Grasping Gallipoli

by Peter Chasseaud

  Air work for the Suvla operations

  Concern for secrecy restricted opportunities for air reconnaissance before the Suvla Bay landings. Good photographic coverage of the Suvla Bay area was flown from Imbros, but as the time of the landings approached, for security reasons only brief high-altitude reconnaissance flights were flown, low-level flights being forbidden.100 Nevertheless air reconnaissance and photography accurately identified the smallness of the Turkish garrison, precisely located the weak Turkish defences and provided the most detailed and accurate information about them, and about Turkish troop movements and the concentration of enemy forces after the landings.101 They did not, however, give much detailed information about the terrain, and their results were not interpreted with this in mind. Apart from the beaches and their exits, observers and air photo interpreters were not instructed to consider the terrain.102

  As the Suvla area was too far from Tenedos for effective cover, and the previous reliance on Ark Royal to cover the Anzac sector was unsatisfactory, the RNAS aeroplane unit established a new airfield on Imbros. On 4 August Capt. A A Walser noted all existing trenches and gun emplacements (most of which he identified as unoccupied), made a sketch of the position from the air, and handed this to GHQ. The next day Knatchbull Hugessen confirmed the information about the gun emplacements and reported that the trenches north of the Salt Lake were unoccupied. Detailed photos were taken of the Chocolate Hill defences, one of the landing’s first objectives. On 6 August the only enemy troops seen were moving away from the area.103

  While overflying the area was kept to a minimum so as not to arouse Turkish suspicions, several of the good air photos taken with a French camera showed little or nothing in the way of enemy trenches or other defences except at Lala Baba. Knatchbull Hugessen wrote against two of these photos taken just before the landing: ‘Note complete absence of all trenches, etc.’104 Samson flew low over the area on 23 July, seeing little activity and few trenches.105 GHQ’s Final Instructions of 29 July to Stopford’s Corps made a specific reference to ‘an aeroplane photograph [which] has also disclosed the presence of a few trenches on Lala Baba. A sketch of these trenches, which have apparently been constructed for some months is attached.’106 The air photos confirmed the Intelligence staff in their belief that the area was only lightly held.107 Unfortunately this did not prevent Stopford and his Chief-of-Staff from adopting a cautious rather than aggressive attitude.

  Colonel F H Sykes RFC and No. 2 Wing RNAS

  Col. F H Sykes RFC arrived from England on 24 June to study the air situation, and sent his report to the Admiralty on 9 July. Among other reasons, the fact that he was RFC while Samson was RNAS created much bad blood. He emphasised the need for a huge expansion of the air forces in the theatre, and recommended that six A-Type air cameras, as used in France, with personnel to form a photographic section, should be sent out.108

  From early August, as a Wing Captain, Sykes took over command of air operations, commanding RNAS Eastern Mediterranean Station. As a direct consequence of his report, No. 2 Wing RNAS under Wing Commander E L Gerrard was, in August, sent from Dunkirk to Imbros. It operated independently of Samson’s No. 3 Wing and, building on its Flanders experience, rapidly developed an expertise in photography while No. 3 Wing specialised in reconnaissance and bombing.

  Its photographic officer, Flight Lieutenant C F Lan-Davies, described the sorry state of affairs when he arrived:

  There were a few stores and tools available, and only by going round personally begging from the Ark Royal, Egyptian Engineers, Maps Office, etc., was I able to get started. I finally succeeded in getting a darkroom built and equipping it. The best method of attachment of the camera to a machine presented difficulties, as the idea at home had been to hold the camera in the hand. This was clearly impossible on Morane Parasol machines, where the camera, in order to avoid cutting off, must be on the outside. I arranged a suitable bracket for holding the camera, and proper boxes to hold the plates, and also built onto the cameras sent out from England a direct vision viewfinder. The finders sent out were of no use, and without one the amount of country included in each photograph and the proper overlapping cannot be at all correctly estimated. I carried out a number of trials to find the correct exposure and, as results of some kind were urgently needed, started work. From plates exposed on one day, clear bright prints were supplied to the Maps Office by the next day, and in some cases enlargements were made. A number of trench and other maps have been made from them, and I may fairly claim that the work turned out is really satisfactory and of use to the General Staff. Observers from the Ark Royal and captains of the monitors have asked for copies of many of the photographs, which they found of considerable value. No. 3 Wing has for long been photographing, but No. 2 Wing results and volume of work turned out compare favourably.109

  No. 2 Wing took over 1,500 photos between 26 August and 19 November; of these 160 exposures failed and a further 120 were lost because of damage incurred by aircraft. In the course of photographic sorties, two cameras were destroyed in accidents to aircraft.

  By the end of August a new airfield had been constructed at Kephalo Point on Imbros. This was used by Nos 2 and 3 Wings until the evacuation. On 1 November Ark Royal moved to Mudros, and thence to Iero Bay, Mitylene. From here, her seaplanes flew reconnaissance and photographic missions over Smyrna, before she was ordered to Salonika on 7 November, arriving the following day.110

  The importance of the Air Service for photo-reconnaissance and mapping cannot be overstated; in a memorandum dated 21 October 1915, Sykes noted:

  At the beginning of the campaign the Air Service was based at Tenedos. This base necessitated an oversea flight of 18 miles for work on the Peninsula and was distant from the strategically important area north of [it?]. It had however the advantage of being near the local base of operations which was then situated on that Island. The transference of the aircraft base to Imbros proved to be a great advantage. The service flight to Helles was shortened by 8 miles and the position is far more central both as regards the new Suvla–Anzac area and the wider strategical area N. and E. of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

  As the operations developed it became apparent that the centres of gravity for air work were four, viz. Helles, Anzac–Suvla, the Dardanelles and the Asiatic shore, the Gulf of Saros and the area NNE and NW of it. As far as possible separate units have been allotted to these areas. The distribution has proved very satisfactory and it is proposed to retain it unless further developments necessitate alteration. [section follows about air observation of Naval gunfire on land targets]… both the Naval and Military forces are peculiarly dependent upon [the RNAS]. Its efficiency and adequacy are matters of vital importance to the success of the operations as a whole, apart from the fact that it carries out all strategical and tactical reconnaissances, and directs the greater part of the fire both of sea and shore guns, it is the sole agent for the supply of reliable maps. This applies to ordinary maps as well as to trench maps.111

  Samson, reporting from Imbros on 23 November 1915 on the work of No. 3 Wing RNAS during the Dardanelles operations, noted that ‘photographs have been taken of the whole sphere of operations’.112 He was critical of the maps provided for the campaign, noting that: ‘The great difficulty we encountered in the Dardanelles was the bad maps available: in time we got out our own maps, and towards the end of the campaign an excellent one was produced by the Survey Department [of Egypt] from our photographs.’113

  Conclusion

  The use of air reconnaissance at Gallipoli was to add diversity to the data in the hands of Hamilton and his General Staff, further adding to, elucidating and correcting that already received from MO2 and GSGS (MO4) in London and that obtained by intelligence officers in theatre. The value of this approach cannot be overstated, especially when combined with the results of other surveys, such as those made from the sea. These form the subject of the next chapter.

  Notes

  1. Chasseaud, Peter, ‘German Maps and
Survey on the Western Front, 1914–18’, Cartographic Journal, London, 2001, 38(2), pp. 119–34.

  2. Berger, Jos. Viktor, Luftfahrzeuge im Dienste der Geländeaufnahme, Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift 1913, pp. 171–9, 261–72.

  3. Chasseaud, op. cit.

  4. Churchill, Proposed Aircraft Expedition to Somaliland, TNA(PRO) CAB 37/119/47.

  5. Albrecht, Oskar, Das Kriegsvermessungswesen während des Weltkrieges 1914–18, Deutsche Geodätische Kommission, Munich, 1969, pp. 6–7.

  6. Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg-im-Breisgau, files PH9XX/47, Übungen der Vermessungsabteilungen in Wahn und Thorn 1912, mit photograph; PH9V/98 & 99, Erkundungs- und Vermessungstätigkeit im Festungskrieg. – Entwurf einer Dienstvorschrift in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Kriegsministerium und dem Chef des Generalstabes der Armee, Bd. 1, 1913–14, & Bd. 2, Jan. 1913 bis Apr. 1914.

  7. Albrecht, op. cit., p. 7.

  8. Eckert, M, ‘Meine Erfahrungen als Geograph im Kriegsvermessungs- und Kriegskartenwesen’, Kartographische und schulgeographische Zeitschrift, 1922, 1 & 2, 7–10.

  9. Roussilhe, H, Emploi de la Photographie Aérienne aux Levées Topographiques à Grande Echelle, Enyclopédie Industrielle et Commerciale, Librarie de l’Enseignement Technique, Léon Eyrolles, Paris, 1930, p. 30; Manual of Photogrammetry, American Society of Photogrammetry, 1952, p. 8.

  10. Multiple Lens Aerial Cameras in Mapping, by the Technical Staff of the Fairchild Aerial Camera Corporation, Fairchild Corporation, New York, 1933.

  11. Schumann, R, ‘Die Entwicklung der photogrammetrischen Geräte in Jena von Jahrhundertwende bis zum Jahre 1945’, Kompendium Photogrammetrie, 18, Leipzig, 1986.

  12. Albrecht, op. cit., p. 33.

  13. Hills, E H, review by ‘E.H.H.’ of Die Geschichtliche Entwicklung der Photogrammetrie und die Begründung ihrer Verwendbarkeit für Mess- and Konstruktionswecke by Weiss, M; Strecker & Schröder, Stuttgart, in Geographical Journal, 42 (2), 1913, p. 189.

  14. Hamilton, Gen. Sir Ian, Gallipoli Diary, Vol. I, London: Edward Arnold, 1920, pp. 7– 8, 25; Rhodes James, Robert, Gallipoli, London: Pimlico, 1999, pp. 52–3.

  15. Extracts from Minutes of Conference Held in the Admiralty on 3 April 1915, TNA(PRO) ADM 1/8497.

  16. Minute to War Council by Churchill, 3-4-15, Milner Papers, Bodleian, Box 122, Folio 129; also quoted, with slight differences, in Churchill, W S, The World Crisis, Vol. 2, London: Butterworth, 1923, pp. 540–1.

  17. Churchill, op. cit., p. 552.

  18. Report on Naval Bombardment Procedures in the Helles Sector, TNA(PRO) WO 95/4263.

  19. Report by Lt Park RNVR on HMS Ark Royal’s photographic work; referred to in Nolan, Col. Mike, The Gallipolian, Winter 1994, p. 15.

  20. ‘Mitchell Report’, C.B. 1550 Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate the Attacks delivered on and the Enemy Defences of the Dardanelles Straits, 1919. Admiralty, Naval Staff, Gunnery Division, April 1921, pp. 513–14. TNA(PRO) ADM 186/600.

  21. Dardanelles. 1914 Sept–Dec. TNA(PRO) ADM 137/881.

  22. Major Hogg’s Reports, HQ, RFC, ME, Gallipoli & Asiatic Mainland 1915, TNA(PRO) AIR 1/2119/207/72/2.

  23. Particulars of HMS Ark Royal, unsigned and undated (probably early 1915), TNA(PRO) AIR 1/361.

  24. Jones, H J, The War in the Air, Vol. II, Oxford: OUP, 1928, pp. 10–11.

  25. Reports from HMS Ark Royal, Dardanelles Operations, Feb– May 1915, Print code: 0(35) AS 140 Pk 1300 250 8/15 E&S, blue printed paper cover, in TNA(PRO) AIR 1/2099/207/20/7.

  26. Hickey, Michael, Gallipoli, London: John Murray, 1998, pp. 51–2.

  27. Corbett, Sir Julian S, History of the Great War, Naval Operations, Vol. II, London: Longmans, Green, 1921, p. 147.

  28. Reports from HMS Ark Royal, Dardanelles Operations, op. cit.

  29. Rhodes James, Robert, Gallipoli, London: Pimlico, 1999, p. 46.

  30. Sec. W.O., London to GOC in C, Cairo. 3324 Cipher M.O. 179. Your 653 E. Feby. 26th, in TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.

  31. Reports from HMS Ark Royal, op. cit.

  32. Sec. W.O., London to GOC in C, Cairo. Rec’d 8.3.15. 3443 Cipher M.O. 192. March 8th. Your 683 E. March 4th, last paragraph. TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.

  33. Aspinall-Oglander, Brig.-Gen. C F, History of the Great War, Military Operations, Gallipoli, Vol. I, London: Heinemann, 1929, p. 86.

  34. Saunders, H St G, Per Ardua. The Rise of British Air Power 1911–1939, London: OUP, 1944, p. 62.

  35. Corbett, op. cit., p. 176.

  36. Ibid, p. 206.

  37. Reports from HMS Ark Royal, op. cit.

  38. Dardanelles 1915 Jan–April (H.S. 1089), items 289/25, 26 and 27, TNA(PRO) ADM 137/1089; Reports from HMS Ark Royal, op. cit.

  39. Reports from HMS Ark Royal, op. cit.

  40. Ibid.

  41. Ibid.

  42. Kitchener to Maxwell, Cairo, Rec’d 8.4.15. 3925 Cipher. Your telegram 861E. TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.

  43. Vice-Admiral (via Mudros) to Maxwell, Cairo. Rc’d 8.4.15. Your 173N. TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.

  44. Hamilton to Maxwell, Cairo, Rc’d 9.4.15. MF 101 8th. TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.

  45. Reports from HMS Ark Royal, op. cit.

  46. Hamilton to Maxwell, Cairo, Rc’d 10.4.15. MF 105 10th. Your Telegram 867E. TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.

  47. Reports from HMS Ark Royal, op. cit.

  48. Ibid.

  49. Anzac Corps General Staff War Diary, TNA(PRO) WO 95/4280.

  50. Chasseaud, Peter, unpublished PhD thesis, British, French and German survey and mapping 1914–1918, University of Greenwich.

  51. Report on the Working of the Kite Balloon Ships at the Dardanelles, Paper on Kite Balloons, 19 October 1915, TNA(PRO) AIR 1/2103.

  52. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 139.

  53. Report on the Working of the Kite Balloon Ships at the Dardanelles, Paper on Kite Balloons, op. cit.

  54. MEF Dardanelles, Gen. Staff (GHQ) War Diary, 1915 Feb–1915 Apr. Appendices. O(b). TNA(PRO) WO 95/4263.

  55. Samson, Charles Rumney, Fights and Flights, London: Ernest Benn, 1930, p. 218.

  56. Corbett, op. cit., p. 208.

  57. Ibid, p. 229.

  58. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 137fn.

  59. Samson, op. cit., p. 227.

  60. Anzac Corps Intelligence War Diary, 15–30 April 1915, TNA(PRO) WO 157/678, Appendix Z4.

  61. Ibid, Appendix Z1.

  62. Ibid, Appendix Z4.

  63. Information on Butler’s photos obtained from MS inscriptions in album of photographs in IWM Dept of Photographs (Accession No. 9008-06), and internal evidence of the photos in that album.

  64. Ibid.

  65. Chasseaud, Peter, Artillery’s Astrologers – A History of British Survey and Mapping on the Western Front 1914–1918, Lewes: Mapbooks, 1999, p. 119.

  66. MEF Dardanelles, op. cit.

  67. Major Hogg’s Reports, op. cit.

  68. Chasseaud collection.

  69. Jones, H J, The War in the Air, Vol. II, Oxford: OUP, 1928, p. 28.

  70. The authors have only seen eight photos or references to specific photos taken before 25 April; photos and MS inscriptions in album of photographs in IWM Dept of Photographs (Accession No. 9008-06).

  71. Samson, op. cit., pp. 232–3.

  72. Rhodes-James, op. cit., pp. 80–1.

  73. Samson, op. cit., pp. 230–1.

  74. Notes on interview with Air Commodore C R Samson, DSO., at the Grosvenor Court Hotel, Davies Street, on 15th March 1923. Operations Section. 16th March, 1923, TNA(PRO) AIR 1/724/76/6.

  75. Samson, op. cit., p. 228.

  76. MS inscriptions, dated 23 & 28 May, in album of No. 3 Squadron air photos in IWM Dept of Photographs (Accession No. 9008-06). The earliest photograph seen by the authors taken with the French camera was dated 28 May.

  77. Major Hogg’s Reports, 11 May, op. cit.

  78. Anzac Corps Intelligence War Diary, TNA(PRO) WO 157/678, Appendix Z12.

  79. 29th Division General Staff War Diary, TNA(PRO) WO 95/4304.

  80. MEF Dardane
lles, Gen. Staff (GHQ) War Diary, op. cit., Appendix 13 April. TNA(PRO) WO 95/4263.

  81. Anzac Corps General Staff War Diary, op. cit.; Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 166.

  82. Hamilton, op. cit., p. 109.

  83. MEF Dardanelles, Gen. Staff (GHQ) War Diary, op. cit.

  84. Samson, op. cit., pp. 232–3.

  85. Ibid, p. 231.

  86. Jones, op. cit., p. 45.

  87. Samson, op. cit., p. 237.

  88. Jones, op. cit., p. 52; Samson, op. cit., pp. 238–9.

  89. Roskill, Capt. S W (ed.), Documents Relating to the Naval Air Service, Vol. I, 1908– 1918, London: Navy Records Society, 1969, p. 205; TNA(PRO) AIR 1/361.

  90. Roskill, op. cit., p. 258; TNA(PRO) AIR 1/664.

  91. Major Hogg’s Reports, 11 May, op. cit.

  92. Jones, op. cit., p. 52.

  93. Major Hogg’s Reports, 10 June, op. cit.

  94. Ibid, 25 June.

  95. General Douglas to French CEO, 30-7-15, in TNA(PRO) WO 95/4273.

  96. Dated from MS entries in album of No. 3 Squadron air photos in IWM Dept of Photographs (Accession No. 9008-06).

  97. Reports from HMS Ark Royal, op. cit.

  98. Jones, op. cit., pp. 56–7, 64–6.

  99. Ibid, p. 73.

  100. Rhodes-James, op. cit., p. 248.

  101. Notes for Observers, Royal Flying Corps, 1915, p. 11. Copy in Sykes papers, Vol. I, RAF Museum, Hendon. See also Sykes, F, From Many Angles: An Autobiography, London: Harrap. 1942, p. 166, and Rhodes-James, op. cit., p. 255.

  102. Sykes, op. cit., pp. 157–73.

  103. Jones, op. cit., p. 59.

  104. MS inscription against photos 456 & 457 in album (Vol. VI – Gallipoli & various) of air photos collected by Capt. Hon. M Knatchbull MC, on loan to IWM Dept of Photographs.

  105. Samson, op. cit., p. 256.

  106. Appendix 3 (Final Instructions from GHQ to IX Corps for the Suvla Operations, 29 July) of OH Military Operations, Gallipoli Vol. II, Maps and Appendices, London: Heinemann, 1932, p. 19.