A section of the Report on Landing Facilities between Kaba Tepe and Cape Helles showed that the existence of gullies and dead ground had been appreciated, as had been the fact that the map did not show all the underfeatures:
Aerial Reconnaissance: prior to a landing it appears most necessary especially to examine the ridges between Gaba Tepe and Helles already referred to. There is doubtless plenty of space here for enemy troops to take cover and to manoeuvre without being seen from seaward, and batteries do exist there, as HMS Grampus was fired upon when examining Chana Ovasi – the number and extent of ridges in this area it is impossible to know without walking over the ground or from an aeroplane reconnaissance.
An examination of the trenches on the higher ridges and on Achi Baba, which are clearly visible from certain positions seaward would also appear desirable.
Aeroplanes over Bulair are also considered necessary so as to support the enemy in the theory that a landing is to be made in that direction.
The report also referred to the Admiralty Chart F, which ‘will give a very good idea of the [Gaba Tepe–Bulair] coast and topographical features.’
These GHQ reports were incorporated by Medforce’s formations into their own reports and sketch maps, issued to officers for briefing purposes. Despite this high degree of preparation, however, there would inevitably be lacunae, both as far as specific geographical information was concerned, and in knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions and plans.
Final preparations at Mudros
The image being formed by commanders and staff from the growing body of information at their disposal, and from sea and air reconnaissance, including air photography from about 11/12 April, was one of an ominous, dark, rugged, threatening, well-garrisoned and increasingly well-defended Peninsula, on which it would be folly to attempt to land their relatively small forces. Samson’s RNAS Squadron flew forty-two reconnaissance and eighteen photographic sorties before the landings (see Chapter 7),58 providing invaluable information, and all intelligence reports showed barbed wire, trenches and field batteries rapidly multiplying. It seemed increasingly likely that the landing forces would, even if they managed to get ashore, disappear into the hinterland and there be cut to pieces like an earlier British force in the similarly dangerous terrain of Afghanistan.
Hamilton’s Intelligence Staff, like nearly everyone else who knew anything about the Dardanelles and the Turkish preparations, were pessimistic. Aubrey Herbert, who by now was with General Godley’s New Zealand Staff as Liaison Officer and Interpreter, wrote soon after 12 April noting their profound depression, and giving the view of the Intelligence Staff that the landing forces would ‘get a very bad knock’. It did not appear to him that the Intelligence Staff and Hamilton were in touch, while it seemed incredible that they were not better informed. For two more weeks the Staff fulminated, daily more convinced of vast incompetence and ignorance at GHQ and in London.59 This horrifying situation confirms what the course of events later suggested – that the whole campaign was like Dr Johnson’s leg of mutton, but rather than being ‘ill-killed, ill-drest, ill-served, as bad as bad could be’, it was ill-conceived, ill-planned and ill-led.
Hamilton’s Staff received the confidential ‘Orders for Combined Operations’ dated Queen Elizabeth 12 April and issued under de Robeck’s name, citing as references the report ‘NID 838. Turkey Coast Defences’, the ‘Military Squared Map Scale 1:40,000’, and ‘Admiralty Charts Nos 1608, 2429 and 1004’.60 On the same day the Anzac Corps Staff, which arrived at Mudros at 7 o’clock that morning from Egypt, was told that the Corps was to land near Gaba Tepe, and was given copies of the GHQ Report on Gallipoli Peninsula; these were ‘issued to Divisions, and studied by all staff officers’.61 A reconnaissance by sea was arranged for the Anzac Staff for the following day.
On the 13th General Hunter-Weston (29th Division) and his GSO2 sailed in the cruiser Dartmouth to Tenedos, where they conferred with Samson, studied the air reconnaissance and Butler’s photo results, and arranged for a copy of the results to be sent to Divisional HQ the next day.62 On the same day, Birdwood visited Hamilton, receiving an outline of the operations plan before sailing on the Anzac reconnaissance the next day.63 In the absence of thorough air reconnaissance and good air photo coverage, visual reconnaissance from the sea, in any case important, was a vital last resort.
The Anzacs were as well-prepared as they could be, given the conditions; Brigadier-General C Cunliffe-Owen (the Anzac CRA, not to be confused with Frederick Cunliffe Owen, the former military attaché in Constantinople) with Birdwood’s staff in Egypt, noted that ‘General Birdwood and staff paid several visits to the Dardanelles in warships, and the Navy in their turn sent representatives to us, to arrange details for an expedition organised jointly by both services’.64
Visual reconnaissances
On 14 April sea and air reconnaissances were made of the two key sectors, Helles and Anzac. Hunter-Weston and the 29th Division Staff sailed in Dartmouth at daybreak for Helles:
Cruised round Tekke Burnu, Cape Helles, Seddel Bahr and Morto Bay as far as Asski Hissarlik. During this no enemy was seen. Smoke from camps at various points – Chana Ovassi – behind North spur of Achi Baba – about Krithia and further South. The Southern end of the peninsula showed heavy entrenchments and much wire entanglement, especially round the three hills 114, 138 and 141. Darmouth returned via Tenedos to Mudros. GOC [Hunter-Weston] went to Queen Elizabeth to arrange principles of operation by the Fleet.65
The Anzac Staff left Lemnos in the Queen at 5pm on 13 April, for the reconnaissance the following day for which Birdwood’s General Staff issued some guidance notes on ‘what to look for’. The Anzac War Diary described this reconnaissance:
Queen steamed down the Gallipoli coast from Bulair – went in close from Ejelmer Bay to Helles point. Landing places north of Kaba Tepe were carefully examined. Enemy trenches located, also gun positions. These agreed with information obtained from Intelligence Officer on Queen – for these see map [1:40,000 sketch map]. No men seen, and apparently no work in progress… The beach selected seemed excellent. The spur of the main hill [Sari Bair] (objective) which should form the primary objective was selected. No shots fired.66
C Cunliffe-Owen gave an account of the same reconnaissance in terms that left no doubt that the terrain of the Gallipoli Peninsula was seen as daunting:
The ANZAC Staff went on board the Flagship ‘Queen.’ … we steamed up the coast for a preliminary reconnaissance, as far as Xeros Bay, and passing Gaba Tepe, our proposed landing place on the way back. The country was broken by huge ravines and mountains, rising from close to the sea. We could see very few roads, and practically no inhabitants. The country was dominated by high hills practically down to the coast. Many trenches were visible and a ship following us was fired on.67
As a result of this intensive reconnaissance effort, supplemented by the first air photos taken over the Peninsula, the Turkish defences identified were plotted on the first lithographed intelligence map issued by the GHQ Printing Company the following day, with defences to 14 April. Orlo Williams noted that these comprised a line facing the sea from Kaba Tepe to Tekke Burnu, an inner line running from Kalmaz Dagh to the north-west side of the Kilid Bahr plateau, thence to Maghram and Achi Baba, and then along the crest line to the Straits, and a third system of trenches at the south end of the Peninsula, Morto Bay, de Totts Battery, and the road to Krithia. About 100 mobile guns and howitzers had been identified.68 The intelligence picture was regularly updated before the landings.
This offshore reconnaissance was invaluable, and together with an air reconnaissance from Tenedos on 14 April by Major Villiers Stuart of the Anzac Intelligence Staff,69 enabled the Anzacs to create a terrain model used for briefing. C Cunliffe-Owen noted that after the reconnaissance a large plaster model was made of the proposed landing area, from which all officers studied the general terrain features.70 He did not record whether air photos were used in the construction of this model; they were
certainly available, even if in small numbers, but very few if any covered the crucial Anzac and Sari Bair area where the most difficult terrain would be encountered. Indeed the 1909 War Office Report – which drew on Grover’s report of 1877 – had warned specifically about operations in this area, pointing out that although landing might be easy, the terrain was extremely difficult (emphasis added):
From the head of Maidos Bay … to Kaba Tepe … a well-marked depression, slightly above sea level, runs across the Peninsula, dividing the Kilid Bahr plateau from the hills farther north. North of this depression is the Saribair Hill, a steep, rugged ridge, which rises to 970 feet, and dominates very steeply the village of Biyuk Anafarta. It is seamed with many ravines, covered with brushwood, and generally difficult of access, except on the southern spurs about Kojadere and Boghali, which are somewhat easier…. For 2 miles north of Kaba Tepe is a shelving beach, some 60 yards wide, backed by steep, friable sandy cliffs from the Saribair, a very rough and difficult ridge which extends inland towards Biyuk Anafarta. Landing for troops is easy, but they would have to march south on leaving the shore and join the other troops in the Asmak Sere. A deep, sandy ravine occurs just north of Kaba Tepe, where ramps would probably have to be made to pass field guns…. The beach south of Nibrunesi Point, for a distance of 2 miles, as far as Fisherman’s Hut, is wide and easy for landing, but a belt of thick, low scrub, rather difficult to traverse, fringes the shore…. A track runs along the beach to the landing place north of Kaba Tepe, but the cliffs have fallen and blocked it at some points, although it might be made passable with difficulty. Between Fisherman’s Hut and Kaba Tepe [the actual ANZAC landing place], where the hills approach the shore, the beach is generally narrow and lined with precipitous sandy cliffs.
More of this document is given in Appendix III. The whole gist of this description was, as had been proposed in Grover’s report, that troops landed in the vicinity of Gaba Tepe should then move south and then east towards Maidos, and not get entangled in the Sari Bair hills. In the event, through mistakes made during the landings which meant that the Anzacs landed a mile too far north, precisely the opposite took place, and the covering force became entangled in the very terrain the 1909 Report had warned about. As a result, it had to be reinforced by the main force, which was thus diverted from its strategic task of rushing across to the Straits.
Final preparations
The air camera with No. 3 Squadron only became available in the first two weeks of April, leaving a mere twenty days before the landings to create a good picture of the terrain and the Turkish defences. This was clearly a very difficult task with only one hand-held, folding camera. It was naturally suggested that air photos should be used for beach reconnaissance. On 16 April Hamilton, in the Arcadian at Lemnos, signalled asking de Robeck ‘for further information as to length, breadth of Cape Helles beaches and preparations for defence from seaward of ravine in Sq. 184, S, T, X, Y [north of Krithia, running inland from coast]. Suggested photographs of beaches might be obtained from aeroplanes’.71 The beach information was duly included in a GHQ report on ‘Landing Places’. The remainder of Hamilton’s GHQ Staff left Alexandria on the same day for Lemnos, arriving on the 18th; only four full days remained until the planned landings early on St George’s Day (23 April), which bad weather later pushed back to the 25th.
On 18 April, key personnel of 29th Division made another sea reconnaissance of the Helles sector:
Personal reconnaissance by GOC [General Officer Commanding] with GOCRA [General Officer Commanding Royal Artillery], Infantry Brigadiers, ADMS [Assistant Director of Medical Services], CRE [Commander, Royal Engineers] and OCs [Officers Commanding] of certain battalions which are to be first to land, proceeded to Tenedos in Dublin, thence to peninsula in Swiftsure and returned in evening.72
On the same day, Hamilton telegraphed to Kitchener an ‘outline of enemy’s defences as shown by aeroplane reconnaissance’, essentially an updated version of that described by Orlo Williams four days earlier.
The following day Hamilton’s Staff received the Naval Orders for the landing, and the naval plan for the control of the Dardanelles. A final up-to-date sketch map of the Turkish field defences in the area from Cape Helles to Achi Baba was being prepared with naval fire-control squaring, and this was lithographed on 20 April:
Gallipoli Peninsula. Z 2012A. Printing Section G.H.Q. Med. Ex. Force. Sketch Plan showing amended results of all Aerial Reconnaissances Corrected to 20th April 1915. Coastline taken from the 1/40,000 map supplied by War Office. Note. In all cases trenches appear to be well traversed. Where guns were noted it is so stated against emplacement.73
The reference (symbols) for this map showed fire trenches (square traversed), communication trenches (zig-zag), trees, gun emplacements with number of guns, paths and tents. Many long but isolated lengths of fire trench were shown, as well as many redoubts providing all-round defence on the hills protecting the beaches and on Achi Baba. A similar map was printed for the Anzac Corps, whose Intelligence Staff kept a detailed record of sea and air reconnaissances (including air photography) during April:74
13th
HMS Queen; Turkish positions in Gallipoli Peninsula observed by aircraft (from Intelligence Officer, Queen). Information on sketch map.
14th
Reconnaissance of West Coast of Gallipoli Peninsula in HMS Queen. Information on sketch map. Aeroplane reconnaissance carried out by Intelligence Officer, Anzac. Information entered on sketch map.
15th
Aeroplane reports of 14th received from GHQ giving trenches and gun positions on Gallipoli Peninsula.
16th
Aeroplane reports of 15th received from GHQ. Marked on map.
19th
Air reports received giving further information of enemy’s dispositions.
20th
Map showing information gained by air reconnaissance up to 18th received from GHQ.
22nd
Air reports of 19th and 20th received from GHQ and marked on map.
The importance of intelligence officers themselves going into the air, and of marking reconnaissance results on a master intelligence map, is clear; from this master map, continually updated, the Intelligence Staff prepared duplicated sketch maps which could be issued to the troops. Several problems remained. One was that, viewed from the air, much of the rugged nature of the terrain was lost – it seemed much flatter. Others were the poor quality and non-verticality of the air photos, the lack of accurate map detail against which to plot new information, and the lack of experience in interpreting air photos. All these improved immeasurably over the next few months.
Whatever Hamilton and others may have later claimed about lack of geographical information provided in London, claims refuted by Callwell, Hamilton was well-provided ‘in theatre’. Indeed, as more and more topographical information came in from the RNAS and the Navy, it was certainly not the case, as perhaps it had been at an earlier stage, that an inadequate picture of the terrain had been acquired, and it may have been this, as much as the reports of Turkish numbers, defences and dispositions, that were turning Hamilton’s formation commanders and intelligence officers, and Commander C R Samson of the RNAS who was regularly over-flying the Peninsula, against the very idea of landing.
Terrain analysis and engineer intelligence
A close examination of the 1877 Reports by Home, Ardagh, Grover, Hare and others would have revealed much about the terrain and resources of the Peninsula, important, as we have seen in Chapter 1, for any military commander. These reports had details of roads (going), water supply and firewood, and contained much information about streams, wells, and the animal and human populations supported by them. Grover’s report on a landing on Gallipoli and an attack on the Kilid Bahr and Boukali batteries gave a very good picture of a rough and inhospitable country with bad roads. He made several mentions of streams, swampy meadows and inundations in winter to be encountered on the march upon the Boukali Battery. Seasonal variations were
extremely important on the Peninsula; in the winter roads were sloughs; in the summer they gave hard, firm surfaces and the surface of the Salt Lake at Suvla dried out. Much of this information was repeated in the 1905 and 1909 reports.
Terrain. The terrain was well-described in the pre-war reports, maps and charts, and this information was amplified by attaché and consular reports, as well as by agents (Greeks). The 1908 NID (Naval Intelligence) and 1909 War Office Report on the Dardanelles defences, with their subsequent intelligence updates, gave a good appreciation of the difficult terrain and field fortifications. A post-war Naval report (Mitchell Report) giving extracts from these reports noted that: ‘The configuration of the land from Nagara to the Entrance to the Straits, with its many hills, ridges and indentations, renders this portion of the Dardanelles particularly well adapted for defence…’75 From late 1914, as we have seen, the Navy was gathering terrain information by visual reconnaissance, and from early 1915 an additional source of terrain intelligence was aerial reconnaissance by seaplane and in April by aerial photography.
Airfield Reconnaissance. An attempt at airfield reconnaissance was made by a landing party at Helles weeks before the main landings. This, and many other examples, show that the naval and military force commanders were well aware of the vital need for air support at all stages of the operations.
Roads, Going and Transport. Pre-war reports and reconnaissances gave a great deal of information about roads and their conditions. Yet General Maxwell told Kitchener about 7–9 March 1915 that there were no roads on the Peninsula, so the 29th Division would have to be supplied with pack animals. In fact there was one metalled road, and the rest were unmade roads and cart tracks, impassable in winter. All this was clearly stated in the 1909 Report which Braithwaite’s Staff possessed. The Turks had, of course, been improving certain roads as the invasion threat increased. More up-to-date information was available in the reports of various military attachés, including those of Frederick Cunliffe Owen, and of vice-consuls and, in theatre, from Greek inhabitants. The Turks were improving the main route into the Peninsula, and before the landings the Force had good information on all aspects of roads and transport.
Grasping Gallipoli Page 21