The General vs. the President

by H. W. Brands

  The Joint Chiefs of Staff, even before receiving MacArthur’s demand for combat troops, had proposed to enlarge the general’s authority to use American force in Korea. In a June 29 meeting with the president, Louis Johnson read a draft of a letter the chiefs wished to send to MacArthur. The letter allowed U.S. troops to defend themselves if they encountered Soviet troops in Korea.

  Truman interrupted. “I do not want any implication in the letter that we are going to war with Russia at this time,” he said. “We must be damn careful. We must not say that we are anticipating a war with the Soviet Union. We want to take any steps we have to to push the North Koreans behind the line”—the 38th parallel—“but I don’t want to get overcommitted to a whole lot of other things that could mean war.”

  Johnson nodded and kept reading, but Frank Pace dissented. The army secretary said he had “considerable reservations” about limiting MacArthur in any way.

  Truman stood firm. The president said he was willing for MacArthur to destroy air bases and ammunition depots above the 38th parallel, in order to reduce the North Koreans’ ability to sustain their invasion of South Korea. But there must be no use of ground forces against North Korea proper. “He is not to go north of the 38th parallel,” Truman said.

  The president turned to Dean Acheson and asked if he had heard anything from the American ambassador in Moscow. Acheson deferred the question to discuss the scope of MacArthur’s instructions. He said the State Department accepted that American warplanes should be free to attack North Korean air bases. And he had no objection to American planes firing on North Korean army units. “If, for example, an American plane sees Communist tanks coming down the road, it should attack those tanks without much concern as to which side of the 38th parallel they happen to be on.” But Acheson had to insist that American planes not go outside North Korea to China or the Soviet Union. “No one would be able to foresee the consequences if one of our planes got over into Manchuria,” he said, referring to the region of China adjacent to North Korea.

  As for ground troops, Acheson was willing to see them sent to South Korea. “It would be a great disaster if we were to lose now,” he said. “And it is essential to give the commander on the spot whatever he needs to stop the disaster.” In the event American troops encountered Soviet troops, they should treat them as any other enemy. “If an American unit found Soviet forces, in Soviet uniforms, attacking them, they naturally had to have the right to defend themselves,” Acheson said.

  Truman apparently thought the letter to MacArthur was to be made public, and he didn’t want to go on record as saying he was ready for Americans to fight Soviet forces. Johnson and Acheson assured him that the letter would be kept secret. Truman dropped his objection, and a consensus emerged, as the notes of the meeting recorded: “Everybody agreed that if General MacArthur’s men met Soviet troops they should defend themselves even if that meant actual engagement between United States and Soviet forces.”

  Truman returned to his question about the news from Moscow. Acheson read a letter from the American ambassador, Alan Kirk, recounting an interview with Soviet deputy foreign minister Andrei Gromyko. In the interview Gromyko took what had been the Kremlin’s position from the outset regarding the fighting in Korea: that it had been provoked by the South Koreans. “Therefore the responsibility for these events rests upon the South Korean authorities and upon those who stand behind their back.” More interesting was Gromyko’s next remark: “As is known, the Soviet Government withdrew its troops from Korea earlier than the Government of the United States and thereby confirmed its traditional principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. And now as well the Soviet Government adheres to the principle of the impermissibility of interference by foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea.”

  Acheson said he and the State Department interpreted Gromyko’s remarks as evidence that the Soviets did not intend to intervene openly in Korea. Yet he cautioned that statements from Communist China, warning of retaliation in the event of American attacks on Manchuria, suggested a strategy of preparing an entrée for the Chinese into the fighting.

  “That means the Russians are going to let the Chinese do the fighting for them,” Truman said.

  The conversation turned to offers, from other members of the UN, of ships and naval facilities to aid in the defense of South Korea. Truman was eager to accept. “Take everything,” he said. “We may need them.” He added, though, “Everything should be accepted as a contribution to the work which General MacArthur is doing for the United Nations. No offers of armed resistance should be accepted as contributions to United States efforts, but only as contributions in support of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.”

  Acheson observed that it would be helpful if the administration knew more about what was happening in the field. He asked Louis Johnson whether the Defense Department and the joint chiefs could get MacArthur to report in a timely and regular manner.

  Before Johnson could answer, Truman cut in. “Order General MacArthur, in the name of the President, to submit complete daily reports,” he told the defense secretary.

  Yet Truman guessed that giving MacArthur an order and having it followed might be two separate things. He knew enough of MacArthur’s history to realize that the general often acted as an authority unto himself. “It is just as hard to get information out of MacArthur now as it was during the war,” he grumbled. The president closed the meeting by saying he had no quarrel with the general or anyone else. “I just want to know the facts.”

  13

  THE FACTS WERE bad enough. Within hours, before dawn on June 30, MacArthur’s cable describing the collapse of the South Korean army and calling for U.S. ground troops reached Washington. The joint chiefs immediately arranged a teleconference with Tokyo. The chiefs to this point had authorized MacArthur to employ U.S. ground forces to secure a port and an air base near Pusan on the southeastern coast. They now asked the general if this would be sufficient.

  He declared emphatically that it would not. “Your authorization, while establishing basic principle that United States ground combat troops may be used in Korea, does not give sufficient latitude for efficient operation in present situation,” he telegraphed. He needed more, and he needed it at once. He proposed to send a regimental combat team immediately and to reinforce it with two divisions as soon as possible. “Time is of the essence, and a clear-cut decision without delay is imperative,” he said.

  —

  THE CHIEFS CALLED Frank Pace, who called Truman. The president’s rural habits died hard, and though it was still very early, he was awake. When Pace recounted the teleconference with MacArthur, Truman approved the dispatch of the regimental team. But he wanted to talk with his advisers before going further. He met with Louis Johnson, the three service secretaries and the joint chiefs at 8:30 that morning. The group reviewed MacArthur’s request for the two divisions, as well as an offer by Chiang Kai-shek of thirty-three thousand Chinese Nationalist troops for use in Korea.

  Truman was initially inclined to accept Chiang’s offer. MacArthur would require weeks to gather and transport the American divisions to Korea, while Chiang said his troops could sail within days. “Time was all-important,” Truman remarked later.

  Dean Acheson demurred. Acheson distrusted Chiang as much as ever, and he feared that Chinese Nationalist entry into the Korea fighting would simply invite Chinese Communist entry. It might also prompt a Chinese attack against Formosa. “The net result might well be the reverse of helpful,” Acheson said.

  The joint chiefs agreed. They noted that Chiang’s army was poorly equipped and might be as helpless against North Korean tanks as the South Koreans were. Besides, Chiang’s troops would require American transport from Formosa to Korea, and that transport would be better employed ferrying American men and matériel.

  Truman dropped the idea, and discussion turned to how the Chinese and Soviets might respond to the introduction of U.S. tr
oops into Korea. Would the Chinese enter the war? Would the Soviets move in the Middle East or Europe? No one had any firm answers, and Truman didn’t expect them. But the questions had to be raised. The president wanted all to remember that much more was at stake than Korea. The United States had global responsibilities.

  After all this, approval of MacArthur’s request for two divisions was nearly a foregone conclusion. The general in the field was saying, in no unmistakable terms, that they were necessary. Their deployment fell fully within the scope of the United Nations resolution authorizing the defense of South Korea. The action would demonstrate America’s commitment to collective security against communist aggression.

  Truman gave the okay. And the United States went to war in Korea.

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  IT WASN’T LOST on Truman, though the matter hardly arose in the discussions among his advisers, that he was breaking constitutional ground with this decision. The Constitution clearly assigns to Congress the authority to declare war; for a president to take the country to war without congressional approval was novel if not downright unconstitutional. To be sure, the United States had at times past engaged in armed conflict without congressional declaration of war. American ships had exchanged fire with French ships in the late 1790s, and American ships and marines had tangled with the Barbary pirates in the early nineteenth century. Franklin Roosevelt had bent the rules of neutrality in ordering the navy to cooperate with the British against Germany ahead of American entry into World War II. In the early twentieth century U.S. marines had been deployed in various countries of Central America. But these episodes were fleeting or minor in scope, and the principle remained that for anything serious in the way of armed combat, congressional approval was required.

  Truman, apt student of history that he was, understood this even as he pioneered a new principle. He didn’t know what a precedent he was setting in ordering combat troops to Korea—that wars waged on presidential authority would become the rule rather than the exception—but he knew he was treading on what had been congressional turf, and he summoned seventeen leading members of Congress to explain. He said he had been meeting with his top advisers and had just reached some important decisions. He read a statement, which was released to the press during the meeting, summarizing these decisions. “The President announced that he had authorized the United States Air Force to conduct missions on specific military targets in Northern Korea where militarily necessary, and had ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast,” Truman read. “General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground units.” Truman stressed that these actions were being taken under the auspices of the United Nations. He noted that several other countries were joining the UN effort.

  Tom Connally inquired where the American troops that were being sent to Korea were coming from. Omar Bradley answered for the president, saying they were from MacArthur’s command in Japan. Connally asked if the UN forces in Korea would be under a unified command. Truman assured him that all military forces would be under MacArthur. Connally nodded approval, saying he wanted every other nation to understand clearly that MacArthur was “the boss.”

  Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland, another Democrat, asked for details about the contributions of other nations. He wished to make sure the other countries sent ground forces to fight beside the Americans. This would be very important for American morale, once the casualty lists started growing. The senator didn’t want anyone to think the fight in Korea was a “private American war.”

  Truman interjected that he hadn’t committed troops to actual combat yet. In fact he had, but he hadn’t announced it. So far as the public—and the lawmakers present—knew, the troops were simply supposed to keep communications and supply lines open.

  Tydings answered that he was thinking ahead. He reiterated that foreign troops would be essential to American morale.

  Louis Johnson volunteered vaguely that one nation had offered ground troops. Some of the lawmakers doubtless guessed he was speaking of Nationalist China, but he didn’t confirm it.

  Alexander Wiley wondered if American forces around the world had been placed on alert. Berlin was a chronically sensitive spot. The Russians had just announced the closure of some power plants in Germany; in conjunction with the fighting in Korea, should this be interpreted as an ominous sign?

  “I don’t interpret,” Truman answered. “I am just waiting to see what will happen.”

  Wiley asked about the Red Chinese. Were they going to help the North Koreans?

  Truman said he had no information on the subject. He acknowledged that rumors were swirling. “But they are just rumors, and we will have to wait and see.”

  Republican congressman John Vorys returned to the issue of allied troops. “It would be a fine thing if we could get some Asiatic peoples in the fighting to help us, not just other white people,” he said. “If we got a few Asiatics into the fighting, it wouldn’t look so much like ‘white man’s imperialism.’ ”

  Truman reflected that this was a difficult matter. Tipping the hand Johnson had held close, he said, “If we got some Asiatics—like Chiang’s men on Formosa, for example—we would have to be awfully careful of the Chinese Communists.”

  Republican Kenneth Wherry, the Senate minority leader, was the first to raise the constitutional question. Was the president going to consult Congress before sending troops to Korea?

  Truman said some troops had already been ordered to Korea. But if there were a real emergency, he would “advise Congress.”

  Wherry wanted more. “The Congress ought to be consulted,” he said.

  Truman replied that he had responded to an emergency. “There was no time for lots of talk. There had been a weekend crisis, and I had to act. I just had to act as commander-in-chief, and I did. I told MacArthur to go to the relief of the Koreans and to carry out the instructions of the United Nations Security Council.”

  “I understand action all right,” Wherry countered. “But I do feel the Congress ought to be consulted before any large-scale actions are taken again.”

  Truman promised that if large-scale actions were to take place, he would “tell the Congress about it.”

  Vice President Alben Barkley tried to change the subject. He asked about ships the British government had offered for use in the waters around Korea.

  But Wherry would not be distracted. He stood up and demanded the floor. The president simply must consult Congress before taking drastic steps, he said.

  Truman still refused to utter the word “consult.” He promised that as further intelligence arrived, he would “inform” the members of Congress. He added, unhelpfully, “If there is any necessity for congressional action, I will come to you.” But this might not be necessary. “I hope we can get those bandits in Korea suppressed without that.”

  Wherry objected to the imprecision of part of Truman’s press release. He wanted more details about the orders sent to MacArthur. Congress and the American people required full knowledge of what was being done in America’s name.

  Alben Barkley agreed that the last sentence ought to be modified. But the vice president thought it should state more explicitly that the president, rather than General MacArthur, would be the one making the decisions on troop use. “The statement ought to say that the President is in control of the forces and is issuing the orders to them.”

  Truman had deliberately directed that the statement be released during the meeting. It was too late to make changes, he told the group. In any event, he had to disagree with the vice president. “This is all very delicate,” he said. “I don’t want it stated any place that I am telling MacArthur what to do. He is not an American general now, he is acting for the United Nations. It would spoil everything if we said he was just doing what we tell him to do.” Truman added that of course MacArthur was obeying orders from Washington. But the administration couldn’t say that. “We must be very careful not to let ourselves be put in that light to the rest of th
e world.”

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  WHEN TRUMAN ASSURED the lawmakers at the meeting that MacArthur was obeying orders, he didn’t know something he soon discovered: that MacArthur had ordered bombing of North Korea and the dispatch of ground troops to Korea without awaiting approval from Washington. The president received a copy of an order MacArthur had sent to the commanding general of his Eighth Army, Walton Walker. “Move the 24th Division at once to Pusan by air and water,” MacArthur wrote. “The 24th Division will establish a base at Pusan with a view to early offensive operations.” MacArthur made clear that the Twenty-Fourth would be under his direct control. “Upon arrival Pusan Commanding Gen 24th Division will operate under instructions from this Hq.”

  “I don’t understand this order of MacA’s,” Truman scribbled beside the copy the Defense Department forwarded to the White House. “Why was this given before he had received full authorization in response to his telegram and the telecom of early hours of the 30th?” Truman was discovering more about MacArthur’s concept of command each day, and he didn’t like what he learned. But amid the crisis in Korea he saw no alternative to accepting the general’s fait accompli.

  Truman appreciated the momentous nature of the decisions made that day—whether by himself or by MacArthur. Perhaps sensing he might benefit from a paper trail, he recorded his recollection of the chronology of the previous several hours. The document revealed both what the president had decided and what he remained undecided about. “Frank Pace called at 5 A.M. E.D.T.,” Truman wrote. “I was already up and shaved. Said MacArthur wanted two divisions of ground troops. Authorized a regiment to be used in addition to the authorizations of yesterday, to be used at Mac’s discretion….Called Pace and Louis Johnson and told them to consider giving MacArthur the two divisions he asked for and also to consider the advisability of accepting the two divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist Government. That Government is still recognized as the 5th permanent member of the Security Council U.N. Since Britain, Australia, Canada and the Netherlands have come in with ships and planes we probably should use the Chinese ground forces.” Though Truman had deferred a decision on Chiang’s offer, he hadn’t ruled out accepting it. Yet he appreciated how acceptance might complicate matters that were complicated enough already. “What will that do to Mau Tze Tung we don’t know. Must be careful not to cause a general Asiatic war.” Always in Truman’s mind was the broader struggle against the Soviet Union, the only enemy that could do real damage to the United States. “Russia is figuring on an attack in the Black Sea and toward the Persian Gulf. Both prizes Moscow has wanted since Ivan the Terrible who is now their hero with Stalin and Lenin.”