In the next chapter we look at the maps provided for the Allied forces in the run-up to the landings, and examine their sources and fitness-for-purpose.
Notes
1. Chasseaud, Peter, ‘Mapping for D-Day: The Allied Landings in Normandy, 6 June 1944’, The Cartographic Journal, London, 38(2), pp. 177–89.
2. Ibid.
3. Pritchard, Maj.-Gen. H L, The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Vol. VI, Chatham: Institution of Royal Engineers, 1952, p. 15.
4. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, Islamic Science, London: World of Islam Festival Publishing Co., 1976, pp. 27–48.
5. War Office (1944), Notes on Maps of the Balkans, July 1944, Confidential, Directorate of Military Survey, London, p. 40.
6. Anon. (probably Col. Mehemmed Shevki Pasha), ‘The Topographical Service in the Ottoman Empire and the Modern Turkish Cartography’, L’Universo, No. 1, 1920, pp. 127–36.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Planheft Südosteuropa, Südlicher Teil, 1 Juli 1943 (German Military Survey), Berlin, given in War Office (1944), Notes on Maps …, op. cit.
10. MI4 (1924), Latitudes of the Turkish Mapping System, typescript note by MI4, dated 8/8/1924, in MCE, RE.
11. Plates to Accompany the Military report on Eastern Turkey in Europe and the Ismid Peninsula [General Staff, War Office, London] (Second Edition, 1909). (B414) 200 6/09 H & S 454-2WO. Foolscap, buff thin card folder; maps, plans and photographs covering Constantinople, Central Plains (Adrianople, etc.), Istranja Balkan District, The Eastern Rhodope District. TNA(PRO) FO 881/9513X.
12. Col. Mike Nolan, in his unpublished notes ‘1907–1917 – The Golden Years in the Development of Cartography in the Ottoman Empire’ (2000), states ‘printed between 1910 and 1911 or 1913–1914’.
13. Dowson, E M, Mapping from Aeroplane Photographs in Gallipoli, Secret, duplicated typescript report with maps and photos, Survey of Egypt, c.Sep 1915, p. 3.
14. MI4, op. cit.
15. Anon, op. cit.
16. VA11 War Diary, Bayerisch Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv, Munich.
17. See Chasseaud, Peter, Artillery’s Astrologers – A History of British Survey and Mapping on the Western Front 1914–1918, Lewes: Mapbooks, 1999 for artillery survey in the period before and during the First World War.
18. Two copies are held in the Australian War Memorial collection.
19. Copy in Australian War Memorial; photograph of this in TNA(PRO) WO 153/1058.
20. Cunninghame, Minutes of Evidence to the Dardanelles Commission, p. 1155, TNA(PRO) CAB 19/33.
21. Sheets J8 (Kuchuk Keui), J10 (Hissarlar), K10 (Chamlija), L10 (Maltepe and Islands), in TNA(PRO) WO 301 pieces 171, 177, 187, 192, respectively.
22. F Cunliffe Owen to The Secretary, Army Council, 27-9-1927, in IWM Department of Documents.
23. A 1:100,000 contoured sheet in TNA(PRO) WO 153/1058 has no graticule; it carries a 1915 print date.
24. Anon., op. cit.
25. Nicholas to Hedley, TNA(PRO) WO 301/46.
26. In TNA(PRO) WO 153 and WO 301.
27. Anon., op, cit.
28. In Report from Major R.H. Phillimore, R.E. (8th Field Survey Co., R.E.) on Turkish Staff Maps 1:25,000 and 1: 5,000 of Gallipoli and Chanak Kale, with list of Conventional Signs Employed. 20/2/1919. DGCD. 30, 3(4).
29. Nicholas to Hedley, 8 May 1915, in TNA(PRO) WO 301/46.
30. TNA(PRO) WO 153/1055.
31. War Office (July 1944), Notes on Maps of the Balkans, op. cit.; Planheft Südosteuropa, op. cit., and other sources.
32. TNA(PRO) WO 153/1058.
33. MI4 (1924), op. cit.
34. Carte de la Presqu’Ile de Gallipoli (in two sheets); published in 1854 by the Dépôt de la Guerre, Paris, under the direction of Colonel Blondel (engraved by Erhard, 42 rue Bonaparte), printed Chez Kaeppelin, Quai Voltaire.
35. Reports and Memoranda relative to Defence of Constantinople and other positions in Turkey. Also on Routes in Roumelia. Strictly Confidential, Printed at the War Office by Harrison & Sons. 1877. [0631] 103 WO. TNA(PRO) FO 358/1; FO 881/3676; WO 33/29.
36. Memorandum on the Passage of the Dardanelles by Major J C Ardagh RE, in Paper No. 797, Seizure of the Dardanelles as a means of coercing the Porte, War Office, 1880, in TNA(PRO) WO 33/35.
37. Reports and Memoranda, op. cit.
38. The Dardanelles Commission 1914–16, London: The Stationery Office, 2001, p. 118.
39. Callwell, Maj.-Gen. Sir C E, The Dardanelles, London: Constable, 1919 (2nd edn 1924), pp. 47–8.
40. Catalogue of Maps Published by the Geographical Section of the General Staff, War Office, London, 1923, p. 7.
41. Gallipoli Campaign 1915, Maps, TNA(PRO) WO 301/473.
42. Close, Col. C F and Cox, Capt. E W, Text Book of Topographical Surveying, 2nd edn, London: HMSO, 1913, p. 183.
43. Ibid, p. 180.
44. Hamilton, Sir Ian, A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book During the Russo–Japanese War, 2 vols, London: Edward Arnold, 1905.
45. Jones, H J, The War in the Air, Vol. II, London: OUP, 1928, p. 2.
46. Gallipoli Campaign maps in TNA(PRO) WO 153 and WO 301.
47. Bullen, John, List of Maps of Gallipoli Campaign, n.d., in the Australian War Memorial, Gallipoli, Vol. I, p. 8.
48. Travers, Tim, Gallipoli 1915, Stroud: Tempus, 2002, p. 68.
49. De Robeck to Churchill, 5 May 1915, 13/65, Chartwell Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge.
50. Diary and papers of General C Cunliffe Owen, p. 18. TNA(PRO) CAB 45/246.
51. Ibid, p. 19.
52. Ibid, Extracts from a lecture on Artillery at Anzac, given at the R.A. Institution by Brig. Gen. C. Cunliffe Owen, p. 1.
53. Dowson, E M, ‘Further Notes on Aeroplane Photography in the Near East’ Geographical Journal, 58, 1921, p. 359.
54. Moorhead, Alan, Gallipoli, London: Hamish Hamilton, Four Square edn, 1963, p. 108.
55. Author’s study of Sheets 1, 2 and 3.
56. Ibid.
57. Dowson, ‘Further Notes …’, op. cit.
58. Royal Naval Division misc. correspondence & arrangements for embarkation 1915, p. 39, PRO ADM 137/3088A.
59. Anzac Corps General Staff War Diary, TNA(PRO) WO 95/4280.
60. Secretary, War Office, London to GOC-in-C, Egypt, rec’d 9/3/15, in TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.
61. Ibid.
62. Hickey, Michael, Gallipoli, London: John Murray, 1998, p. 58.
63. Diary of Brig.-Gen. S W Hare, GOC 86th Brigade, 29th Division.
64. Anzac Corps General Staff War Diary, op. cit., referring to ‘Copy of W.O. Cablegram 4008 (recd 9th) – re maps’.
65. Anzac General Staff War Diary, op. cit.
66. Lt-Col. Ward, Mudros, Lemnos to Maps Officer, W.O. , recd 10/4/15, in TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.
67. Secretary, War Office, London to Director of Intelligence, Cairo, recd 10/4/15, in TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.
68. Col. Ward [GHQ Mudros] to Int. Dept Maps Section [Cairo], recd 13/4/15, in TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.
69. Secretary, War Office, London to Director of Intelligence [Cairo], recd 17/4/15, in TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.
70. Royal Naval Division, General Staff, War Diary, TNA(PRO) WO 95/4290.
71. Anzac Corps, Intelligence War Diary, TNA(PRO) WO 157/678, Appendix Z12.
72. TNA(PRO) WO 301/499-503, Gallipoli Campaign 1915, maps.
73. Anzac Corps, Intelligence War Diary, in TNA(PRO) WO 157/668 & 678.
74. Anzac Corps Intelligence War Diary, in TNA(PRO) WO 157/668.
75. [Mitchell Report] C.B. 1550 Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate the Attacks delivered on and the Enemy Defences of the Dardanelles Straits, 1919. Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery Division, April 1921, pp. 5–18. TNA(PRO) ADM 186/600.
76. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., pp. 121–2.
77. Strahan, A, Summary of Progress of the Geological Survey and Museum for 1918, HMSO, p. 3. The Survey geologists were C H Cunningham (Lt, Machine Gun Corps, died of wounds 1918), R W Pocock (Lt, R
oyal Garrison Artillery) and T H Whitehead (Capt., Suffolk Regiment).
78. Mitchell Report, op. cit.
79. Hogarth, D G, ‘Geography of the War Theatre in the Near East’, Geographical Journal, June 1915, 45(6), pp. 457–71.
80. Turkish historian Kenan Celik, on the basis of Turkish official accounts, holds that machine guns were not deployed in any great numbers on the beaches.
81. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 142.
82. Ibid, pp. 121–2, 142, 149–50.
83. Ibid, p. 234.
84. Ibid, Maps & Appendices: Appendix 1.
85. Rhodes James, Robert, Gallipoli, London: Pimlico, 1999, p. 86.
86. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., Maps & Appendices: Appendix 3.
87. Ibid, Appendix 17.
88. 29th Division General Staff War Diary, op. cit.
89. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., Maps & Appendices: Appendix 4.
90. Anzac Corps General Staff War Diary, TNA(PRO) WO 95/4280; Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., Maps & Appendices: Appendix 5.
CHAPTER 6
The First Operations Maps
Just as it has been generally accepted without query that the intelligence material supplied to Medforce was totally inadequate, it has been taken for granted in the literature on the Dardanelles Campaign that the maps were inaccurate and inadequate. In this chapter the mapping situation is examined, and it is suggested that the evidence is such that the War Office can at least be partly exonerated.
The maps, plans and operation orders for the first landings, April 1915
What was this map used at Gallipoli in 1915 which came in for so much criticism? The assault map, at the 1:40,000 scale (about 11⁄4 inches to the mile), was an enlargement of the 1908 one-inch War Office map produced by the Geographical Section of the General Staff (GSGS, or MO4) under the direction of Colonel Charles Close. This was derived from the French 1:50,000 survey of 1854. That much is incontrovertible, but why was this apparently unremarkable map the subject of so much ire? First and foremost, it was a scapegoat, blamed when the operations failed to make progress. Had the landing forces managed to overcome the opposition and rush forward those crucial four miles to Maidos and past Achi Baba, securing the Kilid Bahr Plateau and permitting the Fleet to at least attempt to pass the Narrows, little or nothing would have been heard of the inadequacies of the map (until the army was perhaps held up farther on). That much is clear.
Several points should be borne in mind. Most of Europe was already fairly well mapped, but Turkey was not. When the armies of Germany, France, Britain and Russia went to war in August 1914 they did so with small-scale maps. Their standard operations maps were copies of the national surveys of the countries in which they were planning to operate – the 1:80,000 map of France, 1:60,000 and 1:100,000 maps of Belgium, 1:100,000 maps of Russia, and so on. Many of these maps, particularly the French 1:80,000, were from old and relatively inaccurate surveys, and gave a poor impression of relief. In no case had they been revised from air photos, for the simple reason that air survey was in its infancy, and in fact had not yet emerged from its experimental stage. The resources and technology were not in place.
The British map of the Gallipoli Peninsula fell into this category, and in fact the French map on which it was based had been surveyed using techniques similar to those used for the French 1:80,000 General Staff map in the mid-19th century. No large-scale regular survey of the Peninsula was made until the eve of the war, and this by the Turks, the resulting maps only being issued to the troops just before operations began. They were, therefore, denied to the Allies until sheets were captured after the landings on 25 April 1915. The Allies cannot, therefore, be blamed for not possessing what was not yet available. Only an agent in place within the survey department in Constantinople would have been able to obtain the required material. We do not know whether the British, French, Russians or Greeks had such an agent, or whether attempts were made by military attachés or Secret Service bureaux to obtain such material. The Greeks would have been most likely to have obtained it, as their General Staff had been planning an attack on the Peninsula for several years.
When serious planning for the D-Day operations began in 1943, most of the intended area of operations was covered by an inaccurate, small-scale, out-of-date, map (the French 1:80,000 mentioned above), and a massive air survey effort, involving thousands of photographic sorties and the use of some of the most modern photogrammetric resources, had to be launched in order to provide the planners and invasion forces with an accurate, large-scale map suitable for fire-support, and for artillery work subsequent to the landing.1
The question of purpose is crucial when assessing whether a map is appropriate for its task. In 1944, as a result of the experience of Gallipoli and earlier Second World War amphibious operations, assault maps were prepared at the large scale of 1:12,500 covering the approaches to the beaches, the beaches themselves and the country inland, overprinted with detailed intelligence as to the enemy defences, and including information about beach gradients, underwater obstacles, going, and so forth. Similar maps were also prepared at 1:25,000, covering the whole operational area, and also gridded topographical maps at 1:50,000, 1:100,000 and 1:250,000.2
In early 1915, however, no preparations had been made for a large-scale opposed landing, as this had not been envisaged before the war. Although combined studies had been undertaken, reports written, and the subject included in the Staff College curriculum, there had been no combined amphibious operational planning or rehearsals; the War Office and Admiralty had simply not forseen the necessity for such a combined planning staff, although they cooperated closely when it came to intelligence gathering and dissemination, and in any case inter-service jealousies would have rendered it difficult to achieve. Nor was there any consideration of the potential of the embryonic techniques of aerial photogrammetry as aids to the preparation of assault mapping. This was not the case in other countries – the Austrians and Germans were notably ahead in their experiments with air survey, as we shall see in Chapter 7, the Germans even advocating a ‘survey airship’ of the Zeppelin type for colonial surveys. At the outbreak of war, aeroplanes were generally considered to generate too much vibration to be used as camera platforms. Effective dampening mountings were arrived at by experimentation during the early months of 1915. Until then, air cameras were normally hand-held.
Mapping for the Gallipoli Campaign has had a very bad press, though its reputation has more recently been at least partially salvaged by Colonel Mike Nolan RE, whose series of articles in the Gallipolian served as a much needed corrective but did not, unfortunately, reach a wide enough audience. The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers,3 taking its cue from Aspinall-Oglander’s Official History, stated: ‘The only map of Gallipoli available for use during the attack was a one-inch [1:63,360] compilation made by the Geographical Section. From the nature of the case it was not reliable, and its inaccuracies caused many difficulties.’ This chapter examines the maps available before the landings, and evaluates them in the light of contemporary and subsequent criticisms.
Existing Turkish maps and surveys
The mathematicians, astronomers, geodesists, navigators and instrument makers of the Islamic world were at one time world-leaders in their field.4 However, a different pattern of technological and economic development from the European model meant that modern land survey techniques took longer to become established there. Theodolites first appeared on Ottoman territory in the hands of European explorers, map-makers and surveyors, and the arrival of the European railway companies in the 19th century – the railways from Salonika and Sofia to Constantinople were built and operated by German, Austrian, French and Belgian companies – created a further impetus for the use of modern survey methods, at least in great engineering works. The arrival on the scene of modern artillery in the late 19th century, together with continuing European encroachment on ‘the sick man of Europe’, meant that, like the European powers, the Ottoman Empire had to
inaugurate a large-scale survey for defence purposes. No definitive history has yet been written of the Turkish Military Survey, and in the various sources available the facts and dates disagree.
The French Crimean War survey of the Gallipoli Peninsula, in two sheets dated 1854, remained the only large-scale survey of the whole Peninsula up to the eve of the First World War. Austrian, Russian and Turkish small-scale General Staff maps of the Balkans, Dardanelles, Constantinople and Bosphorus areas were produced during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Russian surveys covered Turkey in Europe, including the Gallipoli Peninsula, and were used to produce various Russian maps at 1:42,000, 1:84,000 and 1:126,000;5 although the ground surveys may have been executed at the larger scales, the final printed sheets covering the Peninsula appear to have been at 1:126,000. Smaller-scale maps were mainly German and Austrian productions; e.g. Kiepert’s 1:400,000 Karte von Kleinasien, and Philippson’s derived 1:300,000 Topographische Karte des westlichen Kleinasien.
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