Grasping Gallipoli

by Peter Chasseaud

  Hamilton’s requests

  Hamilton was clearly worried about the lack of strategic and military intelligence. On 21 March he telegraphed from Lemnos to the War Office asking that ‘arrangements be made for Diplomatic, Consular and Secret Agents to send all available information direct to him. News from Athens and Balkan States especially desirable.’34 The following day London responded by telegraphing Maxwell:

  3685 Cipher, MO5. Please send all information from Major Marsh, Tiflis [in Georgia], direct to Sir Ian Hamilton. All Diplomatic and Consular Agents have been instructed to communicate information direct to him. Major Samson [Secret Service chief] at Athens has also been instructed to do so.35

  Marsh was particularly well placed to report Russian progress on the Caucasus front. At sea in the Franconia on the 25th, Hamilton received a reply from the War Office stating ‘that they had arranged for all Foreign Office representatives to send C in C military intelligence direct in cipher, and that all other information would be sent from War Office’.36

  In view of the planned landings, intelligence was desperately needed to make up the enemy order-of-battle and dispositions map, a task which had fallen to Aubrey Herbert (or rather Johny Allen) in Cairo. Doughty Wylie at Mudros telegraphed an urgent request to Maxwell for Clayton on 22 March: ‘Please send information of Turkish forces in Syria and Mesopotamia. Important to know if any force has returned towards Dardanelles or date of possible arrival there. Ends’.37

  At Malta on 24 March the Intelligence Staff of the outward bound 29th Division called at Limpus’s intelligence office, and were given information about the Gallipoli Peninsula and the Turkish forces there, including a very detailed order-of-battle. The following day they were told that ‘all the possible landing places in Gallipoli Peninsula were found by Naval Reconnaissance to be held and entrenched, generally with three lines of trenches, but not much wire was seen’. Arriving at Alexandria on 1 April, they compiled a report from verbal information giving details of Turkish troop totals and training, machine guns, artillery, strengths, transport, reserve formations, roads, water supply, inhabitants, defences, and opposition to be expected.38

  Colonel Sir Thomas Cunninghame, the military attaché in Greece, wired on 26 March that he was leaving for Alexandria and wished to see Hamilton on the 28th. He arrived on 27 March, saw Braithwaite on the following two days, and left on the 31st. In fact he was urging avoidance of a landing on the Peninsula and, instead, recommending a landing at Salonika or elsewhere in Thrace where, presumably, the Greeks were willing to cooperate. He proposed a scheme to this effect on 3 April.39 A telegram from the War Office received on 10 April stated that Cunninghame urged his appointment as Liaison Officer between Athens and the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, but Hamilton replied that ‘no necessity was seen for such an appointment’.40 It is difficult to perceive the logic of this reply. Any arrangement which might have secured Greek assistance should have been welcome, but the Russians had vetoed Greek participation on 2 March.41

  On 14 April a War Office telegram, forwarded by Maxwell, informed Hamilton (‘GOC Medforce’) that Captain C L Cobban, Indian Army, had been appointed Liaison Officer with Russian troops (who were planning to attack towards Constantinople from the Black Sea), and had left on the 12th.42 Unfortunately the Russians were not prepared to commit their troops until German ships (Goeben and Breslau) were eliminated from the Black Sea, and this condition was not fulfilled.

  Sketches and photographs

  On 2 April, in Alexandria, Hamilton was informed by de Robeck, through Maxwell, that the ‘Navy was making reconnaissances and sketches of all possible landing places, and asking for Staff Officer to be sent to assist arrangements for cooperation’. Hamilton replied ‘that two trained aeroplane observers were being sent in the Paros today: also that Staff officer would be sent whenever he could be sent for’.43 Considering the shortage of time, this lack of direct staff liaison was a serious matter. There was, however, a naval officer, Captain Mitchell, with Hamilton’s Staff, who had worked with Birdwood on the plans for the Dardanelles operation before Hamilton arrived on the scene.

  The Navy’s reconnaissance sketches took the form of a set of drawn panoramas which were soon lithographed on tough, linen-backed paper by the GHQ Printing Section (see Chapter 8). These assault panoramas are evidence of the considerable thought, preparation and cooperation which were put by the Army and Navy into the brief, intense period before the landings. GHQ still needed further geographical information, and on 4 April Hamilton’s Staff sent a telegram to the War Office regarding water supply on the Peninsula, a reply being received two days later about this, and also about firewood.44 This was the type of information, included in the pre-war reports, which the military attachés could have supplemented before the war if so requested.

  An important development in intelligence acquisition occurred early in April, following the arrival of Commander Samson’s RNAS aeroplane squadron, capable of overflying the Peninsula at a safe height, something the Navy’s seaplanes could not do. Lieutenant Butler of this squadron was an experienced air photographer and had brought his camera and processing equipment. The combination of a reasonable altitude (4,000 feet) and Butler’s near-vertical photographs enabled Turkish trenches, batteries and other tactical features to be plotted with some precision on the new 1:40,000 (enlarged from the one-inch) map. Air photography and air survey are described in detail in Chapter 7 and in Appendix VI.

  From 4 April the Anzac Corps was embarking in Egypt and receiving its new 1:40,000 maps from the Survey of Egypt, many being distributed at sea. On the 7th the Anzac General Staff handed over their file of papers relating to the aborted Alexandretta operation to Maxwell’s GSO. On the same day, the Anzac Printing Section embarked on the Arcadian at Alexandria. This Section, formed for Birdwood’s force by the Survey of Egypt, was handed over to Hamilton on the latter’s arrival in Egypt, and was used for the lithographic printing of panoramas, sketch maps, diagrams and tactical intelligence maps before the landings, and topographical and trench maps afterwards (see Chapter 9). While at sea on 9 April, the Anzac General Staff explained the coming operations to the Australian Division Staff, and even to some members of the Corps HQ who were still in the dark.45

  Following the arrival of Hamilton’s GHQ, intelligence, much of it from Athens or Russian sources, continued to flow via Maxwell’s HQ in Cairo; for example:

  At Alexandria

  21 March:

  Cairo reports following from Athens by Greek of good position who left Dardanelles March 9th [about German ship, Enver, guns, mines etc.]

  Agent of postal boat which left the Dardanelles on March 11th …

  2 April

  Greek engine driver who recently arrived Salonika from Constantinople …

  6 April

  Well informed man just arrived from Constantinople …

  At Mudros

  13 April

  Important wire about Turkish troop numbers on Gallipoli, plus information about Smyrna, from Major Plunkett [Intelligence] in Alexandria. Informant an ex-officer of Greek Navy, now captain of SS Indiana.

  15 April

  Russian General Staff reports presence of 2nd Nizam Corps in Constantinople area.

  16 April

  Report by Greek [sea] Pilot who left Dardanelles March 8th …

  The Greek contribution is particularly important; the Greeks had very good intelligence sources in the Dardanelles area and elsewhere, and kept their material up-to-date. They had to be prepared to participate in operations if the right military, diplomatic and strategic circumstances arose. In particular, they were watching to see which way Bulgaria jumped, and were concerned about Russian designs on Constantinople and the Straits, which they intended to make their own.

  Hamilton was also in regular contact with London through a weekly King’s Messenger who travelled via Malta.46 This was vital for material which could not be entrusted to wireless signals. Compton Mackenzie, who joined Hamilton’s In
telligence Staff in May as a Royal Marine lieutenant, noted the existence of the ‘V’ or Special Intelligence Bureau for the Eastern Mediterranean, in Alexandria. Its chief was ‘Major V’ who reported to ‘C’ (Sir Mansfield Smith-Cumming) in London. After the division of Operations and Intelligence at the War Office at the end of 1915, Cumming headed MI1(c).47 Mackenzie later joined the Alexandria Bureau, before transferring to Athens.48 Lieutenant Thompson RNVR, a ‘member of the British colony in Constantinople’, was the Naval Intelligence Officer on Tenedos, where there were also two other Royal Marine lieutenants working as intelligence officers who had been with businesses in Constantinople. Major Eustace Fiennes was Intelligence Officer of the Royal Naval Division. Mackenzie also noted the large number of caiques and motor boats at Tenedos,49 vital for clandestine operations to the Ottoman coast. Following the landings, GHQ was briefly established here before moving to Imbros.

  Captain Nugent’s Report on the topography

  of the Gallipoli Peninsula

  Captain Walter Vivian Nugent RA, a regular officer who had previously served with MO4 (GSGS), and later commanded the Ranging and Survey Section on the Gallipoli Peninsula, sailed from England with the 29th Division artillery, and on arrival in the theatre immediately began to gather topographical intelligence. By 5 April, in Alexandria, he had compiled sufficient information, some of it vitally important for the movement of artillery and other transport, to present a report to 29th Division HQ. His main points were:50

  1. Many more villages exist than appear on the map, therefore more supplies and ox wagons.

  2. All villages have cart tracks leading to them, suitable for supply wagons.

  3. Field guns can be taken almost anywhere, country undulating.

  4. Many roads made lately but country roads do not dry up for another month, and would now be impassable for heavy siege artillery, such as our 6-inch howitzer with narrow wheels.

  5. At this time of year there is ample water, in fact many of the valleys are flooded and form lakes.

  6. The colouring of the Peninsula is, at the present time, green. Khaki (Indian colour) will show up very much. Later it becomes quite brown or yellow.

  7. Scrub covering hills is not sufficient to stop infantry progress. It is a kind of heather, about 3-feet high.

  While it was substantially correct, this was inevitably a general report and could not cover every locality on the Peninsula. Clearly local conditions varied enormously, and it was most unfortunate that the landing forces at Anzac became entangled in country that did not fit Nugent’s paradigm. That said, there was ample supplementary material on the Anzac zone from other sources.

  GHQ intelligence reports on the Gallipoli Peninsula

  Hamilton’s GHQ Intelligence Staff was divided into I(a), responsible for acquiring information about the enemy and the theatre of operations, and I(b), responsible for counter-espionage. Given the initial lack of detailed knowledge of Turkish dispositions, and insufficiency of geographical information, I(a) had its work cut out to determine the Turkish defences and order-of-battle on the Peninsula, the Asiatic side, and in any other area which might be able to supply reinforcements, quite apart from the other huge problem of creating a realistic terrain-picture of the Peninsula from sea and land reconnaissance, pre-war reports and maps, and agents’ reports. An air camera was not available until April, when it provided vital intelligence about the defence, and made it possible to correct the existing map and prepare a new intelligence map showing Turkish field defences.

  Among the first reports issued by GHQ MEF were the following:51

  1. Extracts from Reports on Defences of Gallipoli Peninsula (undated; 4 pages);

  2. Notes on Asiatic Coast, Gulf of Adramiti and Smyrna District (undated; 2 pages) and

  3. Intelligence Report dated 1 April (2 pages); 80,000 men on Gallipoli Peninsula.

  During the period of preparation in Egypt, Hamilton’s Intelligence Staff began an 8-page letterpress Report on Gallipoli Peninsula,52 which was received by the Anzac Corps as early as 12 April, giving military and geographical information, some of which (on landing places in the Gaba Tepe area) was extracted verbatim from Samson’s 1910 report. Further reports were soon issued, as the flow of information was unceasing. Some of the information in these was obtained from the pre-war reports, but much was the result of recently acquired intelligence, particularly that gleaned from local inhabitants. British intelligence officers were very active among the islands off the Dardanelles, and had agents on the mainland. Few in the expedition knew officially of its destination at this stage, and practically no one knew the Gallipoli Peninsula. They had to be briefed from cold, so a great deal of information had to be packed in. The report, distributed after the force arrived at Mudros, was in several sections; the first was:53

  Memorandum about Turkish defences on Gallipoli Peninsula (sent from GHQ on 15 April to Birdwood (Anzac Corps), Paris (Royal Naval Division) and General d’Amade (French contingent)).

  On 15 April Anzac Intelligence noted: ‘Information re-defences on Gallipoli Peninsula and re-water received from GHQ.’ Further reports on aspects of the Gallipoli Peninsula were soon issued by GHQ to the attacking formations:54

  1. Report on Landing Places in Gallipoli Peninsula including results of reconnaissances (received by Anzac Corps on 15 April).

  2. Water in Gallipoli Peninsula (received by 29th Division on 16 April; much information, confirming good supplies, with map references).

  3. Report on Landing Facilities between Kaba Tepe and Cape Helles – Gallipoli Peninsula (6 pages typescript, references to tracings and sketches, received by 29th Division on 19 April; also issued to Anzac Corps):

  General Description of country and coast line.

  Positions recommended for covering ships.

  Use of cavalry and field guns.

  4. Report on landing facilities and other remarks. Kaba Tepe to the Bulair Lines (received by 29th Division on 19 April); both reports 9 pages in total.

  5. Local Names for Places on the Gallipoli Peninsula; includes square references (4 pages; received by Anzac Corps on 16 April and 29th Division on 19 April).

  6. Information re Roads and Maidos (received by Anzac Corps on 16 April); Maidos reports on roads, water, etc. by the Greek Speros ‘whose home is at Maitos but who is now living at Portianos’, and by Lt-Col. Eustace Fiennes, GSO3 RND; Speros also drew a rough plan of Maidos which was redrawn and reproduced).

  7. Aeroplane Reconnaissance, GHQ 14-4-15; including a ‘camera flight’; entrenchments seen; roads: ‘An excellent road has been made from Sedd-el-Bahr to Krithia, and other roads not shown on map of Gallipoli have been constructed. A map of these roads is being sent from Tenedos, and will be forwarded when received.’ (This and further air reports received by Anzac Corps on 15, 16, 17 April)

  8. Information on the Villages, Roads, and Water in the Gallipoli Peninsula (6 pages; GHQ Stamp: GS Intelligence 16 April).

  9. Diagram showing position of supporting ships and arrangements for aerial observation and reconnaissance (Ops. Order No. 1 of 17-4-15. Para 13). For Anzac Corps: covering area from just south of Nibrunesi Point to south of Gaba Tepe; Anzac Cove (then yet to be named) exactly in centre.

  10. Further report (received by 29th Division on 20 April):

  Water Supply (includes note: ‘it is reported that all wells and slow running streams have been poisoned’).

  Landing Places (giving dimensions, shapes and slopes of beaches and exits of beaches).

  Land Mines.

  Movement (details of enemy troops seen).

  11. Further report on enemy forces (received by 29th Division on 20 April):

  Distribution of Turkish forces; detailed breakdown given, including 34,000 on Gallipoli Peninsula and 44,000 on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. The positions of Turkish Divisions were reported.

  Reserve Divisions may be reckoned at about 1/3 in guns and machine guns of active Divisions.

  Gallipoli Peninsula is rep
orted full of machine guns.

  12. Further Local names for Places (received by Anzac Corps 21 April).

  13. Diagram of Enemy Positions up to 20 April (received by Anzac Corps 22 April; lithographed sketch map – see below).

  14. Aeroplane Reports of 19 and 20 April (received by Anzac Corps 23 April).

  A 1:40,000 ‘Sketch map Square 177 Showing defences of Achi Baba correcting former reconnaissances on 13/4/15’ was printed to update existing maps.55 Successive editions of a 1:40,000 lithographed sketch map of the Turkish field defences, from 14 April in the Helles, and from the 18th in the Anzac, sectors, based on RNAS air photos and visual reconnaissance, were reproduced by the MEF GHQ Printing Section and distributed to the troops before the landings; these were dated 14, 18 and 20 April (see Chapters 6 and 7).56 A separate, untitled 1:40,000 squared lithographed black sketch map of the Gaba Tepe–Anzac–Suvla–Maidos area, showing Turkish defences, was also produced before the landings by the GHQ Printing Section specifically for the Anzac Corps.57 As this showed the area right across the Peninsula, it was clearly intended to be used for the Corps’ main thrust to Mal Tepe, to cut off the Turkish forces in the Helles sector.