Pirates: A History

by Travers, Tim

  The Ming tried to deal with piracy, ransom, and smuggling on the coast by training local militias, building city walls, arming defenders with gunpowder weapons, building new ships, and appointing more efficient military leaders. Equally influential was the opening of foreign trade to Chinese traders in 1567 (except with Japan), which undercut smuggling, plus the introduction of a fairer tax system (the ‘one whip’ system of one defined tax). Notable among the generals appointed to deal with the pirates was Ch’i Chi-Kuang, who was sent to the coastal region of Chekiang in the 1550s and 1560s to deal with the pirates. Chi-Kuang recruited tough peasants from inland areas, kept discipline by cutting off the ears of disobedient soldiers, and instituted the death penalty for units that retreated or failed. Chi-Kuang developed special tactical teams to deal with the pirates, which were called the ‘mandarin duck formation’, since they resembled a duck in outline. This well thought out formation was necessary to overcome the formidable fighting skills of the pirates. The centre of this ‘duck’ formation consisted of four pikemen, carrying pikes twelve feet in length. In front of the pikemen moved four soldiers, two with shields and swords to protect the pikemen, and two carrying bamboo trees with thick foliage to disguise the formation and confuse the enemy. Behind the pikemen marched two soldiers with weapons that discharged fire arrows, although normally Chi-Kuang did not believe in such weapons because he thought them unreliable, and perhaps because he could defeat the pirates without them. Chi-Kuang’s idea was to attack with these formations and keep attacking, despite initial losses, at which point the pirates usually lost cohesion and retreated. Eventually Chi-Kuang enrolled an army of ten thousand men, which, together with the other advantages mentioned above, defeated the pirates by the mid 1560s. Chi-Kuang personally led his armies, and in one battle against the pirates, he shot to death the enemy commander.2

  This period of Chinese piracy reached its height from 1547 to 1567. Then there was a renewal of piracy during the ill-fated Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592. Following this, in the early 1600s, there emerged the pirate Ching-Chi-Ling (also transliterated as Zheng Zhilong). Ching was a Roman Catholic convert who worked in the Portuguese factory in Macao, and acted as an interpreter for the East India Company in the 1620s. During the early 1620s Ching visited Japan where an uncle lived. In Japan, Ching married a Japanese lady, and this marriage produced a son, Koxinga, born in either 1623 or 1624, who later became a well known pirate. But before this, it was in Japan that Ching’s uncle introduced Ching to piracy via his uncle’s fleet of pirate junks. By 1627 Ching had built up a large pirate fleet of 400 junks, with a personal bodyguard of seventy-six Dutchmen, plus 300 Christian Africans, who were ex-slaves from Macao, dressed in colourful silks. Ching was active during the declining years of the Ming dynasty, at which time he gave up piracy and accepted a naval commission from the Ming, with the hope of promoting himself and his son to high positions in the Ming dynasty. Ching was in fact a key naval figure in the defense of southern China against the emerging Chinese imperial dynasty of the Manchus (1644–1912), but apparently was content to defend and did not go onto the offensive. In 1646 Ching either surrendered to the Manchus, or attempted to go over to their side. Either way, Ching was imprisoned by the Manchus, and was executed in 1661, some said through the death of a thousand cuts, but he was in fact beheaded.3

  Ching was succeeded by his son Zheng Chenggong, commonly known as Koxinga. The Manchus had a great deal of trouble in dealing with Koxinga, who remained loyal to the Ming, because he operated a powerful fleet, taken over from his father, and he possessed bases in areas that were inaccessible by land. For some twenty years Koxinga sailed up and down the coast of China, burning and plundering – half pirate – half Ming defender. Koxinga was so successful that the Manchus were forced to order eighty sea coast townships to level their towns and move inland to escape his attacks. Koxinga next moved north in his offensive, as far as the Yangzi River, and in 1659 he even attacked the Manchus at Nanking. This however led to a crushing defeat for Koxinga outside the walls of Nanking, and Koxinga retreated south. He recognised that he did not have the forces or the ability to defeat the Manchus on land, and he was also less familiar with the northern sea coast, so he moved south to find a secure base. This turned out to be the Dutch controlled island of Formosa (Taiwan). In May 1661, with a fleet of 900 junks and 25,000 troops, Koxinga besieged the Formosan fortress of Zeelandia for nine months. The Dutch defender eventually surrendered, worried that if the fort was taken by Koxinga, the women and children might suffer a nasty fate, since Koxinga had a reputation for torture. With the surrender of this fort the rest of Formosa fell into Koxinga’s hands, and the Dutch left. Koxinga then set his sights on Manila, but before he could attack the Philippines, he died in 1662. Koxinga’s son took over, and held out in Formosa for twenty years, although he was defeated eventually by Admiral Shi Lang in 1683. There was a limit to what a purely naval force could do against a logistically superior Manchu dynasty.4

  From the Tay–Son Rebellion to Chinese Piracy, 1770s–1810

  Piracy emerged again in the 1760s, mainly in the islands around the mouth of the Canton River, including the future Hong Kong. These islands were called the Ladrones, meaning robbers or highwaymen, accurately so named by the Portuguese. Then in the 1770s, a rebellion in neighbouring VietNam, the Tay-son rebellion, pitted the Tay-son rebels against the rulers of VietNam. The Tay-son needed naval help, and Chinese pirates became involved on behalf of the Tay-son in the 1780s – chief among them being Ch’en Tien-pao. He was named ‘General Pao, Virtuous Marquis’, by the Tay-son leaders, and he recruited many Chinese pirates and a fleet of 1,000 junks. To maintain their resources, the Tay-son pirates raided into China on a regular basis, and the Manchu emperors found it difficult to defeat these pirates. Squadrons of gun boats did little against the pirates, because the gun boats crews feared the fierce Chinese pirates, and usually just fired their cannon to warn the pirates to escape. But if any pirates were captured by the Chinese authorities, they were executed if they were Vietnamese, and if they were Chinese dressed as Vietnamese, they were put to death by the painful method of ‘slicing’. However, there was limited success in capturing these pirates, and so, just like their Western counterparts, the Manchus resorted to pardons. The idea was that the pirate followers might accept a pardon even if their leaders did not, and this should lead to dissension in the ranks, and so the pirates would turn on each other. Those pirates who surrendered were given cash, or attractive ranks in the army, or land. At the same time, pirates who surrendered were asked to produce the heads or ears of other pirates that they had captured. This general policy had limited success, because pirates realised they could turn themselves in more than once to gain extra money, and although some 1,700 did turn themselves in, causing bureaucratic headaches in resettling so many, piracy was still actually increasing in 1800. Nevertheless, in 1801 the Tay-son fleet was decimated in battle in VietNam, losing 50,000 men, most of their junks, and 6,000 cannon. The next year, Ch’en Tien-pao surrendered, and the last Chinese pirate Tay-son leader, Cheng Ch’i, was captured and beheaded.5

  The Tay-son rebellion was over, but many Chinese pirates escaped back to China, and rather than compete with each other, seven pirate chiefs in July 1805 signed an agreement to co-operate. Ironically, therefore, the Tay-son failure actually provided the means for a revitalised Chinese piracy, and this occurred through the seven chiefs’ agreement which really signaled the professionalisation of piracy in Chinese waters. Now there were strict rules of pirate co-operation in the agreement, much like the articles of Western pirates. For example, there were rules for the distribution of booty, rules for the care of wounded, and rules for the punishment of offenders. But there were differences from the West too, for example, the Chinese pirates were divided into six fleets (reduced from seven to six after one fleet commander surrendered to the authorities), and each fleet had its own coloured flags – Red, Black, White, Green, Blue and Yellow. In addition, becaus
e the pirates expected to make most of their income from protection money, one rule stated that boats that sailed without permission would be burned, weapons confiscated, and bosses executed. Another aspect that was different from Western pirates was the presence of women onboard the pirate junks. Married women were allowed onboard, and ship captains sometimes had as many as five or six wives aboard. The women worked the ship equally with the men, and sometimes commanded junks. According to the reports of one Westerner onboard a junk, there were also eight to ten concubines for the unmarried crew. Women who were captured were either kept for ransom, or assigned to crewmen as wives, or kept as concubines. And there also emerged a famous female commander of the entire pirate fleet – Ching Shi – who inherited the fleet from her husband, and ultimately commanded 800 large junks, 1,000 smaller boats, and a pirate structure of some 70,000 men and women. Yet another difference with the West was the prevalence of homosexuality. Many recruits for the pirate fleets were obtained through homosexual relations, and homosexuality was apparently common onboard. According to one Western witness, pirates ‘committed almost publicly crimes against nature’. Discipline among the Chinese pirates also seems to have been more severe than in the West. Failure to surrender booty would lead to death or a severe whipping. Desertion led to the loss of one’s ears. Raping a female captive led to death, but if the sexual relationship between the female captive and a crew man was by mutual consent, the crew man was decapitated, and the woman thrown overboard with weights attached to her legs.6

  Other differences between West and East included the very large size of the confederation of Chinese pirates and their fleets compared to the small numbers and fleets of Western pirates. A further difference was the political ambitions of the Chinese pirates who aimed with the Tay-son rebellion to help seize power, and then, in China, to maintain control over large areas of the south China coast. There was also a strong measure of cruelty among Chinese pirates, which sometimes occurred among Western pirates too. For example, when the pirate chief Chang Pao captured nine rice boats, he tried to persuade the crew to become pirates. When three or four men resisted his offer, Chang Pao tied their hands behind them and hoisted them three feet from the deck where they were flogged until they were unconscious. Then they were raised to the masthead for an hour or more. The process was repeated until they either agreed to become pirates or died. The Western captive, John Turner, captured and held by Ching Yih, a pirate chief in the Canton area in the period 1806–7, reported inhuman tortures for captured Chinese officers from the Imperial Navy:

  I saw one man … nailed to the deck through his feet with large nails, then beaten with four rattans twisted together, till he vomited blood; and after remaining some time in this state, he was taken ashore and cut to pieces. [Another prisoner] was fixed upright, his bowels cut open and his heart taken out, which they afterwards soaked in spirits and ate … The dead body I saw myself.7

  Other bloody acts occurred in 1808 and 1809, when Chang Pao and his fleets attacked several villages in the Pearl River, Canton (now Guangzhou) area. Usually the pirates sought a ransom for sparing a village, but when the village resisted, the pirates could be ruthless. Thus, when the villagers of San Shan refused to pay, the pirates captured the village after hard fighting and plundered it for three days. As they left, the heads of eighty villagers were hung on the limbs of a banyan tree, and the women and children carried off to the ships. At another town and fort, Huang-pu, a violent struggle saw the pirates lose 200 men – so, stimulated by revenge, Chang Pao promised ten dollars for every Huang-pu head cut off. A witness saw one pirate with two heads hanging by their queues around his neck, with the pirate eagerly looking for a third head. As usual in these cases of resistance, the town was burnt.8

  The pirates of the south China coast were commanded by a succession of capable pirate leaders, the first being the leader of the confederation, Cheng I. He was directly descended from pirates of the seventeenth century, one of whom had served with Koxinga, illustrating the importance of family connections among Chinese pirates. He consolidated his position in the confederation by placing his relatives, both men and women, among other fleets, with the latter becoming wives of influential pirates. Cheng I led the Red flag fleet of 200 junks, and 20,000 to 40,000 men, which swelled to 600 junks by 1807. Cheng I established shore bases for the pirates and helped unify the pirate confederation, but he died in 1807, either drowned or struck by a cannon ball. Cheng I’s widow was a former prostitute, Cheng I Sao, also known as Ching Shi. To consolidate her hold on power, Ching Shi needed a partner, and she chose her husband’s adopted son, Chang Pao. This individual, a fisherman’s son, was initiated into the pirate world through a homosexual liaison at the age of 15 by Cheng I, and rapidly rose through the pirate ranks as a capable leader. Having selected Chang Pao as partner, Ching Shi and Chang Pao quickly became lovers, and then man and wife. Ching Shi ran the pirate confederation with an iron hand, and more important, was an excellent administrator. Chang Pao, a charismatic man, always elegantly dressed in purple silk robe and black turban, was the actual commander of the pirate fleets. He provided an ideology of rebellion to stimulate the pirates, and also posed as a defender of religion, with a temple onboard his command junk, which he consulted for direction over strategy and tactics. Chang Pao was a flexible and restrained commander, and the story is told that one day a pirate named Liu, whose father had died after being captured by Chang Pao’s forces, aimed to stab Chang Pao with a poisoned knife. But Chang Pao, noticing a strange expression on Liu’s face, had him searched and disarmed, and instead of having Liu killed, explained he was not responsible for Liu’s father’s abduction, and rewarded Liu with four silver dollars for his bravery.9

  Ching Shi’s ambition, and the growth of the pirate fleet to very large proportions (the previously mentioned 1,800 boats and some 70,000 men) eventually led to dissension among the pirates. Kuo P’o Tai, the commander of the Black Fleet, who had been a colleague of Cheng I, was jealous of Chang Pao’s rise to power, and the fact that the Red fleet was bigger than his. It seems that Kuo P’o Tai was also extremely jealous of Chang Pao’s relationship with Ching Shi, since he was in love with Ching Shi himself. In addition, Kuo P’o Tai had been brooding for some time over the fickleness of fate in regard to piracy, and was contemplating surrender, if he could be pardoned. Meanwhile, during one action, he refused to come to the help of Chang Pao, which led to an all out battle between the fleets of Chang Pao and Kuo P’o Tai. As it turned out, Kuo’s fleet won, causing 1,000 casualties to Chang Pao, the capture of 321 of his men, and the loss of 16 of Chang Pao’s large junks. Because of this action, Kuo P’o Tai was able to surrender his Black fleet to the Chinese authorities in early 1810, together with key members of the Yellow fleet, while Kuo himself was given a rank in the Imperial Navy. Before long others were surrendering too, and Chang Pao and Ching Shi were forced to recognize that the world was changing. So, to demonstrate their shift to a new allegiance to the Emperor, they set out to capture or destroy the remaining Yellow, Blue and Green fleets. Ironically, Chang Pao was accompanied in this venture by his former adversary, Kuo P’o Tai. When these fleets were largely dealt with, Chang Pao was well received by the Imperial authorities, and continued his successful career, rising eventually to command an Imperial military regiment as a Lieutenant Colonel. Chang Pao achieved all this, despite having started out as an illiterate fisherman’s son. Ching Shi also surrendered and was allowed to retire gracefully, reportedly running a gambling house in Canton in her old age.10

  Before the collapse of the pirate confederation, the pirates had been unusually successful in the period 1805 to 1810, due partly to appropriate tactics and weaponry. The pirate confederation was well organised in that its attacks were usually planned beforehand using information from shore based gambling dens, secret societies, and paid informers. The pirate attacks would aim either at junks close to shore, which generally provided necessary every day commodities and food, or at the valuable la
rge ocean-going junks, which could provide considerable amounts of rice and other rich cargo. The pirates would also attack villages and government warehouses and forts ashore, which usually provided opportunity for ransom, captives for sale, and weapons from the government warehouses and forts. Normally, the pirates liked to attack through surprise or deception. One such attack took place in September 1808 when a heavily laden but well defended ocean junk was sailing from Vietnam to China. Unable to take the junk directly, the pirates took two ferries, concealed their men onboard the ferries, and then pretended to call for help from the junk. When the junk came alongside the ferries to assist, the pirates swarmed aboard while other pirate boats surrounded the junk. At other times the pirates would hide behind points of land, disguise their boats, or even swim with cutlasses over their shoulders and clamber aboard their targets.11

  In general, the Chinese pirates liked to take junks by boarding, and, like most Western pirates, tried to establish a psychological edge through an image of terror, so that their victims would surrender more easily. The pirates stimulated themselves with drinks of wine and gunpowder, which produced red faces and glowing eyes, or ate the hearts of earlier victims to gain courage, and sprinkled themselves with garlic water as a charm against becoming casualties. Personal weapons used were the cutlass and the knife, and long and short bamboo pikes. A great variety of gunpowder weapons were available, including seven feet long gingalls, or blunderbusses, various unreliable match locks, and on the larger ships, cannon. These cannon fired shot ranging from six to twenty-four pounds, but the cannon tended to be fixed and could not adjust for range or direction, so the junk had to line up the enemy before firing. Other weapons included stink pots, containing gunpowder and Chinese gin for inflammation, thrown onto the decks of the target, where they broke and ignited. As in the West, fire ships were a useful weapon when the enemy fleets were too strong to be taken in other ways. However, the aim of the pirates was to board and capture the victim junk intact, in order to take captives alive, either for ransom or simply for sale. The pirates were not above cutting off fingers and ears of their victims to speed up the ransom process. One such raid took place in October 1809 on a village in the Pearl River delta. With their bound feet, the women of the village could not escape, so the pirates easily hauled 250 women aboard ‘by their hair, and treated [them] in a most savage manner’. Protracted negotiations only led to the ransom of 100 of the women, presumably those with wealthier families. The other 150 women were sold to the pirate crew for forty dollars each. After the ransom process, profit could also come from sale of the ship’s cargo, and then the ships themselves. Then there was the salt trade, which the pirates managed to take over by about 1805 in the salt producing area of Tien-pai. Finally, there was the well organised protection racket, in which the pirates forced almost all ships to pay for passes for their safe passage.12