Terrain information was also reported: ‘a swamp with standing water of about 400 yards each way was seen in squares J and K 64 and 65. Swandere and Avulzar Rivers contain water.’ A sketch map showing the lines of mines was forwarded the following day. On the 14th further details of batteries, trenches and topography were acquired.38 Although Ark Royal made successful visual experiments to locate Turkish mines below the surface, the technique could not be guaranteed as the current and other surface anomalies often rendered this impossible. It was intended that photography would be used, but it is not confirmed that this actually took place; the same problems would have been encountered as with visual reconnaissance. An air camera was not available until Samson’s RNAS No. 3 Aeroplane Squadron arrived at the end of March, and even then it was not until around 11 April that the first useful photos of the Peninsula were obtained. On 15 March Ark Royal reported to Sueter that information had been obtained and guns and mines only located by the most careful use of binoculars and squared maps by the observer, and that the pilot without an observer would have brought back no information of any value. On the same day she reported that ‘experiments with mine sunk near Ark Royal seen at 5-feet, 10-feet and 18-feet depths at 1,500, 1,000 and 3,000 feet respectively, but conditions of light and sea were very favourable. Appearance similar to objects seen in Dardanelles.’39
The results of all visual reconnaissance sorties flown to 19 March were plotted on an outline map covering the Peninsula as far north as Gaba Tepe, and as far east as Nagara Point on the Asiatic Shore; this showed trenches and field guns south of Gaba Tepe, a gun emplacement at the cape between Gaba Tepe and Helles, and two emplacements at Helles, as well as trenches and two field gun positions. An emplacement was shown at De Tott’s battery, and plenty more trenches, emplacements and camps along both shores of the Narrows. On 31 March Ark Royal reported that ‘Commander Samson’s aeroplane squadrons [sic] have now commenced work from Tenedos. Work in Dardanelles will now be delegated to aeroplanes. Ark Royal’s seaplanes will be used for more distant reconnaissance etc.’ During February and March, Ark Royal’s eight seaplanes logged seventy-four sorties, during only twenty-nine of which was useful information obtained. Total time in the air was 60 hours and 28 minutes, and in this period there were no fewer than thirty-two engine failures.40
On 7 April Lieutenant Bromet took Ark Royal’s Wight Seaplane No. 172, with Lt-Commander Hornby as observer, in an attempt to reconnoitre the Bulair Lines and the town and port of Gallipoli, but engine trouble forced a return after a flight lasting only thirty-six minutes.41 This type of problem plagued the seaplanes. The shortage of aircraft in the Aegean led to a demand by Birdwood, and then by Hamilton, for some of the French machines in Egypt to be sent to the Dardanelles. On 8 April Kitchener signalled to Maxwell: ‘Admiralty here think you had better keep the seaplanes for service in Egypt and explain through Hamilton to de Robeck the necessity of their remaining if he wants your Brigade’ (Cox’s Indian Brigade).42 Hamilton was having to do some horse-trading with Maxwell to get what he and de Robeck wanted. On the same day, de Robeck signalled to Maxwell: ‘Request seaplanes, urgently required for French Army, be sent ASAP. They will be returned immediately they can be spared.’43 On the 9th Hamilton signalled to Maxwell: ‘Certainly will do my best about the seaplane.’44 The next day some Schneider Cup Sopwith single-seater seaplanes arrived, and Ark Royal noted that Minerva and Talbot would also operate with seaplanes.45 Hamilton signalled again to Maxwell: ‘It is all right about your getting the seaplanes.’46 From 17 April Doris also worked with seaplanes, and Ark Royal announced that she was now responsible for five types of seaplanes and three types of engines.47
In April Ark Royal’s seaplane operations became more efficient than in February and March; eight seaplanes flew seventy sorties in that month, obtaining useful information during forty-eight of these. Ten days were unsuitable for flying owing to bad weather, but due to being at sea or erecting new machines at Tenedos, flying only took place on sixteen days; total flying time was 72 hours and 42 minutes, and there were only twenty engine failures. During April one machine was lent at different times to Minerva and Doris.48 On the eve of the landings, Ark Royal’s seaplanes kept the landing places under close observation. At 9.30pm on 24 April Anzac Corps HQ received a report from Ark Royal that Gaba Tepe was quiet and that no guns had been seen.49 The Turks were lying low, but they were also watching and prepared.
Kite balloons
In April the Manica, a tramp steamer converted to a balloon ship, arrived with No. 1 Kite Balloon Section, equipped with a Drachen-type kite balloon for observation purposes; two or three observers were carried in the basket, in telephone communication with the ship. It was used primarily for spotting for naval gunfire, though general reconnaissance was important. As far as is known, no photography was done from the kite balloon. This was an activity much practised by the French and Germans before the war but, despite various experiments extending over decades, Britain lagged seriously behind by 1914.50 Manica was at Lemnos on 16 April,51 and was later joined by Hector, which left Liverpool on 2 June. On 25 April the landings of the Anzac Corps were supported by naval gunfire directed by kite balloon observation, no aeroplanes being able to operate this far from Tenedos.52 A report on the work of the kite balloon ships at the Dardanelles made no mention of photography, but emphasised the importance of observers possessing a geographic capability, including knowledge of:
The appearance and characteristics of modern earthworks and emplacements, and of troops in the open; cavalry, infantry and artillery… Map-reading, contours and visibility of ground. Use of the Compass… Estimation of distances, and the effect of rising and falling ground on the fall of shot.53
Samson’s No. 3 Squadron RNAS, and the first air photos
On 26 February Sir James Maxwell asked the War Office, in view of possible landings at Gallipoli, if aeroplanes were to be sent for Birdwood’s force in Egypt. The War Office replied the following day that no aeroplanes were available, but the Navy had four aeroplanes besides their seaplanes off the Dardanelles (but they could not take off from Tenedos). Churchill had already completed plans for sending Commander Samson’s No. 3 Squadron RNAS, consisting of twelve naval aeroplanes and pilots, then operating in Flanders, to the Dardanelles. On 8 March the Admiralty sent these out, supplementing them with a kite-balloon section.54 En route, Samson collected ten new French Farman aeroplanes at Marseilles, but finally arrived at Imbros on 23 March55 with only five out of the twenty-two in a serviceable condition. The French were sending six aeroplanes to Mudros from Egypt, but these did not, apparently, arrive until May.56 By 23 March, the day that Samson’s Squadron arrived by sea at Imbros, an airfield had already been prepared at Tenedos, and de Robeck was planning to continue the naval operations.57
Samson himself arrived two days after the fleet bombardment of the Dardanelles forts, but the rest of his squadron took another two weeks to arrive, and the first British aeroplane (as opposed to seaplane) flight did not take place until 27 or 28 March. Even then, apart from Butler’s private camera (first used on 4 (Jones) or 14 (Aspinall-Oglander58) April), good photographs were not available for another fortnight. Samson allotted him a Henri Farman machine, which he regarded as ‘quite suitable for this single seated work’,59 and the intelligence picture was gradually built up on the 1:40,000 base map. Butler did his own processing, assisted by an amateur photographer, the Squadron having no specialist photographic unit attached. At first the photos were regarded as tools for detecting Turkish batteries, mines and other defences rather than as a means for accurate defence and terrain mapping. This view rapidly changed, as it became clear that only air photography could create a detailed picture of the beaches and hinterland, the terrain and the growing defences.
Butler’s first photographs may have been experiments made with locating underwater mines, and it was not until 11 April that No. 3 Squadron first attempted to locate trenches and batteries in the Helles and Anzac areas, and
even then this was a visual rather than a photographic reconnaissance. The first definite mention of photographic reconnaissance was on 14 April, when an intelligence report stated:
Aeroplane report 14 April; Flights [sorties] carried out:- One spotting flight. One flight taking photographs. One flight taking major Villiers Street to Gaba Tepe. Two reconnaissance flights. Flight with camera 11 a.m. Photographs developed not very good owing to age of films. Prints will be sent tomorrow showing position around Sedd-el-Bahr neighbourhood.60
GHQ issued an ‘Aeroplane Reconnaissance’ report on the same day, covering entrenchments located, and also roads:
An excellent road has been made from Sedd-el-Bahr to Krithia, and other roads not shown on map of Gallipoli have been constructed. A map of these roads is being sent from Tenedos, and will be forwarded when received.61
A further eighty-minute ‘camera flight’ took place on the morning of the 17th, when Flight-Commander Marix took Butler up as an observer, but no information was given about the photos obtained.62 Specific photographs of the beaches and their exits were taken at a late stage just before the landings (Table3).
Table 3: Examples of air photos taken before the landings63
Date
Location and notes
14 April
[see above – no details]
17 April
[see above – no details]
19 April
Trenches in square 155 a, g. [hills at In Tepe, on Asiatic side of Straits]
20 April
Morto Bay & Eski Hissarlik, square 169 v, w, x. [Morto Bay & area north of De Tott’s Battery]
21 April
Morto Bay, square 168 t, u, y, z. [area inland of Morto Bay, including road to Krithia]
21 April
Beach, square 168 c, h. [mouth of Gully Ravine & beach to south]
21 April
Beach, square 176 b, g. [south of Sari Tepe, towards Y Beach]
21 April
Cape Helles and part of Sedd-el-Bahr, showing trenches, redoubts, etc.
21 April
Sedd-el-Bahr.
24 April
Achi Baba, showing entrenched all-round defence position, etc
Butler’s German plate camera – a small, folding, hand-held Goertz-Anschutz taking small, narrow-format exposures only about 3¼ x 5¼ inches (8.3 x 13.4cm) – provided contact prints at a scale of roughly one-inch = 280 yards (1:10,080) from negatives exposed at about 4,000 feet. Anti-aircraft fire later forced the aircraft to fly at 7,000 feet and over, at which height the resultant prints would be at a much smaller scale (1:17,640) and of correspondingly less use from a tactical point of view. The focal length of his camera was 12cm (scale = f/h, where f = focal length and h = height).64 Photos taken later with the French camera, focal length about 12 inches (30cm), were significantly larger, 120 x 170mm format.
It does not appear that Butler had enlarging equipment with him, and there was probably no local civilian professional photographer at Tenedos. Dowson, at the Survey of Egypt, could easily have supplied such equipment, but there is no evidence that it was asked for. In this respect the expedition was remarkably ill-equipped. The contact prints supplied Hamilton and de Robeck with an absolutely indispensable picture of the Turkish defences (including trenches and battery positions), the terrain of the assault beaches, their exits and hinterland, and of the interior. They also made it possible to correct the map, as it became clear, for example, that there were two redoubts, and in fact two hills (observation from the sea would already have made this clear), at the locality at Helles known as Hill 138. These twin hills had been shown correctly on the French 1854 map but, due to the wide contour interval on the British one-inch and 1:40,000 maps, only as a single spot-height on these. Given the primitive state of air photo interpretation at this time, it is probable that full value was not extracted from the images, even though some of the prints were of remarkably good quality. There was no trained or experienced air-photo-interpreter in the theatre except for the RNAS people themselves, who were learning as they went along, for the simple reason that this branch of intelligence work was only just beginning; the British armies in France were only just realising the need for air photo experts at this time, the first being appointed in July.65
Visual and photographic air reconnaissance was absolutely crucial before the landings. Army and Navy intelligence officers, themselves going into the air, and marking reconnaissance results on landing on a master intelligence map, supplied vital information. Much could be confirmed from a close study of the photos. From this master map, continually updated, the Intelligence Staff prepared duplicated, and later lithographed, squared sketch maps which could be issued to the troops, and to the Navy for fire support. Several problems remained. One was that, viewed from the air, the rugged nature of the ground was lost – it seemed much flatter. Others were the poor quality and non-verticality of the air photos, the lack of accurate map detail against which to plot new information, and the lack of experience in interpreting air photos. All these improved immeasurably over the next few months.
On 2 April, in Alexandria, de Robeck cabled Hamilton that the ‘Navy was making reconnaissances and sketches of all possible landing places, and asking for Staff Officer to be sent to assist arrangements for cooperation’. Hamilton replied that ‘2 trained aeroplane observers were being sent in the Paros today: also that Staff officer would be sent whenever he could be sent for’.66 The observers, destined for Samson’s No. 3 Squadron, were Major R E T Hogg, Central India Horse, who arrived at Tenedos on 10 April with Captain Jenkins to join No. 3 Squadron. Both were experienced observers, attached to the Royal Flying Corps, who had worked with French seaplanes in Egypt.67 They were joined before 11 May by 2nd-Lt the Hon. Knatchbull Hugessen RHA, of ‘B’ battery RHA (29th Division) who was specifically appointed to spot for British land batteries once the troops were ashore. Working with No. 3 Squadron until August, he used a 1:40,000 map sheet to mark up trenches and targets around Krithia, and later used 1:20,000 sheets over the Suvla area.68
Air reconnaissance
The Official Historian of the air war, drawing on Samson’s reports, summarised the air intelligence and mapping role:
Systematically the officers plotted the enemy positions; they controlled a part of the ships’ fire against enemy batteries, especially those in the difficult country on the Asiatic side; they procured some crude but useful photographs of the landing beaches and the ground in their immediate neighbourhood, and they wrote descriptions of the beaches as they appeared from the air; they corrected the inaccurate maps; and they dropped bombs on batteries and camps. All the information that was brought in was passed on to head-quarters at once, but the squadron commander [Samson] kept also a map which was supplemented and brought up to date from the air reports, from day to day, and this map was handed to Sir Ian Hamilton before the landings.
Most of the photography, which was of an experimental kind, was done by one officer, Flight Lieutenant C. H. Butler, who began on 4 April [more likely the 14th] with a small folding Goertz-Anschutz camera. A better camera was later borrowed from the French squadron, which under Captain Cesari had come out in May, and Butler fixed this alongside his seat outside the nacelle. Until the end of June, when he was badly wounded, he exposed in all some 700 plates, piecing groups together to form maps of each important area, and these maps, from time to time, were passed to army head-quarters. It was not until the end of August that a regular photographic section was organised; thereafter the progress of aerial photography was rapid.69
This, however, was after the Suvla landings.
It appears, therefore, that Butler may have taken scores of air photos of the minefields facing the navy, the forts, the beaches, their exits, and Turkish defences farther inland, before the landings on 25 April,70 by which time his Squadron had flown forty-two reconnaissance and eighteen photographic sorties.71 The Squadron appears to have flown an average of three sorties per day for all purposes bef
ore the 25th. From Tenedos it was some seventeen miles to Helles, thirty to Gaba Tepe, and more to Anzac; to Bulair it was sixty miles direct or seventy miles avoiding overflying the Peninsula.
The RNAS flying reconnaissance and photographic sorties from Ark Royal and Tenedos were later perturbed to find that, although they had been requested to concentrate their attentions, and write reports on, beach defences, Hamilton and his staff, in their final plan, decided to land their troops at some of the beaches which the RNAS had reported as being particularly well-defended by the Turks (at Helles). One writer on the campaign claimed that the RNAS report was not seen by Hamilton’s Staff.72 Not only is this hard to believe, but it does not agree with Samson’s account and contradicts the Official Historian, who stated, as we saw above, that all information was immediately passed on to headquarters.
Hamilton was no newcomer to the possibilities of aeroplanes; before the war he had been given his first flight over the Fleet off the Medway on the same day that Samson had taken Churchill up for a spin. Hamilton had also visited the RNAS at Eastchurch in 1912 and 1913 and been taken for several flights. He made several visits to Tenedos, as did Hunter-Weston, among other things to assess the intelligence potential of Butler’s air photos, and assess their use in operational planning. Samson noted that both generals carefully studied all the air photos, and thoroughly discussed the part No. 3 Squadron were to play in the landings.73
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