To summarise, the Suvla Bay area was weakly fortified by the Turks and there were no continuous lines of trenches. We have seen that various isolated stretches of trenches existed, that these had already been identified by reconnaissance, and that it was appreciated that there were only weak Turkish forces in the area. Nevertheless the British prepared ‘dispositions’ maps or traces showing what Turkish defences had been located by air photography and other reconnaissance. The Turkish force (the Anafarta Detachment) defending the Suvla area, commanded by the Bavarian Major Willmer, comprised four battalions, no machine guns, little barbed wire and a few pieces of artillery whose effect he maximised by changing positions frequently and also using dummy guns. He had established strongpoints on the Kiretch Tepe ridge north of Suvla Bay, Hill 10 north of the Salt Lake and Chocolate Hill east of the Salt Lake, while Lala Baba was entrenched and piqueted by a look-out party. His main force was in a line about a mile north of the western hills, parallel with the sea, barring the way to the Tekke Tepe heights, north of Anafarta Sagir.28 Thus in the immediate landing zone, one Turkish brigade was to be assaulted by a British corps which might have been considered an overwhelming force.
In the area of the British and New Zealanders’ attack from the Anzac beachhead, the old shallow Turkish trench on the summit of Chunuk Bair, had been severely damaged by British naval bombardment.29 The First Instructions from GHQ to IX Corps, dated 22 July, noted that ‘Latest photographs show that the Turkish trenches on this [the Chunuk Bair] ridge, do not extend further north than Chunuk Bair, and it is unlikely that the higher portions of the ridge are held in great strength’.30
For their associated Lone Pine attack at Anzac, the Australians had prepared an accurate, detailed map of the position from the excellent air photos now available, and indeed such trench maps had been prepared and improved ever since the first landings in April, although at first the lack of air photos delayed progress. Unfortunately in this case the photos were poorly interpreted, the timber cover, showing clearly on the photos, of the Turkish front trenches remaining ‘unidentified,’ and the significance of a steep ravine (later called The Cup, in which the Turkish headquarters and reserves were situated, forming the main communication with the front on the left of the Lone Pine position) branching from Owen’s Gully, was not appreciated by the Intelligence staff evaluating the photos; the reverse slopes of this ravine were untrenched, and a breakthrough here would have led directly into open country.31
Maps for the Suvla operation
By the end of July, excellent 1:20,000 topographical maps, copied by the Survey of Egypt from captured sheets of the recent Turkish 1:25,000 survey (see Chapter 9), were available for the Suvla landings as well as for the Anzac and Helles sectors. These British topographical maps did not, however, show the Turkish defences. While trench diagrams had been plotted for the Helles and Anzac sectors, as the result of close study of, and plotting from, aerial photos over a period of three months, simple lithographed intelligence sketch maps were prepared for the Suvla landings by MEF GHQ showing Turkish defences, reflecting the lack of plottable defences on the ground, as identified by land, sea and air reconnaissance. This information turned out to be accurate.
An overdone obsession with secrecy (lack of surprise was a major element in the failure of the April landings) meant that, for the Suvla landings, maps were either only issued to assaulting troops on the afternoon prior to the landings (British company commanders were only issued with maps at Mudros at 2.30pm on the eve of the assault32) or, even worse, in some extreme cases, on the day itself after they had disembarked on a hostile beach.
A deception plan, involving the issue of reports and maps of the Asiatic coastline, was put into operation, 11th Division being concentrated at Mitylene, to threaten the Smyrna district. These maps had to be ordered from, and printed in, Egypt, and their production priority led to a disturbing delay in the arrival of the maps actually required for the real operations.33 Nevertheless, the Suvla maps were available a full week before the landing, allowing plenty of time for study had they been distributed with this in mind.
Following the consolidation of the beachhead and linking up with Anzac, trench diagrams were created for the new operations area on the pattern of those already established at Helles and Anzac.
Water supply
Water supply was perhaps the most problematic aspect of the terrain, and considerable forethought went into planning for the eventuality that there would be severe shortages in the initial phase of the Suvla landings. However, divided responsibilities and failure to inform troops of the probable location of wells and sub-surface water supplies led to a crisis which severely affected operations. The Dardanelles Commission was extremely critical of the arrangements made.
The Suvla Plain north of the Salt Lake appeared flat and arid, while in the Azmak Dere valley the terrain was greener and supported several tree-ringed farmsteads. Water supply, particularly in the trying heat of August, was from the start a serious point for consideration.34 Greek peasants employed as guides by the Anzac Corps, described as ‘uneducated and cannot read a map but are intelligent’, gave information on water supply in the area between Suvla Bay and the Anafartas, stating that it was abundant between Biyuk and Kutchuk Anafarta, the main supply coming from wells exploiting water in the alluvial sediments of the Suvla Plain. Some of these wells were to be ‘poisoned’ by proximity to dead Turkish soldiers.35 Water supply was also stated to be good, even in July, in the area of any break-out from the Anzac perimeter.36
Captured Turkish maps indicated many wells in the Azmak Dere valley, but there were few in the plain and on the northern and southern arms of the bay. Intelligence reports provided the welcome information that there were good springs on Kiretch Tepe, and it was also believed that there was a good sub-surface water supply which could be reached by shallow excavation. On balance, short-term supply remained a cause for much concern, given the large number of troops that would be landed, and it was appreciated that they would have to be supplied from the sea during the early phase of operations.37
On 14 July Hamilton asked the War Office for an expert ‘water-diviner’ to be sent out to assist in finding water after the landings. Lieutenant-Colonel Brady RE, the officer at the War Office responsible for Works and Services for the BEF in France, considered that a more scientific approach was required and, after consulting Sir Aubrey Strahan, Director of the Geological Survey of Great Britain, arranged to send out three Survey geologists (Cunningham, Pocock and Whitehead) together with water-boring equipment (drive tube wells) from the specialist firm of Thompson and Hunter.38 Two of these geologists had joined the army, and were extracted from their units to send to the Dardanelles, while the third was from the Geological Survey. Strahan also, at Brady’s request, collected geological data on the Gallipoli Peninsula and nearby islands. Mr A Beeby Thompson, head of the firm, placed orders for the appropriate equipment on 23–24 July and left England with an assistant on 26 July. Brady kept Hamilton informed of all this, but on 22 July was told that a ‘diviner’ was wanted, not geologists. Brady replied that ‘I did not trust such important work to diviners,’ and went ahead with his arrangements. He later reported of the geologists that ‘I believe they all did very useful work.’39 This was apparently the first occasion on which geological assistance and information was solicited for the Gallipoli operations.
Conclusion
After the experiences of the April landings, and the operations and reconnaissances of the subsequent months, there should have been little doubt about the difficult nature of the terrain. Many contemporary sources cite difficult terrain as impeding the operations following the landings at Suvla Bay, and the fact that troops lacking experience of fighting in this theatre were landed in this area undoubtedly hindered operations. The War Diary of 11th Division noted ‘rough stony ground, cut up into a tangled succession of steep ravines’, and ‘dwarf ilex … with limbs frequently as thick as a man’s arm, and with foliage thro
ugh which it was impossible to force one’s way’.40 This terrain description would have been familiar to anyone who had fought at Anzac, and indeed was prefigured in the various pre-war reports. Yet Suvla looked enticing. Apparently open ground where cultivated, it soon descends into scrub-covered wilderness, with small hills of harder rock providing vantage points for the defender. Even if such terrain information had been distributed, the inexperienced troops would have found the ground heavy going; they had had no training in fighting in similar terrain configuration.
Despite all the anxious pre-landing staff work regarding water supply, the troops seem to have been poorly informed about the existence of sub-surface water, and how to reach it. There is no doubt that conditions were fearful in the heat of August, but sufficient warning had been given for these to have been overcome; in the words of a critical participant, John Hargrave, ‘the landing should not have relied, fatally, on seaborne replenishment’.41
Notes
1. An unpublished paper by Sarah Nicholas, providing a useful tour d’horizon, may be the first serious study of this; Nicholas, S, British Military Intelligence at Suvla Bay, August 1915, 2000 (unpublished dissertation).
2. Reports and Memoranda relative to Defence of Constantinople and other positions in Turkey …, 1877, pp. 147–8, in TNA(PRO) WO 33/29.
3. Report on the Defences of Constantinople, Secret, London, General Staff, War Office, 1909.
4. Aspinall-Oglander, Brig.-Gen. C F, Military Operations, Gallipoli, Vol. I, London: Heinemann, 1929, p. 313.
5. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., Vol. II, London: Heinemann, 1932, p. 6.
6. The Dardanelles Commission, 2001, p. 150.
7. Churchill to 1 S.L., C.O.S., in Evidence to the Dardanelles Commission, TNA(PRO) CAB 19/28, Appendix B1, p. 210.
8. Rhodes James, Robert, Gallipoli, London: Pimlico, 1999, p. 187.
9. Travers, Tim, Gallipoli 1915, Stroud: Tempus, 2001, p. 142.
10. Rhodes James, op. cit., p. 248.
11. Report on the Defences of Constantinople, 1909, op. cit.
12. Aspinall-Oglander, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 313.
13. Rhodes James, op. cit., p. 219.
14. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., Vol. II, p.130.
15. Nicholas, op. cit.
16. It is possible that Commander Douglas carried out at least a reconnaissance of the area on 29 March, while on board the destroyer Mosquito; see, Denham, H M, Dardanelles. A Midshipman’s Diary, London: John Murray, 1981, p. 73.
17. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 129–30.
18. Ibid, p. 132 & fn.
19. Hammersley, report on 11th Division’s operations, TNA(PRO) WO 32/5123.
20. Wolf, L, In Flanders Fields. The 1917 Campaign, London: Longmans, Green, 1958; Edmonds, J, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1917, Vol. II, London: HMSO, p. 117.
21. Notes for Observers, Royal Flying Corps, 1915, p. 11; copy in Sykes papers, Vol. I, RAF Museum, Hendon. See also Sykes, F, From Many Angles. An Autobiography, London: Harrap, 1942, p. 166, and Rhodes James, op. cit., p. 255.
22. Sykes, op. cit., pp. 157–73.
23. Samson, Charles Rumney, Fights and Flights, London: Ernest Benn, 1930, p. 256.
24. MS inscription against photos 456 & 457 in album (Vol. VI – Gallipoli & various) of air photos collected by Capt. Hon. M Knatchbull MC, on loan to IWM Dept of Photographs.
25. Jones, H J, The War in the Air, Vol. II, London: OUP, 1928, p. 59.
26. Appendix 3 (Final Instructions from GHQ to IX Corps for the Suvla Operations, 29 July) of OH Military Operations, Gallipoli Vol. II, Maps & Appendices, London: Heinemann, 1932, p. 19.
27. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 29, 165.
28. Rhodes James, op. cit., p. 255.
29. Ibid, pp. 284–5.
30. OH Military Operations, Gallipoli, Vol. II, op. cit., Appendix 2, p. 17.
31. Rhodes James, op. cit., p. 264.
32. Ibid, p. 257.
33. Nolan, M A, The Gallipolian, Spring 1994, p.16.
34. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 129–30.
35. Hargrave, John, The Suvla Bay Landing, London: John Murray, 1964, p. 115.
36. Anzac Intelligence War Diary, Bulletin, JY 15, dated 7 July, Intelligence Note on Roads, water Supply, etc. TNA(PRO) WO 157/681.
37. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 129–30.
38. Strahan, A, ‘Introduction. Work in Connection with the war’, Memoirs of the Geological Survey, London: HMSO, 1919; Beeby-Thompson, A, Exploring for Water, London: Villiers Publications, 1969, p. 253.
39. Lt-Col. Brady’s evidence to Dardanelles Commission, TNA(PRO) CAB 19/28, p. 100.
40. 11th Division War Diary, TNA(PRO) CAB 45/258.
41. Hargrave, op. cit.
CHAPTER 11
Retrospect
As we have seen, there is much evidence to suggest that intelligence material (maps, reports, plans and reconnaissance) were all available to Hamilton and his General Staff, both before and after the landings. In retrospect, the terrain described in Chapter 1, in terms that would not be alien to any commander, can be seen to have exercised a significant factor in the outcome of battle; in the words of Australian historian Ashley Ekins: ‘At virtually every stage of the campaign the advantages and limitations imposed by terrain dominated the battlefield and largely determined the outcome.’1
Terrain and the Gallipoli Campaign
As was discussed in Chapter 1, the role of terrain is an important factor in the following considerations: (1) tactical position; (2) mobility; (3) ground conditions; (4) resource provision and hazard mitigation. These are discussed below in relation to what actually happened during the Gallipoli Campaign, assessing the role of terrain overall in its outcome.
Tactical position
The three main zones of conflict, Cape Helles, Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay, each had its own problems associated with tactical position. All three were within range of enemy shelling, and unlike the Turks, who had unlimited space for resting troops in the well-watered valleys behind the lines, there were no adequate rest camps.2
Cape Helles and Achi Baba. The landings at Cape Helles were to be made at narrow beaches leading into narrow, constrained valleys which rise up the slopes of the Kilid Bahr Plateau with the intention of capturing the plateau top, threatening Kilid Bahr below. The limestone cliffs are steep to near vertical and unscalable coastal cliffs, and therefore the only access to the slopes of the Kilid Bahr Plateau was through the incised valleys, particularly as there is only one low-lying area at Morto Bay. The two main landing beaches selected, V and W, have only relatively narrow stretches of open beach (200–300 metres) which funnel directly into narrow gorges surrounded on both sides by the limestone slopes characteristic of this land system.
Helles Sector, showing Turkish defences and the funnelling effect of V and W beaches and the excellent use of Terrain by the Turks; based on survey made by Nicholas and Douglas just after the landings in April
Defence of the valleys by the Turks was relatively straightforward, given the ability for enfilading fire from both sides of the valley, and the narrowness of the beaches. Turkish preparations in the month after the cessation of the naval bombardment exploited small hills (Hill 114, Hill 138 and Guezji Baba) as strongpoints, surrounded by trenches and extensive barbed wire entanglements mounted on angle-iron stakes. Trenches contoured the valley sides so as to provide the mutual enfilade fire promoted by the practitioners of the day.3 Machine-gun emplacements were installed on the cliff tops at the mouth of both valleys, providing crossfire.4 To the attackers, the enfilade fire produced by both the infantry in the trenches and the machine-gun posts was decimating. Vegetation on the beaches was insufficient to provide much cover, and the only natural breaks in slope were some raised beach material on V Beach, which enabled the attackers to shelter. The commanding hills and Turkish positions were only captured three days after the initial landing when the steep cliffs and slopes characteristic
of the Helles sector were turned to the attackers’ advantage in providing cover, although the nature of the crossfire was such that such cover could never be a hundred percent efficient.
The beach designated ‘X’ by the Allies was largely undefended by the Turkish forces simply because it was extremely narrow, and the slopes were precipitous and densely vegetated. This meant that the attacking forces were able to come ashore largely unopposed and, if it had not been for poor leadership and inadequate communications, might have assisted in the capture of Hill 114, thereby compromising the Turkish defences. This was not to be. A similar situation was encountered on the other side of the Peninsula at Morto Bay (S Beach), which was also lightly defended. The landings at X and S beaches were not considered by the British to be as important as those at V and W beaches, presumably because here at least the beaches were slightly wider, and access to the dip slope of Achi Baba easier.
Once ashore, the troops had to fight up the dip slope of Achi Baba, part of the Kilid Bahr Plateau. Failure to exploit this more open terrain reflects resourcing difficulties and the tactical advantage for the Turks of the possession of the higher ground. The Allied troops were advancing up what was a relatively gentle slope, but were hampered by inadequate land-based artillery and ammunition, and decreased efficiency of naval artillery due to the flat trajectory used. Limited successful advances on the flanks of the plateau, in the spurs and gullies of the undulating topography typical of plateaux, also meant that often the flanks of the Allied advances were left ‘in the air’ and in danger of being outflanked. The Turks for their part were opposing the Allies on a forward slope, and were able to direct their artillery and machine-gun fire with greater accuracy. After a series of attritional battles which mimicked the Western Front, trench systems became more or less static, and Achi Baba was never captured.
Grasping Gallipoli Page 38