The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics)

by Mckeon, Richard

  BOOK II

  1. Since rhetoric—political and forensic rhetoric, at any rate—exists to affect the giving of decisions, the orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also (1) make his own character look right and (2) put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind. As to his own character: he should make his audience feel that he possesses prudence, virtue, and goodwill. This is especially important in a deliberative assembly. In the law courts it is especially important that he should be able to influence the emotions, or moral affections, of the jury who try the case. Definition of the several emotions. In regard to each emotion we must consider (a) the states of mind in which it is felt; (b) the people towards whom it is felt; (c) the grounds on which it is felt.

  2. In cc. 2–11 the various emotions are defined, and are also discussed (with incidental observations) from the three points of view just indicated. In c. 2, Anger is the subject. The orator must so speak as to make his hearers angry with his opponents.

  3. Calmness (as the opposite of Anger).

  4. Friendship and Enmity.

  5. Fear and Confidence.

  6. Shame and Shamelessness.

  7. Kindness and Unkindness.

  8. Pity.

  9. Indignation.

  10. Envy.

  11. Emulation.

  12. The various types of human character are next considered, in relation to the various emotions and moral qualities and to the various ages and fortunes. By ‘ages’ are meant youth, the prime of life, and old age; by ‘fortunes’ are meant birth, wealth, power, and their opposites. The youthful type of character is thereupon depicted.

  13. The character of elderly men.

  14. The character of men in their prime.—The body is in its prime from thirty to five-and-thirty; the mind about forty-nine.

  15. The gifts of fortune by which human character is affected. First, good birth.

  16. Second, wealth.

  17. Third, power.

  18. Retrospect, and glance forward. The forms of argument common to all oratory will next be discussed.

  19. The four general lines of argument are: (1) The Possible and Impossible; (2) Fact Past; (3) Fact Future; (4) Degree.

  20. The two general modes of persuasion are: (1) the example, (2) the Enthymeme; the maxim being part of the Enthymeme. Examples are either (a) historical parallels, or (b) invented parallels, viz. either (i) illustrations, or (ii) fables, such as those of Aesop. Fables are suitable for popular addresses; and they have this advantage, that they are comparatively easy to invent, whereas it is hard to find parallels among actual past events.

  21. Use of maxims. A maxim is a general statement about questions of practical conduct. It is an incomplete Enthymeme. Four kinds of maxims. Maxims should be used (a) by elderly men, and (b) to controvert popular sayings. Advantages of maxims: (a) they enable a speaker to gratify his commonplace hearers by expressing as a universal truth the opinions which they themselves hold about particular cases; (b) they invest a speech with moral character.

  22. Enthymernes. In Enthymemes we must not carry our reasoning too far back, nor must we put in all the steps that lead to our conclusion. There are two kinds of Enthymemes: (a) the demonstrative, formed by the conjunction of compatible propositions; (b) the refutative, formed by the conjunction of incompatible propositions.

  23. Enumeration of twenty-eight topics (lines of argument) on which Enthymemes, demonstrative and refutative, can be based. Two general remarks are added: (a) the refutative Enthymeme has a greater reputation than the demonstrative, because within a small space it works out two opposing arguments, and arguments put side by side are clearer to the audience; (b) of all syllogisms, whether refutative or demonstrative, those are most applauded of which we foresee the conclusions from the beginning, so long as they are not obvious at first sight—for part of the pleasure we feel is at our own intelligent anticipation; or those which we follow well enough to see the point of them as soon as the last work has been uttered.

  24. Nine topics of apparent, or sham, Enthymemes.

  25. Refutation. An argument may be refuted either by a counter-syllogism or by bringing an objection. Objections may be raised in four ways: (a) by directly attacking your opponent’s own statement; (b) by putting forward another statement like it; (c) by putting forward a statement contrary to it; (d) by quoting previous decisions.

  26. Correction of two errors, possible or actual; (1) Amplification and Depreciation do not constitute an element of Enthymeme, in the sense of ‘a line of Enthymematic argument’; (2) refutative Enthymemes are not a different species from constructive. This brings to an end the treatment of the thought-element of rhetoric—the way to invent and refute persuasive arguments. There remain the subjects of (A) style and (B) arrangement.

  BOOK III

  1. (A) Style. It is not enough to know what to say; we must also say it in the right way. Upon the subject of delivery (which presents itself here) no systematic treatise has been composed, though this art has much to do with oratory (as with poetry). The matter has, however, been touched upon by Thrasymachus in his ‘Appeals to Pity’. As to the place of style: the right thing in speaking really is that we should fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts; and yet the arts of language cannot help having a small but real importance, whatever it is we have to expound to others. Through the influence of the poets, the language of oratorical prose at first took a poetical colour, as in the case of Gorgias. But the language of prose is distinct from that of poetry; and, further, the writers of tragic poetry itself have now given up those words, not used in ordinary talk, which adorned the early drama.

  [Chapters 2–12 omitted.]

  13. (B) Arrangement. A speech has two essential parts: statement and proof. To these may be added introduction and epilogue.

  14. Introduction. The introduction corresponds to the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flute-music. The most essential function and distinctive property of the introduction is to indicate the aim of the speech. An introduction may (1) excite or allay prejudice; (2) exalt or depreciate. In a political speech an introduction is seldom found, for the subject is usually familiar to the audience.

  15. Prejudice. The various lines of argument suitable for exciting or allaying prejudice.

  16. Narration. (1) In ceremonial oratory, narration should, as a rule, not be continuous but intermittent: variety is pleasant, and the facts in a celebrity’s praise are usually well known. (2) In forensic oratory, the current rule that the narration should be rapid is wrong: rightness consists neither in rapidity nor in conciseness, but in the happy mean. The defendant will make less use of narration than the plaintiff. (3) In political oratory there is least opening for narration; nobody can narrate what has not yet happened. If there is narration at all, it will be of past events, the recollection of which will help the hearers to make better plans for the future. Or it may be employed to attack some one’s character, or to eulogize him.

  17. Arguments. The duty of the Arguments is to attempt conclusive proofs. (1) In forensic oratory, the question in dispute will fall under one of four heads: (a) the fact, (b) the existence of injury, (c) the amount of injury, (d) the justification. (2) In ceremonial oratory, the facts themselves will usually be taken on trust, and the speaker will maintain, say, the nobility or the utility of the deeds in question. (3) In political oratory, it will be urged that a proposal is impracticable; or that, though practicable, it is unjust, or will do no good, or is not so important as its proposer thinks. Argument by ‘example’ is highly suitable for political oratory, argument by ‘Enthymeme’ better suits forensic. Enthymemes should not be used in unbroken succession; they should be interspersed with other matter. ‘If you have proofs to bring forward, bring them forward, and your moral discourse as well; if you have no Enthymemes, then fall back upon moral discourse: after all, it is more fitting for a good man to display himself as an honest fellow than as a
subtle reasoner.’ Hints as to the order in which arguments should be presented. As to character: you cannot well say complimentary things about yourself or abusive things about another, but you can put such remarks into the mouth of some third person.

  18. Interrogation and Jests. The best moment to employ interrogation is when your opponent has so answered one question that the putting of just one more lands him in absurdity. In replying to questions, you must meet them, if they are ambiguous, by drawing reasonable distinctions, not by a curt answer.—Jests are supposed to be of some service in controversy. Gorgias said that you should kill your opponents’ earnestness with jesting and their jesting with earnestness; in which he was right. Jests have been classified in the Poetics. ‘Some are becoming to a gentleman, others are not; see that you choose such as become you. Irony better befits a gentleman than buffoonery; the ironical man jokes to amuse himself, the buffoon to amuse other people’.

  19. Epilogue (Peroration, Conclusion). This has four parts. You must (1) make the audience well disposed towards yourself and ill disposed towards your opponent, (2) magnify or minimize the leading facts, (3) excite the required kind of emotion in your hearers, and (4) refresh their memories by means of a recapitulation.—In your closing words you may dispense with conjunctions, and thereby mark the difference between the oration and the peroration: ‘I have done. You have heard me. The facts are before you. I ask for your judgement.’

  RHETORICA

  (Rhetoric)

  BOOK I

  1 Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic.1 Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. [1354a] Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. (5) Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art. (10)

  Now, the framers of the current treatises on rhetorïc have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about Enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. (15) The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down in some states—especially in well-governed states—were applied everywhere, (20) such people would have nothing to say. All men, no doubt, think that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus, give practical effect to their thoughts and forbid talk about nonessentials. This is sound law and custom. It is not right to pervert the judge2 by moving him to anger or envy or pity—one might as well warp a carpenter’s rule before using it. (25) Again, a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points as the law-giver has not already denned for him. (30)

  Now, it is of great moment that well-drawn laws should themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision of the judges; and this for several reasons. [1354b] First, to find one man, or a few men, who are sensible persons and capable of legislating and administering justice is easier than to find a large number. Next, laws are made after long consideration, whereas decisions in the courts are given at short notice, which makes it hard for those who try the case to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency. (5) The weightiest reason of all is that the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but prospective and general, whereas members of the assembly and the jury find it their duty to decide on definite cases brought before them. They will often have allowed themselves to be so much influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear vision of the truth and have their judgement obscured by considerations of personal pleasure or pain. (10) In general, then, the judge should, we say, be allowed to decide as few things as possible. But questions as to whether something has happened or has not happened, will be or will not be, is or is not, (15) must of necessity be left to the judge, since the lawgiver cannot foresee them. If this is so, it is evident that any one who lays down rules about other matters, such as what must be the contents of the ‘introduction’ or the ‘narration’ or any of the other divisions of a speech, is theorizing about non-essentials as if they belonged to the art. The only question with which these writers here deal is how to put the judge into a given frame of mind. (20) About the orator’s proper modes of persuasion they have nothing to tell us; nothing, that is, about how to gain skill in Enthymemes.

  Hence it comes that, although the same systematic principles apply to political as to forensic oratory,3 and although the former is a nobler business, (25) and fitter for a citizen, than that which concerns the relations of private individuals, these authors say nothing about political oratory, but try, one and all, to write treatises on the way to plead in court. The reason for this is that in political oratory there is less inducement to talk about non-essentials. Political oratory is less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic, because it treats of wider issues. In a political debate the man who is forming a judgement is making a decision about his own vital interests. (30) There is no need, therefore, to prove anything except that the facts are what the supporter of a measure maintains they are. In forensic oratory this is not enough; to conciliate the listener is what pays here. (35) It is other people’s affairs that are to be decided, so that the judges, intent on their own satisfaction and listening with partiality, surrender themselves to the disputants instead of judging between them. [1355a] Hence in many places, as we have said already,4 irrelevant speaking is forbidden in the law-courts: in the public assembly those who have to form a judgement are themselves well able to guard against that.

  It is clear, then, that rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration, (5) since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator’s demonstration is an Enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion. The Enthymeme is a sort of syllogism, and the consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, without distinction, is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic as a whole or of one of its branches. It follows plainly, (10) therefore, that he who is best able to see how and from what elements a syllogism is produced will also be best skilled in the Enthymeme, when he has further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what respects it differs from the syllogism of strict logic. The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, (15) and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities.

  It has now been shown that the ordinary writers on rhetoric treat of non-essentials; it has also been shown why they have inclined more towards the forensic branch of oratory. (20)

  Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly. Moreover, (2) before some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. (25) For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom
one cannot instruct. Here, then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody, as we observed in the Topics5 when dealing with the way to handle a popular audience. Further, (3) we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, (30) on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. (35) Both these arts draw opposite conclusions impartially. Nevertheless, the underlying facts do not lend themselves equally well to the contrary views. No; things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in. [1355b] Again, (4) it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs. And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, (5) and above all against the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.