Storm Over Leyte

by John Prados

  But the critical damage followed a 14- or 16-inch shell that impacted in the water, just feet away from the ship, and then detonated below the surface. The shock ruptured the hull and let water into the forward engine room. In the time required for the black gang—the engineers—to secure those boilers, the flood had already reached their waists. It increased quickly. The Gambier Bay lost speed, with the Imperial Navy closing in even faster. After 8:45, when more hits compromised the aft engine room and the ship went dead in the water, the Japanese were down their throats. One of the Japanese cruisers, probably Tone, brazenly closed to within 3,000 yards of the stricken CVE. Captain Vieweg gave orders to abandon ship at 8:50. Only five minutes later, somewhat to the north, the blasted carcass of the Hoel rolled over and sank.

  Survivors watched as Japanese warships continued pounding the wreck. Suddenly looming over them was the bulk of the superbattleship Yamato herself, followed by Nagato. The Gambier Bay actually sank at 9:07 a.m. Ships of Destroyer Flotilla 10 made their own torpedo attack at 9:05 but from extremely long range. There would be no hits.

  Meanwhile Kurita’s crews closed on the other CVEs. Ziggy Sprague’s sailors held to their tasks in a most amazing way, their fighting spirit undiminished. The classic bit of bravado comes from Chief Gunner Jenkins, a flak battery officer aboard the White Plains. “Hold on a little longer, boys,” he shouted. “We’re sucking them in to 40mm range!”

  The Kurita fleet did not feel that brave. They were confronted by a renewed air threat, a strike including sixteen Avengers that Taffy 2 had launched a quarter of an hour earlier. This attack would be the one to inflict important injuries on the Chikuma and Chokai. Captain Sugiura or Mayuzumi, of the Haguro or Tone, could have told Admiral Kurita the Americans were in extremis, but apparently they assumed the C-in-C knew everything. Kurita did not. Poor observation and scouting by the Japanese cruisers left Kurita in the dark.

  At 9:11 a.m. the admiral ordered his fleet to regroup with him, setting a course near to due north. As soon as the message went out, the Yamato put her helm over to assume the new course.

  • • •

  “I HAD EXPECTED to be swimming,” recalled Admiral Clifton Sprague. He heard a lookout shout that the Japanese were getting away. If anything, Ziggy Sprague thought the Japanese would be barreling down upon him. Sprague saw it with his own eyes but still could not believe it. “It took a whole series of reports from circling planes to convince me. And still I could not get the fact to soak into my battle-numbed brain.”

  Many American sailors reacted the same way. Possessing every advantage, the Kurita fleet turned around and sailed the other way. It proved more complicated than that, of course, but the turnaway off Samar on the morning of October 25 became a key event in the Leyte Gulf battle. It needs to be looked at from several perspectives.

  The mind of Kurita Takeo needs a better probe than to assert he had no powers of decision this day, or that he panicked, or whatnot. The admiral had reason to think himself out of touch at 9:11 a.m. By dint of their unfortunate counter to the torpedoes, Yamato and Nagato were so disadvantaged that only radar-directed gunfire remained possible. Floatplane scouts had been sent out but disappeared. Data from subordinate commanders was sparse. Direct observations—such as speeding past the sinking Gambier Bay—disclosed only bits of information. Rear Admiral Koyanagi’s postwar interrogation would be the first time he learned that Japanese cruisers had been less than 10,000 yards from the U.S. carriers when Yamato recalled them. Similarly, Koyanagi told his interrogators that the Kurita fleet had not been able to close the range against fast carriers, only to be stunned to discover they were CVEs. Kurita seconded that view in his own interrogation. This underlined the importance of Japanese misidentification of the Taffy 3 ships. Much later Koyanagi wrote, “If we had known the types and number of enemy ships and their speed, Admiral Kurita would never have suspended the pursuit.”

  What Kurita did know was fuel. He told the interrogators that he had enough fuel and ammunition to get into Leyte Gulf—that “there was no consideration for how to get home.” But the high-speed chase was emptying his ships’ tanks, especially those of the destroyers. The fleet could not sustain battle speed for very long. If they were to turn away, fuel became an issue immediately. And there was the hurt to the fleet itself. Four of the six heavy cruisers with which Kurita had burst through the San Bernardino just hours earlier were now at assorted stages of sinking. An equal number of tin cans—effectively a third of his destroyer strength—were standing by the damaged ships. The Allied air attacks, from the beginning a nuisance, were getting stronger by the minute.

  New losses piled atop those already suffered. That amounted to a strong consideration but not the central one. Operations staff officer Otani had expected the fleet would be met by Allied forces—read Kinkaid’s battleships—as it passed the bottom of Samar toward Leyte. While the fleet proceeded south, lookouts did, in fact, report sighting a Pennsylvania-class battleship with escorting destroyers, but the Japanese gave it a wide berth. Commander Otani believed the entire fleet would perish. Admiral Kurita’s remarks at Brunei before sailing can be viewed the same way. If losses had been the central factor, Kurita would not have reacted the way he did when he obtained radio intelligence.

  Both the Owada Group and Combined Fleet headquarters supplied intercepts that informed Kurita of some of the pleas sent out by Tom Kinkaid and Ziggy Sprague, which reported texts appealing desperately for battleship intervention and carrier air strikes. Matching reports came from the radio intercept station at Takao. These supplemented an intercept the Kurita fleet itself had obtained at 9:00 a.m. that adverted the Taffies still under attack. Immediately upon receipt of the Owada Group intercept, at 11:20 a.m. Admiral Kurita ordered his fleet around to the southwest to proceed to Leyte Gulf. Shortly after the hour he notified Combined Fleet, “WE ARE DETERMINED TO EXECUTE THE PLANNED PENETRATION OF LEYTE GULF DESPITE ANY ENEMY AIR ATTACKS WHICH MAY BE ENCOUNTERED.”

  Visit http://bit.ly/1TKUZZ5 for a larger version of this map.

  While this was happening, the JNAF struck back with the first really effective kamikaze mission, aimed at the very same Taffy 3. During the hour before Kurita made his second run on Leyte Gulf, the special attack unit led by Lieutenant Seki Yukio struck hard, sinking the jeep carrier St. Lo, 800 of whose crew were rescued, and damaging the Kitkun Bay, Kalinin Bay, and White Plains. This single attack signaled the onset of a new way of warfare in the Pacific. Late that afternoon Mikawa sent a dispatch in which the Southwest Area Fleet discussed these attacks. He reported one carrier—a “regular carrier”—damaged but otherwise results unclear.

  The next stage of the disintegration of the Sho plan came with news of another carrier task group sighting, one to the east of the San Bernardino. At 12:36 p.m., Kurita ordered his fleet around to the north to chase this new enemy. The admiral discussed the option with his staff, including Koyanagi and Otani, and determined on that course of action. He reported to the high command that once he had engaged the new carrier fleet he would withdraw through the San Bernardino Strait.

  Meanwhile, the alleged carrier force was actually a phantom, as probably was the sighting of a Kinkaid fleet Pennsylvania-class battleship. Ugaki suggested the report, from a masthead lookout, might be Nishimura, successfully exiting Leyte. Koyanagi disagreed. Kurita sent a floatplane to investigate, but it got shot down. As in the Taiwan air battle, the atrophy of Japanese skills at warship identification helped create an unmitigated disaster. Word soon came on the radio of the destruction of the Nishimura unit and the failure of the Shima fleet.

  • • •

  AT HIYOSHI THE succession of reports fueled a roller-coaster ride. The previous day Admiral Toyoda had managed not to show concern when the Kurita fleet had turned back, though he had agreed to the “divine guidance” dispatch. Chief of staff Kusaka, one of those few officers who believed in transports as targets, had been dissatisfied b
ut not angry. Headquarters knew it could not direct the fleet from Hiyoshi and realized Kurita must have had reasons for his action. Senior officers expressed more concern with Nishimura and Shima—the former for not coordinating more closely with Kurita, the latter for not ordering Nishimura to wait for him so they could make a combined sally. News of the losses deepened their gloom.

  Then, early that morning, Combined Fleet staff had nearly stood on its head, electrified at news the Kurita fleet had encountered an enemy carrier fleet. Officers were overjoyed. No one had thought an enemy carrier fleet would appear within visual range—and as Kusaka observes, the Samar battle actually represented the first time in the Pacific war that a large enemy fleet was encountered within eyeshot. Captain Fuchida claims he himself felt disgust and believed the quarry were merely the small jeep carriers, taken all out of context by his colleagues. “This cannot be happening,” he recalls thinking.

  Fuchida uses a hunting-dog analogy: Trained his whole life to hunt, the dog rushes after a hare. Following similar instincts, naval officers unthinkingly attacked at the first sight of the enemy fleet. Fuchida notes that the operating forces and Combined Fleet headquarters were both full of officers trained to hunt. Admiral Toyoda was all smiles. Admiral Kusaka thought it a golden opportunity. Radio intercepts showed the enemy begging for help. No one at Hiyoshi was about to chastise Kurita and remind him of his mission to actually penetrate Leyte Gulf.

  When news came of Kurita regrouping—then heading north—fleet headquarters was at a complete loss.

  Admiral Toyoda, thousands of miles away, did not feel right giving orders in a tactical situation that changed from minute to minute. The “divine guidance” message had been more of a strategic directive, applying to all Japanese forces, not only Kurita. After the war Toyoda refused to criticize Kurita for the withdrawal.

  At 5:15 p.m., NGS chief Admiral Oikawa radioed: “REPORT MADE TO THRONE CONCERNING TODAY’S BATTLE DEVELOPMENTS IN PHILIPPINE AREA. HIS MAJESTY EXPRESSED DEEP SATISFACTION WITH THE VIGOROUS ACTION OF THE FIRST STRIKING FORCE IN DEALING THE ENEMY A CRIPPLING BLOW.”

  Only in the evening, at 7:25 p.m., did Toyoda send a directive message:

  IF THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO, THE FIRST DIVERSION ATTACK FORCE WILL CONTACT AND DESTROY WHAT IS LEFT OF THE ENEMY TONIGHT. THE OTHER FORCES WILL COORDINATE THEIR ACTION WITH THE ABOVE. 2. IF THERE IS NO CHANCE OF ENGAGING THE ENEMY IN A NIGHT ENGAGEMENT TONIGHT, THE MAIN BODY OF THE MOBILE FORCE AND THE FIRST DIVERSION ATTACK FORCE WILL PROCEED TO THEIR REFUELING POINTS.

  By then the Kurita fleet had already passed through the San Bernardino on its way home. Allied forces bearing down on them included Vice Admiral John S. McCain’s Task Group 38.1 speeding from the east—and within strike range by late afternoon. Halsey, with Bogan’s Task Group 38.2, Lee’s Task Force 34, and the splinter unit Task Group 34.5, were all speeding down from the north.

  The pursuit had begun.

  CHAPTER 11

  SEA FIGHTS AND SHIPWRECKS

  The disappointment of the ultimate surface battle surged with the pain of the relentless Allied pursuit as the fleet retreated. Leyte Gulf had been a sea fight without precedent in the Pacific war, indeed, in all of World War II. Much more had been on the line for the Japanese, who were hoping their actions would stall the Allied offensive in the Pacific, at least long enough for Japan to achieve a new synthesis of tactics and combat power. Instead the battle led to the shipwreck of Japanese naval strategy. And that disaster culminated with the Allied mop-up operations following the battle.

  Crewmen of the Tone saw the heavy cruiser Chokai stopped in the water as they complied with Admiral Kurita’s order to regroup. Commander Matsuzaki Tatsuji’s destroyer Fujinami had been detailed to escort the big ship. Instead, Matsuzaki stood by as Chokai’s troubles multiplied. Eventually Fujinami evacuated the crew from the crippled cruiser. Matsuzaki torpedoed the Chokai to end her ordeal.

  The Chikuma staggered away from the battle area and was hit again by another wave of Grummans from escort carrier Kitkun Bay. New damage from two torpedoes brought her to a halt. Destroyer Nowaki, assigned to recover survivors, stayed late into the day at her side. Commander Moriya Setsuji then set off for Coron Bay. Like the promised land, Coron Bay represented salvation for Imperial Navy sailors terrified of the Allied juggernaut. But there would be no salvation for Moriya’s destroyer. A night scout plane from the carrier Independence saw Nowaki at 10:40 p.m. Bull Halsey reacted by detaching several of his fastest ships, cruisers Biloxi, Miami, and Vincennes and destroyer Miller, and they caught the Japanese destroyer before she could enter the San Bernardino Strait. The Americans opened fire at 12:54 a.m. and quickly dispatched Moriya, his destroyer, and the Chikuma survivors.

  Captain Teraoka Masao’s Suzuya never escaped the battle scene. As she made her way back home, a strong formation of warplanes assailed Suzuya in the forenoon, and a near miss to starboard ignited torpedoes, which led to secondary explosions and spread to ammunition lockers. At 11:30 a.m. Vice Admiral Shiraishi transferred his flag to cruiser Tone, and Teraoka reluctantly ordered “abandon ship” just before noon. The destroyer Okinami stood by to rescue survivors, including the captain and more than 400 crew, but more than 650 sailors went missing or were dead. At 1:22 p.m., the cruiser turned on her starboard side and sank.

  Less than ten minutes later a new wave of American aircraft arrived to persecute the Okinami, now laden with helpless survivors. Commander Okino Tan, the destroyer’s skipper, suspended rescue efforts while the planes attacked. There were several near misses. Okino withdrew but returned afterward to pick up more men. A huge formation of nearly 100 airplanes appeared, but they ignored the Okinami and kept their distance. Around five o’clock Okino received orders to rejoin the Kurita fleet. A small flight of planes harassed him again. With dark coming and no information on the enemy, Commander Okino decided to leave.

  Okinami passed through the San Bernardino alone, stopping briefly to recover thirteen seamen in a lifeboat from the cruiser Tone. Next morning the destroyer would be hit by airplanes in the Sibuyan Sea. Nearly thirty sailors and Suzuya survivors were killed in the attack, and the ship sustained damage around the stern, taking on 150 tons of water. After 11:00 a.m., Commander Okino ran into the damaged destroyer Hayashimo, which had stopped and had just five tons of fuel left. Okinami herself had barely ninety tons, but Commander Okino gave some of it to the other ship. Okinami continued to Coron Bay, was attacked again along the way, and later escorted the crippled Kumano to Manila.

  Kurita Takeo led his battered fleet west, through the San Bernardino, also headed for Coron Bay and oil. Early morning found them off Panay. The weather was fair and the sky clear. Carrier aircraft made contact first, following the oil trails of wounded ships with leaking bunker tanks. A hundred planes came in waves before 9:00 a.m. With thirteen killed and forty wounded, the Yamato suffered more casualties on October 26 than in the Battle of Samar. A bomb casing splinter wounded chief of staff Koyanagi in the right leg. Yamato used up fourteen more of those sanshikidan special flak shells. She sustained a couple more bomb hits and Haruna some near misses, but the main victim would be Captain Kajiwara Sueyoshi’s light cruiser Noshiro. A torpedo hit caused the ship to halt and list dangerously. Attempting to correct the tilt by counterflooding, Captain Kajiwara ordered the forward magazines to be flooded. After 10:00 a.m., another wave hit the already damaged Noshiro. She settled by the bow. Kajiwara and several hundred sailors were rescued by destroyers Hamanami and Akishimo.

  Another heavy cruiser headed to Coron was Captain Hitomi Soichiro’s Kumano, which had limped away from battle, at times doing no better than two knots. Some of the planes aiming for Kurita that morning peeled off to blast the Kumano instead. With her damaged bow, the ship could hardly maneuver, and Kumano suffered hits and a near miss that left her without steam pressure, with most of her boilers off, and with a turbine damaged. Damage repair restored some of the power, a
nd that afternoon, remnants of the Shima fleet joined Kumano for the last leg into Coron. Hitomi stayed there just long enough to refuel and then left for Manila.

  As Admiral Kurita maneuvered under these new air attacks, he gave up the idea of making for Coron Bay. Heavy cruiser Myoko, damaged on the way to Leyte Gulf, was already there. She was meant to leave for Brunei in the afternoon. Early on the twenty-sixth, Captain Ishihara Itsu of the Myoko received fresh orders: Await the arrival of the Kurita fleet. Shortly before 11:00 a.m., the instructions morphed again. Kurita now ordered Ishihara to depart for Brunei immediately. Escorted by destroyers Naganami and Kiyoshimo, the Myoko left.

  The final victims of the Allies mopping up after Leyte were ships from the Shima fleet and Cruiser Division 16. Heavy cruiser Mogami, barely afloat after the Surigao Strait fight, lost its way and then was jumped by planes of Taffy 1. The light cruiser Kinu was smashed as she tried to get a Tokyo Express into Leyte Island.

  Meanwhile, the grounded Hayashimo turned into a Japanese nightmare. She had been damaged by air attack during the afternoon of the Samar battle, losing fuel, radio, compass, and more. The next morning came an attack by Grummans. Skipper Lieutenant Commander Hirayama Toshio suffered wounds. Captain Shiraishi Nagayoshi, commanding Destroyer Division 2, took direct command. At one point, Hirayama and Shiraishi thought they could steam the damaged destroyer, stern-first, all the way to Coron, but instead she was grounded to wait for fuel. Destroyer Fujinami would be sent back to succor the vessel, with Shiranuhi as a rescue ship on October 27, and both of them were sunk by American aircraft. Fujinami’s loss was especially tragic since she carried survivors from cruiser Chokai. The partially sunk hulk of the Hayashimo lay perched on that reef through the end of the war.