms destroy things for whose existence the believers in Forms are more zealous than for the existence of the Ideas; for it follows that not the dyad but number is first, (15) and that prior to number is the relative, and that this is prior to the absolute18—besides all the other points on which certain people, by following out the opinions held about the Forms, came into conflict with the principles of the theory.
Again, according to the assumption on which the belief in the Ideas rests, there will be Forms not only of substances but also of many other things; for the concept is single not only in the case of substances, (20) but also in that of non-substances, and there are sciences of other things than substance; and a thousand other such difficulties confront them. But according to the necessities of the case and the opinions about the Forms, (25) if they can be shared in there must be Ideas of substances only. For they are not shared in incidentally, but each Form must be shared in as something not predicated of a subject. (By ‘being shared in incidentally’ I mean that if a thing shares in ‘double itself’, it shares also in ‘eternal’, but incidentally; for ‘the double’ happens to be eternal.) Therefore the Forms will be substance. (30) But the same names indicate substance in this and in the ideal world (or what will be the meaning of saying that there is something apart from the particulars—the one over many?). And if the Ideas and the things that share in them have the same form, there will be something common: for why should ‘2’ be one and the same in the perishable 2’s, (35) or in the 2’s which are many but eternal, and not the same in the ‘2 itself’ as in the individual 2? But if they have not the same form, they will have only the name in common, and it is as if one were to call both Callias and a piece of wood a ‘man’, without observing any community between them.19 [1079b]
But if we are to suppose that in other respects the common definitions apply to the Forms, e. g. that ‘plane figure’ and the other parts of the definition apply to the circle-itself, (5) but ‘what really is’ has to be added, we must inquire whether this is not absolutely meaningless. For to what is this to be added? To ‘centre’ or to ‘plane’ or to all the parts of the definition? For all the elements in the essence are Ideas, e. g. ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’.20 Further, (10) there must be some Idea answering to ‘plane’ above, some nature which will be present in all the Forms as their genus.
5 Above all one might discuss the question what in the world the Forms contribute to sensible things, either to those that are eternal or to those that come into being and cease to be; for they cause neither movement nor any change in them. (15) But again they help in no wise either towards the knowledge of other things (for they are not even the substance of these, else they would have been in them), or towards their being, if they are not in the individuals which share in them; though if
they were, they might be thought to be causes, as white causes whiteness in a white object by entering into its composition. (20) But this argument, which was used first by Anaxagoras, and later by Eudoxus in his discussion of difficulties and by certain others, is very easily upset; for it is easy to collect many and insuperable objections to such a view.
But, further, all other things cannot come from the Forms in any of the usual senses of ‘from’. (25) And to say that they are patterns and the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical metaphors. For what is it that works, looking to the Ideas? And any thing can both be and come into being without being copied from something else, so that, whether Socrates exists or not, (30) a man like Socrates might come to be. And evidently this might be so even if Socrates were eternal. And there will be several patterns of the same thing, and therefore several Forms; e. g. ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’, and also ‘man-himself’, will be Forms of man. Again, the Forms are patterns not only of sensible things, but of Forms themselves also; i. e. the genus is the pattern of the various forms-of-a-genus; therefore the same thing will be pattern and copy.
Again, it would seem impossible that substance and that whose substance it is should exist apart; how, (35) therefore, could the Ideas, being the substances of things, exist apart?
In the Phaedo21 the case is stated in this way—that the Forms are causes both of being and of becoming. [1080a] Yet though the Forms exist, still things do not come into being, unless there is something to originate movement; and many other things come into being (e. g. a house or a ring) of which they say there are no Forms. (5) Clearly therefore even the things of which they say there are Ideas can both be and come into being owing to such causes as produce the things just mentioned,22 and not owing to the Forms. But regarding the Ideas it is possible, both in this way and by more abstract and accurate arguments, (10) to collect many objections like those we have considered.
6 Since we have discussed these points, it is well to consider again the results regarding numbers which confront those who say that numbers are separable substances and first causes of things. If number is an entity and its substance is nothing other than just number, (15) as some say, it follows that either (1) there is a first in it and a second, each being different in species—and either (a) this is true of the units without exception, and any unit is inassociable with any unit, or (b) they are all without exception successive, (20) and any of them are associable with any, as they say is the case with mathematical number; for in mathematical number no one unit is in any way different from another. Or (c) some units must be associable and some not; e. g. suppose that 2 is first after 1, and then comes 3 and then the rest of the number series, and the units in each number are associable, (25) e. g. those in the first 2 are associable with one another, and those in the first 3 with one another, and so with the other numbers; but the units in the ‘2-itself’ are inassociable with those in the ‘3-itself’; and similarly in the case of the other successive numbers. (30) And so while mathematical number is counted thus—after 1, 2 (which consists of another 1 besides the former 1), and 3 (which consists of another 1 besides these two), and the other numbers similarly, ideal number is counted thus—after 1, a distinct 2 which does not include the first 1, and a 3 which does not include the 2, and the rest of the number series similarly. Or (2) one kind of number must be like the first that was named,23 (35) one like that which the mathematicians speak of, and that which we have named last24 must be a third kind.
Again, these kinds of numbers must either be separable from things, or not separable but in objects of perception (not however in the way which we first considered,25 but in the sense that objects of perception consist of numbers which are present in them)—either one kind and not another, or all of them. [1080b]
These are of necessity the only ways in which the numbers can exist. (5) And of those who say that the 1 is the beginning and substance and element of all things, and that number is formed from the 1 and something else, almost every one has described number in one of these ways; only no one has said all the units are inassociable. (10) And this has happened reasonably enough; for there can be no way besides those mentioned. Some26 say both kinds of number exist, that which has a before and after27 being identical with the Ideas, and mathematical number being different from the Ideas and from sensible things, and both being separable from sensible things; and others28 say mathematical number alone exists, (15) as the first of realities, separate from sensible things. And the Pythagoreans, also, believe in one kind of number—the mathematical; only they say it is not separate but sensible substances are formed out of it. For they construct the whole universe out of numbers—only not numbers consisting of abstract units; they suppose the units to have spatial magnitude. (20) But how the first 1 was constructed so as to have magnitude, they seem unable to say.
Another thinker29 says the first kind of number, that of the Forms, alone exists, and some30 say mathematical number is identical with this.
The case of lines, planes, and solids is similar. For some think that those which are the objects of mathematics are different from those which come after the Ideas;31 and of those who express themselves otherwise some speak of the objects of mathematics and in a mathematical way—viz. (25) those who do not make the Ideas numbers nor say that Ideas exist;32 and others speak of the objects of mathematics, but not mathematically; for they say that neither is every spatial magnitude divisible into magnitudes, nor do any two units taken at random make 2.33 (30) All who say the 1 is an element and principle of things suppose numbers to consist of abstract units, except the Pythagoreans; but they suppose the numbers to have magnitude, as has been said before.34 It is clear from this statement, then, in how many ways numbers may be described, and that all the ways have been mentioned; and all these views are impossible, but some perhaps more than others. (35)
7 First, then, let us inquire if the units are associable or inassociable, and if inassociable, in which of the two ways we distinguished.35 For it is possible that any unit is inassociable with any, and it is possible that those in the ‘2-itself’ are inassociable with those in the ‘3-itself’, and, generally, that those in each ideal number are inassociable with those in other ideal numbers. [1081a] Now (1) if all units are associable and without difference, (5) we get mathematical number—only one kind of number, and the Ideas cannot be the numbers. For what sort of number will man-himself or animal-itself or any other Form be? There is one Idea of each thing, e. g. one of man-himself and another one of animal-itself; but the similar and undifferentiated numbers are infinitely many, (10) so that any particular 3 is no more man-himself than any other 3. But if the Ideas are not numbers, neither can they exist at all. For from what principles will the Ideas come? It is number that comes from the 1 and the indefinite dyad, (15) and the principles or elements are said to be principles and elements of number, and the Ideas cannot be ranked as either prior or posterior to the numbers.
But (2) if the units are inassociable, and inassociable in the sense that any is inassociable with any other, number of this sort cannot be mathematical number; for mathematical number consists of undifferentiated units, and the truths proved of it suit this character. (20) Nor can it be ideal number. For 2 will not proceed immediately from 1 and the indefinite dyad, and be followed by the successive numbers, as they say ‘2, 3, 4’—for the units in the ideal 2 are generated at the same time, whether, as the first holder of the theory36 said, from unequals (coming into being when these were equalized) or in some other way—since, if one unit is to be prior to the other, (25) it will be prior also to the 2 composed of these; for when there is one thing prior and another posterior, the resultant of these will be prior to one and posterior to the other.37
Again, (30) since the 1-itself is first, and then there is a particular 1 which is first among the others and next after the 1-itself, and again a third which is next after the second and next but one after the first 1—so the units must be prior to th
e numbers after which they are named when we count them; e. g. there will be a third unit in 2 before 3 exists, and a fourth and a fifth in 3 before the numbers 4 and 5 exist. (35)—Now none of these thinkers has said the units are inassociable in this way, but according to their principles it is reasonable that they should be so even in this way, though in truth it is impossible. [1081b] For it is reasonable both that the units should have priority and posteriority if there is a first unit or first 1, and also that the 2’s should if there is a first 2; for after the first it is reasonable and necessary that there should be a second, (5) and if a second, a third, and so with the others successively. (And to say both things at the same time, that a unit is first and another unit is second after the ideal 1, and that a 2 is first after it, is impossible.) But they make a first unit or 1, but not also a second and a third, and a first 2, but not also a second and a third.
The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) Page 125