The Enemy At Home

by Dinesh D'Souza

  Even so, liberal critics ridiculed the idea that Bush was really sincere about implementing democracy in Iraq. Applying her characteristic sarcasm, columnist Maureen Dowd wrote, “In Bushworld, we can create an exciting Iraqi democracy as long as it doesn’t control its own military, pass any laws, or have any power.” Writing in Foreign Affairs, political scientist Tony Smith claimed that “the call for democratic change was an integral part of a power play by Washington to control the entire Middle East.”30 These are good examples of how mainstream liberals routinely endorse the leftist view that Bush’s democratic rhetoric conceals a naked imperial ambition.

  Bush has proved this criticism wrong, however, by allowing democracy to take its course in Iraq. The Bush administration had its own schedule for elections, but the Iraqis pushed for elections to be held sooner, and they were. The Bush team wanted the secular liberal fellow, Iyad Allawi, who had been appointed interim prime minister, to win the election. The Iraqis chose religious figures, first Ibrahim al-Jaafari and then Nouri al-Maliki, and the Bush administration accepted these outcomes. The Bush team wanted an Iraqi constitution with equal rights for women. The Iraqis produced a constitution that gives special place to Islam and includes sharia provisions that treat women unequally than men. The Bush administration has accepted the verdict of Iraq’s elected representatives on this issue. Moreover, Bush has proved the left wrong by handing over the oil fields to Iraq’s new government, demonstrating that America had no desire to steal Iraq’s oil. Contrary to Maureen Dowd, Iraq now has an elected government that does control its own military, pass its own laws, and exercise all the power provided by the constitution. Even more impressive, Bush has agreed that U.S. troops will leave Iraq when the Iraqi government decides they are no longer needed.

  IGNORING THESE REMARKABLE signs, Bush’s liberal critics have raised two questions: What if the Iraqis don’t want democracy? What if the Iraqis don’t want American troops in their country? The first question is extremely odd because it presumes that there is a group of people that has no intention of controlling its own destiny. If there is any evidence for this, in Iraq or anywhere else, it has never been produced. On the contrary, I turn on my television and see Hajem al-Hassani, the Sunni Arab speaker of the National Assembly, say, “My dream is to be the Tip O’Neill of Iraq.”31 Recalling O’Neill’s resemblance to our federal government—big, fat, and out of control—I am not ordinarily excited to find a man who wants to emulate Tip O’Neill. But I wish al-Hassani good luck. They need more rotund, jovial wheeler-dealers in Baghdad today.

  What if the Iraqis don’t want us there? Columnist Bob Herbert argues that “the occupation is perceived by ordinary Iraqis as a confrontation and a humiliation.” James Dobbins writes, “The beginning of wisdom is to recognize that Washington has lost the Iraqi people’s confidence and consent.” Robert Byrd laments that “we are now the occupiers, despised by the people of Iraq.”32 The interesting question is how all these people have become so knowledgeable about what the Iraqi people want. Their conclusions seem to be drawn solely from the existence of an insurgency that is made up of less than 2 percent of the Iraqi people and draws its support almost exclusively from the minority Sunni population. In fact, the composition of the insurgency by itself refutes the idea of a broad-based resistance of American occupation. If the Iraqi people opposed America’s presence, all segments of the population would rebel. In fact the rebellion derives its support entirely from the one group that was rudely ejected from power.

  Congressman John Murtha points to an opinion poll showing that more than half of Iraqis “want us out and almost half of them think we’re the enemy.” Put aside the fact that the poll was ambiguously worded, and other polls find Iraqis want American troops to stay for at least another two years.33 Even if Murtha’s preferred pollsters were correct in their findings, what do those results really prove? Polls change because people change their minds. The way that democratic countries express the people’s will is not through shifting poll results but through the decisions and policies made by their elected representatives. If the Iraqi people don’t want American troops there, they can vote for a government that will demand that the troops leave. Murtha’s conclusion that “we’ve lost the hearts and minds of the people” seems to be largely a product of wishful thinking.

  For a group that is supposed to be committed to democracy, liberals seem strangely drawn to a cornucopia of explanations for why democracy isn’t working in Iraq. Columnist Bob Herbert discounted the Iraqi election because “a real democracy requires an informed electorate,” whereas the Iraqi electorate is “woefully uninformed.” For Arianna Huffington, Iraq had a democratic election “in name only” since “most of the candidates lacked name recognition.” Jonathan Steele found Iraq’s election defective because many Sunnis didn’t vote and therefore “voters had only a limited choice.” Robert Dreyfuss found the process flawed because “the Sunni community was tricked into voting” and moreover “the Sunnis who were elected to the parliament do not represent the resistance.” Writing in the American Prospect, Ivan Eland speculated, on no historical evidence in particular, that “spreading democracy doesn’t reduce terrorism and, if anything, actually makes it worse.”34

  Even in Afghanistan, after that country held its first free election in history, leading liberals complained about the inadequacy of the democratic process. “At least a third of Afghanistan is still so dicey that voters there cannot be registered.” Due to the influence of warlords, “voters had to choose between the unknown and the notorious.” “Afghanistan remains unstable.” The elected leader, Hamid Karzai, “has not managed to extend his authority beyond Kabul.” “Opium production is at a record level.”35 When evaluating these criticisms, let us remember that, in Iraq as in Afghanistan, we are witnessing fledgling democracies. Think of how imperfect and unsteady America’s first steps toward democracy were. The important point is that 50 million Afghans and Iraqis are free, and for the first time in their history, they have a chance to control their own destiny.

  Finally, we must confront the argument—first advanced by the left, but now popular among all Bush’s critics—that the war in Iraq has only succeeded in creating more terrorists. Ted Kennedy argues that Iraq has now become “a fertile new breeding ground for terrorists.”36 Richard Clarke argues that as a result of the American presence in Iraq, “President Bush has sowed the seeds of current and future terrorism against the United States.” This argument is based on a paradox: the war against terrorism is producing more terrorists. The basis for the claim is the increased number of terrorist and insurgent attacks following the Iraq invasion. Jimmy Carter cites these attacks as “direct evidence that the Iraqi war has actually increased the terrorist threat.”37 Carter’s argument was supported in the fall of 2006 by an intelligence report that called Iraq a cause celebre for terrorists.

  But there is an alternative explanation for the increased violence. The radical Muslims have upped the ante in Iraq because they have realized how much they stand to lose if Iraq becomes a functioning, pro-American democracy. Iraq is a grand experiment by America to see if the alien seed of democracy can take root in the Middle East. The past few decades have witnessed a great democratic tide sweep the world. Latin America, once run by dictators and strongmen, is now largely democratic. Africa, once the province of Big Daddy despots, has seen a burst of popular self-government. Despite some backsliding, Russia is on the stumbling road to democracy. Many of the “Oriental despotisms” of Asia have been transformed into democracies. Who would have thought any of this possible a century ago? Countries like Japan and India, with no history of self-government, have become functioning democracies.

  Yet with the exception of Israel, until recently there were no democracies in the Arab Middle East. To find Muslim democracy you have to go to Turkey, Indonesia, or Malaysia—in the Arab world, democracy does not exist and has not existed. America is trying to change that, and to establish a new model that traditional Muslim
s might wish to emulate. Already the effects are being felt. Egypt held a parliamentary election in November 2005 in which all groups, even the candidates affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, were allowed to participate. “Now everybody in Egypt is talking about democracy,” says Negad El Borai, director of the Cairo-based Center for Democratic Development. “Nothing would have happened without U.S. pressure.” In 2005, Lebanon held its first parliamentary election in three decades. It, too, was the result of a popular movement inspired by Iraq. Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze in Lebanon and longtime critic of the United States, said, “When I saw the Iraqi people voting, it was the start of a new Arab world. The Berlin Wall has fallen. We can see it.”38 If a democratic wind blows through Iraq, and then spreads to other countries, we could see the beginning of an historical transformation no less momentous than the transformation of the former Soviet Union.

  The Islamic radicals are terrified at this prospect. This is why they will do anything to subvert Iraqi democracy, even to the point of provoking a civil war that would surely produce untold numbers of Muslim deaths. Not that the radicals abhor democracy per se. As we saw with the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian territories and the advances of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the radicals are likely to do pretty well in free elections. What truly frightens them is pro-American democracy. This is something entirely new in the Arab world. Until now the Islamic radicals have had to face only America-backed dictators who are typically secular tyrants with little support from the people. Given a choice between secular tyranny and Islamic tyranny, many Muslims might prefer Islamic tyranny. But what if the choice were between Islamic tyranny and Islamic democracy? Then traditional Muslims would have a serious alternative to consider, and the outcome could well be different.

  The Bush administration has made costly blunders in Iraq. Some of these could have been avoided, others are in the nature of war. There were also catastrophic blunders in World War II—errors in planning, training casualties, bad intelligence, battles lost that should have been won. Even so, the fight went on because the whole country recognized the importance of defeating Hitler. The difference now is that the United States is no longer united: one side seems dedicated not to defeating the Islamic radicals but to defeating the United States. There is a war against the war, and it is being waged by the left with mainstream liberal encouragement. The reason for this homegrown resistance is political. A few years from now, if Iraq is a standing—even if somewhat fragile—democracy, this result will be a magnificent triumph for Bush’s policy and assure his place in history. It will also consolidate the claim of the Republican Party to be the party that can be trusted over the long term with national security. The implications for the Muslim world, and for America, are huge. Therefore two groups are making supreme efforts to defeat Bush in Iraq. The first group is the Islamic radicals and insurgents, who are indeed fighting harder because they have a great deal to lose. The other group is the American left, which is also fighting harder because it too has a great deal to lose. Although these two groups do not speak a word to each other, they have in Bush a common enemy, and therefore, whether they fully realize it or not, they are allies in the war against the war on terror.

  WE ARE NOW in a position to better understand the real message contained in bin Laden’s 2004 and 2006 videotapes. Bin Laden offers a vital clue when he informs Americans in his 2004 statement that “in truth, your security lies not in the hands of Kerry, Bush, or Al Qaeda. It lies in your own hands, and whichever state does not encroach upon our security thereby ensures its own.”39 Clearly bin Laden was proposing some sort of a deal. But to whom? And what deal? Many interpreted bin Laden to be offering America the same terms that he seems to have offered European countries: stop supporting the war on terror and we will stop targeting your country.

  This interpretation rested upon reading the word “state” to mean “country.” But bin Laden didn’t say “country.” This was a letter addressed to Americans, and its subject was the upcoming choice in the 2004 election. Clearly bin Laden was saying that American states that vote against Bush’s war on terror would be spared future attacks. In a sense bin Laden was taking up a complaint that Michael Moore issued immediately after 9/11. Moore protested that bin Laden had picked the wrong targets, because he had concentrated his attacks in states that did not vote for Bush. In his 2004 statement, bin Laden seems to be telling blue America: I know you may be scared of me because of what I did on 9/11, but if you vote against Bush, I will not target your states the next time.

  In other words, bin Laden’s signaling can be understood as an effort to establish a broader political alliance. Speaking to Americans in his 2006 videotape, bin Laden called for a “truce.” Again, a truce with whom? Bin Laden recognizes, of course, that no truce is possible with Bush. His truce is obviously directed to a different group, Bush’s political opposition. More than once in the videotape, bin Laden refers to polls showing that a majority of Americans oppose America’s involvement in Iraq. While scorning Bush for ignoring these polls, bin Laden goes on to praise “the sensible people” in America who protest the Iraq war and who have helped to produce declining public support for it. Bin Laden calls on these “sensible people” to recognize that wars are not won based on “strength and modern arms” alone but also through the kind of “patience and steadfastness” that America does not seem to have but the Islamic radicals do.40

  It is now possible to discern bin Laden’s message to the American left, which I express in my own words: “Your group and my group have very different ultimate goals. You want a permissive society, and I want sharia. Even so, the remarkable thing is that our strategic objectives at the current time are very similar. You want to destroy President Bush, and to do this you have to discredit Bush’s war on terror. I too need to defeat Bush’s war on terror. Neither one of us can succeed on our own. We in Al Qaeda are too weak to defeat the U.S. military. You are not strong enough politically to defeat Bush in your country. We need each other. So let us coordinate our efforts. I want you, the sensible people, to accept a silent truce between Al Qaeda and the American left. You may be reluctant to do this because of a fear of terrorism. But if you work with me I will make sure that I don’t target your states in any future attacks. Here is how our collaboration can be most effective. I will intensify jihad against Bush abroad, and you fight against him in your political battle at home. My insurgents and martyrs will continue to increase the body count of American casualties in Iraq and elsewhere, and you can use my efforts to undermine the will of the American people to continue Bush’s war on terror. This way, the patience and steadfastness of the Muslim fighters can outlast America’s enormous military might. I win, and you win also. It will be the greatest victory, fought by the two most improbable allies, in history.”

  TEN

  The Left’s Hidden Agenda

  Unmasking the Liberal-Islamic Alliance

  FOR THE PAST five years we have been debating the war on terror, yet there is something surreal about this debate. The premise of the debate is that both sides want the United States to win the war, and the disagreement is over the best way to fight Islamic radicalism and terrorism. But is this premise really true? Consider this. When there is good news for American foreign policy, it is ignored or downplayed by liberals in the press. For all Iraq’s problems, there has been remarkable progress there since Hussein’s removal from power. The country has seen the holding of free elections, restoration of sovereignty, formation of a new government, ratification of a constitution, introduction of a sound currency, revival of oil production, a newly established stock market, a surge of new businesses, training of new police and military, rebuilding of roads, opening of schools, new fire stations, an improved computer network, and the increased availability of clean water. Per capita income in Iraq has doubled since 2003 and is now higher than before the invasion. There are now more than a hundred independent newspapers and TV stations in the country.

  How of
ten do you see reports about any of this on TV or in the newspapers? Typically there is no coverage, and when there is, it is minimal. Good news in the war on terror is assiduously downplayed. Recently the U.S. government released documents seized from Al Qaeda safehouses in Iraq. The documents conveyed the Al Qaeda leaders’ desperation that the insurgents were losing their ability to destabilize the country. Each month, they confessed, the Iraqi government grows stronger. Suicide attacks had been reduced to ineffective “hit and run” operations. Indeed, according to Al Qaeda, its best hope at this point was a “media strategy” aimed at disguising the failing insurgency. One might think all of this would be front-page news in America, but typically the stories reporting the documents were minimized. A typical example was the New York Times, which did a small back-page report on the subject.1

  When victories in the war on terror are too obvious for the press to ignore, they are greeted by leftists in the media with silent dismay or open ridicule. Matthew Rothschild, editor of the Progressive, was unimpressed by America’s killing of Iraq’s terrorist mastermind Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Rothschild predicted that Zarqawi’s demise would have “virtually no effect” since “Zarqawi was losing popularity even among Sunni insurgents.” The leftist blogger Juan Cole scoffed that in portraying Zarqawi as a terrorist mastermind the U.S. government had “overestimated his importance.” The Nation insisted that Zarqawi had become “something of a sideshow” and that by killing him Bush may have succeeded only in creating a “martyr.” Consequently Zarqawi’s death “remains part of a larger and tragic story of miscalculation.”2