By the Skin of my Teeth: The Memoirs of an RAF Mustang Pilot in World War II and of Flying Sabres with USAF in Korea

by Colin Downes

  The weather in Korea is seasonal with a long, cold winter during which the mountains are covered with snow, followed by a short almost pleasant spring and then the long hot, humid and unpleasant monsoon of summer; to be followed by a short colourful respite of autumn before reverting back to a cold bare winter. Depending on the season the surrounding paddy at Kimpo changed from white to brown to green to brown and back to white. The winter months on the whole were the preferable period of the year for us as although the temperature dropped to well below zero, the flying weather was at its best with high pressure systems bringing many days of clear blue skies. Another redeeming factor was the relief from the excessive sweating while operating under the hot and humid monsoon conditions that brought a shortage of water and led to uncomfortable and persistent skin ailments. The major redeeming factor of winter was perhaps the welcome freezing of the rice paddy and the consequent relief from the ever pervading effluvium of the night soil fertilizing the paddy fields. The arrival of spring turned the paddy overnight into a carpet of bright green for a short while before the harvest returned the paddy to brown again to match the shades of brown of the hills, river, mud flats and sea – it was on the whole a very brown landscape.

  Spring in Korea

  Modestly it comes: hesitant to show

  A nakedness expectant of reprimand.

  Winter’s mantle falls as departing snow

  Reveals the brown and forbidding land.

  A vernal breeze blows across the Chosen,

  Now loath to show a resplendent array,

  While still so bare, desolate and frozen;

  Ravished by numbing winds from Cathay.

  Suddenly; overnight, like a curtain rising,

  The paddy is green and life is opportune.

  For a short magical moment it is Spring;

  Prior to the long discontent of Monsoon.

  Then: brief respite with a golden autumn;

  Until grim winter completes the continuum.

  North of the airfield and parallel with the Han River ran a ridge on which surveillance radar searched for enemy aircraft that only came at night. The radar also provided some limited tactical air control of not much significance. Between the ridge and the air base of K-14 was the small rural village of Kimpo supporting the farming community. In the familiar pattern of US military bases overseas the village had developed into a shanty town of shacks and was a rats’ nest of brothels, bars and outlets for the black market trade. Despite official efforts to place this out of bounds to service personnel it seemed to thrive from the presence of the base. One particularly unpleasant incident involved an American sergeant who, finding a Korean rifling his kit in his tent on the base, drew his 0.45 automatic and shot him dead. It appeared the sergeant was in the habit of frequenting one of the establishments in Kimpo City and the jungle telegraph conveyed details of the incident to the occupants. While awaiting an enquiry into the shooting the sergeant returned for a final tryst: as he was leaving he was set upon and emasculated. He managed to reach the base gate holding the severed parts before collapsing. The incident was given wide coverage on the base to act as a deterrent.

  Anyone flying into Kimpo International Airport today will find very little to identify the K-14 airfield of 1953. Today the concrete runway is double the length of the old macadam air strip and on the north side a large aircraft parking area has replaced the revetted area. A modern control tower, terminal buildings, maintenance hangers and car parks confront the disembarking passenger where once stood a small wooden control tower, and the 4th FIW Quonset huts. The only visible signs of what had been a Japanese fighter base were the huts on a slight rise on the north-east perimeter that in 1953 housed the officers’ club and quarters. The south side of the east-west runway, the area that accommodated the 67th TRW and 77 RAAF Squadron, became a ROK air transport base and it looked much the same as it did in 1953 when I delivered an HS-748 Executive VIP aircraft to the Presidential Flight in the early seventies. A thriving industrial town has replaced the shanty village of Kimpo. A straight multilane double highway has replaced a meandering dirt road, known to some at K-14 as the Shakuhachi Pass, as it followed the Han River upstream through agricultural farmland to Seoul. The shakuhachi is a Japanese bamboo flute; traditionally an ancient spiritual instrument used by Japanese monks in the thirteenth century to ‘Blow Zen’. Visitors to Seoul pass rapidly through an industrial sprawl to Yongdunpo, once an independent rural township on the south side of the river, and now an industrial suburb of the metropolis of Seoul. There is no longer evidence of the fighting that took place as the battle zone passed twice through the area, taking heavy US casualties. Some evidence of the destroyed bridges during the war remains, but many new bridges now span the wide expanse of the Han River leading to what once resembled a pre-war Japanese city and is now a huge modern high-rise city with a surging economy. The ancient defensive wall still rings the city on the north side, before the bare rugged mountains merge with those of a hostile north.

  The Korean peninsula has a mountain range running north-south covering the eastern half of the country, with the mountains fanning out east-west in the northern part of North Korea to heights approaching 10,000 feet. A fertile alluvial coastal strip runs down the whole length of the west side of the Korean peninsula providing one fifth of the land suitable for arable cultivation that is mostly rice production. At the time of the Korean War the bulk of the rice production lay within South Korea with the main mining and industrial resources with hydro-electric power being in North Korea. The principal areas of population and industry in North Korea are contained within the western coastal strip, together with the principal lines of rail and road communications. These communications run south from Sinuiju at the mouth of the Yalu river on the Manchurian border along the coastal region through the major industrial cities of Namsi-dong, Chongju, Anju and Sinanju at the mouth of the Chong-chong river, and on to the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, and Chinnampo at the mouth of the Taedong river.

  The flat west coastal area of North Korea contained most of the principal military airfields, many built by the Japanese during the Second World War, and it was to this area that the US 5th Air Force directed the bulk of its offensive operations, leaving the narrow coastal strip of the east side of the country to the attention of the US Navy and Marine Corps operating from the Sea of Japan. The 5th Air Force conducted a continuous programme of air strikes on the North Korean airfields, areas of heavy industry together with attacks on the hydro-electric plants on which the industry depended, supply areas and storage facilities and the interdiction of all road and rail communications. The result of this constant pressure on the resources of North Korea was severe denial of the military infra-structure to the communists, and the attacks on the hydro-electric power sources severely inhibited the industrial potential of the North Koreans making them dependent upon Chinese and Soviet sources for their war material and supplies. The relentless day and night interdiction of supply, storage and communication centres, rail centres, bridges and roads restricted communist build ups for their land offensives forcing them to devise counter methods of supply, deployment, dispersal and concealment. With unlimited manpower resources the communists were very adept at repairing their infra-structure quickly and in the process provided many dummy road, rail and airfield targets to distract the attacking fighter-bombers, and it became almost a routine procedure to see these targets appearing regularly on the camera gun combat films.

  Although the damage to the North Korean airfields was quickly and effectively repaired, the regular use of the airfields was denied to the North Korean, Chinese and Soviet fighter units. The communists conducted a continuous redeployment of their fighters so that although there were times when aircraft were seen on the airfields around the Sinuiju complex on the Yalu River, more generally they operated from the sanctuary of the air bases in Manchuria. To this end the communists operated their fighter force from advanced bases around Antung near the mouth of
the Yalu River, or from rear bases situated around Mukden, 100 nm north of the border. With advance warning of approaching US fighters, the Mig-15 fighters could deploy forward of the Yalu river for an interception above the approaching US fighters and then return to the security of their bases around Antung or for added security return to the bases around Mukden. As a result of the USAF air strikes the communist land forces were denied any close air support during any of the communist land offensives as the communist air force had to fly 200 – 300 nm to reach the front line and then return to their safe bases in Manchuria. By the later part of 1952 and throughout 1953, the air operations of 5th Air Force resulted in the United Nations land forces being relieved of any threat of air attacks and the communist armies were forced to conduct any major offensive without any air support. Furthermore, the constant interdiction against communist supplies and communications throughout North Korea hindered the land support of the communist armies limiting any sustained penetration of their offensives.

  Most accounts of the air war over Korea tend to concentrate on the more glamorous aspect of the fighter interceptor groups in combat with the Mig-15 and to the glorification of the ‘aces’. Not enough consideration is given to the more important air battle carried out by the bomber and fighter-bomber groups and the main contributions by the US air forces in bringing the communists to a ceasefire. The area covering the top north-west corner of North Korea was the area of greatest air activity and became known as ‘Mig Alley’. The air arena of combat covered the area between the Yalu and Chong-chong rivers, extending eastwards to the Suiho lakes formed by the Suiho Dam, some 60 miles up the Yalu River from the Antung-Sinuiju complex near the mouth of the Yalu. The two areas of intense AA defence were over the Sinuiju-Antung complex and around the Suiho Dam, where heavy concentrations of Soviet radar tracked 88 mm AA guns were sited. The Mig-15 officially had sanctuary north of the Yalu River in Manchuria and for the F-86s to seek out the Mig-15s and draw them into combat it was necessary to meet them on their terms. To reach ‘Mig Alley’ entailed a flight of 200 nm over enemy territory, about 20 – 30 minutes flying time, with about 15 – 20 minutes combat time before flying back over 200 nm to the nearest friendly base. For this reason those eager to become an ‘ace’ with five confirmed Mig kills would often break the rules of the game and fly across the border in the hope of catching the Migs heading for their bases. The penalty for crossing the border was a possible court martial and a return to the US with the loss of all claims and awards. The advantages lay with the Migs because they received warning of an F-86 sweep as the aircraft crossed the Han River heading north. The Mig, with its superior rate of climb, could climb and be at altitude well above the F-86s as they flew into ‘Mig Alley’. The Mig with its superior altitude capability could always be above the F-86s and thereafter dictate the terms of combat. During the early days of the ‘Mig Alley’ F-86 sweeps the intense competition between the two USAF fighter interceptor groups would have them flying into Mig Alley in two big groups of aircraft with the result that they left the area at the same time and the Migs could bounce them while they were low on fuel. Later tactics were more sensible as the flights of F-86s were fed into the combat area in a stream so that aircraft were arriving as the first flights withdrew from the area leaving friendly fighters to protect them from attacking Migs.

  In a comparison of performance and combat capability of the F-86 and the Mig-15 it can be said that the advantages and disadvantages of both aircraft were in some instances marginal. The Mig-15 could out-accelerate the F-86 with the advantage of less weight and a centrifugal turbine against the greater weight and axial flow turbine of the F-86. The Mig-15 had a higher rate of climb and a higher service ceiling than the F-86, and theoretically with a much lower wing loading by virtue of less weight, the Mig-15 could out turn an F-86 at all altitudes. However, in practice the Mig-15 with a much slower rate of roll, inferior longitudinal control and stall characteristics at high G and low speed, created by the high set tailplane and the aircraft’s conventional Second World War design of its flying controls, was unstable at high Mach numbers and high G forces, thereby reducing its theoretical advantages. At high Mach speeds approaching the sonic barrier, the Mig-15 experienced heavy stick forces and a sluggish rate of roll. Flight instability resulted as the aircraft exceeded Mach 0.9 with severe buffeting and snaking, a flight progression known as ‘Dutch Roll’, and as the aircraft approached Mach 0.95 wing drop and pitch-up occurred. The Mig-15 could not be persuaded to exceed Mach 0.98 without loss of control, whereas, the F-86 was genuinely transonic and fully controllable in a dive above 35,000 feet to a maximum speed of Mach 1.01. We frequently operated within the transonic envelope and, although the Mig-15 held an advantage over the F-86 in climb and altitude performance, the F-86 was faster than the Mig-15 in level flight and in a dive, with superior handling and high speed stability at high Mach speeds. At high altitude the difference in speed between the F-86 and Mig-15 being small resulted in slow closure over long distance, and frequently we had to break off the chase owing to fuel requirements to return to base and to avoid infringement of the Manchurian border. At the lower altitudes the F-86, with its higher speed, faster rate of roll, greater high G stability and no vicious stalling characteristics, could out turn the Mig-15. The F-86 pilot also had the added advantage of a G-suit in low altitude manoeuvring to exceed the G threshold of the Mig-15 pilot flying without the assistance of a G-suit. The Mig-15 was susceptible to a high speed stall or a snap roll at low altitude in a high G turn, the stalling occurring without warning when an accelerated stall resulted in a spin.

  The superior handling of the F-86 over the Mig-15 at lower altitudes allowed the inferior armament of the F-86 against the Mig-15 to be used most effectively. The Mig-15 was designed as a bomber destroyer and with its heavier armament of one 37 mm cannon and two 23 mm cannon the battle damage capability of the Mig-15 was far superior to the F-86 which was armed with six 0.5 inch machine-guns. The Soviets estimated that two hits from the 37 mm cannon or eight hits from the two 23 mm cannon were sufficient to shoot down a B-29 bomber which had a defensive armament of one 20 mm cannon and twelve 0.5 inch machine-guns remotely controlled by radar to provide automatic sighting, tracking and ranging. This may have been an optimistic assessment for the average Mig-15 pilot, but the Mig-15 was successful in its attacks against the B-29s to the extent that the USAF switched the heavy bombers from day to night operations. Certainly one hit with a 37 mm cannon shell on the F-86 would result in massive and probably fatal damage: this was all it took to shoot down Flight Lieutenant Graham Hulse. The Browning machine-guns on the F-86, although they had a far greater density of fire than the Mig-15’s cannon, lacked the weight of fire to cause major structural damage to a Mig-15 at high altitude, or to slow it down for a kill. However, combat at lower altitudes presented a very different picture. Despite a high probability that a hit by a single 37 mm cannon shell could prove fatal, the F-86 proved to be superior to the Mig-15 when combat occurred at the lower altitudes. The superior manoeuvrability of the F-86 over the Mig-15 at low altitudes enabled the six 0.5 inch Browning guns with their reliability, superior range, accuracy and high rate of fire of around twenty rounds per second; combined with the tight bullet pattern assisted by superior sighting, ranging and tracking with either the A-1 or A-4 radar gun sight; to be very effective against the Mig-15. This was especially so when manoeuvring at high ‘G’ when the Mig-15’s comparatively slow rate of fire of around seven rounds per second for the single 37mm cannon and twelve rounds per second for the two 23 mm cannon, decreased the probability of a strike during a sustained high ‘G’ turn; and I can attest to this from personal experience. Finally, the aiming, tracking and ranging of the Mig-15’s armament was manually controlled using a gyro gun sight and this was far less accurate than the automatic radar gun sight on the F-86. In aircraft equipment generally the advantage was with the F-86 as the Mig-15 had equipment and systems inherited from the Second World War, neverthe
less, the Mig-15 was a very formidable fighter when flown by experienced pilots.

  The 4th (‘Fourth but First’) Fighter Interceptor Group (FIG) was the most famous fighter group of 8th Air Force in Europe during the Second World War. Then they were flying the P-51 Mustang. It became the first fighter group to fly the F-86 Sabre during the Korean War, finishing as the top scoring group against the Soviet Mig-15. The 4th FIG consisted of three squadrons, the 334th, 335th and 336th, and I joined the 335th FIS commanded by Lieutenant Colonel McElroy. Max Higson, Tom Sawyer, John Chick, Andy Devine and John King were the other RAF members of the 4th FIG. The group commander, Colonel James Johnson, had a flamboyant and extrovert personality much in the mould of General Curtis Lemay when commanding the US Strategic Air Command. Colonel Johnson did his operational flying with the 335th and at the time of my arrival was halfway to his goal of becoming a double ace. His initial words of greeting to me were succinct and to the point, ‘Welcome to Korea, Captain. This is a God damned awful place and it is a God damned awful war, but it is the only one we’ve got, and we love it!’

  The USAF had two major aims regarding their pilots. First, to update the experienced regular and reservist pilots in jet combat operations, and second, to create a pool of 10,000 jet pilots experienced in combat operations. The three squadrons consisted of a confident and diverse meld of experienced regular and reserve officers with very young newly graduating pilots straight from flight schools in the US. I was the only foreign representative on the squadron until Flight Lieutenant Bob Carew from the RCAF joined the squadron. Although the experienced air force reserve pilots from the Second World War and the newly graduated pilots from flying schools in the US made up the bulk of the fighter pilots on the USAF squadrons in Korea, there were a few regular career officers from the USAF reassigned from squadrons elsewhere. In addition to the small number of RAF and RCAF pilots were a few pilots on exchange from the US Marine Corps. As a consequence, the six squadrons of the two fighter interceptor groups consisted of a few relatively older but experienced senior pilots and a majority of young inexperienced junior pilots.