Grasping Gallipoli

by Peter Chasseaud

  Major Newcombe, formerly a survey and intelligence officer, was, as commander of 4th Field Company RE (2nd Australian Division), heavily involved with mining operations at Anzac. He was awarded the DSO for an act at the end of October:

  For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty near Anzac, Gallipoli Peninsula, on 29th October 1915. During rescue operations he entered a mine tunnel soon after the first casualties were reported, and, although suffering from the effects of fumes, he continued to lead rescue parties till he was completely disabled by the gas. One officer lost his life on this occasion in the attempt at rescue.53

  Newcombe, as the officer at Anzac most experienced in survey, was made responsible for the mapping of the sector in addition to his Field Company duties. Many of the printed sketch maps and trench diagrams at Anzac carried the inscription: Any additions or corrections to be sent to Major Newcombe, 4th Field Coy, 2nd Aust. Div. For example, Trench Map 1/1800 from Chatham’s Post to Lone Pine (Provn.), Compiled from Photos and Traverses. Contours compared with enlargement of 1/20,000 Turkish Plan.54

  As the Anzac sector included the most difficult terrain encountered in the Peninsula, the fact that a report on its large-scale mapping survives is of particular significance. After the evacuation, Newcombe wrote a report on Anzac Trench Mapping and ‘the system of squaring’ for trench maps,55 which was sent back to Hedley in London. This described the techniques and equipment used to produce three categories of plans:

  The following maps or plans were made by the 2nd Australian Division at Anzac.

  1. Trench plans 30-feet to 1-inch (1/360) to show tunnels and mines, for engineer use only.

  2. Trench plans 60-feet to 1-inch (1/720), reduction of above showing communication trenches in addition, and more comprehensive, for Divisional staff, Brigadiers and for planning accommodation tunnels, etc.

  3. A general map 150-feet to 1-inch (1/1800) to show our firing line with known places marked for reference, and the enemy trenches with the ground to our front contoured with 10-foot intervals.

  No.1 was made by tape measuring and compass, and 2 was a reduction of 1. No. 3 required a small triangulation survey, but owing to the difficulty of observing from conspicuous points, a tacheometer traverse was carried right through the firing line. This traverse was tied on to the triangulation and the reduction of 1 was then tied on to the fixed tacheometer points. Thus a fairly accurate map of the firing line was obtained.

  From this base and using the points fixed by tacheometer, conspicuous points in the enemy trenches or enemy country were fixed by plane-table using a periscope. Aeroplane photographs of enemy trenches were enlarged using our firing line as a base, and the points fixed by plane-table for tying in. Thus an accurate plan was obtained.

  For contouring, the Turkish 1/25,000 map was enlarged. And where necessary the 10-metre contours slightly shifted to fit the ground as observed from the plane-table or photos. The 10-foot contours were drawn in by plane-tabling, usually by using Abney’s level without a periscope, as the latter was found to be too inaccurate. The 10-foot contours were only for the ground near our trenches, more distant ground being shown by the 10-metre or 30-foot contours of the enlarged Turkish map. Valleys and other features were put in either by plane-table or from the photographs.

  … Of these 1/800 maps, two issues were made, one showing all our communication trenches as well as the enemy’s and issued only to Staff and Engineers, the other omitting all behind our firing line, issued to every infantry officer. This was to prevent plans of our trenches being captured.

  The copy attached [not present; possibly ‘Trench Map 1/1800 from Chatham’s Post to Lone Pine (see above)] was a provisional issue only, a second and improved edition was being prepared when the evacuation took place. The scale of the map was large because enemy trenches were so close that a smaller scale would not have shown the detail so conveniently; it was possible to use it for giving direction for tunnels intended to undermine desirable points beyond enemy trenches.

  1/1800 or 50 yards to 1-inch was used because every officer has an inch scale in his note-book, and other maps had already been used on that scale.

  It was intended to show:

  All conspicuous points in enemy country, such as prominent trees, peculiar piles of sandbags, noticeable overhead cover etc. to enable officers to read the map easily.

  Known points in our own trenches require marking to enable the map to be sited.

  All names used for our own or enemy trenches are put in.

  For artillery a map on 1/3600 was being produced, reducing the 1/1800 and extending its area by fixing points by plane-table and enlarging the photographs. This map was not quite ready but would have included all the area over which our artillery fired.

  A special officer was detailed to go round artillery observation posts or batteries to mark their positions on the map given them, to see that every one entitled to a map had one, to assist certain officers to read them and to collect and put on the map any fresh names or conspicuous points or pet places which artillerymen made use of, to enable them to pick up objects more rapidly. Battalion Intelligence officers also were asked for names or special objects to be shown in a second edition.

  The map was especially useful to new units coming to the trenches, to Intelligence officers and others who were able to describe enemy trenches to within 12 yards and to telephone immediately positions of enemy mortars or guns accurately. They were useful also for mining operations and in one case of a captured Turkish tunnel, the officer in charge was enabled to know what direction to take when he got into an enemy trench.

  In case of a planned attack, the value for staff operations is obvious.

  It was found possible to enlarge the photographs to 60-feet to 1-inch [1:8640] by fixing accurately from a base in our trenches 2 or more points in enemy trench and enlarging the line between those points. Hence position of our tunnels with reference to enemy line was correct to about 5 or 10 feet.

  In addition to this map, it was intended to issue a photograph of the area by adjusting together several aeroplane photographs and making one large photograph [mosaic]. Copies were to be issued to Staff and all battery commanders.

  Experience showed, especially in the peculiarly indented country, that the study of the photograph assisted materially the understanding of the country while the map gave distance and direction.

  Though the photograph of the enemy’s country may be considered particularly secret, there could be no more objection to issuing them than the maps, since the latter gave equal detail of enemy’s trenches and probably the enemy have photographs themselves.

  The following instruments were used:

  3-inch theodolite, 300-foot steel tape. Periscope with glasses absolutely parallel: wooden from painted black inside. Tacheometer and staff. Small plane-table with telescopic legs, Abney’s level. The compass was used for traversing, but owing to [the proximity of] steel [snipers’] plates and rifles, was often found inaccurate.

  Conclusion

  In the use of intelligence sketch maps and trench diagrams of an entirely different series from the standard contoured topographical sheets, the maps used during most of the Gallipoli Campaign repeated the early mistake made in France. The initial lack of a dedicated survey unit, and prolonged absence of an integrated and coordinated Allied survey organisation, prevented the early creation of an artillery triangulation, thus denying effective artillery support and retarding the production of good maps. The lack of early provision for air survey also impeded progress.

  The 1:20,000 topographical maps were incompatible with the larger-scale trench diagrams, and this was a major cartographic error that had serious implications for operations. The obvious solution, to combine all the information onto one, reliable, gridded base map, was arrived at in mid-1915 on the Western Front with the creation of the British ‘regular series’ 1:10,000 trench maps. However, trenches were not overprinted on to the 1:20,000 maps until the end of 1915. It was not
until 1916 that there was identical topographical and tactical detail on both 1:10,000 and 1:20,000 maps of the Western Front. Towards the end of the Gallipoli Campaign, we see the beginnings of a similar trend, with the creation of a 1:10,000 regular series.

  Notes

  1. Dowson, E M, ‘Further Notes on Aeroplane Photography in the Near East’, Geographical Journal, 58, 359.

  2. Nicholas to Hedley, 8 May 1915, in TNA(PRO) WO 301/46.

  3. Aspinall-Oglander, Brig.-Gen. C F, History of the Great War, Military Operations, Gallipoli, Vol. II, London: Heinemann, 1932, p. 20; Rhodes James, Robert, Gallipoli, London: Pimlico, 1999, p. 220.

  4. Nicholas to Hedley, 12 June 1915, in TNA(PRO) WO 301/46.

  5. TNA(PRO) WO 301/508, 505, 507 respectively.

  6. TNA(PRO) WO 301/505–508.

  7. In TNA(PRO) WO 153/1199.

  8. TNA(PRO) WO 301/ 509–513.

  9. TNA(PRO) WO 153/1199.

  10. Nicholas to Hedley, 12 June 1915, op. cit.

  11. Ibid.

  12. Anzac Intelligence War Diary, Appendix No. JY 21, TNA(PRO) WO 157/681.

  13. Ibid, Appendix No. JY 37.

  14. Later special editions of this sheet, overprinted with Turkish fortifications and other defences and the positions of Allied ships on 25 April, were published in London; those carry the designation: ‘NS (GTD) C.B. 1550’, etc. (Naval Staff (Gunnery Training Division) Confidential Book) were from the post-war Mitchell report.

  15. Pritchard, Maj.-Gen. H L, The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Vol. VI, Chatham, Institution of Royal Engineers, 1952, p. 15.

  16. Anzac Corps General Staff War Diary, TNA(PRO) WO 95/4280.

  17. Orlo Williams Diary, 7 April 1915, IWM.

  18. T C Nicholas tapes, IWM, Dept of Sound Records.

  19. In TNA(PRO) WO 301.

  20. ‘A’ Printing Section Outline War Diary, RE Institution Library, Chatham.

  21. Nicholas tapes, op. cit.; 10475/3/1-3.

  22. T E Lawrence to Capt. G Lloyd, 29 June 1915, Churchill College, Cambridge; noted by Mike Nolan in The Gallipolian, Spring 1994, p. 15.

  23. ‘A’ Printing Section … Diary, op. cit.

  24. Dowson, E M, Director-General, Survey of Egypt, Notes on Mapping from Aeroplane photographs in the Gallipoli Peninsula, Secret. [c.September 1915], initially issued not earlier than 22 September 1915. Over 40 foolscap pages, illustrated with maps, diagrams and four air photographs, ‘taken by the RNAS in Gallipoli for mapping purposes’, reproduced typescript, in MCE, MRLG. Also in TNA(PRO) WO 317/13 and AIR 1/2284/209/75/10.

  25. Nicholas to Hedley, 12 June 1915, op. cit.

  26. Dowson, E M, Notes on Mapping …, op. cit.

  27. Hedley typescript, para 11, sub-section (a).

  28. No. 2 Ranging and Survey Section Outline War Diary, RE Institution Library, Chatham.

  29. Dowson, E M, Notes on Mapping …, op. cit.

  30. Royal Naval Division General Staff, Correspondence, Reports & Operations Orders, Dardanelles 4/15 to 1/16, p. 33, TNA(PRO) ADM 137/3087.

  31. TNA(PRO) WO 301/527.

  32. TNA(PRO) WO 301/578. See also Dowson, Notes on Mapping …, op. cit.

  33. Dowson, Notes on Mapping …, op. cit.

  34. Salmon Collection, Royal Geographical Society. Belgian, French and German Maps – Miscellaneous Maps No. 143A.

  35. Note on MS map in TNA(PRO) WO 153 1199.

  36. 5th Field Survey Company RE War Diary, TNA(PRO) WO 95 492.

  37. Royal Naval Division General Staff, Correspondence …, op. cit., p. 67.

  38. Ibid, p. 33.

  39. Service Géographique de l’Armée, Rapport sur les Travaux exécutés du 1er août 1914 au 31 décembre 1919. Historique du Service Géographique de l’Armée pendant la Guerre, Paris: Imprimerie du Service Géographique de l’Armée, 1924, pp. 245–7.

  40. Reports on Section de Topographie in 3M 569 – Service Géographique; Armée d’Orient, mission du Service Géographique dans les Balkans, Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre, Château de Vincesses, Paris.

  41. Service Géographique de l’Armée, op. cit., pp. 245–7.

  42. Reports on Section de Topographie, op. cit.

  43. Service Géographique de l’Armée, op. cit., pp. 245–7.

  44. Report of work by Short seaplanes in support of firing by HMS Roberts, TNA(PRO) AIR 1/665/17/122/714.

  45. Service Géographique de l’Armée, op. cit., pp. 146–61.

  46. Reports on Section de Topographie, op. cit.

  47. Ibid.

  48. Ibid.

  49. Presqu’Ile de Gallipoli – Plan Directeur du Secteur Français, 1:10,000, Edition Provisoire, octobre 1915, TNA(PRO) WO 301/612.

  50. Service Géographique de l’Armée, op. cit., pp. 245–7. See also Reports on the work of the Section de Topographie in 3M 569 – Service Géographique: Armée d’Orient, mission du Service, op. cit.; and also de Larminat, E, La topographie chez l’ennemie. Comment nous dressions la carte du terrain occupé par l’adversaire, Paris: Lavauzelle, 1920. BL Ref: X.619/10050.

  51. TNA(PRO) WO 301/551.

  52. In Collection of Gallipoli Maps, GHQ-MEF, BL Map Library, Maps 43336. (21).

  53. London Gazette, 22 January 1916.

  54. TNA(PRO) WO 153/1055.

  55. Report by Major S F Newcombe RE, with GSGS Map Room stamp dated 17 March 1916; TNA(PRO) WO 301/45.

  CHAPTER 10

  Repeating the Mistakes: the Suvla Landings

  The preparations for the Suvla Bay landings in August had several advantages over those for the April assault, including possession of captured large-scale Turkish maps, months of additional reconnaissance opportunities, excellent air photographic coverage and accurate intelligence about Turkish defences and dispositions. The failure to break out of the Suvla beach-head cannot in general be laid at the door of intelligence failure, though intelligence and maps were not always distributed effectively. The failure, rather, is clearly ascribable to the inexperience of the troops, particularly in night operations, and lack of positive leadership, above all on the part of General Stopford, commanding IX Corps, the force designated for the landings. That said, it is important to identify the sources of intelligence, and the ways in which it was used. This is an area which has received little dedicated study.1

  Suvla Bay as a landing place

  We saw in Chapter 3 that Grover in 1877, and Ardagh in 1880, had both identified the Suvla Bay area and the beach south of Nibrunesi Point as good potential landing zones, and that this was confirmed by several subsequent reports. Grover had stated that his large-scale map (four inches to the mile) showed:

  … the coast between Kaba Tépé and Suwla Bay, on the west side of the Gallipoli Peninsula, opposite Maïdos, which seems suitable for the landing of a force to attack, in rear, the batteries of Kilid Bahr and Boukali, as a means of land – co-operation with a naval effort to force the passage of the Dardanelles. The selected coast is low, and affords easy access to the interior, for an extent of nearly two miles, on the west of the villages of Böjök Anafarta. It is here protected from the prevalent north-east winds, and the Admiralty Chart appears to show sufficient depth of water, and good anchorage, for the proposed operation.2

  Suvla Bay was again specified as a landing place in the 1909 War Office Report on the Defences of Constantinople,3 and this report actually included a panoramic drawing from the sea, indicating the landing place. The Greeks also envisaged a landing here. It was not included in the April 1915 landings because at that season the Salt Lake was impassable, being full of water, and because the route inland east of Sari Bair was believed to be strongly held and would therefore require a large force to force through, and could not be supported by the Fleet’s guns.4 In addition, the Navy was concerned about lack of accurate hydrographic data, and feared shoals, rocks and reefs.

  Sight is often lost of the fact that, following the Helles and Anzac landings in April, it was still hoped to push the Fleet through to Constantinople, that the Rus
sians might yet land a corps at the Bosphorus, and that the Greeks or Bulgarians might declare war against Turkey.5 There were still, therefore, distinct strategic possibilities despite the lack of progress in fighting up the Peninsula.

  However, even more so than for the April landings, the lack of a clear strategic aim and purpose for the Suvla and Anzac attacks on 6 August and subsequent days led to confused objective-setting and muddled operational planning. Were the operations intended to lead to a break-out and a dash across the Peninsula to the Narrows, combined with a further attempt by the Fleet to force its way through to the Marmara and Constantinople? On 29 June Hamilton was telling Kitchener that he envisaged using additional divisions to turn the Turkish right flank at Anzac (i.e. break out around the north side of the existing Anzac position) and to push forward east and south-east to occupy a position right across the Peninsula from Gaba Tepe (south of Anzac) to Maidos (on the Narrows), capturing the Kilid Bahr Plateau in order ‘to clear the Asiatic shore subsequently of big guns’ (something he should have done in April). He also wanted to make a landing on the Asiatic Shore.6 Or were they intended merely to improve the existing position and to secure a base-area and harbour at Suvla?