The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics)

by Mckeon, Richard

  What kinds of offices, and how many, are necessary to the existence of a state, and which, if not necessary, yet conduce to its well-being, are much more important considerations, affecting all constitutions, (35) but more especially small states. For in great states it is possible, and indeed necessary, that every office should have a special function; where the citizens are numerous, many may hold office. And so it happens that some offices a man holds a second time only after a long interval, and others he holds once only; and certainly every work is better done which receives the sole, and not the divided attention of the worker. [1299b] But in small states it is necessary to combine many offices in a few hands, since the small number of citizens does not admit of many holding office:—for who will there be to succeed them? And yet small states at times require the same offices and laws as large ones; the difference is that the one want them often, (5) the others only after long intervals. Hence there is no reason why the care of many offices should not be imposed on the same person, for they will not interfere with each other. When the population is small, offices should be like the spits which also serve to hold a lamp.47 We must first ascertain how many magistrates are necessary in every state, (10) and also how many are not exactly necessary, but are nevertheless useful, and then there will be no difficulty in seeing what offices can be combined in one. We should also know over which matters several local tribunals are to have jurisdiction, (15) and in which authority should be centralized: for example, should one person keep order in the market and another in some other place, or should the same person be responsible everywhere? Again, should offices be divided according to the subjects with which they deal, or according to the persons with whom they deal: I mean to say, should one person see to good order in general, or one look after the boys, another after the women, and so on? Further, under different constitutions, (20) should the magistrates be the same or different? For example, in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, should there be the same magistrates, although they are elected, not out of equal or similar classes of citizens, but differently under different constitutions—in aristocracies, for example, they are chosen from the educated, in oligarchies from the wealthy, and in democracies from the free—or are there certain differences in the offices answering to them as well, (25) and may the same be suitable to some, but different offices to others? For in some states it may be convenient that the same office should have a more extensive, in other states a narrower sphere. Special offices are peculiar to certain forms of government:—for example that of probuli, (30) which is not a democratic office, although a bule or council is. There must be some body of men whose duty is to prepare measures for the people in order that they may not be diverted from their business; when these are few in number, the state inclines to an oligarchy: or rather the probuli must always be few, (35) and are therefore an oligarchical element. But when both institutions exist in a state, the probuli are a check on the council; for the counsellor is a democratic element, but the probuli are oligarchical. Even the power of the council disappears when democracy has taken that extreme form in which the people themselves are always meeting and deliberating about everything. [1300a] This is the case when the members of the assembly receive abundant pay; for they have nothing to do and are always holding assemblies and deciding everything for themselves. A magistracy which controls the boys or the women, or any similar office, (5) is suited to an aristocracy rather than to a democracy; for how can the magistrates prevent the wives of the poor from going out of doors? Neither is it an oligarchical office; for the wives of the oligarchs are too fine to be controlled.

  Enough of these matters. I will now inquire into appointments to offices. (10) The varieties depend on three terms, and the combinations of these give all possible modes: first, who appoints? secondly, from whom? and thirdly, how? Each of these three admits of three varieties: (A) All the citizens, (15) or (B) only some, appoint. Either (1) the magistrates are chosen out of all or (2) out of some who are distinguished either by a property qualification, or by birth, or merit, or for some special reason, as at Megara only those were eligible who had returned from exile and fought together against the democracy. They may be appointed either (a) by vote or (b) by lot. Again, (20) these several varieties may be coupled, I mean that (C) some officers may be elected by some, others by all, and (3) some again out of some, and others out of all, and (c) some by vote and others by lot. Each variety of these terms admits of four modes.

  For either (A 1 a) all may appoint from all by vote, or (A 1 b) all from all by lot, or (A 2 a) all from some by vote, (25) or (A 2 b) all from some by lot (and if from all, either by sections, as, for example, by tribes, and wards, and phratries, until all the citizens have been gone through; or the citizens may be in all cases eligible indiscriminately); or again (A 1 c, A 2 c) to some offices in the one way, to some in the other. Again, if it is only some that appoint, they may do so either (B 1 a) from all by vote, or (B 1 b) from all by lot, or (B 2 a) from some by vote, or (B 2 b) from some by lot, or to some offices in the one way, to others in the other, i. e. (B 1 c) from all, to some offices by vote, to some by lot, (30) and (B 2 c) from some, to some offices by vote, to some by lot. Thus the modes that arise, apart from two (C, 3) out of the three couplings, number twelve. Of these systems two are popular, that all should appoint from all (A 1 a) by vote or (A 1 b) by lot—or (A 1 c) by both. (35) That all should not appoint at once, but should appoint from all or from some either by lot or by vote or by both, or appoint to some offices from all and to others from some (‘by both’ meaning to some offices by lot, to others by vote), is characteristic of a polity. And (B 1 c) that some should appoint from all, to some offices by vote, to others by lot, is also characteristic of a polity, (40) but more oligarchical than the former method. And (A 3 a, b, c, B 3 a, b, c) to appoint from both, to some offices from all, to others from some, is characteristic of a polity with a leaning towards aristocracy. That (B 2) some should appoint from some is oligarchical—even (B 2 b) that some should appoint from some by lot (and if this does not actually occur, it is none the less oligarchical in character), or (B 2 c) that some should appoint from some by both. [1300b] (B 1 a) that some should appoint from all, and (A 2 a) that all should appoint from some, by vote, is aristocratic.

  These are the different modes of constituting magistrates, (5) and these correspond to different forms of government:—which are proper to which, or how they ought to be established, will be evident when we determine the nature of their powers.48 By powers I mean such powers as a magistrate exercises over the revenue or in defence of the country; for there are various kinds of power: the power of the general, (10) for example, is not the same with that which regulates contracts in the market.

  16 Of the three parts of government, the judicial remains to be considered, and this we shall divide on the same principle. There are three points on which the varieties of law-courts depend: The persons from whom they are appointed, (15) the matters with which they are concerned, and the manner of their appointment. I mean, (1) are the judges taken from all, or from some only? (2) how many kinds of law-courts are there? (3) are the judges chosen by vote or by lot?

  First, let me determine how many kinds of law-courts there are. There are eight in number: One is the court of audits or scrutinies; a second takes cognizance of ordinary offences against the state; a third is concerned with treason against the constitution; the fourth determines disputes respecting penalties, (20) whether raised by magistrates or by private persons; the fifth decides the more important civil cases; the sixth tries cases of homicide, which are of various kinds, (25) (a) premeditated, (b) involuntary, (c) cases in which the guilt is confessed but the justice is disputed; and there may be a fourth court (d) in which murderers who have fled from justice are tried after their return; such as the Court of Phreatto is said to be at Athens. But cases of this sort rarely happen at all even in large cities. (30) The different kinds of homicide may be tried either by the same or by different c
ourts. (7) There are courts for strangers:—of these there are two subdivisions, (a) for the settlement of their disputes with one another, (b) for the settlement of disputes between them and the citizens. And besides all these there must be (8) courts for small suits about sums of a drachma up to five drachmas, or a little more, which have to be determined, but they do not require many judges. (35)

  Nothing more need be said of these small suits, nor of the courts for homicide and for strangers:—I would rather speak of political cases, which, when mismanaged, create division and disturbances in constitutions.

  Now if all the citizens judge, in all the different cases which I have distinguished, (40) they may be appointed by vote or by lot, or sometimes by lot and sometimes by vote. Or when a single class of causes are tried, the judges who decide them may be appointed, some by vote, and some by lot. [1301a] These then are the four modes of appointing judges from the whole people, and there will be likewise four modes, if they are elected from a part only; for they may be appointed from some by vote and judge in all causes; or they may be appointed from some by lot and judge in all causes; or they may be elected in some cases by vote, and in some cases taken by lot, or some courts, even when judging the same causes, may be composed of members some appointed by vote and some by lot. (5) These modes, then, as was said, answer to those previously mentioned.

  Once more, the modes of appointment may be combined; I mean, that some may be chosen out of the whole people, others out of some, some out of both; for example, the same tribunal may be composed of some who were elected out of all, and of others who were elected out of some, either by vote or by lot or by both. (10)

  In how many forms law-courts can be established has now been considered. The first form, viz. that in which the judges are taken from all the citizens, and in which all causes are tried, is democratical; the second, which is composed of a few only who try all causes, oligarchical; the third, in which some courts are taken from all classes, (15) and some from certain classes only, aristocratical and constitutional.

  * * *

  1 The numbers in this paragraph are made to correspond with the numbers in the next.

  2 Cp. ii. 1265b 35.

  3 Cp. 1288b 29.

  4 iii. 7; Cp. N. Eth. viii. 10.

  5 iii. 14–18.

  6 iii. 1279a 32–37, 1286b 3–5, 1284a 3–b 34, ch. 17.

  7 Cp. iii. 1284a 3–b 34, chs. 17, 18, v. 1310b 10 sq., vii. 1325b 10–12.

  8 Plato, Polit. 302 E, 303 A.

  9 C. 3–10.

  10 C. 11.

  11 C. 12.

  12 Book vi. 1–7.

  13 Book v.

  14 iii. 1283a 14 sq., and Cp. vii. 8, 9.

  15 1289a 31–33, 40 sqq., Cp. viii. 1340a 40–b 5, 1342a 28 sqq., b29 sqq.

  16 Cp. iii. 1279b 21.

  17 i. e. democracy and oligarchy, Cp. 1290a 13.

  18 1289b 27 sq.

  19 ii. 1261a 22 sqq., iii. 1283a 14 sqq., iv. 1289b 27–1290b 5, 1290b 23 sq., Cp. iii. 1277a 5 sqq.

  20 Rep. ii. 369.

  21 Cp. iii. c. 6.

  22 Il. ii. 204.

  23 Cp. N. Eth. v. 1137b 27.

  24 Cp. v. 1301b 10.

  25 1291b 17–30.

  26 i. e. they make a law that the governing class shall have the power of co-optation from other classes.

  27 Rep. viii, ix.

  28 iii. 1279a 34, 1286b 3, Cp. vii. 1328b 37.

  29 Cp. ii. 1273a 21–30.

  30 iii. 7.

  31 Cp. 1297a 38.

  32 Cp. ii. 1270b 17.

  33 iii. 14–17.

  34 iii, 1285a 16–b3.

  35 iii. 1285b 2.

  36 1293b 7–21, Cp. 1293b 36–1294a 25.

  37 N. Eth. i. 1098a 16. vii. 1153b 10, x. 1177a 12.

  38 Cp. Pl. Rep. iv. 421 D ff.

  39 Cp. v. 1310a 22.

  40 Cp. ll. 1–3.

  41 v. 1308a 18–24.

  42 Cp. v. 1302a 8, 1307a 16.

  43 1289a 8, b13, 1291b 15–1292b 10, 1292b 22–1293a 10.

  44 Cp. 1289b 36, vi. 1321a 8.

  45 sc. in an advanced democracy. Cp. vi. 1317b 21.

  46 1292a 17–21, b7–10, 1293a 32–34.

  47 Cp. 1252b 2.

  48 The promise is not fulfilled in the Politics.

  BOOK V

  1 The design which we proposed to ourselves is now nearly completed.1 Next in order follow the causes of revolution in states, (20) how many, and of what nature they are; what modes of destruction apply to particular states, and out of what, and into what they mostly change; also what are the modes of preservation in states generally, or in a particular state, and by what means each state may be best preserved: these questions remain to be considered.

  In the first place we must assume as our starting-point that in the many forms of government which have sprung up there has always been an acknowledgement of justice and proportionate equality, (25) although mankind fail in attaining them, as indeed I have already explained.2 Democracy, for example, arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects; because men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. (30) Oligarchy is based on the notion that those who are unequal in one respect are in all respects unequal; being unequal, that is, in property, they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely. The democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be equal in all things; while the oligarchs, under the idea that they are unequal, claim too much, which is one form of inequality. All these forms of government have a kind of justice, but, (35) tried by an absolute standard, they are faulty; and, therefore, both parties, whenever their share in the government does not accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up revolution. Those who excel in virtue have the best right of all to rebel (for they alone can with reason be deemed absolutely unequal),3 (40) but then they are of all men the least inclined to do so.4 [1301b] There is also a superiority which is claimed by men of rank; for they are thought noble because they spring from wealthy and virtuous ancestors.5 Here then, so to speak, are opened the very springs and fountains of revolution; and hence arise two sorts of changes in governments; the one affecting the constitution, (5) when men seek to change from an existing form into some other, for example, from democracy into oligarchy, and from oligarchy into democracy, or from either of them into constitutional government or aristocracy, and conversely; the other not affecting the constitution, (10) when, without disturbing the form of government, whether oligarchy, or monarchy, or any other, they try to get the administration into their own hands.6 Further, there is a question of degree; an oligarchy, for example, may become more or less oligarchical, and a democracy more or less democratical; and in like manner the characteristics of the other forms of government may be more or less strictly maintained. (15) Or the revolution may be directed against a portion of the constitution only, e. g. the establishment or overthrow of a particular office: as at Sparta it is said that Lysander attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and king Pausanias,7 the ephoralty. At Epidamnus, (20) too, the change was partial. For instead of phylarchs or heads of tribes, a council was appointed; but to this day the magistrates are the only members of the ruling class who are compelled to go to the Heliaea when an election takes places, (25) and the office of the single archon8 was another oligarchical feature. Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution, but an inequality in which there is no proportion—for instance, a perpetual monarchy among equals; and always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion.

  Now equality is of two kinds, numerical and proportional; by the first I mean sameness or equality in number or size; by the second, (30) equality of ratios. For example, the excess of three over two is numerically equal to the excess of two over one; whereas four exceeds two in the same ratio in which two exceeds one, for two is the same part of four that one is of two, (35) namely, the half. As I was saying before,9 men agree that justice in the abstract is proportion, but they differ in that some think that if they are equal in any resp
ect they are equal absolutely, others that if they are unequal in any respect they should be unequal in all. Hence there are two principal forms of government, (40) democracy and oligarchy; for good birth and virtue are rare, but wealth and numbers are more common. [1302a] In what city shall we find a hundred persons of good birth and of virtue? whereas the rich everywhere abound. That a state should be ordered, simply and wholly, according to either kind of equality, is not a good thing; the proof is the fact that such forms of government never last. (5) They are originally based on a mistake, and, as they begin badly, cannot fail to end badly. The inference is that both kinds of equality should be employed; numerical in some cases, and proportionate in others.

  Still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution than oligarchy.10 (10) For in oligarchies11 there is the double danger of the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also with the people; but in democracies12 there is only the danger of a quarrel with the oligarchs. No dissension worth mentioning arises among the people themselves. And we may further remark that a government which is composed of the middle class more nearly approximates to democracy than to oligarchy, (15) and is the safest of the imperfect forms of government.

  2 In considering how dissensions and political revolutions arise, we must first of all ascertain the beginnings and causes of them which affect constitutions generally. They may be said to be three in number; and we have now to give an outline of each. (20) We want to know (1) what is the feeling? (2) what are the motives of those who make them? (3) whence arise political disturbances and quarrels? The universal and chief cause of this revolutionary feeling has been already mentioned;13 viz. the desire of equality, (25) when men think that they are equal to others who have more than themselves; or, again, the desire of inequality and superiority, when conceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have not more but the same or less than their inferiors; pretensions which may and may not be just. Inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, (30) and equals that they may be superior. Such is the state of mind which creates revolutions. The motives for making them are the desire of gain and honour, or the fear of dishonour and loss; the authors of them want to divert punishment or dishonour from themselves or their friends. The causes and reasons of revolutions, (35) whereby men are themselves affected in the way described, and about the things which I have mentioned, viewed in one way may be regarded as seven, and in another as more than seven. Two of them have been already noticed;14 but they act in a different manner, for men are excited against one another by the love of gain and honour—not, as in the case which I have just supposed, in order to obtain them for themselves, (40) but at seeing others, justly or unjustly, engrossing them. [1302b] Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state; causes of another sort are election intrigues, carelessness, neglect about trifles, dissimilarity of elements.