By the Skin of my Teeth: The Memoirs of an RAF Mustang Pilot in World War II and of Flying Sabres with USAF in Korea

by Colin Downes

  The uncertainties of the First World War carried over to the Second World War in the need of public heroes for propaganda purposes, supported by commanders eager to promote morale, the offensive spirit and unit prowess with the reflected glory. The political dilemma arises between what is urgent or immediate recognition for propaganda purposes and what is accurate. For the politician and the propagandist, what constitutes the truth does not concern either and in the presentation of heroes once ace status is achieved, the unsubstantiated and unconfirmed claims of the ‘lone wolves’ become acceptable and recognized. The result is that those writing of the ‘aces’ to perpetuate the myths actively support the claims, some of which must obviously fall within an area of speculation and suspicion. Further confusion arises following claims of aces in the Second World War and succeeding wars when the number of flying bombs and unarmed transport aircraft shot down, and the number of aircraft destroyed on the ground are added to the totals. Shooting down a V-1 or flying bomb was a very hazardous business but the fundamental fact as it applies to the ‘ace’ status is that it could not fight back and therefore no combat takes place. Similarly, ground attack in the face of defensive AA fire was also a very hazardous business, but again the aircraft attacked could not fire back. The shooting down of unarmed transport aircraft does not fall within any accepted definition of air combat. Therefore, such claims should not be accepted when establishing ‘ace’ status, or else the accepted definition of what constitutes the ‘unofficial’ recognition of an ace should be redefined.

  Although the designation of ‘ace’ was not officially recognized by the RAF, during the Second World War the Air Ministry issued the following stipulations for approving combat claims:

  ‘Destroyed’. The aircraft must be seen destroyed on the ground or in the air. Failing that, the aircraft must be seen to break up in the air or to be descending in flames: the claim was invalid if only smoke was seen. In all these circumstances there had to be independent confirmation either in the air or on the ground.

  ‘Probable’. The pilot of the enemy aircraft must be seen to bale out of the aircraft. Failing that the aircraft must be seen to break off combat in circumstances that prove the aircraft is a loss.

  ‘Damaged’. The aircraft must be seen to be considerably damaged as a result of the attack; for example, engine stopped, smoke issuing or parts shot away.

  Therefore, all claims had to undergo scrutiny before officially approved. However, post-war research revealed that claims were exaggerated even though they were made in good faith and apparently verified at the time.

  In the Korean War the USAF claimed nearly 800 Mig-15s destroyed for a loss of around 60 USAF F-86s, a kill-to-loss ratio of more than 10:1. Thirty-nine pilots claimed ace status with five kills or more, and of these eleven claimed double ace with ten or more kills, and three pilots claimed triple ace. Proponents for the glamorization and promotion of the fighter aces in general, such as Johnnie Johnson in ‘The Story of Air Fighting’; Edward Simms in ‘The Greatest Aces’; and Don McCaffery in ‘Air Aces’, readily and even wholeheartedly accepted and promoted the USAF claims. There were others who would stretch the kill-to-loss ratio to as much as 14:1 by suggesting that the aces had additional ‘unofficial’ claims to add to their totals. The Mig-15 claims were all destroyed over North Korea or Manchuria and therefore there were no wreckages available for inspection. The confirmation process was, therefore, entirely dependent upon gun camera film showing the disintegration of the aircraft or the ejection of the pilot. In support of the gun camera film was the confirmation by a witness, usually the wingman of the pilot making the claim. In the confirmation process rank had its privileges and in the Korean War, of the thirty-nine ‘official’ aces eight were of colonel rank, ten of major rank, sixteen of captain rank and five of first lieutenant rank. Only one second lieutenant F-86 pilot claimed a Mig-15 and it is uncertain if this was by ramming or an air collision. This shows, as would be expected, that the ‘wingman’ flying the F-86 missions did not share in the glory and rewards of Mig-15 combat to the same extent as the ‘leaders’.

  Only the communists can confirm the actual number of aircraft shot down and no actual loss figures for the Korean War were released by the North Korean, Chinese or Soviet Air Forces. The only so-called ‘confirmation’ to date stems from a North Korean pilot, Lieutenant Kum Sok No, who defected in a Mig-15 after the cease-fire. AVM Johnnie Johnson in his book ‘The Story of Air Fighting’ states: ‘According to him (Kum) the communists lost more than 800 Migs, including two Russian units entirely wiped out; and the Chinese could not train pilots fast enough to replace those shot down.’ It is hard to believe that a junior North Korean squadron pilot was in possession of this information at the time of the cease-fire. Under a communist regime it is inconceivable, and not even a senior ranking communist officer would have been aware of the total Mig losses sustained in the Korean War by the communist air forces. Such information could only be accessible in the top echelons of Peking and Moscow, and for obvious reasons this information would not be passed to the squadrons. An American fighter pilot would be unaware of the actual losses of USAF fighters operating in Korea beyond his own squadron or group. Obviously, under the circumstances of his defection, Lieutenant Kum, while under interrogation, would willingly confirm any figures suggested to him, and it is unlikely that he coincidentally conjured up by himself the same figures as claimed by the USAF. Regarding the comment about the Russian losses, if indeed he made this claim, one can only view it as spurious. It is also unlikely that a junior North Korean pilot flying with a North Korean Mig-15 squadron would be completely conversant with the Chinese Air Force flying training programme.

  The post-war revisions and reassessments by the USAF reduced the claims of Mig-15s destroyed in air combat with the F-86 by as much as 50 per cent, to less than 400 Mig-15s destroyed. At the same time the USAF nearly doubled the admitted losses in combat to around 100 F-86s lost. This produced a modified kill-to-loss ratio of around 4:1. The process of reassessment is not known but the result indicates that confirmed ‘destroyed’ claims were revised down to lesser claims of ‘probable’ and ‘damaged’, or even ‘not known’. The problem with the USAF’s revised Mig-15 claims is that the details are not released and therefore, the individual claims remain unaltered. The USAF reduction by 50 per cent of the original claim of Mig-15 aircraft destroyed if factored to the claims of the thirty-nine ‘official’ aces would reduce the number of aces to around fifteen with no double aces. To account for where the discrepancies arise becomes a question of speculation. The official aces represented approximately 10 per cent of the F-86 pilots and accounted for 40 per cent of the total of Mig-15s claimed. It could be argued, with some logic, that by their success the aces demonstrated greater aggressiveness with superior flying skills and marksmanship. This argument implies that the discrepancies in claims lie mainly with the 90 per cent of the lesser claimants accounting for 60 per cent of the total of Mig-15s destroyed. A complete assessment of the kill – loss ratio of the F-86 versus Mig-15 combat is not feasible as it is virtually impossible to reassess the various claims against photographic evidence and the absence of the official communist losses. What the revised USAF figures indicate is a failure of the official USAF confirmation processes, as quite obviously some claims for confirmed kills were allowed that should not have been. To complicate the revision process there is the question of some unknown Mig-15 losses occurring in combat that have not been claimed for various reasons.

  There is an interesting area of speculation resulting from the revised USAF claims regarding the claims of my own squadron, the 335th, as the top-scoring F-86 squadron of the six interceptor squadrons in continuous combat with the Mig-15. The squadron claimed 220 Mig-15 ‘destroyed’, almost 30 per cent of the original total of nearly 800 Mig-15 claimed destroyed, and in making these claims the squadron provided 30 per cent of the recognized aces. If the individual claims pertain, this figure rises to more than 60 per cen
t of the revised total, which seems unlikely. In support of the number of ‘destroyed’ claims, the other claims were more modest with 80 ‘probable’ and 185 ‘damaged’ Mig-15 claims. The claims of the squadron during July 1953, the last month of the war, produced 12 Mig-15 ‘destroyed’, mostly by the aces, against 2 Mig-15 ‘damaged’.

  Russian figures from sources flying with the Soviet Mig-15 squadrons present a very different picture to that offered by the USAF. This is to be expected and in any event cannot be viewed as official and as such only cloud the question of the true kill-to-loss ratios of the combatants. The figures presented apply to the Russian pilots involved as neither the Chinese or North Koreans have offered any figures concerning their losses, official or otherwise. The Russian pilots were the most experienced in flying the Mig-15 and a higher kill-to-loss ratio can be expected than from the Chinese or North Korean squadrons. It is also probable that the Russian claims cover all types of USAF aircraft. The only certain conclusion that emerges from a study of air-air combat is that the ‘official’ enemy aircraft ‘destroyed’ claims seldom correspond to the ‘official’ quartermaster ‘loss’ figures of the opposing air forces. The mathematics seldom match up. Therefore, despite the revised USAF kill-to-loss ratio figures, without the total communist loss rate any contention regarding the US ‘aces’ will remain unresolved, thereby maintaining the status quo and so avoid an embarrassing ‘Catch-22’ question – Who were the real aces? However, even if the total of Mig-15 aircraft destroyed is half of that originally claimed and the kill-to-loss ratio is reduced from 10:1 to 4:1, it is still an outstanding achievement. The Mig-15 was a formidable aircraft and had the advantage of forewarning with superior climb and altitude capability, with the advantage of operating over friendly territory from inviolate bases in Manchuria. The F-86 had to fly 400 nm over enemy territory to engage combat and return to the front line. This was an impressive display of the aggressive spirit, combative drive, superior training and flying skills shown by the USAF pilots, and a testament to their superior equipment.

  In studying the few books available on the Korean War most confine their observations to the land battle and the air battle is covered cursorily, if at all. The war started on 25 June 1950 as North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. The land battle moved south to invest Pusan and then back north again as far as the Yalu River on the Manchurian boarder. The entry of China into the war caused a retreat back to the 38th parallel, where after one year of fighting, a stalemate developed resulting in a demarcation line just north of the 38th parallel in July 1951. The air battle continued with increasing intensity over North Korea until the cease-fire two years later on 27 July 1953. This cease-fire was the result of the USAF air battle over North Korea, together with the threat of escalation against the airfields in Manchuria. That this cease-fire was an armistice and not a surrender by the Communists is the result of the Communists being made aware early on in the war that it would be a limited war and no nuclear weapons would be used by the US. Also, no retaliation would be taken against communist forces outside the limits of North Korea, together with immunity for non-military targets within North Korea. This later aspect became a mute point when it was decided towards the end of the war to attack the Toksan and Chasan irrigation dams and the resulting floods destroyed rice crops and the rail communication to Pyongyang.

  Whenever the air battle is mentioned emphasis is given to the more glamorous aspects of the Mig-15 versus F-86 aerial combat. Not enough consideration is given to the more important air battle of the bomber and fighter-bomber wings and the main contribution by the USAF in bringing the Communists to a cease-fire. The continuous pressure in attacking the airfields of North Korea forced the communist air forces to operate from rear bases in Manchuria. The fighter interceptor wings contribution was in protecting the day bomber, fighter-bomber and photo-reconnaissance aircraft from the Mig-15. This enabled massive and continuous damage to be inflicted on the North Korean airfields denying their use to the communists. In addition, attacks on the hydro-electric power sources reduced power down to 10 per cent of previous output. This had a great effect on the industrial potential of North Korea resulting in their war material and supplies being dependent upon Chinese and Soviet sources. The relentless day and night interdiction of supply and communication centres, rail centres, bridges and roads restricted communist build-ups for their land offensives forcing the communists to devise counter methods of supply, deployment, dispersal and concealment. With the UN land forces stabilized along a defensive front and the US politically denied the means to end the war, it was the USAF that brought about an armistice.

  It is interesting to speculate on the outcome of the Mig versus Sabre combat had the Soviets supplied the Chinese with the Mig-17 by 1953 and the war had continued into 1954. The Mig-17 entered service with the Soviet Air Force in 1952 and its deployment to satellite air forces was restricted until its manufacture under licence in China in 1954. The Mig-17 had updated systems and equipment with improved stability control at high speed over the Mig-15. It was faster with a higher ceiling, although inferior in rate of climb. The Mig-17 still lacked a radar gun sight and an anti-G suit. The increased performance of the Mig-17 with a superior climb and altitude performance over the F-86, would undoubtedly have changed the parameters of air combat to some extent, and maybe the outcome with a different kill-to-loss ratio to that claimed against the Mig-15. However, I am sure the result would still have favoured the F-86 for other considerations, such as pilot ability and tactics. Had the Korean War continued into 1954 with the Mig-17 flying over North Korea, the United States had a counter with the North American F-100 that entered operational service in 1954. The F-100 was less manoeuvrable than the Mig-17, but faster with a genuine supersonic capability in level flight, and it also had a superior rate of climb. For combat the F-100 had a more lethal armament than the F-86 with four 20 mm cannon.

  By 1952 the USAF B-29 raids changed from daylight to night attacks after suffering losses from the Mig-15. A friend of mine, Captain Chuck Edwards, whom I met in San Francisco while waiting to fly to Japan, flew A-26s from the island airfield of K-16 in the Han River outside Seoul. In addition to day and night interdiction missions his squadron carried out special missions such as dropping agents into North Korea. Apparently, on occasions these brave Koreans lost heart when they came to the drop zone and had to be persuaded to leave by means of a ‘45’ automatic! The A-26s operated with two pilots and a navigator and the aircraft had tail warning radar. The B-29s and the B-26s were often intercepted at night by Soviet piston-engine all-weather fighters, but by 1953 there were reports of interceptions by jet fighters at night. While on a special mission over North Korea, Edwards told me his navigator reported a fighter closing at speed that indicated a jet fighter. After some evasive action he managed to shake off his pursuer, but shortly afterwards the fighter started closing in again and it required more violent evasive manoeuvring to lose the attacking fighter.

  The USAF reports of night interceptions by jet aircraft over North Korea during 1953 showed that despite evasion tactics the Soviet fighters were still able to maintain contact, indicating a definite possibility that they had an airborne interception radar capability. The assumption was a development of the Mig-15, and I reported this to Air Ministry Intelligence. The reaction from London was to dismiss the reports, claiming it was not possible for the Soviets to be that advanced. It appeared that Air Ministry were unaware that the Mig-17 had been in squadron service in the Soviet Air Force since 1952, and it is now known the Soviets carried out a redesign of the nose section of the Mig-15 in 1950 to incorporate Izamrud airborne interception radar. The appearance was similar to the F-86D all-weather interceptor that became operational in 1950, with the difference that the Mig radar system had two scanners: one in the intake for tracking and the other in a lip above the intake for search. This necessitated the removal of the 37 mm cannon, leaving an armament of two 23 mm cannon. The aircraft
became the Mig-15 SP1 and after a limited production run and successful trials during 1951, the Izumrud radar system was used in an all-weather variant of the Mig-17 in 1952. It is entirely feasible and quite probable that during 1953, either Mig-15 SP1 or Mig-17 PF all-weather fighters carried out operational trials against the USAF operating at night over North Korea and the Manchurian border. If so, it is likely that they operated clear of the North Korea border from one of the Chinese air bases around Mukden.

  Following the cease-fire the flying was still good if a bit more routine and with less adrenaline flowing. The irksome readiness duties continued as 5th Air Force maintained a full alert status. I was by then a flight commander in charge of ‘Charlie’ flight, although this did not give me priority to lead my flight on sweeps. However, it did on any other missions and it entitled me to a personal aircraft with my name on the side of the cockpit canopy. My crew chief asked me what personal symbol I wanted painted on my aircraft and I was tempted to display a winged lime, but I decided instead to name it after my yacht in England, Wild Goose, showing a goose in flight with its neck outstretched like an index digit.

  Our flying reverted to combat training and I gave my flight, including the wingmen, experience of briefing the sortie, leading a section or the flight, and debriefing the sortie. This was similar to a small fighter leader’s school within the squadron. The change both surprised and pleased the junior pilots after flying permanently on someone’s wing, and it gave them a chance to prove themselves. We carried out live gunnery training and camera gun dogfights, and we also tried to improve on the bad weather let-down procedures. The long range patrols along the west and east coasts of North Korea became the nearest to an operational mission, involving the use of the 200 gallon drop tanks in place of the standard 120 gallon tanks. With these tanks we flew long flights along the entire coastline of North Korea. On the west coast we flew up to Sinuiju at the mouth of the Yalu, and once I flew 100 nm west of Sinuiju almost to Port Arthur. The east coast patrols were much longer and of far greater concern in the event of engine failure. Although the US Navy had ships in the Sea of Japan and provided radar cover, one did not feel the prospect of rescue from the sea was as good as over the west coast. My longest flight took us past Chongjin to within sight of the USSR border where contrails were visible, presumably of Migs based in the Vladivostok area. Occasionally, three of our F-86s would join up with an RF-86 from the 67th TRW for a photo recce escort. Not once did we get any reaction from the Mig-15s and none came up to investigate. The patrols did not appear to achieve very much other than to present an alert and aggressive posture to the communists. There was no discernible naval activity and as officially we could not infringe on North Korean or Manchurian airspace we could not evaluate the state of Mig activity on the airfields, other than those within sight of the coast. In respect of the long-range coast patrols, I do not recall any of the senior pilots who were so eager to grab the ‘shooting slots’ on the sweeps flying on these missions.