Clearly, (10) also, it is not possible, if all the units are inassociable, that there should be a 2-itself and a 3-itself; and so with the other numbers. For whether the units are undifferentiated or different each from each, number must be counted by addition, (15) e. g. 2 by adding another 1 to the one, 3 by adding another 1 to the two, and 4 similarly. This being so, numbers cannot be generated as they generate them, from the 2 and the 1; for 2 becomes part of 3, and 3 of 4, (20) and the same happens in the case of the succeeding numbers, but they say 4 came from the first 2 and the indefinite 2—which makes it two 2’s other than the 2-itself; if not, the 2-itself will be a part of 4 and one other 2 will be added. And similarly 2 will consist of the 1-itself and another 1; but if this is so, (25) the other element cannot be an indefinite 2; for it generates one unit, not, as the indefinite 2 does, a definite 2.
Again, besides the 3-itself and the 2-itself how can there be other 3’s and 2’s? And how do they consist of prior and posterior units? All this is absurd and fictitious, (30) and there cannot be a first 2 and then a 3-itself. Yet there must, if the 1 and the indefinite dyad are to be the elements. But if the results are impossible, it is also impossible that these are the generating principles.
If the units, then, are differentiated, each from each, (35) these results and others similar to these follow of necessity. But (3) if those in different numbers are differentiated, but those in the same number are alone undifferentiated from one another, even so the difficulties that follow are no less. e. g. in the 10-itself there are ten units, and the 10 is composed both of them and of two 5’s. [1082a] But since the 10-itself is not any chance number nor composed of any chance 5’s—or, for that matter, units—the units in this 10 must differ. For if they do not differ, neither will the 5’s of which the 10 consists differ; but since these differ, (5) the units also will differ. But if they differ, will there be no other 5’s in the 10 but only these two, or will there be others? If there are not, this is paradoxical; and if there are, what sort of 10 will consist of them? For there is no other 10 in the 10 but itself. (10) But it is actually necessary on their view that the 4 should not consist of any chance 2’s; for the indefinite 2, as they say, received the definite 2 and made two 2’s; for its nature was to double what it received.
Again, as to the 2 being an entity apart from its two units, (15) and the 3 an entity apart from its three units, how is this possible? Either by one’s sharing in the other, as ‘pale man’ is different from ‘pale’ and ‘man’ (for it shares in these), or when one is a differentia of the other, as ‘man’ is different from ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’.
Again, some things are one by contact, some by intermixture, (20) some by position; none of which can belong to the units of which the 2 or the 3 consists; but as two men are not a unity apart from both, so must it be with the units. And their being indivisible will make no difference to them; for points too are indivisible, (25) but yet a pair of them is nothing apart from the two.
But this consequence also we must not forget, that it follows that there are prior and posterior 2’s, and similarly with the other numbers. For let the 2’s in the 4 be simultaneous; yet these are prior to those in the 8, (30) and as the 2 generated them, they generated the 4’s in the 8-itself. Therefore if the first 2 is an Idea, these 2’s also will be Ideas of some kind. And the same account applies to the units; for the units in the first 2 generate the four in 4, so that all the units come to be Ideas and an Idea will be composed of Ideas. (35) Clearly therefore those things also of which these happen to be the Ideas will be composite, e. g. one might say that animals are composed of animals, if there are Ideas of them.
In general, to differentiate the units in any way is an absurdity and a fiction; and by a fiction I mean a forced statement made to suit a hypothesis. [1082b] For neither in quantity nor in quality do we see unit differing from unit, (5) and number must be either equal or unequal—all number but especially that which consists of abstract units—so that if one number is neither greater nor less than another, it is equal to it; but things that are equal and in no wise differentiated we take to be the same when we are speaking of numbers. If not, not even the 2’s in the 10-itself will be undifferentiated, (10) though they are equal; for what reason will the man who alleges that they are not differentiated be able to give?
Again, if every unit + another unit makes two, a unit from the 2-itself and one from the 3-itself will make a 2. Now (a) this will consist of differentiated units; and (b) will it be prior to the 3 or posterior? It rather seems that it must be prior; for one of the units is simultaneous with the 3, (15) and the other is simultaneous with the 2. And we, for our part, suppose that in general 1 and 1, whether the things are equal or unequal, is 2, e. g. the good and the bad, or a man and a horse; but those who hold these views say that not even two units are 2.
If the number of the 3-itself is not greater than that of the 2, (20) this is surprising; and if it is greater, clearly there is also a number in it equal to the 2, so that this is not different from the 2-itself. But this is not possible, if there is a first and a second number.38
Nor will the Ideas be numbers. For in this particular point they are right who claim that the units must be different, if there are to be Ideas; as has been said before.39 (25) For the Form is unique; but if the units are not different, the 2’s and the 3’s also will not be different. This is also the reason why they must say that when we count thus—‘1, 2’—we do not proceed by adding to the given number; for if we do, (30) neither will the numbers be generated from the indefinite dyad, nor can a number be an Idea; for then one Idea will be in another, and all the Forms will be parts of one Form. And so with a view to their hypothesis their statements are right, but as a whole they are wrong; for their view is very destructive, since they will admit that this question itself affords some difficulty—whether, (35) when we count and say ‘1, 2, 3,’ we count by addition or by separate portions. But we do both; and so it is absurd to reason back from this problem to so great a difference of essence.
8 [1083a] First of all it is well to determine what is the differentia of a number—and of a unit, if it has a differentia. Units must differ either in quantity or in quality; and neither of these seems to be possible. But number qua number differs in quantity. And if the units also did differ in quantity, (5) number would differ from number, though equal in number of units. Again, are the first units greater or smaller, and do the later ones increase or diminish? All these are irrational suppositions. But neither can they differ in quality. For no attribute can attach to them; for even to numbers quality is said to belong after quantity. (10) Again, quality could not come to them either from the 1 or from the dyad; for the former has no quality, and the latter gives quantity; for this entity is what makes things to be many. If the facts are really otherwise, they should state this quite at the beginning and determine if possible, (15) regarding the differentia of the unit, why it must exist, and, failing this, what differentia they mean.
Evidently then, if the Ideas are numbers, the units cannot all be associable, nor can they be inassociable in either of the two ways.40 But neither is the way in which some others speak about numbers correct. (20) These are those who do not think there are Ideas, either without qualification or as identified with certain numbers, but think the objects of mathematics exist and the numbers are the first of existing things, and the 1-itself is the starting-point of them. It is paradoxical that there should be a 1 which is first of 1’s, as they say, (25) but not a 2 which is first of 2’s, nor a 3 of 3’s; for the same reasoning applies to all. If, then, the facts with regard to number are so, and one supposes mathematical number alone to exist, the 1 is not the starting-point (for this sort of 1 must differ from the other units; and if this is so, (30) there must also be a 2 which is first of 2’s, and similarly with the other successive numbers). But if the 1 is the starting-point, the truth about the numbers must rather be what Plato used to say, and there must be a first 2 and 3, and th
e numbers must not be associable with one another. But if on the other hand one supposes this, many impossible results, as we have said,41 follow. (35) But either this or the other must be the case, so that if neither is, number cannot exist separately.
It is evident, also, from this that the third version42 is the worst—the view ideal and mathematical number is the same. [1083b] For two mistakes must then meet in the one opinion. (1) Mathematical number cannot be of this sort, but the holder of this view has to spin it out by making suppositions peculiar to himself. (5) And (2) he must also admit all the consequences that confront those who speak of number in the sense of ‘Forms’.
The Pythagorean version in one way affords fewer difficulties than those before named, but in another way has others peculiar to itself. (10) For not thinking of number as capable of existing separately removes many of the impossible consequences; but that bodies should be composed of numbers, and that this should be mathematical number, is impossible. For it is not true to speak of indivisible spatial magnitudes; and however much there might be magnitudes of this sort, (15) units at least have not magnitude; and how can a magnitude be composed of indivisibles? But arithmetical number, at least, consists of units, while these thinkers identify number with real things; at any rate they apply their propositions to bodies as if they consisted of those numbers.
If, then, it is necessary, if number is a self-subsistent real thing, (20) that it should exist in one of these ways which have been mentioned,43 and if it cannot exist in any of these, evidently number has no such nature as those who make it separable set up for it.
Again, does each unit come from the great and the small, equalized, or one from the small, another from the great? (a) If the latter, (25) neither does each thing contain all the elements, nor are the units without difference; for in one there is the great and in another the small, which is contrary in its nature to the great. Again, how is it with the units in the 3-itself? One of them is an odd unit. But perhaps it is for this reason that they give 1-itself the middle place in odd numbers. (30) (b) But if each of the two units consists of both the great and the small, equalized, how will the 2, which is a single thing, consist of the great and the small? Or how will it differ from the unit? Again, the unit is prior to the 2; for when it is destroyed the 2 is destroyed. It must, then, be the Idea of an Idea since it is prior to an Idea, (35) and it must have come into being before it. From what, then? Not from the indefinite dyad, for its function was to double.
Again, number must be either infinite or finite; for these thinkers think of number as capable of existing separately, so that it is not possible that neither of those alternatives should be true. [1084a] Clearly it cannot be infinite; for infinite number is neither odd nor even, but the generation of numbers is always the generation either of an odd or of an even number; in one way, when 1 operates on an even number, (5) an odd number is produced; in another way, when 2 operates, the numbers got from 1 by doubling are produced; in another way, when the odd numbers operate, the other even numbers are produced. Again, if every Idea is an Idea of something, and the numbers are Ideas, infinite number itself will be an Idea of something, either of some sensible thing or of something else. Yet this is not possible in view of their thesis any more than it is reasonable in itself, at least if they arrange the Ideas as they do.
But if number is finite, how far does it go? With regard to this not only the fact but the reason should be stated. (10) But if number goes only up to 10, as some say,44 firstly the Forms will soon run short; e. g. if 3 is man-himself, what number will be the horse-itself? The series of the numbers which are the several things-themselves goes up to 10. (15) It must, then, be one of the numbers within these limits; for it is these that are substances and Ideas. Yet they will run short; for the various forms of animal will outnumber them. At the same time it is clear that if in this way the 3 is man-himself, the other 3’s are so also (for those in identical numbers are similar), (20) so that there will be an infinite number of men; if each 3 is an Idea, each of the numbers will be man-himself, and if not, they will at least be men. And if the smaller number is part of the greater (being number of such a sort that the units in the same number are associable), then if the 4-itself is an Idea of something, e. g. of ‘horse’ or of ‘white’, man will be a part of horse, if man is 2. It is paradoxical, (25) also that there should be an Idea of 10, but not of 11, nor of the succeeding numbers. Again, there both are and come to be certain things of which there are no Forms; why, then, are there not Forms of them also? We infer that the Forms are not causes. Again, it is paradoxical if the number-series up to 10 is more of a real thing and a Form than 10 itself. (30) There is no generation of the former as one thing, and there is of the latter. But they try to work on the assumption that the series of numbers up to 10 is a complete series. At least they generate the derivatives—e. g. the void, proportion, the odd, and the others of this kind—within the decade. For some things, e. g. movement and rest, good and bad, they assign to the originative principles, and the others to the numbers. (35) This is why they identify the odd with 1; for if the odd implied 3, how would 5 be odd?45 Again, spatial magnitudes and all such things are explained without going beyond a definite number; e. g. the first, the indivisible, line,46 then the 2, &c. [1084b] ; these entities also extend only up to 10.47
Again, if number can exist separately, one might ask which is prior—1, or 3 or 2? Inasmuch as the number is composite, 1 is prior, but inasmuch as the universal and the form is prior, (5) the number is prior; for each of the units is part of the number as its matter, and the number acts as form. And in a sense the right angle is prior to the acute, because it is determinate and in virtue of its definition; but in a sense the acute is prior, because it is a part and the right angle is divided into acute angles. As matter, then, the acute angle and the element and the unit are prior, (10) but in respect of the form and of the substance as expressed in the definition, the right angle, and the whole consisting of the matter and the form, are prior; for the concrete thing is nearer to the form and to what is expressed in the definition, though in generation it is later. How then is 1 the starting-point? Because it is not divisible, they say; but both the universal, and the particular or the element, (15) are indivisible. But they are starting-points in different ways, one in definition and the other in time. In which way, then, is 1 the starting-point? As has been said, the right angle is thought to be prior to the acute, and the acute to the right, and each is one. Accordingly they make 1 the starting-point in both ways. But this is impossible. For the universal is one as form or substance, (20) while the element is one as a part or as matter. For each of the two is in a sense one—in truth each of the two units exists potentially (at least if the number is a unity and not like a heap, i. e. if different numbers consist of differentiated units, as they say), but not in complete reality; and the cause of the error they fell into is that they were conducting their inquiry at the same time from the standpoint of mathematics and from that of universal definitions, (25) so that (1) from the former standpoint they treated unity, their first principle, as a point; for the unit is a point without position. They put things together out of the smallest parts, as some others48 also have done. Therefore the unit becomes the matter of numbers and at the same time prior to 2; and again posterior, (30) 2 being treated as a whole, a unity, and a form. But (2) because they were seeking the universal they treated the unity which can be predicated of a number, as in this sense also49 a part of the number. But these characteristics cannot belong at the same time to the same thing.
If the 1-itself must be unitary (for it differs in nothing from other 1’s except that it is the starting-point), and the 2 is divisible but the unit is not, the unit must be liker the 1-itself than the 2 is. But if the unit is liker it, it must be liker to the unit than to the 2; therefore each of the units in 2 must be prior to the 2. (35) But they deny this; at least they generate the 2 first. [1085a] Again, if the 2-itself is a unity and the 3-itself is one al
so, both form a 2. From what, then, is this 2 produced?
9 Since there is not contact in numbers, but succession, viz. between the units between which there is nothing, (5) e. g. between those in 2 or in 3, one might ask whether these succeed the 1-itself or not, and whether, of the terms that succeed it, 2 or either of the units in 2 is prior.
Similar difficulties occur with regard to the classes of things posterior to number—the line, the plane, and the solid. For some50 construct these out of the species of the ‘great and small’; e. g. lines from the ‘long and short’, (10) planes from the ‘broad and narrow’, masses from the ‘deep and shallow’; which are species of the ‘great and small’. And the originative principle of such things which answers to the 151 different thinkers describe in different ways. And in these also the impossibilities, the fictions, and the contradictions of all probability are seen to be innumerable. (15) For (i) the geometrical classes are severed from one another, unless the principles of these are implied in one another in such a way that the ‘broad and narrow’ is also ‘long and short’ (but if this is so, the plane will be a line and the solid a plane;52 again, how will angles and figures and such things be explained?). And (ii) the same happens as in regard to number; for ‘long and short’, (20) &c., are attributes of magnitude, but magnitude does not consist of these, any more than the line consists of ‘straight and curved’, or solids of ‘smooth and rough’.53
(All these views share a difficulty which occurs with regard to species-of-a-genus, when one posits the universals, viz. whether it is animal-itself or something other than animal-itself that is in the particular animal. (25) True, if the universal is not separable from sensible things, this will present no difficulty; but if the 1 and the numbers are separable, as those who express these views say, it is not easy to solve the difficulty, if one may apply the words ‘not easy’ to the impossible. For when we apprehend the unity in 2, or in general in a number, do we apprehend a thing-itself or something else?)
The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) Page 126