Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel

by Butler, Daniel Allen

  Facing them would be the 260 panzers of all types the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions could muster between them, together with 278 Italian tanks, mostly M13/40 models of limited value. Rommel’s infantry strength would be almost entirely Italian, with five such divisions available to him. The British had been as assiduous in building up their airpower as they had in accumulating ground forces, and the pilots of the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica would find themselves outnumbered more than two-to-one.

  The ball formally opened on the night of November 14–15 when a group of 32 British commandos under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Laycock staged a raid at the coastal town of Beda Littoria, Libya, fully 200 miles west of Tobruk. British intelligence had pinpointed the building where Rommel had his headquarters: this was the target for the commandos’ attack, their mission to kill Rommel and as many of his staff as possible. The operation was an utter and abject failure: three German soldiers were killed, as were two British officers, while all but two of the survivors were later captured. The intelligence on which the planning had been based was badly outdated: not only was Rommel in Rome at the time of the attack, but he had spent just two nights in the building in mid-August before moving forward to Gambut, halfway between Tobruk and Sollum. It would be days before Auchinleck would learn that the mission had failed; by then it made no difference.

  Operation Crusader began before dawn on November 18, when Eighth Army moved out of Mersa Matruh, Egypt, led by the 7th Armoured Division, and headed west-southwest. It crossed the frontier near Fort Maddalena, almost 60 miles inland, and there turned northwest, taking dead aim on Bir el Gubi. The South African Division protected the column’s southern flank, while XIII Corps and the 4th Armoured Brigade moved to a position west of Sidi Omar, ready to meet the expected riposte by the Afrika Korps. Torrential rain during the night of November 17–18 had turned the North African airfields—Allied and Axis alike—into quagmires, utterly incapable of permitting aircraft to be flown off, which turned out to be something of a mixed blessing for both sides. Eighth Army was initially denied the air cover and fighter-bomber support it had been promised for the first day of the offensive, but the weather continued to be dodgy throughout the morning and afternoon, grounding the Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights that would have discovered Eighth Army’s advance, letting Auchinleck to steal a day’s march on Rommel.

  Auchinleck’s plan was to have XIII Corps outflank the Axis strongpoints that ran from Sidi Omar to the Halfaya Pass: this would be the anvil. The hammer would be the 7th Armoured Division, which was expected to engage the Afrika Korps somewhere south of Sidi Rezegh. XIII Corps would advance north to Bardia on the coast, and once the German armor had been written down, XXX Corps would continue northwest to Tobruk, where the plan called for it to link up with the fortress garrison, which would launch a breakout attack to the southeast. Even if the Italian infantry contained the garrison, without the Afrika Korps’ tanks, it would be essentially helpless against the British armor. The key to the entire offensive was the destruction of the Afrika Korps: Auchinleck understood, unlike far too many British officers in North Africa, that the objective in any desert battle was the enemy’s army, not taking and holding meaningless geographic features. Once the Afrika Korps was crippled or eliminated, the Italians would be as good as in the bag. It might not be elegant, and it offered to be bloody, but if properly executed it would work.

  It wasn’t until the morning of November 19 that the panzergruppe headquarters realized the British were attacking, when the left wing of the 7th Armoured Division ran headlong into the Ariete Division at Bir el Gubi, 35 miles south of Tobruk, and was stopped cold after hard fighting by the Italians. So thoroughly had Rommel been convinced by the evidence from the planted documents captured in September that Auchinleck’s attack was still at least a month away that his staff had dismissed earlier reports from Leutnant Seebohm’s radio intercept unit that large British formations were on the move. When the entire Eighth Army radio net went silent on the night of November 17, no one paid the incident the slightest heed. Now there was a momentary paralysis in the Axis command structure as it struggled to assimilate a reality it had believed was impossible.

  Meanwhile, Eighth Army was well on its way to success as the center and right columns of the 7th Armoured pressed forward to capture the huge airfield complex at Sidi Rezegh, 10 miles from the Tobruk perimeter. Von Ravenstein, after conferring with Crüwell, launched a counterattack into 7th Armoured’s right flank with 60 tanks of the 21st Panzer Divison, supported by antitank units and a battery of 88mm Flak guns. Crüwell wanted to pull the 15th Panzer Division back from Tobruk, where it had been positioned to support the upcoming assault on the fortress, and add its weight to von Ravenstein’s counterstroke. Rommel, who had finally returned to North Africa late on November 18, disagreed. Still determined that the attack on Tobruk would go in as planned, he argued against overreacting to what may well have been some preemptive stroke by Auchinleck, a British counterpart to his own Sommernachtstraum. However, reports of increasingly heavy fighting between Axis forces and large formations of British armor convinced him by the morning of November 20 that this was no mere raid. However reluctant he was to do so, he authorized the indefinite postponement of the Tobruk attack and released the mobile units positioned there to be turned against the advancing British.

  Once he had shaken himself free of his strategems for Tobruk, Rommel began reacting with his characteristic speed and decisiveness. It was not a popular decision in either Berlin or Rome, where, several hundred miles removed from the fighting, strategic and operational realities were not always properly represented by colored pins moved across maps. Men like Franz Halder and Walter von Brauchitsch, traditional commanders in every sense of the word, did not grasp the fundamental reality of desert warfare—as Erwin Rommel, or for that matter, Claude Auchinleck—that the main objective of any operation there was not ground, but the enemy’s army. Fritz Bayerlein, Crüwell’s new Chief of Staff, would recall that

  Considerable controversy has occurred . . . as to whether Rommel was right in calling off the attack on Tobruk in order to deal with the enemy offensive first. Our covering force might indeed have sufficed to hold the enemy attack until after Tobruk had fallen and this would have been of the greatest advantage for us, for we could then have then operated . . . with far greater ease and freedom than we were, in the event, able to do with the strong Tobruk garrison in our backs. But would the British have allowed us time to capture Tobruk undisturbed? This was not just a matter of audacity and daring; it was a gamble, which General Rommel refused to undertake.139

  The third day of Crusader saw the Ariete Division and the 22nd Armoured Brigade, the 7th Armoured Division’s left-flank element, continue to pound away at each other. The Italians justified Rommel’s basic confidence in them, and apparently they had learned a few lessons from the Afrika Korps, for despite being handicapped with inferior equipment, they were giving as good as they got, and the battle around Bir el Gubi degenerated into a bloody brawl. Meanwhile, the 4th Armoured Brigade, the 7th Armoured Division’s right-flank element, fought a “ducks and drakes” sort of engagement with the 21st Panzer Division, pitting the nimbleness of their cruiser tanks against the hitting power of the German guns. In the center, on the perimeter of the Sidi Rezegh airfield, the 7th Armoured Brigade drove off a strong counterattack mounted by the 90th Light and Bologna Divisions. Casualties, while not yet heavy, were beginning to mount on both sides.

  The attack by the Bologna and the 90th Light confirmed the wisdom of Rommel’s decision to abandon the Tobruk assault. Both units had been positioned on the fortress perimeter, assigned to the attack; hastily turning about 180 degrees, they struck at Sidi Rezegh. Even though they were unable to drive the 7th Armoured Division off the airfield, they pinned much of the British tank strength in place while the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions were concentrating. Rommel conceded that for the moment Crüwell had a better grasp of the overall sit
uation, and instructed him to “destroy the enemy battle groups in the Bardia, Tobruk, Sidi Omar area,” giving him a free hand in containing the main British armored thrust.140

  By the evening of November 20, Rommel was confident that he now had the full picture. Crusader was not simply an effort to relieve the Tobruk garrison, it was an all-out effort to destroy Panzergruppe Afrika. The Axis positions at the Egyptian frontier—the Halfaya Pass and Sollum—were under heavy, methodical attack; it would be soon be the turn for Bardia, Fort Capuzzo, and Sidi Omar (XIII Corps would, in fact, begin attacking them the next day). Only a fool would expect the Tobruk garrison to sit idly by under these circumstances—and Rommel certainly was no fool. But these were peripheral issues, ones where, in the old Austrian mot, “The situation is critical, it is not yet serious.” Rommel was now firmly focused on what had become his primary objective—the airfield at Sidi Rezegh, or more precisely, the enemy armor concentrated at Sidi Rezegh. There the situation was, in the old Prussian mot, “serious but not critical.” The British were making a mistake, and if he could exploit it, punish them for it, Rommel could win this battle.

  That mistake was in allowing their armor to become separated in three unrelated engagements at and around Sidi Rezegh. Rommel intended to exploit that mistake by doing exactly the opposite: in sheer numbers, the Axis armor was markedly inferior to the British, but by concentrating his panzers, Rommel could achieve a decisive local superiority wherever he chose, giving him the opportunity to defeat the separate British armored brigades in detail. That evening, Rommel took the time to write a hasty letter to Lucie:

  20 November 1941

  My Dearest Lu,

  The enemy offensive began immediately after my arrival. The battle has now reached its crisis, I hope we get through it in good order. It will probably all be decided by the time this letter arrives. Our position is certainly not easy.141

  It was the Tobruk garrison that struck first. On the evening of November 20, General Sir Ronald Scobie, commanding both the British 70th Infantry Division and the Tobruk garrison, ordered an attack against the Axis units holding the southeast perimeter to begin at first light the following morning. A short but powerful and well-planned bombardment initially stunned the Italians, and several of their strongpoints were overrun as the 70th Infantry Division, supported by 50 Matilda tanks, pressed hard in the direction of Sidi Rezegh. There the 7th Armoured Division, only 10 miles from the Tobruk perimeter, launched an attack of its own, hoping to link up with the Tobruk force. But the Italians’ resistance stiffened, and the 70th Infantry’s advance slowed, while the 90th Light Division, with Rommel leading in person, contained the 7th Armoured—for the time being. Rommel, though, was under no illusions as to the ability of the 90th Light to hold back the British armor indefinitely—it lacked organic tanks of its own—and so he signaled Crüwell to bring up the Afrika Korps to Sidi Rezegh to prevent the 7th Armoured Division from linking up with the Tobruk garrison. By sundown the two panzer divisions had reached the eastern edge of the airfield and were engaged with the British armor.

  Thus far Rommel’s tactics were working: British armor was being “written down” at a far faster rate than was German—one British armored brigade had lost all but 28 of its 160 tanks by the end of the day. Now Rommel split his armored force: he had Crüwell move the 15th Panzer to Gambut, from where it could move behind the 7th Armoured, while keeping the 21st Panzer between Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk, the better to guard against simultaneous attacks by the garrison there and the 7th Armoured Division that would link up and raise the siege. Early in the afternoon of November 22, the 21st Panzer attacked Sidi Rezegh and, after a short but fierce fight, captured the airfield, knocking out another 50 British tanks as it did so. In just four days of fighting, Eighth Army’s armored divisions had lost 530 tanks; German and Italian losses were around 100. That same day, in Tobruk, General Scobie began preparing for another attempt to break through the Axis perimeter around the fortress.

  The Germans and Italians weren’t having everything their way, however. To the east, closer to the coast, XIII Corps was mauling the Axis defensive positions. Fort Capuzzo fell on November 22, as did the strong points around Sidi Omar; Sollum and Halfaya Pass would be completely cut off the next day. The fate of their garrisons would depend entirely on the outcome of the battle around Sidi Rezegh. It was during this action that a New Zealander brigade, moving around the west end of the Axis defensive line, stumbled across the headquarters of the Afrika Korps. In a short, confused firefight, almost the entire staff personnel were killed or taken prisoner, only Crüwell and Bayerlein escaping.

  Crüwell had already issued his orders to the panzer divisions, however. The 21st Panzer, along with the 90th Light, was holding the escarpment to the north of Sidi Rezegh, under heavy attack by the 7th Armoured Division, which had been reinforced by the South African Division—recalled from the now-superfluous duty of covering the Crusader columns’ southern flanks. The Italian High Command, acknowledging reality at last, had placed both the Ariete and Trieste Divisions under Rommel’s direct command, and now Ariete and 15th Panzer together now moved to strike the British divisions at Sidi Rezegh. This particular November 23 happened to be the Totensonntag (Sunday of the Dead), the last Sunday of the ecclesiastical year, the day when Evangelische Germans pray for the souls of the departed, and nationally celebrated as the day of mourning for the dead of the Great War; the day would give its name to this battle. Bayerlein’s decription of the action is vivid and memorable:

  The Ariete’s assault spearheads had meanwhile arrived with 120 tanks and General Crüwell now launched the combined German and Italian armored forces northwards into the enemy’s rear, with the object of bottling him up completely and forcing him back against the 21st Panzer Dvision’s front at Sidi Rezegh.

  The attack started well, but soon came up against a wide artillery and antitank gun screen, which the South Africans had formed at a surprising speed. . . . Guns of all kinds and sizes laid a curtain of fire in front of the attacking tanks and there seemed almost no hope of making any progress in the face of this fire-spewing barrier. Tank after tank split open in the hail of shells. Our entire artillery had to be thrown in to silence the enemy guns one by one. However, by late afternoon we had managed to punch a few holes in the front. The tank attack moved forward again and tank duels of tremendous intensity developed deep in the battlefield. In fluctuating fighting, tank against tank, tank against gun or antitank gun nest, sometimes in frontal, sometimes in flanking, assault, using every trick of mobile warfare, the enemy was finally forced into a confined area. With no relief forthcoming from a Tobruk sortie, he now saw his only escape from complete destruction in a breakout from the ring surrounding him. . . .

  The wide plain south of Sidi Rezegh was now a sea of dust, haze, and smoke. Visibility was poor and many British tanks and guns were able to break away to the south and east without being caught. But a great part of the enemy force still remained inside. Twilight came, but the battle was still not over. Hundreds of burning vehicles, tanks, and guns lit up the field of Totensonntag. . . .142

  The outcome of the action around Sidi Rezegh led Rommel to believe the battle was as good as won.

  23 November 1941

  Dearest Lu,

  The battle seems to have passed its crisis. I’m very well, in good humor and full of confidence. Two hundred enemy tanks shot up so far. Our fronts have held.143

  Lieutenant General Cunningham, Eighth Army’s officer commanding, was appalled by his losses, particularly at Sidi Rezegh, where nearly half of the South African Division had been annihilated. With two thirds of his tanks were out of action, he was convinced that Crusader had failed, and asked Auchinleck for permission to withdraw and fall back across the frontier. Auchinleck would have none of it, and promptly sacked Cunningham, replacing him with Major General Neil Ritchie, who was given firm, explicit orders to continue the offensive.

  On November 24, the surviving German and Italia
n armor turned east toward Sidi Omar, splitting Eighth Army, XIII to the east, the remnants of XXX Corps to the west, hoping to aggravate Eighth Army’s disorganization and confusion. Rommel told Crüwell

  The greater part of the force aimed at Tobruk has been destroyed; now we will turn east and go for the New Zealanders and the Indians before they have been able to join up with the remains of the main force for a combined attack on Tobruk. At the same time we will . . . cut off their supplies. Speed is vital; we must make the most of the shock effect of the enemy’s defeat and push forward immediately and as fast as we can with our entire force to Sidi Omar.144

  This operation would become known to the British as “The Dash to ‘the Wire.’” Though Rommel would not know it until much later, the Afrika Korps would pass within 4 miles of the main British supply dumps south of Gabr Saleh without catching a hint of their presence—by sheer good fortune, Eighth Army would be allowed to hold on and eventually resume the offensive. A push 15 miles across the frontier yielded nothing but empty desert, and Rommel decided that the time had come to relieve the Halfaya garrison and retake the defensive positions the British had captured earlier. As he did so he would, he was still confident, find those supply dumps.

  The following day, he turned the Afrika Korps to the northwest, toward Sidi Azeiz. However when the Desert Air Force discovered and attacked the column, he was forced to pull back. At Sidi Omar, the 5th Panzer Regiment and the 7th Indian Brigade fought each other to exhaustion before the Indians’ 25-pounders decided the issue and the panzers called it a day. This was the last hurrah for the Dash to the Wire: for all that he charged to and fro across the desert, Rommel had accomplished nothing decisive. He came perilously close to running the fuel tanks of his panzers dry with no hope of replenishment, and now, like a thunderbolt, came news from his operations officer, Lieutenant Colonel Westphal, that a daring and skillful nighttime attack on the Sidi Rezegh ridge had linked up with a sortie by the garrison of Tobruk. A narrow, vulnerable corridor now connected the Tobruk garrison with Eighth Army. Westphal, in fine “better to seek forgiveness than beg permission” form, on his own initiative ordered the 21st Panzer Division back to Sidi Rezegh in the hope that it still had sufficient strength remaining to sever the link between Tobruk and XXX Corps. Rommel was distinctly unhappy when he learned of Westphal’s action, but he knew it had to be done; Westphal’s orders were confirmed. The 15th Panzer Division took Sidi Azeiz the morning of November 27, but that was Rommel’s last hurrah in the Crusader battle. By the early afternoon of November 27, the Afrika Korps was beginning to lose its momentum as a consequence of the exertions and fatigue of four days of almost constant combat around Sidi Rezegh. Rommel managed to convince himself that this was because the battle was almost over, writing to Lucie that evening that “The battle has now been raging in the desert around Tobruk and in front of Sollum since the 19th. You will have heard from the communiqués more or less how it has gone. I think we’re through the worst and that the battle will be of decisive importance to the whole war situation. . . .” Ironically prophetic words.145