Water Supply. Water supply information was also given in the 1909 report, as it had been in the 1877 report. Even more information was forthcoming from Greek inhabitants. Despite this, it was claimed that little was known about water supply on the Peninsula. According to Hamilton and Aspinall, in March 1915 the War Office asked them, while they were at Alexandria, for such ‘good and recent’ information, as its only information was the 1905 Report on Eastern Turkey in Europe and a report from Admiral Jeffrey stating that village water supplies were ‘scanty and polluted, and that the streams dried up quickly after rain’. Aspinall admitted that the 1905 handbook’s statement that ‘water is generally plentiful in the valleys’ was correct and that the fears were groundless, except at Anzac where water supply was always a worry but thorough preparations had been made.76 During the campaign, and following consultation with the Geological Survey of Great Britain under the direction of Sir Aubrey Strahan, preliminary information was gathered and then Survey geologists, already serving in the Army, were sent to the Dardanelles to study the water supply situation.77 A great deal of information about water supply was forthcoming in theatre, and GHQ was able to produce reports on this before the landings. There is, however, a good case for arguing, as Frederick Cunliffe Owen implied, that the CIGS should have instructed the Directorate of Military Operations to pay more attention to these and related points before the war.
The Turkish Land Defences. The post-war Mitchell report,78 using extracts from the NID 838 and WO 1909 Reports, noted the following:
Infantry defences in Connection with Coast Batteries.
Prepared Defences… extensive entrenchments had been prepared on the Kilid Bahr plateau during the war with Italy [1911] to protect the Narrows from land attacks from the west. These were repaired and added to during 1914–15 … Similarly the ridges east and south of Kum Kale were entrenched for a step-by-step defence against landing on the Asiatic Coast in the Besika Bay–Kum Kale area.
The southern extremity of the Gallipoli Peninsula was not considered favourable for landing attacks, and little had been done in that locality to prepare infantry defences for the protection of the coast batteries beyond the construction of a few fire trenches and small strong-points near possible landing places. Counter-attacks by mobile troops were relied on for local defence.
These comments were in line with those made by Hogarth on the eve of the landing in April 1915.79
Since the outbreak of hostilities, the Turks had re-utilised most of their Balkan War entrenchments, dug against the possibility of invasion over the beaches, and added significant new ones. Their plan was to defend the high ground, in particular the Kilid Bahr Plateau, and a discontinuous trench line, facing towards Helles, the Aegean coast (with Gaba Tepe at its centre) and the Maidos Plain, had been created. Amazingly, there were no fortifications across the Maidos Plain itself, a weak point and a major route across the Peninsula, so a force landing near Gaba Tepe could, in theory, rapidly push right across to the Dardanelles north of Maidos. Nor was Mal Tepe, the high point of a ridge east of the Maidos neck and a component of the Kilid Bahr Plateau, fortified. That said, any force landing at Helles or Gaba Tepe would come under fire from the infantry and artillery of the Turkish garrison holding this defended high ground, and would also be subject to attack by mobile forces which were kept back for just such counter-attacks. Trenches were also dug by the Turks to command the possible landing beaches, some of which were also covered by machine guns, pom-poms and mobile field artillery batteries.80
As we have seen, most of the trenches had been discovered by British sea and air reconnaissance (including air photography), and plotted on successively updated lithographed intelligence maps issued by GHQ and used by the Navy for fire control. However, poor communications and staff work prevented some information from getting to the troops concerned. Visual observation, communicated by Queen Elizabeth to GHQ on 23 April, determined that there was an unwired, though probably mined, sixty yard gap at the west end of W Beach (north of Cape Helles), and also the feasibility of a small number of boats landing men below the cliffs north-west of W Beach towards Cape Tekke. GHQ passed this information on the same day to 29th Division, but Brig.-General Hare’s 86th Brigade, tasked with landing the covering force on the Helles beaches, never received it.81
The weather was an unknown quantity and, as on D-Day twenty-nine years later, threatened to disrupt or even wreck the landings. De Robeck, responsible for giving the word ‘go’, had to make this decision thirty-six hours before the landing date in order to allow time for the whole complex assault apparatus to function, and luckily read the weather correctly and gave the order on the morning of 23 April. The intelligence picture built up as regards roads, transport and water supply proved to be substantially correct,82 but less was known about the dispositions of the Turkish divisions on the Peninsula and the Asiatic Shore, and nothing about the way in which those troops would be deployed and used when the landing forces assaulted the beaches. As commonly happens before contact is made with enemy land forces, the enemy’s strengths and dispositions were hidden in the fog of war. The view prevailing in Medforce, based on a mass of accumulated intelligence, was that the Turks were too strong, but this did not prevent Hamilton and de Robeck from launching the assault on 25 April.
Hamilton’s plan, operation orders and instructions
for the 25 April landings
At the heart of the failure of the operations were three elements: numerical weakness, vague orders and, according to Aspinall, lack of initiative and leadership.83 The first was the one that tipped the balance, the second might have led to failure even if the first had not applied, while the third meant that the successful landings at Helles were not exploited. The assault force was simply not strong enough to deal with a determined Turkish opposition; it should have been numerically stronger by a factor of two or three. As had been found on the Western Front, a well-entrenched enemy armed with magazine rifles could destroy a much larger force attacking across the open. It was not even necessary to have machine guns, although these would clearly help, as would barbed wire and other obstacles. The obverse of numerical weakness was the strength and leadership of the Turkish forces, and to these must be applied a ‘terrain multiplier’, the value of terrain in magnifying the efforts of the defender.
Allied invasion plans, 1915
Kitchener’s instructions to Hamilton on 13 March made it clear that large-scale military operations were envisaged if the fleet failed to get through the Dardanelles aided by only minor operations. Kitchener saw the landings on the Peninsula as only the preliminary to large-scale operations in the Constantinople area in collaboration with the Russians, including the creation of an entrenched bridgehead on the Asian side of the Bosphorus. Although he stated that it was ‘undesirable to land any permanent garrison or hold any lines on the Gallipoli Peninsula’, in the next sentence he contradicted this by saying that: ‘Probably an entrenched force will be required to retain the Turkish forces in the Peninsula and prevent reinforcements arriving at Bulair, and this force would naturally be supported on both flanks by gun-fire from the Fleet.’84 Thus Kitchener appears either to have been suggesting the necessity of capturing and holding both the Kilid Bahr Plateau and the Bulair Lines, or at the least the latter. In his verbal instructions to Hamilton the previous day, he had emphasised the importance of capturing the Kilid Bahr Plateau and thus dominating the forts at the Narrows.
Hamilton’s Force Order No.1 (dated 13 April 1915) for the landings made on the 25th was singularly lacking in both strategic and operational clarity, and little idea was given of the supreme importance of thrusting rapidly across the Peninsula from Gaba Tepe to Maidos in order to capture the Kilid Bahr Plateau (Grover’s plan of 1877 and Ardagh’s of 1880, and the main component of the Greek plan) and cut off the retreat of Turkish forces in the Helles area. After the war Hamilton admitted that he should have given much more weight to this crucial thrust, and landed troops on the good
beaches south of Gaba Tepe.85 In fact he regarded the push across the Peninsula to capture Mal Tepe as the easier of the two operations (the other being the Helles landing and push to Achi Baba), which is why he assigned it to the Anzacs. The only regular division he had, the 29th, was assigned to the Helles landings which Hamilton regarded as the crucial part of the whole operation.
By this time the idea of landings at Bulair had been abandoned, the area being too heavily defended, and he gave the aim (‘object’) of the Expedition as being ‘to assist the fleet to force the Dardanelles by capturing the Kilid Bahr plateau, and dominating the forts at the Narrows’.86 However, he did not concentrate his force to achieve this. Hamilton’s command was scattered around the Peninsula from Kum Kale (French force) on the Asiatic Shore of the mouth of the Dardanelles to the north side of the Peninsula at Bulair (where the Royal Naval Division (RND) made an unconvincing feint). Concentration of force was not, therefore, achieved at the critical points of Helles (29th Division) and Gaba Tepe (Anzac Corps). While it was proper that diversions should be made, the form they took entailed a useless tying-up of manpower which would have tipped the balance elsewhere. Unfortunately it had been decided that the beaches at Helles were too restricted to land the RND simultaneously with the 29th Division. Had the RND been landed instead at Gaba Tepe or Suvla, simultaneously with the main landings, it could have joined forces with the Anzacs and together they could have cut across to Maidos.
Nor did the orders and instructions to the 29th Division and Anzac Corps emphasise the importance of capturing the Kilid Bahr Plateau. However, an Enclosure to 29th Division Operation Order No. 1 reiterated Hamilton’s ‘Object of the Expedition’ given in Force Order No. 1 on 13 April, and clearly stated: ‘The task of the 29th Division is the attack of the Kilid Bahr plateau from the south.’ But in a concluding statement of ‘the lines to be gained successively’, the final line given (‘the occupation and fortification of a line running east from Achi Baba to the sea about level 300, and west from Achi Baba via hill 472 to the sea’) was one running from north-west to south-east across the Peninsula, with Achi Baba at its centre – miles short of the Kilid Bahr plateau.87 A ‘Secret Memorandum on Artillery Cooperation between HM Ships and 29th Division’ gave the ‘Final objective for 1st day – Line through Achi Baba Peak. Level 650 [in fact 600] – Halar – Achi Baba Peak – level 472. Flanks resting on sea.’88 No mention was made in either of these instructions of pushing on to capture the Kilid Bahr Plateau. Thus formation and unit commanders could perhaps be forgiven for not clearly understanding this main imperative. There is evidence of poor staff work in the contradictory and incorrect map references provided. Again, orders were vague, despite the spot-heights and other features clearly shown and named on the 1:40,000 map.
Summary
To summarise, the Anzac Corps was directed to capture Mal Tepe, cutting off the Turkish defenders of the southern part of the Peninsula, including the Kilid Bahr Plateau, and denying them any reinforcements, but it was not ordered to push right across the Peninsula to the Straits. The 29th Division was initially to capture a line, with Achi Baba in its centre, across the Peninsula; the next stage would be to capture the Plateau and neutralise the forts so that the Navy could go through. The aim would, of course, have been made clear to General Hunter-Weston in the course of personal meetings with Hamilton and Braithwaite. Perhaps it was hoped that the success of the Anzac thrust, and the threat of the 29th Division’s landing at Helles, would force a Turkish withdrawal, in which case it would not be necessary to storm the fortified Kilid Bahr Plateau. But would the Turks give up their ‘fortress’ so easily?
The objectives of the weak covering forces were given vaguely in the following terms; for the single brigade and RE field company of the Anzac Corps’s covering force: ‘At Gaba Tepe a covering position on the south-western spurs of the hill in squares 224-237-238 (WO Map Sari Bair)’, and for the single brigade, plus a battalion and a field company, of the 29th Division: ‘At Cape Helles the Achi Baba ridge’. Once the covering forces were ashore, the main bodies would land immediately. Hamilton also held the Plymouth Battalion of the Royal Marines ready to land at Y Beach, from where it could head across the Peninsula to cut any Turkish retreat from Helles and prevent reinforcements arriving from Krithia. Formations ashore would then assemble clear of the beaches, before moving to forming-up places and rendezvous designated by staff officers landed with the covering forces.
Beyond this, Hamilton’s initial Force Order gave no further instructions regarding operations subsequent to the landings. It was almost as if the landings in themselves were considered sufficient. However, also on 13 April, GHQ issued the ‘Instructions for Helles Covering Force’ and ‘Instructions to G.O.C. A. & N.Z. Army Corps.’ The former were subsequently replaced by a new set of Instructions on 19 April. The 29th Division Covering Force was to be landed at Beaches S (Eski Hissarlik Point; De Tott’s Battery), V (Sedd el Bahr – Cape Helles), W (Cape Helles – Tekke Burnu), X (Sq. 168Q.8 – just north of Tekke Burnu) and Y (point to be selected between Square 175.P. and Square 175.X – just north of the mouth of Gully Ravine), and was given the clear objective ‘the ridge across the Peninsula, point 344 (Sq. 170.d.) [Tener Chift Knoll] – Achi Baba peak – 472 [Yazy Tepe] – coast line (Sq. 184) [Aegean coast].’89 This line was less than halfway to the Kilid Bahr Plateau. No further instructions as to operations were given, but the implication was that once the main force was ashore it would advance to the final objective, which was not, however, clearly given.
The instructions to the Anzac Corps stated their objective as ‘the ridge over which the Gallipoli–Maidos and Boghali–Kojadere roads run, especially Mal Tepe. Gaining such a position the Army Corps will threaten, and perhaps cut, the line of retreat of the enemy’s forces on the Kilid Bahr plateau, and must, even by their preliminary operations, prevent the said plateau being reinforced, during the attack of the 29th Division, from Maidos, Gallipoli or Bulair.’ Under the heading ‘Topography,’ the instructions stated:
The first essential for the covering force will be to establish itself on the hill in Squares 224, 237 and 238 (Sari Bair on the War Office map) in order to protect the landing of the remainder of the Army Corps. From the ridge between squares 237.Z and 224.F spurs run north-west and south-west to the sea. This semicircular system of ridges seems to lend itself to the establishment of a strong covering position. Whether it will be necessary or not to include the crest of the mountain must be left to your discretion.
The ‘General plan of operation of the Army Corps’ was then to make a further crucial advance:
The Landings
Leaving the covering force to protect the northern flank of the landing place and line of communication, an effort will be made to storm Mal Tepe [four miles from the landing beach] which is the centre and key to the ridge over which the Gallipoli–Maidos and Boghali–Kojadere roads run. Should the A. & N.Z. Army Corps succeed in securing this ridge the results should be more vital and valuable than the capture of the Kilid Bahr plateau itself.90
In fact, the capture of Mal Tepe and a small further advance south to the Dardanelles north of Maidos would, provided the line could be held against attacks from both directions, automatically entail the cutting off of the Turkish forces in the Helles area and the capture of the Kilid Bahr Plateau. Again, the wording of the instructions was strangely lacking in imperative direction and clarity. Birdwood undoubtedly understood what was required of him, but simply did not have a large enough force to achieve it, particularly after landing too far to the north and getting too entangled in the tortuous ravines and gullies of the Sari Bair foothills. Had the Royal Naval Division also been available to land at Suvla or Gaba Tepe, it might have been a very different story. The terrain (see Chapter 1) lent itself greatly to a rapid push across the narrow part of the Peninsula running from Gaba Tepe to Maidos, as envisaged by Grover in 1877 and by the Greeks, and there seems no reason why, with determination and a clear plan, this co
uld not have been achieved. This, after all, was the essence of the earlier Anglo-Greek plan.
Conclusion
Looking at the quantity and type of intelligence material in the hands of Hamilton’s Force at the time of the landings, there can be no doubt that it was not bad maps or a lack of terrain intelligence which stymied the operation, but a poor plan and the sturdy fighting qualities of the Turkish soldiers. The British covering forces got ashore and, at Helles at least, initially defeated the opposition. Then a pall of exhaustion, uncertainty and inertia fell over the battlefield. Battle-shocked soldiers, their leaders having become casualties, went to ground when they should have been pushing forward. It was not the fault of the maps or lack of terrain intelligence.
Could more have been done to identify Turkish forces and dispositions? The British air survey effort in April 1915, though providing vital intelligence, was extremely rudimentary. It will be emphasised in Chapter 7 that the British lagged behind the Germans and Austrians in air survey; peacetime reconnaissance or survey flights had not been undertaken as no suitable air cameras had yet been developed by the British (despite decades of experiments), and no airships and few aeroplanes were in theatre. Air photo reconnaissance had only just been started in the RFC and RNAS in 1913–14, particularly by Victor Laws and the Watson camera in the Beta airship and later in an aeroplane. This prototype camera was most unfortunately badly damaged on the eve of the war when the aircraft in which it was mounted crashed on landing. With the primitive photographic equipment available in April 1915 at the Dardanelles, and even had Hamilton’s force been equipped with more and better aeroplanes and with the new A-camera, it is extremely unlikely that, in such difficult terrain, Turkish troops and movements could have been identified, particularly as they were quite mobile and moved (often at night) in relatively small detachments. In France and Flanders, troop movements were identified in 1914 by long dark corps and divisional columns marching along dusty white roads, and by train movements. Neither of these applied to the Peninsula. Hidden among trees, olive groves, orchards and scrub, and in the shadow of ravines and gullies, companies, battalions and batteries could remain concealed and, except at times of emergency, move only under cover of darkness.
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