Grasping Gallipoli

by Peter Chasseaud

  The availability of intelligence

  Applying the tests suggested in the quotation opening this chapter, the following questions should be asked of the intelligence available before the landings:

  • Was it timely? The nature of the political decision-making, and the attitude of Kitchener and Churchill in particular, meant that insufficient time was available to perform the intelligence function properly. That said, and given the shortage of aircraft and cameras, a remarkable amount of topographical, hydrographic and operational intelligence was gathered in a few weeks.

  • Was it accurate? Much of the operational and tactical intelligence collected in the two decades before the outbreak of war was remarkably accurate. The terrain intelligence was mostly good, but it is doubtful if it was properly studied and understood at command level, and disseminated, as there is no evidence to suggest it was consulted widely.

  • Was it relevant? Clearly, if troops were to land on a hostile shore.

  • Was it verifiable? Intelligence relies on cross-checking from as many independent sources as possible. To some extent this was possible – reports from agents, consuls and attachés might be verified by naval or air observation – but not always.

  • Did it answer a question? What were the questions? Were the politician and commanders asking the right questions? For example, were efforts made by agents to obtain the most up-to-date Turkish maps? There is evidence that the questions were not sufficiently focused, and that the targets were not sufficiently specific. Some of this lack of focus may be due to the low priority afforded to the Gallipoli Peninsula by Henry Wilson, the pre-war Director of Military Operations (DMO).

  • Did it engender ‘proactive actionable’ decision-making? There is a huge problem here. As the landings drew closer, the intelligence picture was turning Hamilton’s staff officers and divisional commanders against the operation, but the message coming from London was that the operation had to be carried out. In this case, with hindsight, we can see that the field commanders (except for Hamilton) were right and the politicians wrong.

  The following chapters consider the nature of the terrain and the British Intelligence effort as it gathered momentum from August 1914.

  Table 1: Summary of Geographical etc. Handbooks available for the Dardanelles area in 1914

  1905

  Confidential

  Military Report on Eastern Turkey in Europe [with three maps]

  1906

  Extracts from Military Reports on Western Turkey in Europe

  1908

  NID 838, Turkey Coast Defences [Part II on Gallipoli Peninsula & Dardanelles Defences], with charts, maps, plans & photos

  1909 Secret

  Report on the Defences of Constantinople [including Gallipoli Peninsula]; with separate folder of plates – maps, plans, panoramas & photos

  1909Confidential

  Military Report on Eastern Turkey in Europe and the Ismid Peninsula, 2nd Edn; with separate folder of plates – maps, plans & photos.

  1909Secret

  Report on Certain Landing Places in Turkey in Europe [not Gallipoli]

  1912

  Handbook of the Turkish Army

  1913

  Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations [& 1911]

  Military Report on Western Anatolia, by Captain G S Pitcairn

  Military Report on Asia Minor

  Handbook on Western Turkey in Europe

  Notes

  1. Gibson, Stevyn, ‘Open Source Intelligence: An Intelligence Lifeline’, RUSI Journal, 149 (1), February 2004, pp. 18–22.

  2. Secret Branch: 1796–1826. TNA(PRO) ADM 1.

  3. Porter, Maj.-Gen. W, History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Vol. I, Chatham: Institution of Royal Engineers, 1889, p. 229.

  4. Hope, Maj. M, ‘The Defence of Dardanelles, A Report written in 1799’, Royal Engineers Journal, September 1918, pp. 118–23.

  5. British Library Map Library, Maps SEC. 5 (2429).

  6. Ritchie, Rear-Admiral G S, The Admiralty Chart, London: Hollis & Carter, 1967, pp. 269–73.

  7. Wood, M, In Search of the Trojan War, London: BBC Books, 1985, pp. 42–6.

  8. Survey of Defensive Position near Bulair shewing the Lines constructed by the Anglo-French Army in 1855 … 1877. TNA(PRO) MPH 1/871/2.

  9. Reports and Memoranda relative to Defence of Constantinople and other positions in Turkey. Also on Routes in Roumelia, Strictly Confidential, printed at the War Office by Harrison & Sons 1877. [0631] 103 WO. TNA(PRO) FO 358/1; FO 881/3676; WO 33/29.

  10. Mead, Peter, The Eye in the Air. History of Air Observation and Reconnaissance for the Army 1785–1945, London: HMSO, 1983, pp. 17–19.

  11. Sketch of Portion of West Coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula N.W. of Maidos. G E Grover, Capt. RE, 8 February 1876. Lithd. At the Intelligence Branch, Qr Mr Genl’s Department under the direction of Lt Col. R Home CB RE, April 1877. [1:15,840]. Stamp: Rec’d TSGS Map Room 7 Jan 1888. British Library Map Library, pressmark Maps 43335 (94).

  12. Three maps of Gallipoli Peninsula from report of 31-1-1877 by G E Grover Capt. RE about proposed landing places for troops south of Hanafart (Anafarta Lim). TNA(PRO) MPH 1/871/5–7.

  13. Reports and Memoranda …, op. cit., pp. 147–8.

  14. Ibid, pp. 135–46.

  15. Turkey: Despatches. Defences of Gallipoli (Vice-Consul Odoni). TNA(PRO) FO 881/3288.

  16. Reports and Memoranda …, op. cit., pp. 103–9.

  17. Reprinted by OSO Southampton, 1903. In: Reports on the Defences of Constantinople by Lieut.-Colonel F. R. Maunsell, R.A. (Military Attaché, Constantinople.) 1903. TNA(PRO) WO 33/284.

  18. Aspinall-Oglander, Brig.-Gen. C F, History of the Great War, Military Operations, Gallipoli, Vol. I, London: Heinemann, 1929, pp. 26–7.

  19. Carte de la Presqu’Ile de Gallipoli – 2 sheets, 1876–80. TNA(PRO) MPH 1/803/2–3 from WO 33/35.

  20. Paper No. 797, Seizure of the Dardanelles as a means of coercing the Porte, War Office, 1880, in TNA(PRO) WO 33/35.

  21. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 27.

  22. Callwell, Maj.-Gen. Sir Charles E, Stray Recollections, Vol. I, London: Edward Arnold, 1923, pp. 39, 344–7.

  23. English, Lt-Col. T, late RE, ‘Eocene and Later Formations Surrounding the Dardanelles, Quarterly Journal of the Geological Society of London, 60 (1905), pp. 243– 77.

  24. Ritchie, op. cit., p. 270.

  25. Information from RE Corps Library, Chatham.

  26. Map bearing results of this survey in RGS Map Room.

  27. Reports on the Defences of Constantinople by Lieut.-Colonel F. R. Maunsell R. A. (Military Attaché, Constantinople). 1903. Secret. [A 826] 9/1903 – (B 157) – 209 WO. Intelligence Department, War Office, 12th September 1903. 50 pp. TNA(PRO) FO 881/9666X, also WO 33/284.

  28. Reconnaissance of the Chatalja Lines [1876], IDWO 1736 (Secret), Heliozincographed at the Ordnance Survey Office, Southampton, 1903. Corrections up to date. Signed F. R. Maunsell Lieut.-Col., 15th March 1903, Military Attaché.

  29. Military Report on Eastern Turkey in Europe, 1905, Prepared by the General Staff, War Office. Confidential. A 1027. I 38535. 150.-11/05. Fk. 728. E.&S. A2. Small 8vo. [Chapter VI (pp. 53–72] is on the Gallipoli Peninsula.]

  30. Foreign Office Lists, 1902–13, Public Record Office, open shelves.

  31. Graves, Philip, Briton or Turk, London: Hutchinson, 1941, pp. 180–1.

  32. Brandenburg, Erich, From Bismarck to the World War. A History of German Foreign Policy 1870–1914, London: OUP, 1933.

  33. Foreign Office correspondence relating to Secret Service: Errington (FO) to Sir William Garstin, 31-10-1907, in TNA(PRO) HD 3/135.

  34. Ibid.

  35. Guide to Greece, The Archipelago, Constantinople, The Coast of Asia Minor, Crete and Cyprus, 3rd edn, London: Macmillan, 1910, pp. 110–11, 122.

  36. Ibid, p. 158.

  37. Hankey’s evidence to Dardanelles Commission, TNA(PRO) CAB 63/18 (microfilm), sheet 146.

  38. M
ackenzie, Compton, Gallipoli Memories, London, Cassell, 1929, p. 86.

  39. PRO ADM 231/49, NID 838. Turkey. Coast Defences, &c. May 1908. The earlier reports are elsewhere in ADM 231.

  40. Ottley, The Forcing of the Dardanelles, op. cit., final draft, p. 8.

  41. Ibid, p. 10.

  42. A copy of the text of NID 838, Turkey. Coast defences, &c., Parts I, II and III, is at TNA(PRO) ADM 231/49, but the maps, charts, plates, etc., although listed in the contents, are lacking. Several of these may be found in PRO WO 301 Gallipoli Campaign maps, and in TNA(PRO) CAB 19, Minutes of Evidence to the Dardanelles Commission.

  43. The Times, 22 & 23 December 1910.

  44. TNA(PRO) CAB 17/184, sheets 248–53. The Possibility of a Joint Naval and Military Attack Upon the Dardanelles, I. Memorandum by the General Staff. N.G.L. December 19 1906. II Note by the Director of Naval Intelligence. December 20 1906. 92 B. Secret. Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. February 1907.

  45. Rhodes James, Robert, Gallipoli, London: Pimlico, 1999, p. 94; Travers, Tim, Gallipoli 1915, Stroud: Tempus, 2001, p. 35.

  46. Fergusson, Thomas G, British Military Intelligence, 1870 –1914. The Development of a Modern Intelligence Organization, London: Arms & Armour Press, 1984, Chart 10, p. 252.

  47. GSGS Register, MCE, RE, MRLG, Tolworth. Copies in TNA(PRO) WO 301.

  48. Edmonds, Brig.-Gen. Sir J, History of the Great War, Military Operations, France and Flanders 1914, Vol. I, 3rd edn, London: Macmillan, 1933, pp. 13–14.

  49. Gooch, J, The Plans of War. The General Staff and British Military Strategy c1900 –1916, London: Routledge, 1974, p. 271.

  50. Fergusson, op. cit.

  51. Gleichen, Maj.-Gen. Lord E, A Guardsman’s Memoirs, London: Blackwood, 1932, pp. 314–16, 330–2.

  52. Foreign Office correspondence relating to Secret Service, TNA(PRO) HD 3/135.

  53. Fergusson, op. cit., p 221.

  54. H Charles Woods, Evidence to the Dardanelles Commission, pp. 853–60, in TNA(PRO) CAB 19/33.

  55. Ibid.

  56. Callwell’s Summary of Proposed Evidence to the Dardanelles Commission, in TNA(PRO) CAB 19/28.

  57. Minutes of Evidence to the Dardanelles Commission, pp. 853–60, in TNA(PRO) CAB 19/33.

  58. Woods, H Charles, Washed by Four Seas – An English Officer’s Travels in the Near East, London: T Fisher Unwin, 1908.

  59. Woods, H Charles, The Danger Zone of Europe – Changes and Problems in the Near East, London: T Fisher Unwin, 1911.

  60. Woods, H Charles, La Turquie et ses Voisins, Paris: E. Guilmoto, Librairie orientale et Americaine, 1911.

  61. Samson, Maj. L L R, Report on Landing Places at Kaba Tepe (Gallipoli Peninsula) with two roads leading therefrom to Maidos and the Kilid Bahr Plateau, Adrianople 28.9.1910. 10pp. duplicated typescript. TNA(PRO) WO 106/1534.

  62. Philippson: 1:300,000 Topographische Karte des westlichen Kleinasien, based on Kiepert: 1:400,000 Karte von Kleinasien.

  63. Leaf, Walter, ‘Notes on the Troad’, The Geographical Journal, July 1912, 40(1), pp. 25–44.

  64. Leaf, Walter, Troy, a study in Homeric Geography, London: Macmillan, 1912.

  65. Acquisition date in RGS Picture Library Catalogue.

  66. RGS Catalogue Ref: MR Turkey S/S. 36.

  67. RGS Catalogue Ref: MR Turkey S/S 15.

  68. Minutes of Evidence to the Dardanelles Commission, p. 1404, TNA(PRO) CAB 19/33.

  69. F Cunliffe Owen to The Secretary, Army Council, 17-9-1927, in IWM Department of Documents.

  70. Ibid.

  71. F Cunliffe Owen to Mallet 23-3-14, in Mallet to Grey 24-3-14, N. 201; Minute by Russell 30-3-14. TNA(PRO) FO 371/1847.

  72. F Cunliffe Owen to The Secretary, Army Council, 27-9-1927, in IWM Department of Documents.

  73. Newcombe, Capt. S F RE and Greig, Lt J P S RE, ‘The Baghdad Railway’, Geographical Journal, December 1914, 44(6), pp. 577–80.

  74. Woolley, C L, As I Seem to Remember, London: Allen & Unwin, 1962, p. 93.

  75. Hinsley, F H et al, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. I, London: HMSO, 1979, p. 16.

  76. ‘Reduction of Estimates for Secret Services’, Cabinet Memorandum 19-3-1920, House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George MSS F/9/2/16.

  77. Rohde, Lt G H, Die Operationen an den Dardanellen im Balkankriege, 1914.

  78. Baedecker, Karl, Guide to Konstantinopel … Kleinasien, etc., 2te Auflage, Leipzig, 1914.

  79. Carlyon, L A, Gallipoli, London: Doubleday, 2002, p. 50.

  80. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 42fn.

  81. F Cunliffe Owen to The Secretary, Army Council, 27-9-1927, in IWM Department of Documents.

  82. Rhodes James, op. cit. p. 10; Carlyon, op. cit., p. 50.

  83. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., pp. 42–3.

  84. Corbett, Sir Julian S, History of the Great War, Naval Operations, Vol. II, London: Longmans, Green, 1921, p. 306.

  85. Greece, 1915–1922, papers relating to economic and strategic position in Balkans and Dardanelles Campaign – letters from Admiral Mark Kerr, TNA(PRO) ADM 137/4178.

  86. Report on the Defences of Constantinople. General Staff. Secret. 1909. War Office. [A 1311]. [(B 369) 100 2/09 H & S 400WO]. Copy No. 3 D.M.O. Hard buff covers, portrait format, c4.5 x 6.5 inches. xii + 151 pp. TNA(PRO) WO 33/2333. pp. 3–5.

  87. After the Dardanelles. The Next Steps. Secret. Notes by the Secretary to the Committee for Imperial Defence, dated March 1st 1915. TNA(PRO)CAB 63/17 (microfilm), sheet 137.

  88. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit. p. 139fn.

  89. Ibid, p. 139 & fn.

  90. TNA(PRO) ADM 137/1089, Dardanelles 1915 Jan–April (H.S. 1089), item 120.

  91. The Dardanelles Inquiry. Proof. Notes for Evidence … Part II – The Origin and Initiation of the Joint Naval and Military Attack on the Dardanelles, April 25. Sheet 350. TNA(PRO) CAB 17/184.

  CHAPTER 4

  Terrain Intelligence at the Outbreak of War

  This chapter deals with the intelligence processes from the outbreak of war with Germany, through the period of the commencement of hostilities with Turkey, and considers the intelligence-gathering activities in the Aegean and the Levant, particularly by the Navy. It looks critically at the accounts of Kitchener’s briefing of Hamilton and Braithwaite at the War Office in March 1915, the briefing that was to initiate the land campaign, and set the scene for one of the most controversial military expeditions in history.

  The General Staff and the Directorate of Military Operations in 1914–15

  Many of the intelligence and operational planning problems in the early months of the war may be traced to the dispersion of the General Staff, and its Division and Branch officers, following mobilisation; most experienced officers joined the BEF by a decision of the Army Council, and their replacements, if any, were retired officers with little up-to-date knowledge, dominated by Kitchener.1 This autocrat, who appeared incapable of delegation, by-passed his General Staff, preferring to maintain direct contact with the commanders in the field. One historian has gone so far as to claim that during the first year of war Hankey, the Secretary to the War Council, effectively took over the strategic-direction role of the General Staff: ‘… his written papers were exceptionally able and distinct and represented precisely the work which the General Staff should have produced.’2

  Thus an appalling situation obtained at the War Office from August 1914 to December 1915, when Sir William Robertson, as the new CIGS, took over responsibility for military strategy. At the same time (the end of 1915) the Intelligence Branch, which hitherto had been part of the Directorate of Military Operations, was made into a separate Directorate of Military Intelligence under George Macdonogh. Robertson wrote that hitherto ‘a more deplorable state of affairs can never have existed in the conduct of any war’.3 While Kitchener tried to be his own Chief of Staff, the creation of well-considered and evaluated strategy and plans was not going to occur. His weak and fearful Staff, under the ‘notoriously incompetent’ Sir James W
olfe-Murray,4 appointed by Kitchener but not taken into his confidence, were never going to become the strong, efficient General Staff required for effective strategic coordination and direction. This was to strangle the Dardanelles operation in its cradle.

  To assist in planning any operation, relevant intelligence should have been forthcoming at various stages from the European Section of MO2 under Col. B T Buckley, who had succeeded Col. Dallas in late 1914, covert or semi-covert collection operations of the Special Intelligence Section (SIS) of MO5, and various embassy, military attaché and consular reports to the Foreign Office, the Naval Intelligence Division at the Admiralty, and the Intelligence Branch at GHQ in Egypt (later also the ‘Arab Bureau’, set up at the beginning 1916, which was an offshoot of this) and the Survey of Egypt. Major L L R Samson, already introduced as a ‘military consul’ at Adrianople before the war, was head of the British Secret Service in Athens in 1914, and provided an extremely useful channel; he also opened an office in Egypt. Compton Mackenzie worked for him from 1916. The French Deuxième Bureau, the Greeks and the Russians also supplied information.

  What happened in the Geographical Section of the General Staff (GSGS, MO4) on mobilisation may be regarded as typical. All officers immediately departed for duty except Colonel Hedley and Captain W V Nugent RA, and the latter left on 15 November, being replaced by Lt-Col. P J Gordon, formerly of the Survey of India.5 Nugent, who went to Gallipoli with the 29th Division, later took command of the 2nd Ranging & Survey Section RE when it was sent to Gallipoli in June 1915. Hedley soon found himself with no other officers, and thirty-one other staff, including civilian trades, to look after. Later more civilians were employed. At the same time, the volume of work increased enormously, not just for the Western Front but all other theatres of war as well.6