Gaba Tepe and Anzac Cove. The intended landing site of the Anzac troops was to be north of Gaba Tepe on the open beach initially designated Z beach, later to be called Brighton Beach by the troops. The plan was to exploit the lower slopes of the Sari Bair Plateau, rising up the less steep, but still deeply incised valley systems of the southern margin of the plateau in order to reach the summit and overlook Kilid Bahr and the Dardanelles beyond. In fact, as is well known, the landing actually took place much farther to the north in Anzac Cove. This was unfortunate, as it is the only stretch of coast where the soft sediment cliffs of the Peninsula plateaux meet the sea, and although the Turkish defenders had not strongly defended this stretch of coastline, it was topographically challenging.
The tactical implications of the mistaken landing are serious. After initial successes on the day of landing, the Anzac troops did not ever manage to control the heights of the plateau, and as at Cape Helles, a parallel line of trenches was dug along the coastal slopes, the Turks always having the observational advantage of high ground. The final Anzac line actually ran north-eastwards paralleling the fault scarp which was the north-eastern expression of the plateau. The effectiveness of the Anzac position was therefore severely constrained by the nature of the slopes, particularly with regard to the steepness and level of dissection of the plateau, extremely difficult for the attacking troops to ascend. Turkish forward trenches, positioned as they were at the crest of this slope, provided a clear view of the low ground beneath them. The dissected dip slope leading up to the plateau also presented problems, the dissection producing north-west–south-east trending narrow ridges separated by steep-sided gullies. The broken ground provided by this topography made communications difficult, and the further construction of Turkish defensive positions on the higher slopes, surrounding the peaks of Chunuk Bair and Koja Chemen Tepe, meant that advances by the Anzac troops were difficult and costly; typical examples being the battle for the Lone Pine and the charge of the Australian Light Horse at a narrow subsidiary ridge known as the Nek. The constant observation of all the Anzac lines by the Turks meant that there were no safe rest camps close to the line, and even swimming parties were under constant threat from Turkish artillery. Finally, the narrowness of the beach at Anzac Cove produced its own problems with respect to resourcing and storage of men, material and pack animals from the sea.
Suvla Bay. The landing at Suvla Bay, made in August 1915, was meant to exploit the previously untried landing beaches of the bay, and to allow troops to deploy rapidly across the flat Suvla Plain before taking the high ground which surrounded the plain in the form of the Anafarta and Karakol ridges. The landing was, unfortunately, bodged such that troops from different commands became hopelessly mixed, and no decisive military decisions were taken that day, and as we have seen, even the hard lessons of the landings in April were not learned.
In fact the Turkish defenders were small in number, and were deployed in small outposts to the north and south of the Suvla Plain, exploiting small knolls and hillocks of harder rock sticking above the plain. The British troops did eventually traverse the open and flat Suvla Plain, and not even the Salt Lake was an obstacle to progress, by foot at least, as it was seasonally dry. However, although they were to take up their positions at the foothills, they were never to take the commanding peaks which overlooked the Suvla Plain, and consequently they wasted a valuable opportunity to break out of the constrained area. A later offensive in August tried to break out of the Suvla Plain by attacking the so-called Chocolate, Green and Scimitar hills, and the north-western facing scarp of the Sari Bair Plateau. However, these attacks failed at least in part because of the observational advantage possessed by the Turks who were now deployed in force, and ultimately this led to the decision to withdraw from the Peninsula completely.
Mobility
Unlike the situation on the Western Front, trafficability was never a major issue in the Gallipoli Campaign, due to a variety of factors. Importantly, the level of troop movements was limited inland, as the majority of supplies were derived from shipborne sources, including water supplies, as is well known. Movement of supplies inland was in the main by mule transport, although some wheeled traffic was used more extensively at Cape Helles, where there was the maximum Allied penetration. Therefore, it was important to construct piers for the landing of stores, and for the construction of roads capable of taking wheeled artillery pieces, as there were no real roads on the Peninsula at that time. These roads and paths were mostly constructed by slope excavation, and there is no record of elaborate construction methods being used. However, road construction using crushed stone aggregates was carried out by the Royal Engineers on Lemnos, and may also have been used on the Peninsula.5
Ground conditions
Ground conditions are most important in the development of permanent or semi-permanent entrenchments and other defensive positions. Three basic sets of ground conditions existed, primarily associated with the plateaux, limestone cliffs, and hard ridges of the Peninsula. These affected the construction of temporary, shallow-scrape ‘foxholes’, and more permanent defensive trench positions. Importantly, the nature of the ground conditions allowed for the development of tunnelling and offensive mining.
Trench and dugout construction. The necessity to establish secure beachheads after the first landings at Gallipoli ensured that trench warfare would become an important aspect of life for both sides during the Gallipoli Campaign. Initially, trenches were dug to provide protection for the newly landed and battle-weary troops, but by the end of the campaign, trench systems took on a complexity which in many ways mimicked that of the Western Front and was intimately associated with the intricacies of the local terrain.
On the Anzac front, the relatively soft sediments of the Sari Bair Plateau enabled the fairly rapid development of rudimentary trench systems, although this was hampered in the opening hours of the campaign by an absence of adequate construction tools, and by the degree of root penetration. By the end of the campaign, the trench systems were complex with a parallel underground system of tunnels and saps. In addition, many terraces were cut in the reverse slope to provide rudimentary dwelling areas. In general, few drainage problems were encountered, due to the paucity of rainfall, in the summer months at least, the relative permeability of the trenches, and the absence of ground water close to the surface – itself a major issue. Revetment was usually achieved using locally derived or shipped-in timber, and both sides used covered trench systems, roofed by timber baulks and earthworks, in order to mitigate the effects of shrapnel and small arms fire, although largely useless against direct hits from high explosive shells. Covered trench systems made extensive use of loopholes for snipers. New trenches were often dug by the use of shallow tunnels which were then roofed with timber before the cutting of loopholes. As with the Western Front, dugouts varied from the deep, shell-proof dugout to the shallow recess or ‘funk-hole’ intended only as a limited shelter. Extensive dugout systems were cut into the seawards slopes of the Sari Bair Plateau providing shelter for a variety of administrative and service personnel.
At Helles, the initial landings encountered the relatively hard limestones of land system II and this meant that in many cases there was insufficient depth for protection without the use of heavy tools not immediately available. Blasting was used later in the campaign.6 However, the subsequent advances from the Helles beachhead enabled the construction of trenches in both soft sediments and harder limestone rocks. Extensive dugout systems were also constructed, and much use was made of the incised ‘gullies’ on the dip slope of the Kilid Bahr Plateau, particularly at Gully Ravine. At Suvla, trench construction was commenced tactically earlier than it should have, before the high ground was captured and exploited. Support lines protecting the landing beaches were also dug adjacent to the Salt Lake, and these were undoubtedly more difficult to maintain, given the proximity of standing water, marshes and sand-dunes. Lala Baba, composed of the same hard rocks that making up
Kirech Tepe Ridge was also heavily defended.
Offensive mining. Offensive mining is characteristic of protracted trench warfare, and was extensively used on the Western Front.7 Mining was also employed, intensively but on a smaller scale, at Gallipoli, on both the Helles and Anzac fronts.8 There were few geological problems with these tunnelling activities, as they were exclusively cut through the relatively workable sediments of sands and clays, with harder bands serving to roof the tunnels.9 On both fronts, and by both sides, mining activities were developed after the failure of the summer offensives. On the Anzac front, mining and tunnelling activities led to the development of an extensive underground tunnel system which sent forward a series of saps under the enemy lines which were to be packed with explosives and blown at appropriate moments. In addition, and in an attempt to solve the overcrowding of the Anzac Cove area, an extensive tunnel system was constructed under the Anzac trench lines to provide quarters for the men, storage facilities, and the ability to move about without being observed. These tunnels were constructed by tunnelling companies of the Royal Engineers attached to the Anzac Corps. A special corps of Australian tunnellers was also raised, but were formed too late to take an active part in the Gallipoli Campaign. Similar tunnels and offensive mining techniques were employed at Cape Helles, although there was less need for an extensive system for storage and habitation. As on the Western Front, the opposing troops carried out a series of countermining techniques in order to both detect and deal with the mining activity, using shallow ‘camouflet’ mines designed to destroy the tunnels without producing a surface crater.
Resources
The provision of resources to the invading armies was a particular problem for the Allied forces. In most cases, elaborate supply lines were constructed which brought food, water and ammunition from Imbros. A system of semi-permanent piers and jetties was constructed, mostly from anchored inshore craft, but also from pile-driven steel girders driven deep into the beach sediments, the remains of which can still be observed today.
Potable water. Water supply was a major consideration for the Gallipoli Campaign. The Allies were forced from the beginning to plan for the provision of an adequate supply of potable water to serve both its men and animals. Water was derived from three sources: (1) surface water; (2) ground water, and (3) imported supplies. As we have seen, the search for potable water supplies initiated some of the earliest reports on the geology of the Gallipoli Peninsula, commissioned directly from the Geological Survey of Great Britain.
Surface water supplies were extremely variable and for the most part, insufficient. There are few flowing rivers on the Peninsula, the majority of them being seasonal. Ground water supplies were more promising. The majority of ground waters were derived from: (1) limestone/sandstone strata at depth; (2) beach and riverbed sediments, and (3) from clay layers capturing water in the otherwise dry deposits at Anzac.10 The water-bearing limestone strata of the coastal area provided the resources for much of the Cape Helles operation. However, as the British advanced up the slopes of Achi Baba, groundwater became more difficult to obtain. Wells tapping this aquifer also existed around the south-eastern margins. Beach and river sediments were found to be a good source of water on the Suvla Plain by Beeby-Thompson,11 and these provided some limited resources at Anzac Cove, and more abundant supplies at the eastern margin of the Suvla Plain. Salt water spoiling water resources was a problem within the central part of the plain itself occurring seasonally, and due to excessive water abstraction. Much of the Suvla Plain and Karakol water supplies were derived from the hard sandstones that formed the ridge.
One of the biggest problems was a lack of reliable groundwater supplies at Anzac Cove. Here, the valuable water-bearing limestones are at depth, and seasonally supplies perched on impermeable strata, difficult to accurately locate, were the norm, together with some exploitation of seasonally dry rivers. These were ephemeral, however, and many of the wells dug in the surrounding gullies began to dry up with the approach of summer, though others were found at depth. This meant that the daily ration from local sources in the 1st Australian Division was rarely more than one third of a gallon per man. Except on the extreme northern flank, wells were even scarcer in the area occupied by the New Zealanders, on the northern slope of the Sari Bair Plateau. Most water supplies for these areas were from imported water and large water-lighters used to be towed from Alexandria and Malta and moored alongside the piers at Anzac Cove. The water could then be pumped by hand into iron tanks on the beach, whence it was taken by mules to other tanks in the hills, and thence by hand to the troops holding the line. Later, a pumping plant and a number of larger storage tanks were obtained from Egypt.12 These were hauled to specially constructed platforms on the slopes of Plugge’s Plateau, Walker’s Ridge and other points near the front line. They were connected to the beach, and thereafter water could be pumped straight into them from the lighters, and then distributed to smaller tanks by gravitation.
Hydrology of the Peninsula
The lessons learned at Anzac Cove led to the development of elaborate plans for water supply at Suvla Plain, despite the existence of more abundant groundwater supplies. Four fifty-ton water lighters specially fitted out in Egypt were towed across from Imbros by a water tank steamer, itself capable of carrying 200 tons of water, and which would fill the lighters when empty. Each lighter had been fitted with troughs, pumps and 120 feet of hose, and was manned by a crew of Royal Engineers. To enable the water to be carried forward to the troops, the bazaars in Egypt had been ransacked for every imaginable kind of water-carrying receptacle, and large quantities of milk cans, petrol tins, camel tanks and water bags had been shipped over. Unfortunately, these plans did not assist the landing in August, as the lighters grounded a long way out, and it was late in the day before water could be landed, causing much suffering amongst the troops.
Mineral/aggregate resourcing. The Gallipoli Campaign was fought over a relatively limited timescale, and there was little development of the kind of static positions developed on the Western Front which required concrete and other construction materials. In fact, the majority of permanent defensive works were built using timber and earthworks, although breastworks and sangars were created where the rock strata, limestones and sandstones could be broken into slabs. Road and jetty construction mostly utilised locally derived materials won when the initial cuttings were created, or when paths were widened, and in other cases broken and crushed stone may have been used.13
Hazard mitigation. The most important natural hazard which affected the troops was the flash flooding of the parallel aligned dry valley systems of the plateaux that dominate the centre of the Peninsula. This was particularly prevalent in the winter months, with increased rainfall, and unexpected floods led to the deaths of many men in the incised Gully Ravine later in the year. Little was done to mitigate such hazards, which occurred in the winter months following the break in the summer drought, and it is unlikely that they were expected.
Beaches and terrain
As has been argued by most historians, if the Peninsula was to be captured then Hamilton had no real choice but to land where he did. The capture of the high ground was of clear importance, and Hamilton’s plan, to capture the Kilid Bahr Plateau using a pincer movement from Gaba Tepe and Helles and exploiting the low slopes of the coastal areas, appears sound. However, the beaches at Helles, developed at the mouth of the narrow, ravine-like valleys are clearly more suited to the defender, and the terrain multiplication effect magnified the excellent fire discipline of the Turkish troops to create a maelstrom into which the 29th Division landed during the ‘Battle of the Beaches’ on 25 April 1915.
The choice of Gaba Tepe makes sense from the perspective of terrain, using as it does the low slopes that would ultimately lead to that strategic prize, Maidos and the Narrows, but the use of the Anzac beaches does not. It must therefore be recognised of course that this was beyond the control of the commander once the landing was in place. Here, at
the only place where the soft cliffs of Sari Bair reach the sea, the landing was made. As it happens, the landing here was a surprise, but as with Cape Helles in the south, the advantage was not pressed home, and after the initial surprise the tactical advantage soon passed to the defenders, controlling as they did the high ground.
The real mystery is why neither commander fully appreciated the value of Suvla Bay as a landing site earlier in the campaign. This has the benefit of both relatively wide beaches for the landing of men and material, and the Suvla Plain – flat but with sufficient cover for rapid deployment, and with a ground surface sufficiently dry for movement on foot or with animal transport, although damp and muddy in places. This mystery is partly answered by the fact that Suvla was some distance from the main objectives – the Turkish guns on the Dardanelles shore – and that the Allies appeared to have had little knowledge of either the terrain or the landing beaches themselves. For example, the Admiralty had little information upon the nature of shoaling of the coastal area, and the military commanders had minimal understanding of the nature of important water resources. In fact the opposition to landing at Suvla appears to have mainly come from the Navy. When the British finally landed in August 1915, the control of the high ground to the east, which ultimately could be used to outflank the Turkish positions on the Sari Bair Plateau overlooking Maidos and the Dardanelles, was in their grasp. Poor generalship led to the loss of this advantage, to the subsequent costly and unsuccessful battles for the heights of the Anafarta Ridge and the Sari Bair Plateau, and ultimately to the admission of defeat by the Allies.
Grasping Gallipoli Page 39