Part II (169 pages) of the report dealt specifically with the Dardanelles. As this was a naval report it naturally concentrated on the coast defences and the various threats to a fleet, but it did contain a section on the ‘Land Defences of Gallipoli Peninsula’, which made specific reference to Map 3A, the secret edition of the 1-inch map showing the Turkish coastal defences, and Plates 57 and 58 covering the Bulair Lines and area. Pages 50–52 contained a ‘Short Description of Peninsula’, including sections on ‘topography, nature of country, streams, roads, telegraphs’. It also noted that ‘In this description the spelling of the names of places in the Gallipoli Peninsula has been made to conform with the spelling on the M.O.D. [Military Operations Directorate] Map (Map 3A) accompanying this report’. This was clearly done with combined operations in mind.
A long section (pages 52–63) covered the Bulair Lines and their garrison, and pages 63–69 dealt with ‘Submarine Defences in the Dardanelles’, including mines. The rest of the section included:
Other defences
69
Torpedo battery
69– 70
Lights
71– 2
Garrison of Dardanelles
73– 5
Communications
76– 85
Sea of Marmara
Bulair Lines
76– 7
Rodosto
Other towns.
86– 94
Constantinople
95– 125
Bosphorus
126– 30
Land Defences of Constantinople [including Chataldja Line]
131– 54
Black Sea
155– 8
Appendix I was a ‘History of Submarine Defences in the Dardanelles and Bosphorus’ (up to 1896).
[The plates relating to the Dardanelles Defences were]:
11.
Besika Bay.
12.
Port Tenedos, Fort and Battery.
Dardanelles
13.
Map showing position of ‘Fort Seddul Bahr’ in its relation to ‘Cape Helles’ and ‘Field Gun’ Batteries.
14.
Cape Helles Battery and Field Gun Battery.
15.
Fort Seddul Bahr, New Field Gun Battery.
16.
– do –
17.
– do –
18.
Mining Station at Eski Hissarlik. Orkhanieh Tabia and Field Gun Battery.
19.
– do –
20.
Map showing position of ‘Kum Kalessi’ in its relation to ‘Orkhanieh’ and ‘Yeni Shehr’.
21.
Kum Kalessi Tabia.
22.
Fort Kum Kalessi (approaching from the west).
23.
– do – (– do – from the north-west).
24.
Mount Dardanus Q.F. Battery.
25.
Yildiz or Tekeh Tabia.
26.
Relative positions of ‘Yildiz Tabia’, ‘Rumili Medjidieh’, ‘Hamidieh II’, ‘Namazieh’, ‘Derma Burnu’, and adjacent batteries, &c.
27.
Rumili Medjidieh Tabia.
28.
– do – (approaching from the south-west).
29.
Hamidieh II. (Toprak Tabia).
30.
Fort Namazieh.
31.
– do – (left of south front).
32.
– do – (south front).
33.
– do – (east front).
34.
– do – (approaching from the north-east).
35.
– do – (interior, south front).
36.
– do – (interior, east front).
37.
Bilas Baba Tabia (Kusghum Baba Tabia).
38.
Relative positions of ‘Hamidieh I’, ‘Hamidieh III’, ‘Medjidieh Avan Tabia’, Anadolu Medjidieh, &c.
39.
Hamidieh I. Tabia.
40.
– do – (west by south view).
41.
– do – (north-west view).
42.
Hamidieh III. Tabia (Fort Sultanieh).
43.
– do – (south front view).
44.
– do – (west front view).
45.
Derma Burnu Tabia.
46.
Medjidieh Avan.
47.
Anadolu Medjidieh.
48.
– do – (view of interior).
49.
Defences. Panoramic view of European shore.
50.
Cham Burnu Tabia. Maitos Tabia. Sari Tabia.
51.
Map showing positions of ‘Mal-Tepeh’ and ‘Nagara Baba’ Batteries in their relation to ‘Nagara Kalessi’.
52.
Mal-Tepeh Tabia. Nagara Baba Tabia.
53.
Nagara Kalessi.
54.
– do – (view from south-west).
55.
– do – (view from north-east).
56.
Ak Tabia. Agh Bashi Tabia.
57.
The Lines of Bulair from the north by west.
[The maps, plans and photo-plates were printed at the Ordnance Survey.]
Appendix III
Extracts from:
Report on The Defences of Constantinople. General Staff. Secret. 1909. War Office. [A 1311. (B 369) 100 2/09 H & S 400WO].
[xii + 151 pp. ‘Copy No. 3 D.M.O.’ is in The National Archives at TNA(PRO) WO 33/2333.]
[The introduction to this 1909 Report noted: ‘The European side of the Dardanelles is formed by the remarkable Peninsula of Gallipoli, which is connected with the mainland by a very narrow neck of land. In order to protect the Dardanelles forts from an attack from the rear, a line of works, known as the Bulair Lines, has been constructed across this neck. In following report each of the above systems of defence [of Constantinople] will be dealt with in a separate chapter, and in addition the Gallipoli Peninsula will be specially considered from the point of view of a possible attack upon the Dardanelles defences from the rear.’[xi–xii]. One third of this Report was concerned exclusively with the Gallipoli Peninsula and the Dardanelles, as were 4 out of the 8 maps and 33 out of the 72 Plates.
The Contents of the Gallipoli Peninsula part of the Report were vital information for the 1915 landings:]
Introduction
xi
Chapter I. The Gallipoli Peninsula and the Asiatic Shore of the Dardanelles.
Topographical and other Details.
The Gallipoli Peninsula:-
General description
1
Physical feature
2
Population
5
Towns and villages
5
Cultivation and forests
7
Water supply and streams
7
Communications
8
Transport
10
Supplies
10
The Dardanelles:-
General description
11
Towns and villages
12
Communications
13
Chapter II. The Dardanelles Defences
[14–36]
[very detailed – deals with all forts, batteries, earthworks, garrison, searchlights, range-finders, telegraphic communications]
Chapter III. The Military Importance of the Kilid Bahr Plateau.
Landing Places and Routes Inland
.
The Kilid Bahr Plateau:-
Military Importance
37
General Description
37
Landing Places on the West Coast of the Peninsula:-
South of Kaba Tepe Promontory
North of Kaba Tepe Promontory [including Anzac Cove area]
40
South of Nibrunesi Point
40
Suvla Bay
41
Ejelmer Bay
41
Routes inland from the West Coast:-
From the beach near Kaba Tepe
42
From Suvla Bay and the beach near Nibrunesi Point
43
From Ejelmer Bay
44
Landing Places along the Straits:-
European shore
45
Asiatic shore
45
Chapter IV. The Bulair Lines
[47– 55]
[all aspects dealt with in detail]
[Chapters V–VIII dealt with the Chatalja Lines, Positions to North and West of Constantinople, the Bosphorus Defences, and Landing Places on the Black Sea Coast, and Defensive Positions which might be taken up to oppose landings.
The Report contained a good deal of topographical information. Under ‘Physical features’ it provided the following description, which was studied by Hamilton and his staff, of the Peninsula: 4–7.]
South-west of the Bulair Lines begins a chain of hills which extends along the north-western shore of the Peninsula, as far as Cape Suvla. These hills, which attain at some points a height of 1,300 feet, fall almost perpendicularly towards the sea in the Gulf of Xeros.
Rough spurs are thrown out towards the south, the steep slopes of which, covered with a little oak and pine forest and much brushwood, overlook the Straits, until Maidos Bay (Kilia Liman) is reached, just north of the Narrows.
Between the spurs a succession of small valleys, draining into the Straits, traverse the Peninsula at right angles. Near Gallipoli are the valleys of the Aivali Dere and other small streams, which drain the rounded, cultivated spurs behind the town, and those in rear of the Bulair Lines…
The southern part of the Peninsula, from Cape Suvla and Maidos to Cape Helles, has rather different characteristics. In this part the highest ground is along the south-eastern coast, overlooking the Straits, while the Aegean coast is bordered throughout the greater part of its length by a shelving beach.
The Kilid Bahr plateau … is situated in this part of the Peninsula. Its western edge overlooks the Peren Ovasi and the Chana Ovasi, the flat cultivated valley round Ibrahim Agha’s farm. The plateau lies at a height of from 600 to 700 feet above the sea. The Kalkmaz Dagh is a prominent isolated feature just north of Maidos, and forms a spur of the plateau, but at a lower level.
From the head of Maidos Bay (Kilia Liman) to Kaba Tepe on the Aegean a well-marked depression, slightly above sea level, runs across the Peninsula, dividing the Kilid Bahr plateau from the hills farther north.
North of this depression is the Saribair Hill, a steep, rugged ridge, which rises to 970 feet, and dominates very steeply the village of Biyuk Anafarta. It is seamed with many ravines, covered with brushwood, and generally difficult of access, except on the southern spurs about Kojadere and Boghali, which are somewhat easier.
South of Cape Suvla is the wide bay of the same name, well sheltered from the northern winds which frequently prevail, and having a sandy beach suitable for landing. A good beach runs south of Nibrunesi Point also, and from both these places access is fairly easy to the villages of Biyuk and Kuchuk Anafarta, and thence into the plain about Turshtenkeni and Selvili. A rough coast track leads south also.
The Kaba Tepe is a prominent headland on this coast, rising to a height of 110 feet above the sea. There is a look-out station on it which has a garrison of one lieutenant and 33 men, and it is connected by telegraph with Kilid Bahr.
The ground at the end of the Peninsula about Cape Helles is generally open and undulating, with much cultivation around Krithia. Achi Baba is a prominent hill, rising to over 600 feet, just east of this village. Near Sedd-el-Bahr, at the entrance of the Straits, is the small sandy bay of Morto; but from Eski Hissarlik Point to the Narrows the shore rises very steeply to a height of 600 feet from a narrow strip of beach. The slopes are covered with brushwood, and only steep paths up the small ravines lead to the summit. Two larger ravines, known as the Jambaz (Avuzlar) Dere and the Soghan Dere, having steep sides covered with brushwood, and both rather difficult of access, lead down to the coast, and render approach from the south to the Kilid Bahr plateau difficult.
… In the centre of the Peninsula there were formerly some extensive forests, but very little of them now remains. The several spurs from the northern hills are covered with patches of forest, principally oak and pine, and with much dense brushwood. The country is extremely rough and difficult for the movement of troops.
[This is only a fraction of the Report, but enough has been given to emphasise that it gives an uncompromising picture of the terrain. Even if troops could be successfully landed, and bridgeheads established, the message comes across that the country was very rugged and suited to defence, and would create severe difficulties for troops attempting to break out from beachheads and fight along the Peninsula towards the Narrows and Bulair. No doubt this is why Hamilton’s staff, and most of his commanders, became increasingly pessimistic as they studied the problem. Under ‘Communications’ the Report was equally uncompromising:]
Rough cart tracks form the only communications throughout the entire Peninsula. In the northern part, about Gallipoli, where the soil is stiff clay, the tracks become almost impassable in winter owing to the mud. At the southern end the soil is rather more sandy, but nevertheless the tracks are difficult in wet weather.
The only metalled road in the Peninsula runs north-east from Gallipoli through Keshan to Adrianople, and forms an important military communication… Over the rough country in the centre of the Peninsula between Gallipoli and Maidos only one track is to be found which is passable for wheels. This track leads from Gallipoli through Bairkeui, the Karakova Dere, Taifurkeui, Karnabili, Kumkeui, and Boghali to Maidos. Leaving Gallipoli it skirts the low stony cliffs of the coast and descents occur at small streams, seven of these being crossed before Bairkeui is reached. They are all dry in summer except the Bituk Dere, but have steep banks and are difficult for wheels… Easy communications lead towards Kumkeui and Boghali from landing places on the coast near Suvla and Ejelmer Bays….
From Maidos to Kaba Tepe across the peninsula is a rough track recently improved by military labour.
From Maidos to Sedh-el-Bahr is a good track through Krithia, over cultivated country for the most part.
Cart tracks lead to the summit of the Kilid Bahr plateau from the beach near Kaba Tepe.
[The clear imputation of this is that, in the initial stages at least, a landing force attempting to move up the Peninsula and across country would have to be supported by mountain batteries and rely on pack transport. In this, operations would resemble those on the North-West Frontier of India; but this was hardly a ‘small-war’ against a few hundred ill-armed tribesmen, but a large-scale operation against troops armed with modern weapons, including machine guns and artillery – rather more like the Boer War, which, extending over two years, during which all the military resources of the Empire were concentrated, involved severe defeats for British troops and much hard fighting.
Perhaps the most important section of the 1909 Report was that dealing with ‘The Military Importance Of The Kilid Bahr Plateau And Landing Places Adjacent To It’. After dealing with the plateau itself, it went on to deal with the core of the whole operational concept:]
It is obvious, therefore, that if this plateau could be occupied by a hostile force landed on the Aegean coast, some 6 miles to the west, the principal defences could be rendered untenable, and the Straits opened to a fleet which has got through the outer line of works. [37]
[The landing places were clearly the subject of close reconnaissance, and were dealt with under the heading]: Landing Places on the West Coast of the Peninsula. The landing places on the Aegean from which to gain access inland
to the Kilid Bahr plateau are as follows: [39–42]
1. South of Kaba Tepe Promontory, the most direct route. [Y Beach, west of Krithia, was at the southern end of this stretch; the landing here in April 1915 was successful but unexploited, and the force was disembarked; X Beach, used in April 1915, was almost a mile north of Tekke Burnu (Cape Tekke), but was not considered practicable in the 1909 Report.]
Grasping Gallipoli Page 42